



UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



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THE
HISTORY OF THE WORLD.

IN FIVE BOOKS.

VIZ.

TREATING OF THE BEGINNING AND FIRST AGES
OF THE SAME FROM THE CREATION UNTO
ABRAHAM.

OF THE BIRTH OF ABRAHAM TO THE DESTRU-
TION OF THE TEMPLE OF SOLOMON.

FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF JERUSALEM TO THE
TIME OF PHILIP OF MACEDON.

FROM THE REIGN OF PHILIP OF MACEDON TO
THE ESTABLISHING OF THAT KINGDOM IN
THE RACE OF ANTIGONUS.

FROM THE SETTLED RULE OF ALEXANDER'S
SUCCESSORS IN THE EAST UNTIL THE ROMANS
(PREVAILING OVER ALL) MADE CONQUEST OF
ASIA AND MACEDON.

BY

SIR WALTER RALEGH, KNIGHT.

A NEW EDITION, REVISED AND CORRECTED.

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HISTORY OF THE WORLD

BY J. W. B. B. B.

THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD
FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE
WORLD TO THE PRESENT
TIME. BY J. W. B. B. B.

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BOOK V.

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THE
HISTORY
OF
THE WORLD,
IN FIVE BOOKS.

THE THIRD BOOK.

CHAP IV.

THE ESTATE OF THINGS FROM THE DEATH OF CYRUS
TO THE REIGN OF DARIUS.

SECT. I.

Of the number and names of the Persian kings.

OF the successors of Cyrus, and the continuance of the Persian empire, there are many opinions; as that of Metasthenes, who hath numbered the Persian kings and their times as followeth.

Darius Medus, and Cyrus, jointly	2 years.
Cyrus alone - - - -	22
Priscus Artaxerxes - - - -	20
Darius Longimanus - - - -	37
Darius Nothus - - - -	19
Artaxerxes Mnemon - - - -	55
Artaxerxes Ochus - - - -	26
Arses, or Arsames - - - -	4
Darius, the last, conquered by Alexander - - - -	6

To which Philo agreeth: which number of years added, make in all one hundred and ninety-one. But in this catalogue Metasthenes hath left out Cambyes and Xerxes, and names Artaxerxes Assuerus for the immediate successor of Cyrus, in place, (saith Melancthon,) of Darius the son of Hystaspes; for Metasthenes, as Melancthon conjectureth, doth not account Cambyes in the catalogue, because his reign was confounded with that of Cyrus.

There is a second opinion, though ridiculous, of Sedar Olam, who finds but four Persian kings from the beginning to the end of that empire.

Genebrard, Schubert, and Beroaldus, have also a differing account from the Greeks; whom nevertheless Eusebius, and most of the Latins follow; and so doth Krentzheim¹, who hath fully answered, and, as I take it, refuted all the former authors varying from that account. For in this sort do the Greeks marshal the Persian kings, with the times of their reigns.

Cyrus in all ² - - - -	30 years.
Cambyes with the Magi - - - -	8
Darius Hystaspes - - - -	36
Xerxes ³ - - - -	21
Artaxerxes Longimanus - - - -	40

¹ Chro. Kren. fol. 195, but 20.

² Melancth. gives Cyrus but 22.

³ Melancth.

Darius Nothus	-	-	-	19 years
Artaxerxes Mnemon ⁴	-	-	-	43
Artaxerxes Ochus ⁵				23
Arsames	-	-	-	3
Darius the last ⁶				6

Which numbers put together, make in all two hundred and thirty.

This account, (as I have said,) the most chronologers and the best learned approve. These Persian princes being all warranted by the authority of the scriptures, as Peucer in his *Historical Animadversions* hath gathered the places, finding first Cyrus in 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22, 23. Ezra i. 1. and often elsewhere.

Secondly, Cambyses in the eleventh of Daniel, who may indeed be well esteemed for one of those three kings in the second verse named, and so the marginal commentator upon the *Geneva* understands that place; but under correction, mistakes the matter greatly, when he saith in the same note, that Darius Hystaspes was an enemy to the people of God, and stood against them; his great favour and liberality to the Jews being elsewhere proved.

Thirdly, Darius Hystaspes is found in 1 Ezra, iv. 5., who in the 6th verse is also named Ahassuerus.

Fourthly, In the 11th of Daniel, verse the 2d, Xerxes is plainly foretold and described, and the great war which he should make against the Greeks by Daniel remembered.

Fifthly, Artaxerxes Longimanus, in Ezra, ch. iv. verse 7., who is also called Arthasasta, c. 4. v. 1. and vii. 7.

Sixthly, Darius Nothus, Ezra iv. 24. and v. 6. Nehem. xii. 22.

Seventhly, Artaxerxes Mnemon in Nehem. ii. 1. who was father to Artaxerxes Ochus, and Arsames: for Darius the last, he was of another family, the

⁴ Melanct. but 40.

⁵ Melanct. 26.

⁶ Melanct. 4.

line of Cyrus the Great ending in Ochus, who descended from Xerxes the son of Atossa, Cyrus's daughter; and the issue-male of Cyrus failing with his own sons.

But to proceed, Eusebius, with the Latins, following the Greeks, apply the beginnings and ends of every Persian king, with their acts, to some certain Olympiad: as the war of Astyages (Cyrus's maternal grandfather) and Alyattes, (Cræsus's father) to the forty-ninth Olympiad; the beginning of Cyrus's reign, to the beginning of the fifty-fifth Olympiad; the taking of Sardis by Cyrus, to the fifty-eighth Olympiad; the invasion of Egypt by Cambyses, to the third year of the sixty-third Olympiad; and so of the rest. Which reference with good agreement between several forms of computation, add the more credit unto both.

Again, this historical demonstration is confirmed by the astronomical computation of Ptolemy⁷, who refers the death of Alexander the Great, who died on the twelfth of November, in the beginning of the hundred and fortieth Olympiad, to the four hundred and twenty-fourth year after Nabonassar. And the æra of Nabonassar began on the twenty-sixth of February; which, conferred with the Olympiad, was in the ninth month of the first year of the eighth Olympiad; so that whether we follow the accounts of the Olympiads, as do the Greek historians, or that of Nabonassar with Ptolemy, we shall find every memorable accident to fall out right with each computation.

For Ptolemy reckons the time answerable to two hundred and twenty-four Julian years, and one hundred and forty days from Nabonassar to the sixteenth of July, in the seventh year of Cambyses.

The Greeks, and namely Diodorus Siculus, place the taking of Egypt by Cambyses in the second or third year of the sixty-third Olympiad, and the be-

⁷ Alm. l. 3. c. 6.

ginning of Cambyzes's seventh year, in the first of the sixty-fourth Olympiad; which first of the sixty-fourth Olympiad runs along with part of the twenty-second of Nabonassar. The like agreement is consequently found about the beginning and end of Cyrus.

Likewise the twentieth of Darius, who succeeded Cambyzes, is, according to Ptolemy, the two hundred and forty-sixth of Nabonassar, which (observing the differences of Nabonassar's æra and the Olympiad, viz. twenty-eight years) agrees with the third of the sixty-ninth Olympiad, wherein it is placed by the Greeks. In this Josephus agrees with the Greeks throughout, saving that he joineth Darius Medus, whom Xenophon calleth Cyaxares, with Cyrus, in the destruction of Babylon; which is true, and not contrary to the Greek computation, but may very well stand with it.

Lastly, The disagreements and confused accounts of those that follow the other catalogue of the Persian kings formerly rehearsed, doth give the greater credit to this of the Greeks, which being constant in itself, accordeth also with the computation of other historians and astronomers, and likewise with the holy scriptures,

SECT. II.

Of Cambyzes, and the Conquering of Egypt by him.

WE will, therefore, according to the truth, give the empire of Persia to Cambyzes, the son of Cyrus, though degenerate in all things, saving the desire to increase the greatness of his empire, whereof he was possessed in his father's time, while Cyrus made war in the north. Ctesias, with others, give him a longer reign than agreeth with the Grecian account before received.

In the fifth year of his sole reign, and in the third year of the threescore and third Olympiad, accord,

ing to Diodorus ' and Eusebius, he invaded Egypt ; and having overthrown the king thereof, Psammeniticus, he not only caused him to be slain, but also did put to death all his kindred and dependents, with the most of his children. Herodotus and Ctesias give for cause of this war, (being no other indeed than the ambition of Cambyes,) that when he sent to Amasis king of Egypt, to have his daughter in marriage, Amasis presented him with Nitetis the daughter of Apries, his predecessor, which Cambyes disdained.

Howsoever it were, true it is, that Cambyes gathered an army fit for such an enterprise, and caused the same to march. But before they entered Egypt, Amasis died, and left Psammeniticus, whom Ctesias called Amyrteus, his successor, who enjoyed Egypt after his father (according to the best copies of Herodotus) but six months, though other chronologers give him six years. But how long soever he held the crown, in one battle he lost it, and was himself taken prisoner.

It is said that Cambyes, following therein the example of Cyrus, did not only spare life to the conquered king, but that he also trusted him with the government of Egypt, and that upon some revolt, or suspicion thereof, he caused him to be slaughtered. But the race of this king was not so extirpated, if we may believe Herodotus and Thucydides, but that he left a son called Inarus, who caused the Egyptians to revolt both from Xerxes and Artaxerxes.

That Psammeniticus was at the first entreated gently by Cambyes, I hold it very improbable, if it be true which is also written of him, That he so much hated Amasis the king of Egypt, who died before his arrival, that he caused his body to be drawn out of the grave, and after divers indignities used, commanded the same to be burnt, contrary to the custom both of the Egyptians and Persians ; for

the Egyptians used to powder their dead bodies with salt, and other drugs, to the end the worms might not devour them. The Persians durst not consume them with fire², which they esteemed as a god, and therefore feared to feed it with carrion.

SECT. III.

The rest of Cambyses's acts.

AFTER this victory obtained in Egypt, Cambyses sent an army into Cyprus, and constrained Evelthon, king thereof, to acknowledge him, who before held that island of the Egyptians.

While Cambyses yet busied himself in Egypt, he so much detested the idolatry of that nation, as he caused the images themselves, with the temples wherein they were worshipped, to be torn down and defaced. This done, he directed a part of his army into Libya, to overturn the temple of Jupiter Ammon; but the devil, in defence of his oratory, raised such a tempest of sand, wherewith the greatest part of the country is covered, as the Persians were therewith choaked and overwhelmed.

Notwithstanding which misadventure, Herodotus and Seneca report, that, disdaining to be resisted, he prepared the rest of his army, which himself meant to conduct into those parts, but that finding a beginning of those incommodities, which his first-sent troops had tried, he changed his purpose. For though conquering kings have power over men, yet the elements do not obey them; according to that old English proverb: "Go, saith the king; stay, saith the tide."

After his return from the attempt of Ethiopia, he caused Apis, the Egyptian bull, worshipped by that

² Neither did the Romans ever consume their dead to ashes, till the time of Sylla dictator, who caused his own to be devoured by that element, fearing the law called *Talionis*, or like for like, because himself had untombed the carcase of Caius Marius after his death. Her. l. 3. Plin. l. 6. c. 54. Stra. and Just. l. 1. p. 97, 88. Her. l. 3. Sen l. 7.

nation as a god, to be slain : a deed very commendable, had it proceeded from true zeal, and been executed in the service of Him that only is, and liveth. But soon afterwards, when in a dream it seemed unto him that Smerdis did sit in the royal throne of Persia, (which apparition was verified in Smerdis the Magus,) he gave it in charge to his favourite Praxaspes to murder Smerdis his brother. And having married his own sisters, contrary to the Persian laws, he committed a most causeless and most detestable murder upon one of them called Meroe, then by himself with child, because she bewailed the death of her brother Smerdis. I find it written of this Cambyses¹, that because his predecessors observed religiously the ordinances of the empire, he assembled his judges and enquired of them, whether there were any law among the Persians that did permit the brother to marry his own sister, it being his own intent so to do; the judges (who had always either laws or distinctions in store to satisfy kings and times) made answer, That there was not any thing written allowing any such conjunction, but they notwithstanding found it in their customs, that it was always left to the will of the Persian kings to do what best pleased themselves; and so, as Nauclerus terms it, *invenerunt occasionem*; that is as much as to say, the judges found a shift to please the king, and to secure themselves. And yet, where it concerned not the king's private satisfaction, he caused Sisamnes, one of his judges, and perchance one of those which favoured his incestuous match, to be flayed alive, for an unjust judgment given, and his hide to be hung up over the judgment-seat. After which, bestowing the father's office on his son, he willed him to remember that the same partiality deserved the same punishment.

Among other his cruelties, that which he exercised against the son of his beloved Praxaspes, was very

strange and ungrateful. For when he desired to be truly informed by him what the Persians thought of his conditions, Praxaspes answered, that his virtues were followed with abundant praise from all men; only it was by many observed, that he took more than usual delight in the taste of wine: with which taxation inflamed, he used this replication, ‘ And are
‘ the Persians double-tongued, who also tell me
‘ that I have in all things excelled my father Cyrus?
‘ Thou, Praxaspes, shalt then witness, whether in
‘ this report they have done me right; for if at the
‘ first shot I pierce thy son’s heart with an arrow,
‘ then is it false that hath been spoken; but if I miss
‘ the mark, I am then pleased that the same be ac-
‘ counted true, and my subjects believed.’ This being spoken, he immediately directed an arrow towards the innocent child, who falling down dead with the stroke, Cambyses commanded his body to be opened, and his heart being broached on the arrow, this monstrous tyrant greatly rejoiced, shewed it to the father, with this saying, instead of an epitaph, ‘ Now, Praxaspes, thou mayst resolve thyself,
‘ that I have not lost my wits with wine, but the
‘ Persians theirs, who make such report.’

Many other barbarous cruelties he exercised, till at the last, according to the phrase of our law, he became *felo de se*; for when he was informed, that Patizites, and Smerdis the Magus, (Cedrenus writeth them Sphendanis and Cimerdus,) ministers of his domestic affairs, taking advantage of the great resemblance between Smerdis the king’s brother and Smerdis the Magus, possessed themselves of the empire, he made all haste towards Persia; and in mounting hastily on horseback, his sword dis-sheathing, pierced his own thigh, wherewith, deadly wounded, falling into an over-late and remediless repentance of the slaughter which he had executed upon his own brother, he soon after gave up his wicked ghost, when he had reigned eight years, accounting there-

in those seven months in which the Magi governed while he was absent.

In Cambyzes the male-line of Cyrus failed, for he had no issue either by Atossa or Meroe: yet Zonaras ⁴, out of Jerome, gives him a daughter called Pantaptes, and a son called Orontes; who being drowned in the river Ophites by Antioch, the same was afterwards, in memory of the prince's death, called Orontes.

He built the city of Babylon in Egypt, in the place where Latopolis was formerly seated, and that of Meroe in the island of Nilus, calling it by the name of his sister Meroe.

SECT. IV.

Of the interregnum between Cambyzes and Darius.

CYRUS and his two sons being now dead, and the kingdom in the possession of one of the Magi, the counterfeit of Smerdis, the princes, or satrapas, or provincial governors of the empire, (to wit, Otanes, Intaphernes, Gobrias, Megabysus, Asphatines, Hidarnes, and Darius, who were all descended from Achæmenes, the first Persian king,) having discovered the fraud of this imposture, joined their forces together, surprised and rooted out the conspirator, with his companions and assistants. In which action, (saith Justin,) Intaphernes and Asphatines were slain; but Herodotus otherwise, that they were only wounded; for he avoweth, that all the seven princes were present at the election following. For the empire being now without a governor, these princes grew into consultation how the same might be ordered from thenceforth. Otanes, (one of the seven,) did not fancy any election of kings, but that the nobility and cities should confederate, and by just laws defend their liberty in equality; giving divers reasons for his opinion, being, as it seemed, great.

⁴ Zon. Com. ii. p. 117.

ly terrified by the cruelties of Cambyzes : as, first, that it was not safe to give all power to any one, seeing greatness itself, even in good men, doth often infect the mind with many vices ; and that liberty and freedom in all things is most apt to insult and to commit all manner of wicked outrage. Again, that tyrants do commonly use the service of wicked men, and favour them most ; they usurp upon the laws of their country ; take other men's wives by force, and destroy whom they please without judgment.

Megabyses was of another opinion ; affirming, that the tyranny of a multitude was thrice more intolerable than that of one ; for the multitude do all things without judgment, run into business and affairs with precipitation, like raging and overbearing floods. He therefore thought it safest to make election of a few, and those of the best, wisest, and most virtuous, because it is ever found that excellent counsels are ever had from excellent men.

Darius gave the third judgment, who persuaded the creation of a king ; because, even among few, diuturnity of concord is seldom found, and in great empires it doth ever happen, that the discord of many rulers hath enforced the election of one supreme. It were therefore, saith Darius, far safer to observe the laws of our country, by which kingly government hath been ordained.

The other four princes adhered to Darius, and agreed to continue the same imperial government by God established, and made prosperous ; and, to avoid partiality, it was accorded, that the morning following these seven princes should mount on horseback, and on him the kingdom should be conferred, whose horse, after the sun-rising, should first neigh or bray. In the evening², after this appointment was made, it is said, that Darius consulted with the master of his horse Oebarus, who, in the suburbs of

² Her. iii. p. 100, 101.

the city where the election was resolved of, caused the same horse, whereon in the morning Darius was mounted, to cover a mare, who, as soon as he came into the same place, was the first horse that brayed : whereupon the other six princes descended from their horses, and acknowledged Darius for their lord and king.

Plato, in the third of his laws, affirmeth, that in memory of the seven princes, whereof Darius himself was one that delivered the empire from the usurpation of the Magi, he divided the whole into seven governments; Herodotus saith into twenty satrapies.

CHAP. V.

OF DARIUS, THE SON OF HYSTASPES.

SECT. I.

Of Darius's lineage.

DARIUS was descended of the ancient Persian kings, to wit, of the Achæmenidæ, of which Cyrus the Great was the lineal successor, ; for in this sort Herodotus deriveth him as before :

Cyrus the first, who had
 Theispius, who begat
 Ariaramnes, who was father of
 Arsamnes, the father of
 Hystaspes, the father of
 Darius, surnamed Celus, the father of Xerxes.

Hystaspes accompanied Cyrus the Great in the wars against the Scythians¹; at which time, Cyrus, being made jealous of Darius by a dream of his own, caused him to be sent into Persia; others say, to be imprisoned; from whence, by the death of Cyrus, he was delivered, and made governor of the Persian Magi. He afterwards followed Cambyzes into Egypt; he then joined with the rest of the princes against the Magi; and either by the neighing of his horse², or, as others affirm, by strong hand, he obtained the empire, which he the more assured to himself by taking two of Cyrus's daughters, and as many of his nieces, for his wives.

Hystaspes, according to Herodotus³, had, besides Darius, these three sons, who were great commanders in the war which Darius made in Asia the Less, Thrace, Macedon, and Greece,—Atarnes, Artaphernes, and Artabanus, who dissuaded Xerxes from the second Grecian war. Hystaspes had also a daughter married to Gobrias, the father of Mardonius, who commanded the army of Darius in Macedon, and married the daughter of Darius, Artosostre, his cousin-german.

Reineccius gives to Hystaspes five sons; Darius, who succeeded Cambyzes, Artabanus, Artaphernes, Otanes, and Atarnes, with two daughters.

SECT. II.

Of Darius's government, and suppressing the rebellion of Babylon.

DARIUS devised equal laws whereby his subjects might be governed, the same being formerly promised by Cyrus. He gave access to all his subjects, and behaved himself so mildly to all men, that many nations desired and offered themselves to become his

¹ Curt. l. iv. ² Her. l. i. 3. ³ Herodot. p. 154, p. 130, p. 101, and 202, p. 108, 109. Her. l. vi. p. 180, p. 186, 190, p. 179, p. 200, 204, and 213, 265, 286, p. 214, 254. De Reg. Persar. fol. 22.

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any other way, then not without great difficulty; but the same was resisted by Histiaëus prince of Milet, a city of Ionia; which nation, being a colony of the Greeks, Diodorus calleth traitors to their country², because they joined themselves to Darius. But the Scythians, more elegantly, termed them good slaves; forasmuch as they would not run away from their master, but were more mindful of doing their duties than of shaking off their bondage, when they were presented with as fair an occasion of liberty as could have been desired: for the great army of Darius entering the desert country called Bessarabia, found in it neither people to resist them, nor any sustenance to relieve them; for the Scythians were then, as are the Crim Tartars, their posterity, at this day, all horsemen, using the bow and sword. They were not ploughmen, but graziers, driving their herds from one place to another, as opportunity of pasture led them. Standing towns they had none, but used for houses the waggons, wherein they carried their wives and children. These waggons they place at every station in very good order, making streets and lanes in the manner of a great town, removable at their pleasure. Neither hath the emperor himself, called now the Great Cham, any other city than such as Agora, (as they name it,) or town of carts. When as therefore Darius had wearied himself, and wasted his provision in those desolate regions, wherein he found neither ways to direct him, victuals to refresh him, nor any houses, fruitful trees, or living creatures, nor any thing at all, which either he himself might make use of, or by destroying it might grieve his enemies, he began to perceive his own folly, and the danger into which he had brought himself. Yet, setting a good face upon a bad game, he sent brave messages to the Scythian, bidding him to cease his flight, and either to make trial of his valour and fortune in plain battle, or, if he acknowledged himself

the weaker, then to yield by fair means, and become his subject, giving him earth and water, which the Persians used to demand as a sign that all was yielded unto them. To this challenge the Scythian returned an hieroglyphical answer; sending a bird, a frog, a mouse, and five arrows: which dumb shew Darius interpreting by his own wish, thought that he did yield all the elements wherein those creatures live, and his weapons withal, into his hands; but Gobryas, one of the seven princes who had slain the Magi, construed their meaning aright, which was thus: ‘O ye Persians, get ye wings like birds, or
‘dive under the water, or creep into holes in the
‘earth, for else ye shall not escape our arrows!’ And this interpretation was soon verified by the Scythians themselves, who assailed the Persian camp, drove the horsemen into the trenches, and vexed the army with continual alarms day and night; were so fearless of this great monarch, and so little regarded him, that, within his hearing, and even in his sight, they did not forbear the pastime of coursing a hare, which they had started by chance. By this boldness of theirs, Darius was so discouraged, that he forsook his camp by night, making many fires, and leaving all that were sick and weak behind him, and so with all speed marched away towards the river Ister. He was pursued hardly by the Scythians, who missed him; yet arriving at the bridge before him, persuaded the Ionians to depart, assuring them, that the Persian king should never more be able to do them either good or harm. Which words had certainly been proved true, had not Histiaëus, the Milesian, prevailed with his people to attend the coming of Darius, whom the Scythians did likewise fail to meet when they returned from Ister to seek him out.

SECT. V.

Some actions of the Persians in Europe, after the Scythian war.

DARIUS having thus escaped out of Scythia, determined the invasion of Thrace and Macedon; in which war he employed Megabyzus, who mastered the Peonians, and transplanted them, and possessed Perinthus, Chalcedon, Byzantium; other places being also soon after subjected and added to the Persian empire by Otanes, the son of Sysamnes, whom Cambyses had excoriated for false judgment.¹ So were the cities of Selymbria² and Cardia³ likewise taken in for the Persian, who having now reduced under his obeisance the best part of Thrace, did send his ambassadors to Amyntas king of Macedon adjoining, demanding of him by the earth and water the sovereignty over that kingdom. Amyntas doubting his own strength, entertained the ambassadors with gentle words, and afterwards inviting them to a solemn and magnificent feast, the Persians greatly desired that the Macedonian ladies might be present; which being granted, the ambassadors, who were well filled with wine, and presumed upon their greatness and many victories, began to use such embracings and other lascivious behaviour towards those noble ladies, as Alexander, the king's son, great-grandfather to Alexander the Great, disdaining the Persians' barbarous presumption, besought his father to withdraw himself from the assembly, continuing, notwithstanding, all honourable respect towards the ambassadors, whom withal he entreated that the ladies might refresh themselves for a while, promising their speedy return. This being obtained, Alexander caused the like number of well-favoured young men to clothe themselves in the same garments,

¹ Her. l. v.
 ople.

² A maritime city of Thrace to the south of Constantinople.
³ Cardia, a city upon the Chersonesus of Thrace, afterwards Lysimachia. Pto. Paus.

and to use the same attires which the ladies had worn at the feast; giving them in charge, that when the Persians offered to abuse them, they should forthwith transpierce them with their long knives, of which they were provided for that purpose, which was accordingly performed. Charge was soon after given by Darius for a severe revenge of this murder; but Alexander, somewhat before the death of Amyntas, gave his sister Gygea in marriage to Bubaris, a principal commander of Darius's forces on that side, who persuading her husband how helpful the alliance of Macedon would prove for the invasion of Attica intended, so prevailed, as Alexander escaped that tempest, which threatened to fall upon him very suddenly; the war of Asia the Less, called Ionic, falling out at the same time.

SECT. VI.

The first occasion of the war which Darius made upon Greece, with a rehearsal of the government in Athens, whence the quarrel grew.

Now, the better to understand the reason and motives of that great war which followed soon after, between the Persians and Grecians, it is necessary to make a short repetition of the state of Athens, which city endured the hardest and worst brunt of Darius's invasion on that side the sea, with admirable success. Neither do I hold it any impertinence to be large in unfolding every circumstance of so great a business as gave fire to those wars which could never be thoroughly quenched, until, in the ruin of this great Persian monarchy, Persepolis, the capital city of the empire, was, at the request of an Athenian harlot, consumed with a flame as dreadful as, in the pride of their greatness, the Persians had raised in Athens.

Now therefore, as out of the former books it may be gathered how Athens, and other parts of Greece, were anciently governed,—the same being already set

down, though scatteringly, and in several times, among other the contemporary occurrences of the eastern emperors, and the kings of Judæa; so I thought it very pertinent in this place to remember again the two last changes in the state of Athens. As for the Lacedæmonians, they maintained still their ancient policy under kings, though these also, after some fifteen descents, were bridled by the ephori.

Codrus, king of the Athenians, in the former books remembered, who willingly died for the safety of his people, was therefore so honoured by them, as, (thinking none worthy to succeed him,) they changed their former government from monarchical to princes for term of life, of which Medon, the son of Codrus, was the first, after whom they were called Medontidæ; and of these there were twelve generations, besides Medon: to wit,

Agestus,

Archippus, in whose times the Greeks transported themselves into Ionia, after Troy an hundred and fourscore years, according to Eusebius; which migration all other chronologers, (such as follow Eusebius herein excepted,) find in the year after Troy fallen one hundred and forty.

Thersippas,

Phorbas,

Mezades,

Diogenetus, in whose time Lycurgus gave laws to the Spartans.

Pheredus,

Ariphron,

Theispius, in whose time the Assyrian empire was overthrown by Belochus and Arbaces.

Agamnestor,

Æschylus, in whose time the ephori, (according to Eusebius¹,) were erected in Lacedæmon.

Alcamenon, the last prince for life, after whose

¹ Paus. p. 159. Dionys. l. iii. Paus. p. 169, 170, and 331.

death the Athenians elected decennial governors; the former princes for life having continued in all three hundred and sixteen years. The first of those that governed for ten years, or the first archon, was

Charops, then

Esymedes,

Elydicus,

Hippomenes,

Leocrates,

Absander,

Erixias was the last archon of the decennial governors, which, after continuing threescore and ten years, was then changed into annual magistrates, mayors, and burgomasters, of which Theseus was the first, according to Pausanias; others find Leostratus, and then

Anthostenes,

Achimedes,

Miltiades,

Damisias,

Draco,

Megacles,

Solon, and others, who are the less to be regarded, by reason of the yearly change.

This Solon being a man of excellent wisdom, gave laws to the Athenians, which were published, according to Gellius, in the three and thirtieth year of Tarquinius Priscus, and were in after-ages derived unto the Romans, and by the Decemviri (magistrates in Rome created for that purpose) reduced into twelve tables, which were the ground of the Roman laws. But these good ordinances of Solon were in his own days violated, and for a while almost quite extinguished. For whereas they were framed unto the practice and maintenance of a popular government, the state of Athens was very soon changed into a monarchy by Pisistratus the son of Hippocrates; who finding the citizens distracted into two factions,

whereof Megacles and Lycurgus, two citizens of noble families, were become the heads, took occasion by their contention and insolency to raise a third faction more powerful than the other two, and more plausible, for that he seemed a protector of the citizens in general. Having by this means obtained love and credit, he wounded himself, and feigned that, by malice of his enemies, he had like to have been slain for his love to the good citizens; he procured a guard for his defence, and with that band of men surprising the state-house, or citadel of Athens, he made himself lord of the town, Hegesistratus being then governor. But the citizens, who in every change of government had sought to remove themselves further and further from the form of a monarchy, could so ill brook this usurpation of Pisistratus, that he was driven, for lack of help, to fly the town, as soon as Megacles and Lycurgus (joining their forces) attempted his expulsion. Yet, as the building of his tyranny, founded upon the dissention of the citizens, was ruined by their good agreement; so was it soon after well re-edified by the new breaking out of the old factions. For when Megacles found the power of Lycurgus to grow greater than his own, he did, (as is the usual practice of the weaker side,) call in the common enemy Pisistratus, to whom he gave his daughter in marriage; by which alliance the family of the Alcmaeonidæ, whereof Megacles was chief, became very powerful, yet so that Pisistratus by their power was made master both of them and all the rest.

But this agreement held not long; the Alcmaeonidæ, and especially Megacles, being incensed against Pisistratus for his misdemeanor towards his wife. Wherefore they practised with the soldiers of the town, proceeding in their treason so secretly, and so far, that Pisistratus (upon the first discovery of their intent) perceived no other remedy for his affairs, than to withdraw himself

to Eretria², where he remained eleven years. Which time being expired, having hired soldiers out of many parts of Greece, he again recovered the principality of Athens, after which third obtaining his estate, he governed Athens seventeen years, according to Aristotle, and reigned in all thirty and three years, saith Elianus, but as Justin hath it, four and thirty; accounting the time belike as well before as after his several expulsions. Herodotus gives the father and the son six and thirty years; Aristotle five and thirty. But Thucydides affirmeth, that he died very old, leaving for his successors his two sons, Hippias and Hipparchus, who governed the Athenians with such moderation, as they rather seemed the lineal successors of a natural prince than of a tyrant. But in the end, and some three years before Hippias was expelled out of Athens, his brother Hipparchus was murdered by Harmodius and Aristogiton. The cause why, and the manner how performed, Thucydides hath written at large. And, though Hipparchus was charged with unnatural lust after Harmodius, yet Plato in his Dialogue entitled *Hipparchus*, doth greatly magnify him, affirming that he was a prince of as many eminent virtues as that age had, and altogether condemning the murderers, and authors of that scandal. Hippias fearing that this enterprise upon his brother had more and deeper roots than were apparent, first sought to discover the further intents of Harmodius and Aristogiton, by a harlot of theirs called Lemnia; who because she would not reveal her companions, did cut out her own tongue. Then did Hippias, the better to strengthen himself, enter into a strait amity with Æantides, tyrant of the city Lampsacus³, whom he knew to be greatly favoured by Da-

2 Her. l. xii. Eretria a city of Eubœa, by others called Melane, by Stephanus Erotia. Pol. 5. Heraclid. apud Elian. pag. 262. Just. p. 28. Her. l. vi. Thucyd. l. vi. c. 10. 3 Lampsacus, a city of Mysia, upon the Hellespont. Her. l. v. Thucyd. l. vi. c. 1.

rius, to whose son Hypoclus, he gave one of his daughters in marriage. But some three years after the death of his brother, doubting I know not what strong practice against himself, he began to use the citizens with great severity, which neither Pisistratus the father, nor Hippias himself, had ever exercised, during their usurpation, till this time. And therefore the Athenians, fearing that this disease might rather increase than diminish in Hippias, they stirred up Clistines, one of the noblest and best able of their city, to practise their delivery; who, calling to his assistance the banished Alcmaeonidæ, together with an army of the Lacedæmonians, led by Cleomenes their king, so affrighted Hippias, as by composition he gave over his estate, and the possession of Athens; and from thence embarking himself, took land at Sigeum⁴, whence he went to Lampsacus in Mysia, governed by Æantides, who presented him to Darius. He was deprived of his estate, as Herodotus and Thucydides agree, twenty years before the battle of Marathon; all which time he continued, partly with Æantides, at other times with Artaphernes, lieutenant for Darius in Sardis, the metropolis of Lydia; persuading and practising the enterprise upon Athens, which Darius in the end, to his great dishonour, undertook, twenty years after Hippias had resigned his estate.

Thus far I have digressed from Darius, to the end the reader may conceive the better the causes and motives of this war; whereof the hope that Hippias had to be restored to Athens by the help of Darius, which made him solicit and persuade the Persians to conquer Greece, was one, but not the most urgent.

⁴ Sigeum, a promontory opposite to the Isle of Tenedos, which Aristot. in 5. Animal. calls Idæ promontorium.

SECT. VII.

Of the Ionian rebellion, which was the principal cause of the wars ensuing between Greece and Persia.

ANOTHER, and a strong motive to this expedition, was the Ionic war, breaking out in Asia, about the same time. The colonies transported out of Greece into Asia, which occupied the greatest part of the sea coast, having enjoyed their liberty about five hundred years, even from the Ionic migration, to the time of Cræsus, were by this Lydian king made tributaries, and afterwards, as parcel of his dominions, were taken in by Cyrus, and left as hereditary servants to the crown of Persia. But as it is the custom of nations half conquered, (witness Ireland,) to rebel again upon every advantage and opportunity; so did the Ionians, and other Grecians, both in Cyrus's life, and after him, seek by all means possible to free themselves.

At this time they found such men ready to spur them into rebellion, as had by the Persian been given unto them for bridles to hold them in subjection. Every one of those towns had a lord to rule it, whom they (abhorring the government of one man) called their tyrants. These lords were very true to the Persian, by whose might only they held the people in subjection, and this their dutiful affection they had well declared, when Darius, being in great extremity, they used all means to deliver him and his army (that otherwise had been lost) out of the Scythian's hand. Of this great piece of service, Histiaëus, the tyrant of Miletus expected the chief thanks, as having been chief author of their expecting Darius, when the rest, either persuaded by the Scythians, or carried away with their own desires, were ready to have abandoned him. But it came so to pass, that Darius being more fearful of the harm that Histiaëus (being powerful and crafty) might do

to him in the future, than mindful of the good which he had already received at his hand, found means to carry him along to Susa, where he detained him with all kind usage of a friend, yet kept such good espial upon him, as an enemy, he could not start away. Histæus had subtilty enough to discover the king's purpose, which ill agreed with his own desires. For he thought it more pleasant and more honourable, to rule as a prince in one fair city, having a small territory, than to sit and feast at the great king's table, and hear the counsels by which a large empire was managed ; being himself an idle beholder, and enjoying, with much restraint of liberty, none other pleasures than a private man might bestow upon himself.

Wherefore he bethought himself of raising of some tumults in the lower Asia, to pacify which if he might be sent, as one that had great experience and authority in those quarters, it would afterwards be in his power to stay at home, and either satisfy the king with excuses, or deal as occasion should require. Resolving upon this course, he sent very secret instructions to Aristagoras his kinsman whom he had left his deputy at Miletus, advising him to stir up some rebellion. These directions came seasonably to Aristagoras, who having failed in an enterprise upon the isle of Naxos, through the false dealing of a Persian his associate, stood in fear of disgrace, if not of some further ill that might befall him, as one that had wasted the king's treasures to no good purpose.

Therefore he readily embraced the counsel : and the better to draw the whole country of Ionia into the same course which he determined to run, he abandoned his tyranny, and set Miletus at liberty. This plausible beginning won unto him the hearts of the Milesians ; and his proceeding with other Ionian tyrants, (of whom, some he took, and sold as slaves to their citizens, others he chased away,) caused the

whole nation to be at his command. The Persian fleet, whereof he lately had been admiral, in the enterprise of Naxos, he had surprised in his first breaking out, together with the principal officers and captains; so that now he thought himself able to deal with the great king's forces lying thereabout, either by land or sea. But likely it was that the power of all Asia would shortly be upon his neck, and crush both him and his assistants to pieces unless he were able to raise an army that might hold the field, which the Ionians alone were insufficient to perform. Therefore he took a journey to Sparta, where having essayed in vain with many arguments, and the offer of fifty talents, to win to his party Cleomenes, king of the Lacedæmonians, he went from thence to Athens, and with better success besought the people to lend him their assistance. The Athenian ambassadors, which had been sent to the Persian king's lieutenants in the lower Asia, desiring them not to give countenance to Hippias, now a banished man, and lately their tyrant, were a while before this returned with ill answers, having found very churlish entertainment. So that the evil which they were to expect in all likelihood from the Persian, made them willing to begin with him. To which purpose their consanguinity with the Ionians, and the persuasions of Aristagoras, drew them on apace, if perhaps his treasure were not helping. Twenty ships the Athenians furnished for this voyage; to which the Eretrians furnished five more, in regard of the ancient kindness that had passed between the Ionians and them.

With these and their own forces joined, the Ionians entered the river Caistrus, which falleth into the sea by Ephesus: by which advantage they surprised Sardis, when no enemy was heard of, or suspected; insomuch as Artaphernes, who ruled as viceroy in those parts, had no other hope of safety, than by retreating into the castle, which

the Grecians could not force ; from whence he beheld the slaughter of the citizens, and the city flaming. The Persians at length, mixed with the burghers, began to encourage them to defence, and recovered the market-place, strengthened by the river Pactolus, which ran through it; and borrowing courage from desperation, they both defended themselves, and charged their enemies; who well advising themselves, made all the haste they could towards the sea-side. But Artaphernes, having gathered all the strength he could, pursued the Grecians, and found them near Ephesus; where setting resolvedly upon them, he slaughtered a great part of their army, the rest saving themselves in Ephesus. In this fight Evalcides, captain of the Eretrians, perished: but his fame and memory was by that excellent poet Simonides preserved. After this overthrow, the Athenians, which were before sent unto Aristagoras, and to the Ionians, could by no arguments of theirs, no not by their tears, be persuaded to make any second trial of their fortunes on that side of the sea.

Yet the burning of Sardis made a greater noise in the world, than the late good success, which the Persians had in one or two skirmishes, could raise. Wherefore the Ionians bravely proceeding, won a great part of Caria; and sending their fleet into the Hellespont, got Byzantium and other towns into their hands. Yea, the Cyprians, lately subdued by Cambyses, began hereupon to take heart; and entering into confederacy with the Ionians, who were able to give them aid by sea, rebelled against the Persians.

These news coming to the ear of Darius, filled him with great indignation, and with an extreme hatred of the Athenians, upon whom he vowed to take sharp revenge. As for the Ionians, his contempt of them, and their knowledge of his power, made him to think, that they would not have dared to attempt such things, but by the instigation of those to whom the ignorance of his great might had af-

forded the courage to provoke him. This was the main ground of the war commenced by Darius, and pursued by Xerxes, against Athens; to which the solicitation of Hippias, before remembered, gave only some form and assistance; the business, when once it was thus far on foot, being like enough to have proceeded, though he had perished ere it were advanced any further.

Some other occurrences in this Ionian commotion extended the quarrel of Darius against many of the islanders, if not against the whole nation of the Greeks; for all of them gave to his rebels free harbour: the islanders moreover did help to furnish out a navy of three hundred and sixty sail against him. These provocations did rather breed in him a desire to abate their pride, than any fear of harm that they were like to do him. For what they had done at Sardis was but by surprise. In every fight they were beaten by the Persians, who had not yet lost the fruits of their discipline wherein Cyrus had trained them, nor all their ancient captains. In one sea-fight by the isle of Cyprus, the Ionians indeed had the upper hand, but they were Phœnicians, Egyptians, and Cilicians, whom they vanquished; neither was that victory of any use to them, the Cyprians, in whose aid they came, being utterly beaten by the Persian army at land, and reduced into their old subjection. So had the Persians likewise, by open war and fair force, overthrown the Carians in two battles, and reclaimed that nation; as also they had recovered the towns upon Hellespont, with some Æolian and Ionian cities, when Aristagoras with his friends quitting Miletus, fled into Thrace, desirous to seat himself in Amphipolis, a colony of the Athenians. But the Edonians, on whose territory belike he landed, overthrew him, and cut his troops in pieces.

About the same time Histiaëus, the first mover of this insurrection, came down into those quarters; who having undertaken the performance of great

matters to Darius, was glad to flee from his lieutenants, by whom his double dealing was detected. But this evasion preserved him not long. For after many vain attempts that he made, he was taken in fight by the Persians, and hastily beheaded, lest the king should pardon him, upon remembrance of old good turns; as it seems that he would have done, by the burial which he commanded to be given to his dead body that was crucified, and by his heavy taking of his death.

Histiæus had sought to put himself into Miletus; but the citizens, doubting his conditions, chose rather to keep him out, and make shift for themselves, without his help. The strength of their city by land, which had in old time withstood the Lydian kings, and their good fleet, which promised unto them the liberty of an open sea, emboldened them to try the uttermost, when very few friends were left upon that continent to take their part. But their navy was broken as much by threatnings as by force; many of their companions and fellow-rebels forsaking them upon hope of pardon, and many being daunted with the causeless flight of those that should have assisted them. Neither was it long before the town itself, being assaulted both by land and sea, was taken by force, the citizens slain, their wives and children made slaves, and their goods a booty to the Persians, whom for six years space they had put to so much trouble.

SECT. VIII.

The war which Darius made upon Greece, with the battle of Marathon, and Darius's death.

THIS war with good success finished by the Persians, and some attempts made on Europe's side, with variable success; Darius, obstinate in the enterprise and conquest of Greece (though at first he pretended to make the war but against the Athenians and Eretri-

ans, who jointly assisted the Ionians against him, and burnt Sardis in Lydia,) did now by his ambassadors demand an acknowledgement from them all : among whom, some of them, not so well resolved as the rest, submitted themselves; as the *Æginetæ*¹, and others. Against these the Athenians being inflamed, (by the assistance of the Lacedæmonians) after divers encounters forced them to give pledges, and to relinquish the party of the Persians. Cleomenes led the Lacedæmonians in this war, and caused his companion King Demantus to be deposed; who thereupon fled to Darius, far the more confident of victory, by reason of these discords, alienations, and civil wars among the Greeks. He therefore gave order to Hippagoras to prepare a fleet of ships, fit to transport his army over the Hellespont, the same consisting of an hundred thousand foot, and ten thousand horse. The charge in chief of his army he committed to Datis, accompanied and assisted by Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, expelled out of Athens twenty years before, and by Artaphernes his brother, governor of Sardis, and the sea-coast of Asia the Less. These commanders having their companies brought down to the sea-side, embarked themselves in six hundred gallies and other vessels; and first of all attempted the islands, called Cyclades, which lay in the midway between Asia the Less and Greece. For, (obtaining those places,) the Persians had then nothing to hinder the transportation of their forces over the *Ægean* sea; but on the contrary, they might always both relieve themselves in their passage, and shroud themselves from all sudden tempests and outrage.

To this end, they first possessed themselves of Samos; secondly, they attempted Naxos; which island the inhabitants, despairing of their own forces, aban-

¹ Herod. l. 6. Whether this city or people were of Peloponnesus in Sicyonia, or of *Ægæa* between Thessalia and Macedon, I do not know; but those borders, and next the enemy, were more likely to compound than the rest far off. There is also a city called *Æginum*, not far from *Ægæa*, Liv. 32, 33, &c.

done. So did the people of Delos, of which Apollo was native : which island Darius did not only forbear to sack, but recalling the inhabitants, he gave order to beautify the places and altars of sacrifice to Apollo erected. And having recovered these and other islands, the Persians directed their course for Eretria in Eubœa ; for that city (as already hath been shewed²) had assisted the Ionians at the taking and firing of Sardis. In this island the Persians took ground, and besieged Eretria very straitly ; and after six days assault, partly by force, and in part by the treason of Euphabus and Philagius, they took it, sacked it, and burnt it to the ground. Thus far the winds of prosperous fortune filled their sails. From Eubœa the Persians passed their army into Attica, conducted and guided by Hippias, late prince of Athens ; and marching towards it, they encamped at Marathon, in the way from the sea where they landed towards Athens.

The Athenians, finding the time arrived wherein they were to dispute with their own virtues against fortune, and to cast lots for their liberty, for their wives, their children, and their lives, put themselves in the best order they could to make resistance ; and withal sent away with speed to the Lacedæmonians for succour ; employing in that negotiation one Phidippides, who passing through Arcadia, encountered in the way a familiar devil, which he supposed to be Pan, who willed him to assure the Athenians of victory, promising that some one of the gods should be present at the battle, to assist them and defend them against the multitude of their enemies. Phidippides at his return, seeing he could not bring with him any present succours from Sparta, yet he thought it greatly availing to bring news from the gods, and promise of assistance from heaven ; which no doubt, though the device was somewhat likely to be his own, yet it greatly encouraged the multitude and common people,

who in all ages have been more stirred up with fond prophecies, and other like superstitious fooleries, than by any just cause or solid reason.

The Athenians being now left to themselves, with one thousand only of the Plataëans, (who having been formerly defended by the Athenians against the Thebans, did in this extremity witness their thankfulness and grateful disposition,) began to dispute, whether it were most for their advantage to defend the walls of Athens, or to put themselves into the field with such forces as they had, the same consisting of ten thousand Athenians, and one thousand of the Plataëans. In the end, and after great diversity of opinions, Miltiades, who persuaded the trial by battle, prevailed.

The armies being now in view, and within a mile of each other, the Athenians disposed themselves into three troops; two wings or horns, as they term them, and the body of a battle. The Persians, when they perceived so small a troop advancing towards them, thought the Athenians rather dispossessed of their understandings, than possessed with the resolution whereof they made shew. So invincible and resistless the Persians esteemed their own numbers to be, and that small troop of their enemies, then in view, rather to be despised than to be fought withal. But in conclusion, the victory being doubtfully balanced for a while,—sometimes the virtue of the Grecians, and sometimes the number of the Persians prevailing, the Grecians fighting for all that they had, the Persians for that they needed not,—these great forces of Darius were disordered, and put to rout, the Athenians following their victory even to the sea-shore; where the Persians, so many of them as lost not their wits with their courage, saved themselves in their ships.

The Persian army consisted of an hundred thousand foot, and ten thousand horse; of which there were slain in the place six thousand three hundred,

and of the Grecians an hundred fourscore and twelve. For howsoever it came to pass,—either by strange visions, which were afterwards called *Panici terrores*, or by some other affright,—it seemeth that the invading army, after the first encounter, fought with their backs towards their enemy, and lost that number, by Herodotus set down, in their disorderly retreat, or rather in their flat running away. As for Justin's report, that two hundred thousand of the Persian army were slain, the same hath no appearance nor possibility of truth. In this fight Hippias, the persuader of the enterprise, was slain, saith Justin, and Cicero; but Suidas³ tells, that he escaped, and died most miserably in Lemnos.

The greatest honour of this victory was cast upon Miltiades, who both persuaded the trial by battle, and behaved himself therein answerably to the counsel which he gave. Themistocles had his first reputation in this fight, being but young and of the first beard. Those of the Grecians, of mark and commandment, that fell in the first encounter, were Callimachus and Stesileus. It is also said, that Cynæigrus following the Persians to their embarking, laid hands on one of their gallies, to have held it from putting off the shore; and having his right hand cut off, he yet offered to arrest it with his left; of which also being deprived, he took hold of it with his teeth. This encounter happened in the first year of the threescore and twelfth Olympiad, about the time of the war made by Coriolanus against his fellow Romans; Alexander, the son of Amyntas, being then king of Macedon, and Phanippus then governor of Athens, according to Plutarch⁴, or Hybilides, after Halicarnasseus.

This great fray thus parted, and the Persians returned back into the Lesser Asia, Miltiades sought and obtained an employment against the islanders of Paros, one of the Cyclades; and passing over his com-

³ Ad Att.

⁴ In vita Arist.

panies in threescore and ten gallies, after six and twenty days assault, he broke his thigh, in seeking to enter it by the temple of Ceres ; wherewith himself being made unable, and his companies discouraged, he returned to Athens ; where those ungrateful citizens, forgetting all his services past, and that of all other the most renowned at the battle of Marathon, did, by the persuasion of Xantippus, the father of Pericles, (who envied his fame,) cast him into prison, and set on him a fine of fifty talents ; where his weak and wounded body being not able to endure the one, nor his estate to pay the other, he, after a few days, ended his life. Which envy of the better sort to each other, with their private factions, assisted by the unthankful and witless people, brought them, not many years after, from a victorious and famous nation, to base subjection and slavery. Miltiades left behind him one son called Cimon, begotten on Hegisipyle, daughter of Olorus king of Thrace, who, (saith Plutarch,) was neither inferior to his father in valour, nor to Themistocles in understanding, but exceeded them both in justice and good government.

Now, Darius taking greater care how to recover his honour, than sorrow for the loss he received in Greece, gave order for new levies of men, and all other warlike provisions ; but the Egyptians revolting from his obedience, (a kingdom of great strength and revenue,) greatly distracted his resolution for the re-invasion of Greece. The dissension also among his sons, of whom the younger, being born after he was king, and by so great a mother as Atossa, disdained to give place unto his elder brother, born before Darius obtained the empire, greatly vexed him ; and, lastly, death, who hath no respect of any man's affairs, gave end to all his consultations and enterprises, and joined him to the earth of his ancestors, about a year after the battle of Marathon, and after that he had reigned six and thirty years. He left be-

hind him five sons, namely, Artabazanes, born before he obtained the kingdom; Xerxes, who succeeded him; Achæmenes, governor of Egypt; Masistes, and Ariabignes.

CHAP. VI.

OF XERXES.

SECT. I.

The preparations of Xerxes against Greece.

XERXES received from his father, as hereditary, a double war; one to be made against the Egyptians, which he finished so speedily, that there is nothing remaining in writing how the same was performed; the other against the Grecians, of which it is hard to judge, whether the preparations were more terrible, or the success ridiculous. In the consultation for the prosecution of this war, which was chiefly bent against the Athenians, the princes of Persia were divided in opinion. Mardonius, who had formerly commanded in Thrace and Macedon, under Darius, and had also Hystaspes for his grandfather, as Xerxes had, and married Xerxes's sister Artozotres, persuaded, by many arguments, the European war; but Artabanus, brother to the late Darius, and uncle to Xerxes, maintained the contrary counsel, laying before Xerxes the lamentable and ridiculous success of the two late invasions, which Darius had made

contrary to his counsel ; the one in person upon the Scythians, the other by his lieutenants upon the Greeks ; in each of which Darius left to his enemies both his army and his honour. He therefore besought Xerxes to be right well advised before he did too far embark himself in this business ; for whatsoever undertaking hath deliberate and sound counsel for conductor, though the success do not always answer the probability, yet hath fortune nothing else thereof to vaunt than the variableness of her own nature, which only the divine Providence, and not any human power, can constrain.

But so obstinate was the resolution of Xerxes in prosecution of his former intent, that Artabanus, whether terrified by visions, (as it is written of him,) or fearing the king's hatred, which he made known to all those that opposed his desire to this war, (changing opinion and counsel,) assisted the Grecian expedition with all the power he had.

After the war of Egypt was ended, four years were consumed in describing and gathering an army for this invasion ; which, being compounded of all nations subject to the Persian empire, consisted of seventeen hundred thousand foot, and eighty thousand horsemen, besides chariots, camels, and other beasts for carriage, if we may believe Herodotus¹ ; for of this multitude, Trogus finds the number less by seven hundred thousand footmen.

The commanders of the several nations were the princes of the blood of Persia, either by marriage in the king's house or otherwise ; for to these were all commandments of this nature given, some few people excepted, who had of their own, leaders. The charge of the whole army was bestowed on Mardonius, the son of Gobrias, by a sister of Darius, to whom were joined some others of Xerxes's nearest kindred, as generals over all ; saving that the charge of ten thousand select Persians, called the

¹ Her. l. vii.

immortal regiment, (because if any one of the whole number died or were slain, there was another presently chosen in his stead,) was given to Hydarnes : the eighty thousand horsemen were led by the sons of Datis, who commanded the late army of Darius in Greece.

The fleet of gallies were two thousand two hundred and eight, furnished by the Phœnicians, who had commanders of their own nation ; and by the Cypriotes, Cilicians, Pamphilians, Lycians, Dorians, Carians, Ionians, Æolians, and Hellespontines, who were entrusted with the furnishing of their own vessels, though commanded by the princes of Persia ; as by Ariabignes, the son of Darius, and others. The rest of the vessels for transportation were three thousand. There were also certain gallies furnished by Artemisia, the daughter of Lygdamis, princess of Hallicarnassus and the islands adjoining, which herself commanded. Those gallies, by her prepared and furnished, excelled all the rest of the fleet, excepting those of Sidon, in which Xerxes himself was embarked.

SECT. II.

Xerxes's army entertained by Pytheus ; his cutting off mount Athos from the continent ; his bridge of boats over the Hellespont ; and the discourse between him and Artabanus upon the view of the army.

WHEN this world of an army was thoroughly furnished, he caused all the nations of which it was compounded, to make their rendezvous and repair at Sardis in Lydia. And when he had assembled to the number of seventeen hundred thousand foot, as he entered the border of Celenas, he was by one Pytheus, a Lydian, entertained, who, out of his flocks and herds of cattle, gave food to Xerxes and his whole army. The feast ended, he also presented him with two thousand talents of silver, and in gold

four millions, wanting seven thousand of the Persian darici, which make so many of our merks.

The king, overcome with the exceeding liberality of Pytheus, did not only refuse his treasure offered, but commanded that seven thousand darici should be given him to make up his four millions, of which so many thousands were wanting when he made the present. But soon after, when Pytheus besought him to spare one of his five sons from his attendance into Greece, (because himself was old and had none whom he could so well trust as his own son,) Xerxes, most barbarously, caused the young man, for whom his father sought exemption, to be sundered into two parts, commanding, that the one half of his carcase should be laid on the right, and the other half on the left hand of the common way by which the army marched.

Two things he commanded to be done before he came to the sea-side. The one was a passage for gallees to be cut behind mount Athos, making the same, (with the half island or headland, whereon it stood,) to be an entire island, sundering thereby from the continent of Thrace five cities, besides the mountain and the Chersonesus, or neck of land itself;—a work of more ostentation than of use, and yet an enterprise of no great wonder, the valley which held it to the continent having but twelve furlongs, (which make about a mile and a half,) to cut through, and the ditch being broad enough only for two gallees to pass in front. The cities so severed from the main, were Dion, Olophyxus, Acrothoon, Thysus, and Cleonæ. He also gave order, that a bridge upon boats should be made over the Hellespont between Abydos and Sestos, the sea there having a mile of breadth, wanting an eighth part; which, after the finishing, was by a tempest torn asunder and dissevered; where-with Xerxes being more enraged than discouraged, commanded those to be slain that were masters of the work, and caused six hundred threescore and

fourteen gallies to be coupled together, thereon to frame a new bridge ; which, by the art and industry of the Phœnicians, was so well anchored to resist both winds blowing into and from the Euxine sea, as the same being well boarded and railed, the whole army of seventeen hundred thousand foot, and four-score thousand horse, with all the mules and carriages, passed over it into Europe in seven days and seven nights without intermission. This transportation of armies did Cæsar afterwards use ; and Caligula, that mad emperor, in imitation of Xerxes's bridge, did build the like.

The bridge finished, and the army brought near to the sea-side, Xerxes took a view of all his troops, assembled in the plains of Abydos, being carried up, and seated on a place over-topping the land round about it and the sea adjoining ; and, after he had gloried in his own happiness, to behold and command so many nations, and so powerful an army and fleet, he suddenly, (notwithstanding,) burst out into tears, moved with this contemplation, that, in one hundred years, there should not any one survive of that marvellous multitude. The cause of which sudden change of passion, when he uttered to Artabanus his uncle, Artabanus spake to the king to this effect : That which is more lamentable than the dissolution of this great troop within that number of years remembered by the king, is, that the life itself which we enjoy is yet more miserable than the end thereof ; for in those few days given us in the world, there is no man among all these, or elsewhere, that ever found himself so accompanied with happiness, but that he oftentimes pleased himself better with the desire and hope of death than of living ; the incident calamities, diseases, and sorrows whereto mankind is subject, being so many and inevitable, that the shortest life doth oftentimes appear unto us over long ; to avoid all which, there is neither refuge nor rest but in desired death alone.

With this melancholy discourse, Xerxes being not much pleased, prayed Artabanus not to overcast those joys which they had now in pursuit, with sad remembrances ; and holding still a doubtful conceit, that Artabanus utterly condemned the invasion of Greece, against which he had formerly given many strong reasons, desired him to deal freely with him, whether he were returned to his first resolution, that the enterprize of Greece could not be prosperous, or whether, according to the change of mind put into him by his late vision, he was confident of good success? Artabanus, notwithstanding that he assured himself of the king's resolution to go on, and dared not by any new arguments to batter the great purpose itself, yet he told the king, that there were two things which marvellously affrighted him, and which the king should find, as he feared, to be most adverse, to wit, the sea and the land :—the sea, because it had nowhere in that part of the world any port capable of so great a fleet ; insomuch, as if any tempest should arise, all the continent of Greece could hardly receive them, nor all the havens thereof afford them any safety ; and therefore when any such shelter shall be wanting unto them, he prayed him to understand, that in such a case of extremity, men are left to the will and disposition of fortune, and not fortune to the will and disposition of men :—the land, beside other incommodities, will be found by so much the more an enemy, by how much the unsatiate desire of man, to obtain more and more thereof, doth lead him forward ; for were there no man found to give resistance, yet the want of means to feed such an army, and the famine which cannot be prevented, will, without any other violence offered, dis-enable and consume it. By these arguments Artabanus hoped to have diverted Xerxes, not daring perchance to utter what indeed he most feared, to wit, the overthrow of the army itself, both by sea and land, which soon after followed.

These cautions were exceeding weighty, if Xerxes's obstinacy had not misprised them. For to invade by sea upon a perilous coast, neither being in possession of any port, nor succoured by any party, may better fit a prince presuming on his fortune, than enriched with understanding. Such was the enterprise of Philip the second upon England, in the year 1588, who had belike never heard of this counsel of Artabanus to Xerxes, or forgotten it. Now concerning the second point, it is very likely that Xerxes's army, which could not have in it less than two millions of souls, besides his beasts for service and carriage, should after a few days suffer famine; and using Machiavel's words, *Morire senza caltello*—die without a knife. For it was impossible for Greece, being a ragged, strait, and mountainous country, to yield food (besides what served themselves) for twenty hundred thousand strangers, whom they never meant to entertain, but with the sharpened points of their weapons, destroying withal whatsoever they could not well inclose and defend. Nay, if we may believe Herodotus, the army of Xerxes, being reviewed at Thermopylæ, consisted of five millions, two hundred eighty-three thousand, two hundred and twenty men, besides laundresses, harlots, and horses; and was therefore likely to endure a speedy famine.

The effect of Xerxes's answer, was, that it was impossible to provide for all things, and that whosoever should enterprise any great matter, if he gave the hearing to all that could be objected of accidental inconveniences, he should never pursue the same farther than the dispute and consultation; which if his predecessors, the Persian kings, had done, they had never grown to that greatness, or possessed so many kingdoms and nations as they now did; and therefore concluded, that great enterprises were never undertaken without great peril. Which resolution of Xerxes was not to be condemned, if any necessi-

ty had enforced him to that war. But seeing the many nations newly conquered, which he already commanded, were more than could be constrained to obedience any longer than the powerful prosperity of the Persians endured; and that Greece was separated by the sea from the rest of Xerxes's dominions, (of whose resolution his father Darius had made a dear experience,) the fruit of this war was answerable to the plantation, and the success and end agreeable to the weak counsel whereon it was grounded. Furthermore, those millions of men which he transported, and yet in his own judgment not sufficient, (for he gathered, in marching on, all the strength of Thrace and Macedon,) were an argument, that he rather hoped to affright the Greeks by the fame of his numbers, than that he had any confidence in their valour and resolution whom he conducted. For it is wisely said of those uncountable multitudes,—
' Non vires habent, sed pondus; et impedimenta potius sunt, quam auxilium: ' They are great in bulk, but weak in forces, and rather a luggage than an aid.

Besides, as it was impossible to marshal such a world of men in one army, so the divers nations, speaking divers languages, bred the same confusion among the Persian commanders when they came to fight, as it did to the builders of Babel, when they came to work. Whereas, if Xerxes had of his five millions compounded ten armies of fifty thousand chosen soldiers in each, and sent them yearly into Greece well victualled and furnished, he had either prevailed by the sword, or forced them to forsake their territory, or brought them into obedience by necessity and famine, which cannot be resisted. But while Xerxes resolved to cut down the banks of Greece, and to let in a sea of men among them, he was deceived both of his own hopes, and in their hearts whom he employed, and beaten by the Greeks both by land and sea; yea, he himself, conducted by

his fear, fled shamefully into Asia. A great part of his army was buried in Greece; the remainder whereof, which wintered in Thessaly, and led by Mardonius who persuaded the enterprise, was in the summer following utterly defeated, and himself slain.

SECT. III.

Of the fights at Thermopylæ and Artemisium.

AFTER such time as Xerxes had transported the army over the Hellespont, and landed in Thrace, (leaving the description of his passage along that coast, and how the river of Lissus was drunk dry by his multitudes, and the lake near to Pissirus by his cattle, with other accidents in his marches towards Greece,) I will speak of the encounters he had, and the shameful and incredible overthrows which he received. As first, at Thermopylæ, a narrow passage of half an acre of ground, lying between the mountains, which divide Thessaly from Greece, where sometime the Phocians had raised a wall with gates, which was then for the most part ruined. At this entrance, Leonidas, one of the kings of Sparta, with three hundred Lacedæmonians,—assisted with one thousand Tegeatæ and Mantineans, one thousand Arcadians, and other Peloponnesians, to the number of three thousand one hundred in the whole, besides one thousand Phocians, four hundred Thebans, seven hundred Thespians, and all the forces, (such as they were,) of the bordering Locrians,—defended the passage two whole days together, against that huge army of the Persians. The valour of the Greeks appeared so excellent in this defence, that in the first day's fight, Xerxes is said to have three times leaped out of his throne, fearing the destruction of his army by one handful of those men, whom not long before he had utterly despised; and when the second day's attempt upon the Greeks had proved in vain, he was altogether ignorant how to proceed further; and so

might have continued, had not a runagate Grecian taught him a secret way, by which part of his army might ascend the ledge of mountains, and set upon the backs of those who kept the streights. But when the most valiant of the Persian army had almost enclosed the small forces of the Greeks, then did Leonidas, king of the Lacedæmonians, with his three hundred, and seven hundred Thespians, which were all that abode by him, refuse to quit the place which they had undertaken to make good, and with admirable courage not only resist that world of men which charged them on all sides, but issuing out of their strength, made so great a slaughter of their enemies, that they might well be called vanquishers, though all of them were slain upon the place. Xerxes having lost in this last fight, together with twenty thousand other soldiers and captains, two of his own brethren, began to doubt what inconvenience might befall him by the virtue of such as had not been present at these battles, with whom he knew that he shortly was to deal. Especially of the Spartans he stood in great fear, whose manhood had appeared singular in this trial, which caused him very carefully to enquire what numbers they could bring into the field. It is reported of Dieneces the Spartan, that when one thought to have terrified him by saying, that the flight of the Persian arrows was so thick as would hide the sun, he answered thus; ‘ It is very good news, for then shall we fight in the cool shade.’

Such notable resolution having as freely been expressed in deeds as it was uttered in words, caused the Persian to stand in great doubt, when he heard that the city of Sparta could arm well nigh eight thousand men of the like temper, and that the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to those were very valiant men. Wherefore he asked counsel of Demaratus, a banished king of the Spartans, who had always well advised and instructed him in the things

of Greece, what course was fittest to be taken in his further proceedings. The opinion of Demaratus was, that all the land-forces should assemble together to defend the Isthmus, that streight neck of ground which joineth Peloponnesus to the continent. For which cause he advised, that three hundred ships, well manned, should be sent unto the coasts of Laconia, to spoil the country, and to hold the Lacedæmonians and their neighbours busied at home; whilst Xerxes, at his leisure having subdued the rest, might afterwards bring his whole power upon them, who, remaining destitute of succour, would be too weak alone to make resistance. To this purpose also the same Demaratus further advised, that the said fleet of three hundred ships should seize upon the island than called Cythera, now Cerigo, which, lying near to the coast of Laconia, might serve as a fit place of rendezvous upon all occasions, either of their own defence, or endamaging the enemy: whereby that ancient speech of Chilon the Lacedæmonian should be verified. that it were better for his countrymen to have that isle drowned in the sea, than stand so inconveniently for them as it did.

What effect this counsel might have taken, had it been followed, it is not easy to guess. But a contrary opinion of Achæmenes, brother to king Xerxes, was preferred as the safer. For the Persian fleet had been sorely vexed with a grievous tempest, which continued three whole days together, wherein were lost, upon the coast of Magnesia, four hundred ships of war, besides other vessels innumerable, accordingly as Artabanus had foreseen, that if any such calamity should overtake them, there would not be found any harbour wide enough to give them succour. Therefore Achæmenes persuaded his brother not to disperse his fleet; for if (said he) after the loss of four hundred ships we shall send away other three hundred to seek adventures, then will the Greeks be strong enough by sea to encounter the rest of the navy, which, holding

all together, is invincible. To this counsel Xerxes yielded; hoping that his land-army and fleet, should each of them stand the other in good stead, whilst both held one course, and lay not far asunder. But herein he was far deceived; for about the same time that his army had felt the valour of the Greeks by land, his navy likewise made a sorrowful proof of their skill and courage at sea. The Grecian fleet lay at that time at Artemisium, in the straits of Eubœa, where the Persians thinking to encompass them, sent two hundred sail about the island to fall upon them behind, using a like stratagem to that which their king did practise against Leonidas, in a case not unlike, but with far different success. For that narrow channel of the sea, which divideth Eubœa from the main, was in the same sort held by a navy of two hundred and seventy-one sail against the huge Persian armada, as the straits of Thermopylæ had formerly been maintained by Leonidas, till he was circumvented, as this navy might have been, but was not. The departure of those two hundred ships, that were sent about the island, and the cause of their voyage, was too well known in the Persian fleet, and soon enough disclosed to the Greeks, who, setting sail by night, met them with a counter surprise, taking and sinking thirty vessels, enforcing the rest to take the sea; where, being overtaking with foul weather, they were driven upon the rocks, and cast all away. Contrariwise, the navy of the Greeks were increased by the arrival of fifty-three Athenian ships, and one Lemnian, which came to their party in the last fight. As these new forces encouraged the one side, so the fear of Xerxes's displeasure stirred up the other to redeem their loss with some notable exploit. Wherefore setting aside their unfortunate policy, they resolved in plain fight to repair their honour, and casting themselves into the form of a crescent, thought so to inclose the Greeks, who readily did present them battle at Artemisium.

The fight endured from noon till night, and ended with equal loss to both parties. For, though more of the Persians ships were sunk and taken, yet the lesser loss fell altogether as heavy upon the Grecian fleet, which being small, could worse bear it. Herein only the Barbarians may seem to have had the worse, that they forsook the place of fight, leaving the wrack and spoils to the enemy, who nevertheless were fain to abandon presently even the passage which they had undertaken to defend ; both for that many of their ships were sorely crushed in the battle, and especially because they had received advertisement of the death of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Before they weighed anchor, Themistocles, general of the Athenians, engraved upon a stone at the watering-place an exhortation to the Ionians, that either they should revolt unto the Greeks or stand neutral ; which persuasion, he hoped, would either take some place with them, or at the least make them suspected by the Persians.

SECT. IV.

The attempt of Xerxes upon Apollo's temple ; and his taking of Athens.

WHEN Xerxes had passed the straits of Thermopylæ, he wasted the country of the Phocians, and the regions adjoining : as for the inhabitants, they chose rather to fly, and reserve themselves to a day of battle, than to adventure their lives into his hands, upon hope of saving their wealth, by making proffer unto him of their service. Part of his army he sent to spoil the temple of Delphi, which was exceeding rich, by means of many offerings that had been made by divers kings and great personages ; of all which riches it was thought that Xerxes had a better inventory than of the goods left in his own palace. To make relation of a great astonishment that fell upon the companies which arrived at the

temple to have sacked it, and of two rocks that breaking from the mount Parnassus overwhelmed many of the Barbarians, it were peradventure somewhat superstitious. Yet Herodotus, who lived not long after, saith, that the broken rocks remained even to his memory in the temple of Minerva, whither they rolled in their fall. And surely this attempt of Xerxes was impious; for seeing he believed that Apollo was a god, he should not have dared to entertain a covetous desire of enriching himself by committing sacrilege upon his temple. Wherefore it may possibly be true, that licence to chastise his impiety, in such manner as is reported, was granted unto the devil, by that Holy One, who saith, ‘Will a man spoil his Gods?’ And elsewhere, ‘Hath any nation changed their gods, which yet are no gods? Go to the Isles of Chittim, and behold, and send to Kedar, and take diligent heed, and see whether there be any such thing². Now this impiety of Xerxes was the more inexcusable, for that the Persians alleged the burning of Cybele’s temple by the Athenians, when they set fire on the city of Sardis in Asia, to be the ground and cause of the waste which they made in burning of cities and temples in Greece. Whereas indeed, in the enterprise against Delphi, this vizard of holy and zealous revenge falling off, discovered the face of covetousness so much the more ugly, by how much the more themselves had professed a detestation of the offence which the Athenians had committed in that kind by mere mischance.

The remainder of that which Xerxes did, may be expressed briefly thus: ‘He came to Athens, which finding forsaken, he took and burnt the citadel and temple which was therein.’ The citadel indeed was defended a while by some of more courage than wisdom, who literally interpreting Apollo’s oracle, ‘That Athens should be safe in wooden walls,’ had

¹ Malac. iii. 8.² Jerem. ii, 9, 10.

fortified that place with boards and pallisadoes ; too weak to hold out long, though by their desperate valour so well maintained at the first assault, that they might have yielded it upon tolerable conditions had they not vainly relied upon the prophecy ; whereof, (being somewhat obscure,) it was wisely done of Themistocles, to make discretion the interpreter, applying rather the words to the present need, than fashioning the business to words.

SECT. V.

How Themistocles the Athenian drew the Greeks to fight at Salamis.

THE Athenians had, before the coming of Xerxes, removed their wives and children into Trœzene, Ægina, and Salamis, not so highly prizing their houses and lands, as their freedom, and the common liberty of Greece. Nevertheless this great zeal, which the Athenians did shew for the general good of their country, was ill requited by the other Greeks, who with much labour were hardly intreated to stay for them at Salamis, whilst they removed their wives and children out of the city. But when the city of Athens was taken, it was presently resolved upon, that they should forsake the isle of Salamis, and withdraw the fleet to Isthmus ; which neck of land they did purpose to fortify against the Persians, and so to defend Peloponnesus by land and sea, leaving the rest of Greece as indefensible to the fury of the enemy. So should the islands of Salamis and Ægina have been abandoned, and the families of the Athenians, (which were there bestowed as in places of security,) have been given over into merciless bondage. Against this resolution, Themistocles, admiral of the Athenian fleet, very strongly made opposition, but in vain. For the Peloponnesians were so possessed with fear of losing their own, which they would not hazard, that no persuasions could

obtain of them to regard the estate of their distressed friends and allies. Many remonstrances Themistocles made unto them, to allure them to abide the enemy at Salamis; as first in private unto Eurybiades the Lacedæmonian, admiral of the whole fleet, that the self-same fear, which made them forsake those coasts of Greece, upon which they then anchored, would afterwards (if it found no check at the first) cause them also to dis sever the fleet, and every one of the confederates to withdraw himself to the defence of his own city and estate; then to the council of war which Eurybiades upon this motion did call together, (forbearing to object what want of courage might work in them hereafter,) he shewed that the fight at Isthmus would be in an open sea, whereas it was more expedient for them, having the fewer ships, to determine the matter in the streights; and that, besides the safeguard of Ægina, Megara, and Salamis, they should, by abiding where they then were, sufficiently defend Isthmus, which the Barbarians should not so much as once look upon, if the Greeks obtained victory by sea; which they could not so well hope for elsewhere, as in that present place, which gave them so good advantage. All this would not serve to retain the Peloponnesians, of whom one, unworthy of memory, upbraided Themistocles with the loss of Athens, blaming Eurybiades for suffering one to speak in the council that had no country of his own to inhabit. A base and shameful objection it was, to lay as a reproach that loss, which being voluntarily sustained for the common good, was in true estimation by so much the more honourable, by how much it was the greater. But this indignity did exasperate Themistocles, and put into his mouth a reply so sharp, as availed more than all his former persuasions. He told them all plainly, That the Athenians wanted not a fairer city than any nation of Greece could boast of; having well-near two hundred good ships of war, the better

part of the Grecian fleet, with which it was easy for them to transport their families and substance into any part of the world, and settle themselves in a more secure habitation, leaving those to shift as well as they might, who in their extremity had refused to stand by them. Herewithal he mentioned a town in Italy, belonging of old to the state of Athens, of which town he said an oracle had foretold, That the Athenians in process of time should build it anew, and there (quoth he) will we plant ourselves, leaving unto you a sorrowful remembrance of my words, and of your own unthankfulness. The Peloponnesians, hearing thus much, began to enter into better consideration of the Athenians, whose affairs depended not, as they well perceived, upon so weak terms, that they should be driven to crouch to others, but rather were such as might enforce the rest to yield to them, and condescend even to the uttermost of their own demands.

For the Athenians, when they first embraced that heroical resolution of leaving their grounds and houses to fire and ruin, if necessity should enforce them so far, for the preservation of their liberty, did employ the most of their private wealth, and all the common treasure, in building a great navy. By these means they hoped (which accordingly fell out) that no such calamity should befall them by land, as might not well be counterpoised by great advantages at sea; knowing well, that a strong fleet would either procure victory at home, or a secure passage to any other country. The other states of Greece held it sufficient, if building a few new ships they did somewhat amend their navy. Whereby it came to pass, that had they been vanquished, they could not have expected any other fortune, than either present death or perpetual slavery; neither could they hope to be victorious without the assistance of the Athenians, whose forces by sea did equal all theirs together; the whole consisting of more than three hundred and fourscore bottoms. Wherefore

these Peloponnesians, beginning to suspect their own condition, which would have stood upon desperate points if the fleet of Athens had forsaken them, were soon persuaded, by the greater fear of such a bad event, to forget the lesser, which they had conceived of the Persians; and laying aside their insolent bravery, they yielded to that most profitable counsel of abiding at Salamis.

SECT. VI.

How the Persians consulted about giving battle; and how Themistocles by policy held the Greeks to their resolution; with the victory at Salamis thereupon ensuing.

IN the mean season the Persians had entered into consultation, whether it were convenient to offer battle to the Greeks or no. The rest of the captains giving such advice as they thought would best please the king their master, had soon agreed upon the fight; but Artemisia, queen of Halicarnasseus, who followed Xerxes to this war in person, was of a contrary opinion. Her counsel was, that the king himself directly should march towards Peloponnesus, whereby it would come to pass, that the Greek navy (unable otherwise to continue long at Salamis for want of provision) should presently be dissevered; and every one seeking to preserve his own city and goods, they should, being divided, prove unable to resist him, who had won so far upon them when they held together. And as the profit will be great in forbearing to give battle, so on the other side the danger will be more (said she) which we shall undergo, than any need requireth us to adventure upon; and the loss, in case it fall upon us, greater than the profit of the victory which we desire. For if we compel the enemies to fly, it is no more than they would have done, we sitting still; but if they, as better seamen than ours, put us to the worst, the

journey to Peloponnesus is utterly dashed, and many that now declare for us will soon revolt unto the Greeks. Mardonius, whom Xerxes had sent for that purpose to the fleet, related unto his master the common consent of the other captains, and withal this disagreeing opinion of Artemisia. The king was well pleased with her advice, yet resolved upon following the more general, but far worse counsel of the rest; which would questionless have been the same which Artemisia gave, had not fear and flattery made all the captains utter that as out of their own judgment, which they thought most conformable to their prince's determination. So it was indeed that Xerxes had entertained a vain persuasion of much good that his own presence upon the shore, to behold the conflict, would work among the soldiers. Therefore he encamped upon the sea side, pitching his own tent upon the mount *Ægaleos*, which is opposite unto the isle of *Salamis*, whence at ease he might safely view all which might happen in that action, having scribes about him to write down the acts and behaviour of every captain. The near approach of the Barbarians, together with the news of that timorous diligence, which their countrymen shewed in fortifying *Isthmus*, and of a Persian army marching apace thither, did now again so terrify and amaze the *Peleponnesians*, that no intreaty nor contestation would suffice to hold them together. For they thought it mere madness to fight for a country already lost, when they rather should endeavour to save that which remained unconquered; propounding chiefly to themselves what misery would befall them, if losing the victory they should be driven into *Salamis*, there to be shut up, and besieged round in a poor desolate island.

Hereupon they resolved forthwith to set sail for *Isthmus*; which had presently been done, if the wisdom of *Themistocles* had not prevented it. For he perceiving what a violent fear had stopped up their

ears against all good counsel, did practise another course, and forthwith labour to prevent the execution of this unwholesome decree ; not suffering the very hour of performance to find him busy in wrangling altercation. As soon as the council broke up, he dispatched secretly a trusty gentleman to the Persian captains, informing them truly of the intended flight, and exhorting them to send part of their navy about the island, which encompassing the Greeks, might prevent their escape ; giving them withal a false hope of his assistance. The Persians no sooner heard than believed these good news, well knowing that the victory was their own assured if the Athenian fleet joined with them, which they might easily hope, considering what ability their master had to recompense for so doing both the captains with rich rewards, and the people with restitution of their city and territories. By these means it fell out, that when the Greeks very early in the morning were about to weigh anchor, they found themselves inclosed round with Persians, who had laboured hard all night, sending many of their ships about the isle of Salamis, to charge the enemy in rear, and landing many of their men in the isle of Psytalea, which lieth over against Salamis, to save such of their own, and kill such of the Grecian party as by any misfortune should be cast upon the shore. Thus did mere necessity enforce the Grecians to undertake the battle in the streights of Salamis, where they obtained a memorable victory, stemming the foremost of their enemies, and chasing the rest, who falling foul one upon another, could neither conveniently fight nor fly. I do not find any particular occurrences in this great battle to be much remarkable. Sure it is, that the scribes of Xerxes had a wearisome task of writing down many disasters that befel the Persian fleet, which ill acquitted itself that day, doing no one piece of service worthy the presence of their king, or the registering of his notaries. As for the

Greeks, they might well seem to have wrought out that victory with equal courage, were it not that the principal honour of that day was ascribed to those of Ægina, and to the Athenians ; of whom it is recorded, that when the Barbarians did fly towards Phalerus, where the land army of Xerxes lay, the ships of Ægina having possessed the streights, did sink or take them, whilst the Athenians did valiantly give charge upon those that kept the sea, and made any countenance of resisting.

SECT. VII.

Of things following after the battle of Salamis, and of the flight of Xerxes..

AFTER this victory, the Greeks intending, by way of scrutiny, to determine which of the captains had best merited of them, in all this great service ; every captain, being ambitious of that honour, did, in the first place, write down his own name, but, in the second place, as best deserving next unto himself, almost every suffrage did concur upon Themistocles. Thus private affection yielded unto virtue, as soon as her own turn was served. The Persian king, as not amazed with this calamity, began to make new preparation for continuance of war ; but in such fashion, that they, which were best acquainted with his temper, might easily discern his faint heart through his painted looks ; especially Mardonius, author of the war, began to cast a wary eye upon his master, fearing lest his counsel should be rewarded according to the event. Wherefore, purposing rather to adventure his life in pursuit of the victory, than to cast it away by undergoing his prince's indignation, he advised the king to leave unto him three hundred thousand men, with which forces he promised to reduce all Greece under the subjection of the Persian sceptre. Herewithal he forgot not to sooth Xerxes with many fair words, telling him, that the cowardice of

those Egyptians, Phœnicians, and Cilicians, with others of the like metal, nothing better than slaves, who had so ill behaved themselves in the late sea service, did not concern his honour, who had always been victorious, and had already subdued the better part of Greece, yea, taken Athens itself, against which the war was principally intended. These words found very good acceptance in the king's ear, who presently betook himself to his journey homewards, making the more haste, for that he understood how the Greeks had a purpose to sail to Hellespont, and there to break down his bridge, and intercept his passage. True it was that the Greeks had no such intent, but rather wished his hasty departure, knowing that he would leave his army not so strong as it should have been had he in person remained with it; and for this cause did Eurybiades give counsel, that by no means they should attempt the breaking of that bridge, lest necessity should enforce the Persians to take more courage, and rather to fight like men, than die like beasts. Wherefore Themistocles did, under pretence of friendship, send a false advertisement to this timorous prince, advising him to convey himself into Asia with all speed before his bridge were dissolved; which counsel Xerxes took very kindly, and hastily followed, as before is shewed. Whether it were so that he found the bridge whole, and thereby repassed into Asia, or whether it were torn in sunder by tempests, and he thereby driven to embark himself in some obscure vessel, it is not greatly material; though the Greeks did most willingly embrace the latter of these reports. Howsoever it were, this flight of his did well ease the country, that was thereby disburdened of that huge throng of people, which, as locusts, had before overwhelmed it.

SECT. VIII.

The negotiations between Mardonius and the Athenians, as also between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, after the flight of Xerxes.

MARDONIUS, with his three hundred thousand, had withdrawn himself into Thessaly, whence he sent Alexander, the son of Amyntas, king of Macedon, as ambassador to the Athenians, with promise of large amends for all their losses received, and of extending their territories as far as their own desires; allowing them to retain their liberty and laws, if they would make peace with Xerxes, and assist him in that war.

The Athenians had now re-entered their city, but not as yet brought back their wives and children; forasmuch as they well perceived that the place could not be secure till the army of Mardonius were broken and defeated. Wherefore, the Lacedæmonians, understanding what fair conditions this ambassador would propound, were perplexed with very great fear lest he should find good and ready acceptance. Hereupon they likewise very speedily dispatched their ambassadors for Athens, who, arriving before the Macedonian had audience, used the best of their persuasion to retain the Athenians firm. They alleged, that neither Xerxes nor Darius had any pretence of war against the rest of Greece, but had only threatened the subversion of Athens, till they and all their confederates, arming themselves in defence of that city, were drawn into the quarrel, wherein the Athenians, without much cruelty of injustice, could not leave them. We know, said they, that ye have endured great calamities; losing the fruit of the grounds, and being driven to forsake the town, the houses whereof be ruined, and unfit for your habitation; in regard whereof, we undertake to maintain, as our own, your wives and children amongst

us, as long as the war shall continue; hoping that ye, who have always procured liberty to others, will not now go about to bring all Greece into slavery and bondage. As for the Barbarians, their promises are large, but their words and oaths are of no assurance. It was needless to use many arguments to the Athenians, who gave answer to Alexander, in presence of the Spartan ambassadors,—That whilst the sun continued his course they would be enemies to Xerxes, regarding neither gold nor any riches with which he might seek to make purchase of their liberty. Concerning the maintenance of their wives and children, it was a burden which they promised to sustain themselves, only desiring the Lacedæmonians, that with all speed they would cause their army to march; forasmuch as it was not likely that Mardonius would long sit still in Thessaly, having once received such a peremptory answer.

In this their opinion of Mardonius's readiness to invade Attica, they found themselves nothing deceived; for he, as soon as Alexander had returned their obstinate purpose of resistance, did forthwith lead his army towards them and their city; they having now the second time quitted it, and conveyed themselves into places of more security abroad in the country, where they expected the arrival of their confederates. From Athens he sent his agent unto them with instructions, not only to persuade them to acceptance of the conditions before to them propounded, but with great promises to allure the principal of them to his party. His hope was, that either the people, wearied with forsaking their houses so often, would be desirous to preserve them from fire, and to have those which were already laid waste re-edified at the king's charges; or, if this affection took no place with them, but that needs they would rely upon their old confederates, whose succours did very slowly advance forwards, yet perhaps the leaders might be won with great rewards, to draw them to

this purpose : all which projects, if they should fail, the destruction of Athens would be a good means to please his master king Xerxes, who must thereby needs understand that Mardonius kept his ground, and feared not to confront the whole power of Greece in the strongest part of their own country.

But his expectation was beguiled in all these : for the Athenians so little regarded his offers, that when one Lycidas, or, (as Demosthenes calls him,) Cyrsilus, advised the senate to accept the conditions, and propound them to the people, all the senators, and as many as abiding without the council-house heard what he had said, immediately set upon him and stoned him to death, not examining whether it were fear or money that had moved him to utter such a vile sentence. Yea, the women of Athens, in the isle of Salamis, hearing of his bad counsel and bad end, assembling together, did enter his house there, and put his wife and children to the like execution. All this bravery, notwithstanding, when they perceived the slackness of the Peloponnesians in giving them aid, they were fain to betake themselves to Salamis again, the old place of their security. Remaining there, and seeing little forwardness in those whom it most concerned to assist them, they sent very severe messages to Sparta, complaining of their slackness, and threatening withal to take such course as might stand best with their own good, seeing that the common estate of all was so little regarded. These messengers were at the first entertained with dilatory answers, which every day grew colder, when as the Peloponnesian wall, built athwart the isthmus, was almost finished. But as the Lacedæmonians waxed careless and dull, so the Athenians hotly pressed them to a quick resolution, giving them plainly to understand, that if they should hold on in those dilatory courses, it would not be long ere the city of Athens took a new course that should little please them. All this while the Persian fleet lay upon the

coast of Asia, not daring to draw nearer unto Greece, as being now too weak at sea. Likewise the Grecian navy contained itself within the harbours upon Europe side, both to do service where need should require at home, and withal to shun the danger which might have befallen any part of it that being distracted from the rest had adventured over far. So mutual fear preserved in quiet the islands lying in the midst of the *Ægean* sea. But it was well and seasonably observed by a counsellor of Sparta, that the wall upon Isthmus would serve to little purpose for the defence of Peloponnesus, if once the Athenians gave ear to Mardonius; considering that many doors would be opened into that demi-island as soon as the enemy should, by winning the friendship of Athens, become the masters of the seas about it. The Lacedæmonians, upon this admonition, making better perusal of their own dangers, were very careful to give satisfaction to the Athenian ambassadors, who, not brooking their delays, were upon point of taking leave, yea, as it seemed, of renouncing their alliance. Wherefore, dispatching away five thousand Spartans in the evening, under conduct of Pausanias, they gave audience the next day to the ambassadors, whose complaints they answered with vehement protestations of their readiness, deeply swearing, that the army of Sparta was already far upon the journey; and giving them leave to take up other five thousand Lacedæmonians out of the region adjoining, to follow after them.

The Athenians, though distasting such want of gravity in a matter so important, were nevertheless contented with the final conclusion, and levying the number appointed of Lacedæmonian soldiers, made what haste they could to encamp in Attica. The other Grecians were nothing slack in sending forth companies, whose near approach caused Mardonius to forsake Attica as a rough country, and therefore of much disadvantage to horse, wherein consisted the

best of his power. Before his departure he burnt the city of Athens, beating down the walls of it, and ruining all that had formerly escaped the fury of war.

SECT. IX.

The great battle of Plataea.

It were too long a rehearsal to shew all that happened in many skirmishes between the Greeks and him in the country of Bœotia, which Mardonius had chosen to be the seat of that war. Much time was spent before the quarrel was decided by the trial of one main battle; for both parties did stand upon their guard, each expecting when the other should assail them.

The army of Mardonius contained about three hundred thousand, which were by him chosen out of Xerxes's army; to whom were adjoined the forces of Thebes, Macedon, Thessaly, and other parts of Greece, that now, siding with the Persian, furnished his camp with fifty thousand men. Against these, the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and their confederates, had levied an army of one hundred and ten thousand; of which forty thousand were weightily armed; the rest were only assistants to these forty thousand, being armed more slightly, as rather to make excursions and give chase, than to sustain any strong charges.

These two armies having eleven days confronted one the other, without performing any memorable piece of service, Mardonius, whose victuals began to fail, resolved to begin the fray. The Greeks were promised the victory by an oracle, if they fought in the land of the Athenians, and in the plain of Ceres and Proserpina, making prayers unto certain gods, demi-gods, and nymphs. But it was hard to find the certain place which the oracle designed; for the plain of Ceres was indeed in the territory of Athens;

but there was also an old temple of Ceres and Proserpina near unto the place where they lay at that time encamped ; as likewise the memorials of those nymphs and demi-gods were in the same place upon mount Citheron ; and the ground served well for footmen against horse ; only the land belonged unto the Plataeans, and not unto the Athenians.

Whilst the Greeks were perplexed about the interpretation of this doubtful oracle, the Plataeans, to make all clear, did freely bestow their land on that side the town upon the Athenians. This magnificence of the Plataeans caused Alexander the Great, many years after, to re-edify their city, which was ruined in the Peloponnesian war.

All things being ready for battle, the Lacedæmonian general thought it most meet that the Athenians should stand opposite that day to the Medes and Persians, whom they had formerly vanquished at Marathon ; and that he, with his Spartans, should entertain the Thebans and other Greeks which followed Mardonius, as better acquainted with their fight, and having beaten them oftentimes before. This being agreed upon, the Athenians changed place with the Lacedæmonians ; which Mardonius understanding, (whether fearing the Athenians, of whose valour the Medes and Persians had felt heavy proof, or desiring to encounter the Spartans, as thinking them the bravest soldiers in Greece,) he did also change the order of his battle, and oppose himself to Pausanius. All the Greeks might well perceive how the enemy did shift his wings, and Pausanias thereupon returned to his former station ; which Mardonius noting did also the like. So one whole day was spent in changing to and fro. Some attempt the Persians made that day with their archers on horseback, who did so molest the Greeks at their watering-place, that they were fain to enter in to consultation of retiring, because they could not, without much loss to themselves, and none to the

enemy, lie near to that fountain which did serve all the camp. Having concluded among themselves to dislodge, and part of the army being sent away before day-light, Mardonius perceived their departure in the morning, and whereupon being encouraged by their flight, (which to him seemed to proceed out of mere cowardice,) he charged them in the rear with great violence. It may well be recorded as a notable example of patient valour, that the Lacedæmonians being overtaken by the enemy's horse, and overwhelmed with great flights of arrows, did quietly sit still, not making any resistance or defence, till the sacrifices for victory were happily ended, though many of them were hurt and slain, and some of special mark lost, before any sign of good success appeared in the entrails.

But, as soon as Pausanias had found in the sacrifice those tokens, which the superstition of that age and country accounted fortunate, he gave the signal of battle; and thereupon the soldiers, who till then did sit upon the ground, as was their manner, arose altogether, and, with excellent courage, received the charge of the Barbarians, that came thronging upon them without any fear of such notable resistance. The rest of the Greek army that was in march, being revoked by Pausanias, came in apace to succour the Lacedæmonians; only that part of the army which was led by the Athenians, could not arrive unto the place of the great battle, because the Thebans, and other Greeks confederated with the Persians, gave them check by the way. Nevertheless, the Spartans, with other their assistants, did so well acquit themselves, that the Persians were vanquished, and Mardonius, with many thousands more, slain in the field; the rest fled into the camp, which they had fortified with wooden walls, and there defended themselves with such courage as desperate necessity enforced themselves unto; holding out the longer, because the Lacedæmonians were not acquainted with

the manner of assaulting fortresses and walls. In the meantime, the Athenians having found strong opposition of the Thebans and Thessalians, did, with much labour and courage, obtain victory; which having not long pursued, they came to help the Lacedæmonians, whom they found wearily busied in assaulting the camp with more valour than skill. Wherefore they themselves undertook it, and in short space forced a passage through the wall; at which breach first, and then on all sides, the Greeks entered with such fury, and just desire of vengeance, that of three hundred thousand, they are said not to have left three thousand alive, excepting those who fled away with Artabazus, when the Persian army first fell to rout.

If the execution were so great as is reported, an especial cause of it was the foolish retreat, or rather flight, into the camp. For though it were so that the place was well fortified, and the number of those who cast themselves into it greater than any of the assailants, yet they being of several nations and languages, and having lost their general, with other principal commanders, it was impossible that they, in such a terror and astonishment, should make good that piece of ground, lying in the heart of an enemy's country, against an army of men far more valiant than themselves, and inflamed with present victory; therefore, the same wall, which, for a few hours had preserved their lives by holding out the enemy, did now impale them, and leave them to the slaughtering fury of unpitiful victors. Artabazus fled into Thrace, telling the people of Thessaly and other countries in his way, that he was sent by Mar-donius upon some piece of service; for he well knew, that had they understood any thing of that great discomfiture, all places would have been hostile unto him, and sought, with his ruin, to purchase favour of the vanquishers. Therefore, making so large marches, that many of his soldiers, being feeble,

were left behind and lost, he came to Byzantium, whence he shipped his men over into Asia. Such was the end of the vain-glorious expedition, undertaken by Xerxes against the Greeks, upon hope of honour and great conquest, though sorting otherwise, accordingly as Artabazus had foreseen, and rather worse; forasmuch as it began the quarrel which never ended before the ruin of the Persian empire was effected by that nation of the Greeks, despised and sought to have been brought into slavery. Hereby it may seem, that the vision appearing to Xerxes was from God himself, who had formerly disposed of those things, ordaining the subversion of the Persian monarchy by the Greeks, who, thus provoked, entered into greater consideration of their own strength and the weakness of their enemies.

SECT. X.

The battle of Mycale, with a strange accident that fell out in the beginning of it, and examples of the like.

THE same day on which the battle was fought at Plataea, there was another battle fought at Mycale, a promontory, or head-land, in Asia, where the Persian fleet rode.

Leotychides the Spartan, with Xantippus the Athenian, admirals of the Greek navy, at the request of some islanders and Ionians, did sail into those parts, to deliver the Samians, and procure the Ionians to revolt from the Persian. Xerxes himself at this time lay at Sardis, a city in Lydia, not far from the seaside, having left threescore thousand under the command of Tigranes, for the defence of Ionia and the sea-coast. Therefore, when Artayntes and Ithramitres, admirals of the Persian fleet, understood that the Greeks bent their course towards them, they did forthwith draw their ships a-ground, fortifying with palisadoes and otherwise, as much ground as was

needful for the encamping of all their land and sea-forces. Leotychides, at his arrival, perceiving that they meant to keep within their strength, and resolving to force them out of it, rowed with his galley close aboard the shore, and called upon the Ionians, (who more for fear than good-will were encamped among the Persians,) exhorting them in the Greek tongue to remember liberty, and use the fair occasion which they now had to recover it. Herein he did imitate Themistocles, who had done the like at Eubœa; trusting that either these persuasions would prevail, or, if the Persians did happen to understand them, that it would breed some jealousy in them, causing them to fight in fear of their own companions. It need not seem strange, that this very same stratagem, which little or nothing availed Themistocles, did now very happily succeed. For Xerxes being in his full strength, it was a matter of much difficulty, to persuade those inhabitants of Asia to revolt, who now, in his declining estate, gave a willing ear to the sweet sound of liberty. The Persians likewise, who in their former bravery little regarded, and less feared any treason to be contrived by their subjects, were now so wary, that from the Samians, which were amongst them, they took away their arms; the Milesians, whom they did suspect, but would not seem to mistrust, they placed far from them, as it were for defence of the streight passages of Mycale; pretending that these Milesians did best of all others know those places. But these devices little availed them. For the Samians, perceiving that they were held as traitors, took courage in the heat of the fight, and, laying hold upon such weapons as came to hand, assailed the Persians manfully within the camp; which example the Ionians presently followed, being very glad to have found some that durst begin. It is said, that whilst the Greeks were yet in march towards the enemy's camp, a rumour suddenly ran in the army, that Mardonius was overthrown in Greece, which

(though perhaps it was given out by the captains to encourage the soldiers,) was very true. For the battle of Plataea was fought in the morning, and this of Mycale in the evening of the same day.

The like report, of that great battle wherein Paulus Æmilius overthrew Perseus the last king of Macedon, was brought to Rome in four days, as Livy with others do record. And Plutarch hath many other examples of this kind :—As that of the battle by the river Sagra in Italy, which was heard of the same day in Peloponnesus ; that of the battle against the Tarquinians and the Latins, presently noised at Rome ; and, (which is most remarkable,) the victory obtained against Lucius Antonius, who was rebel to Domitian the emperor. This Lucius Antonius, being lieutenant of the higher Germany, had corrupted his army with gifts and promises, drawing the barbarous people to follow him, with great hope to make himself emperor ; which news much troubling the city of Rome, with fear of a dangerous war, it was suddenly reported that Antonius was slain, and his army defeated. Hereupon many did offer sacrifice to the gods, and shew all manner of public joy, as in such cases was accustomed. But when better inquiry was made, and the author of these tidings could not be found, the emperor Domitian betook himself to his journey against the rebel ; and, being now with his army in march, he received advertisement by post of the victory obtained, and the death of Antonius ; whereupon remembering the rumour noised before in Rome, of the self-same victory, he found that the report and victory were born upon one day, though twenty thousand furlongs (which make about two thousand five hundred miles) asunder. It is truly said of Plutarch, that this last example gives credit unto many the like. And indeed it were very strange, if among so many rumours, begotten by forgery or mistakings, and fostered by credulous imagination, there

should not be found, (as happens in dreams, among many thousand vain and frivolous,) a few precisely true. Howbeit we may find, that God himself doth sometimes use to terrify those who presume upon their own strength, by these light means of tumultuous noises; as he raised the siege of Samaria, by causing a sound of horses and chariots to affright the Aramites; and as he threatened Sennacherib, saying, 'Behold, I will send a blast upon him, and he shall hear a noise, and return to his own land'.

Wherefore it may well have been true, that God was pleased, by such means as this, to animate the Greeks; who, (as Herodotus notes,) went towards the enemies with heavy hearts, being in great fear, lest their own adventure should by no means fall out well; considering in what danger they had left their own country of Greece, which was ready to be subdued by Mardonius, whilst they went wandering to seek out enemies afar off, upon the coast of Asia. But the fame of the battle of Plataea being noised among them; every man desired that his own valour, in the present fight, might be some help to work out the full deliverance of Greece. In this alacrity of spirit, they divided themselves into two battalions, whereof the Athenians led the one, by the way of the plain, directly towards the enemy's camp; the Lacedæmonians conducted the other, by the mountains and strait passages, to win the higher ground. The Athenians did first set upon the camp, (ere the Lacedæmonians could arrive on the other part,) and being desirous to get all the honour of the day to themselves, did so forcibly assault it, that they broke way through the palisadoes and gabions, and made themselves masters of the place, slaying all that could not save themselves by flight. In this fight the Samians did good service, as is formerly mentioned.

But the Milesians, who, upon the like jealousy, were placed by the Persians on the tops of Mycale, to defend the passage, did now, (as if they had been set on purpose to keep them from running away,) put as many to the sword as fell into their hands, letting none escape, except a very few that fled through by-paths. The Lacedæmonians that day did little service, for the business was dispatched ere they came in; only they broke such companies as retired in whole troops; making them fly dispersed in very much disorder, whereby the Milesians were enabled to do the greater execution upon them. This was the last fight of that huge army levied against Greece, which was now utterly broken, and had no means left to make offensive war.

SECT. XI.

Of the barbarous qualities of Xerxes; with a transition from the Persian affairs to matters of Greece, which from this time grew more worthy of regard.

XERXES lay at Sardis, not far from the place of this battle; but little mind had he to revenge either this or other his great losses, being wholly given over to the love of his brother's wife; with whom, when he could not prevail by entreaty, nor would obtain his desire by force, because he respected much his brother her husband, he thought it best to make a match between his own son Darius and the daughter of this woman; hoping by that means to find occasion of such familiarity as might work out his desire. But whether it were so, that the chastity of the mother did still reject him, or the beauty of her daughter allure him, he soon after fell in love with his own son's wife, being a vicious prince, and as ill able to govern himself in peace as to guide his army in war. This young lady having once desired the king to give her the garment which he then wore, being wrought by his own wife, it caused the queen

thereby to perceive her husband's conversation with her, which she imputed not so much to the beauty of her daughter-in-law, as to the cunning of the mother, against whom thereupon she conceived extreme hatred. Therefore, at a royal feast, wherein the custom was that the king should grant every request, she craved that the wife of Masistes, her husband's brother, the young lady's mother, might be given unto her disposition. The barbarous king, who might either have reformed the abuse of such a custom, or have deluded the importunate cruelty of his wife, by threatening herself with the like to whatsoever she should inflict upon the innocent lady, granted the request, and sending for his brother, persuaded him to put away the wife which he had, and take one of his daughters in her stead. Hereby it seems, that he understood how villanously that poor lady should be entreated, whom he knew to be virtuous, and whom himself had loved. Masistes refused to put her away, alleging his own love, her deserving, and their common children, one of which was married to the king's son, as reasons important to move him to keep her; but, in most wicked manner, Xerxes reviled him, saying, 'That he now should neither keep the wife which he had, nor have his daughter, whom he had promised unto him.' Masistes was much grieved with these words, but much more, when he returned home, he found his wife most butcherly mangled by the queen Amestris, who had caused her nose, lips, ears, and tongue, to be cut off, and her breasts in like manner, which were cast unto dogs. Masistes, enraged with this villany, took his way with his children and some friends towards Bactria, of which province he was governor, intending to rebel and avenge himself; but Xerxes understanding his purpose, caused an army to be levied, which cut him off by the way, putting him and all his company to the sword. Such was the tyrannical condition of the Persian government, and such are

generally the effects of luxury, when it is joined with absolute power.

Yet of Xerxes it is noted that he was a prince of much virtue ; and therefore Alexander the Great, finding an image of his overthrown, and lying upon the ground, said, that he doubted, whether, in regard of his virtue, he should again erect it, or, for the mischief done by him to Greece, should let it lie. But surely, whatsoever his other good qualities were, he was foolish, and was a coward, and consequently merciless.

Therefore, we may firmly believe, that the virtue of Cyrus was very great, upon which the foundation of the Persian empire was so surely laid, that all the wickedness and vanities of Xerxes, and other worse princes, could not overthrow it, until it was broken by a virtue almost equal to that which did establish it. In wars against the Egyptians, the fortune of Xerxes did continue, as at the first it had been, very good ; but against the general estate of Greece, neither he, nor any of his posterity, did ever make offensive war, but received many losses in Asia, to which the last at Mycale served but as an introduction ; teaching the Greeks, and especially the Athenians, that the Persian was no better soldier at his own doors than in a foreign country ; whereof good trial was made forthwith, and much better proof, as soon as the affairs of Athens were quietly settled and assured.

From this time forward I will therefore pursue the history of Greece, taking in the matters of Persia, as also the estate of other countries, collaterally, when the order of time shall present them. True it is, that the Persian state continued in her greatness many ages following, in such wise, that the known parts of the world had no other kingdom representing the majesty of a great empire. But this greatness depended only upon the riches and power that had formerly been acquired, yielding few actions or

none that were worthy of remembrance, excepting some tragedies of the court, and examples of that excessive luxury, wherewith both it, and all, or the most of empires that ever were, have been enervated, made unwieldy, and, (as it were,) fattened for the hungry swords of poor and hardy enemies. Hereby it came to pass, that Xerxes and his successors were fain to defend their crowns with money and base policies; very seldom, or never, (unless it were with great advantage,) daring to adventure the trial of plain battle with that little nation of Greece, which would soon have ruined the foundations laid by Cyrus, had not private malice and jealousy urged every city to envy the height of her neighbour's walls, and thereby diverted the swords of the Greeks into their own bowels, which after the departure of Xerxes began very well, and might better have continued to hew out the way of conquest on the side of Asia.

CHAP. VII.

OF THINGS THAT PASSED IN GREECE, FROM THE END OF
THE PERSIAN WAR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PELO-
PONNESIAN.

SECT. I.

How Athens was rebuilt and fortified.

AFTER that the Medes and Persians had received their last blow, and were utterly beaten at Mycale, Leotychides, who then commanded the Grecian

army, leaving the pursuit of the war to the Athenians, assisted by the revolted Ionians, returned with the Lacedæmonians and other Peloponnesians to Sparta and other places, out of which they had been levied. The Athenians in the meanwhile besieged Sestos, a city on the strait of the Hellespont, between which and Abydos, Xerxes had lately fastened his bridge of boats; where the inhabitants, desperate of succour, did not long dispute the defence thereof, but quitted it to the Greeks, who entertained themselves the winter following on that side the Hellespont. In the spring they drew homeward, and having left their wives and children, since the invasion of Attica, and the abandoning of Athens, in divers islands, and at Troezen, they now found them out, and returned with them to their own places.

And though the most part of all their houses in Athens were burnt and broken down, and the walls of the city overturned, yet they resolved first on their common defence, and to fortify their city, before they cared to cover themselves, their wives and children, with any private buildings; whereof the Lacedæmonians being advertised, and misliking the fortifying of Athens, both in respect that their own city of Sparta was unwall'd, as also because the Athenians were grown more powerful by sea than either themselves or any other state of Greece, they dispatched messengers to the Athenians to dissuade them; not acknowledging any private dislike or jealousy, but pretending, that if the Persians should return to invade Greece a third time, the Athenians being in no better state to defend themselves than heretofore, the same would serve to receive their enemies, and to be made a seat of war as Thebes had lately been. To this the Athenians promised to give them satisfaction by their own ambassadors very speedily. But being resolved to go on with their work, by the advice of Themistocles, they held

the Lacedæmonians in hope of the contrary, till they had raised their walls to that height, as they cared not for their mislikes, nor doubted their disturbance; and therefore (to gain time) they dispatched Themistocles towards Lacedæmon, giving him for excuse, that he could not deliver the Athenians' resolutions, till the arrival of his fellow-commissioners, who were of purpose retarded. But after a while, the Lacedæmonians' expectation being converted into jealousy, (for by the arrival of divers persons out of Attica, they were told for certain, that the walls of Athens were speedily grown up beyond expectation,) Themistocles prayed them not to believe reports and vain rumours, but that they would be pleased to send some of their own trusty citizens to Athens, from whose relation they might resolve themselves, and determine accordingly. Which request being granted, and commissioners sent, Themistocles dispatched one of his own, by whom he advised the Athenians, first to entertain the Lacedæmonians with some such discourse as might retain them a few days, and in conclusion to hold them among them till himself and the other Athenian ambassadors, then at Sparta, had their liberty also to return. Which done, and being also assured by his associates and Aristides, that Athens was already defensible on all parts, Themistocles demanding audience, made the Lacedæmonians know, that it was true, that the walls of Athens were now raised to that height, as the Athenians doubted not the defence of their city;—praying the Lacedæmonians to believe, that whensoever it pleased them to treat with the Athenians, they would know them for such as knew right well what appertained to a commonwealth and their own safety, without direction and advice from any other: That they had in the war of Xerxes abandoned their city, and committed themselves to the wooden walls of their ships, from the resolutions of their own counsels and courage, and

and not thereto taught or persuaded by others ; and finally, in all that perilous war against the Persians, they found their own judgments, and the execution thereof, in nothing inferior, or less fortunate, than that of any other nation, state, or commonwealth among the Greeks. And therefore concluded, that they determined to be masters and judges of their own affairs, and thought it good reason that either all the cities confederated within Greece should be left open, or else that the walls of Athens should be finished and maintained.

The Lacedæmonians finding the time unfit for quarrel, dissembled their mislike, both of the fortifying of Athens and of the division ; and so suffered the Athenians to depart, and received back from them their own ambassadors.

The walls of Athens finished, they also fortified the port of Piræus, by which they might, under covert, embark themselves upon all occasions.

SECT. II.

The beginning of the Athenian greatness, and prosperous wars made by that state upon the Persian.

THE Athenians having settled things in good order at home, prepared thirty galleys for the pursuit of the war against the Persians, to which the Lacedæmonians added other twenty ; and with this fleet, strengthened by the rest of the cities of Greece confederated, they set sail for Cyprus, under the conduct of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian ; where, after their landing, having possessed themselves of many principal places, they embarked the army again, and took land in Thrace, recovering from the Persians by force the city Byzantium, now Constantinople ; from whence Pausanias, behaving himself more like a tyrant than a captain, especially towards the Ionians, lately revolted from Xerxes, was called back by the council of Lacedæmon, and not only accused

of many insolent behaviours, but of intelligence with the Medes, and treason against his country. In his stead they employed Docres, who either gave the same cause of offence, or else the Athenians, who affected the first command in that war, practised the soldiers to complain; though indeed the wise and virtuous behaviour of Aristides, general of the Athenian forces, a man of rare and incomparable sincerity, had been able to make a good commander seem ill in comparison to himself, and therefore was much more available in rendering those detested whose vices afforded little matter of excuse. Howsoever it were, the Lacedæmonians being no less wearied of the war than the Athenians, were eager to pursue it; the one obtained their ease, and the other the execution and honour which they desired; for all the Greeks, (those of Peloponnesus excepted,) willingly subjected themselves to the command of the Athenians, which was both the beginning of their greatness in that present age, and of their ruin in the next succeeding. For the charge of the war being now committed unto them, they began to rate the confederated cities; they appointed receivers and treasurers, and began to levy money according to their discretion, for the maintenance of the general defence of Greece, and for the recovering of those places on Europe's side, in Asia the Less, and the islands, from the Persians. This tribute, (the first that was ever paid by the Greeks,) amounted to four hundred and threescore talents, which was raised easily by the honest care of that just man Aristides, to whose discretion all the confederates referred themselves, and no man found occasion to complain of him. But as the virtue of Aristides, and other worthy citizens, brought unto the Athenians great commodity, so the desire which they conceived of increasing their commodity, corrupted their virtue; and, robbing them of the general love which had made them powerful, abandoned their

city to the defence of her treasure, which with her in the next age perished ; for it was not long ere these four hundred and threescore talents were raised to six hundred ; nor long after that ere their covetous tyranny had converted their followers into slaves, and extorted from them yearly thirteen hundred talents. The isle of Delos was at the first appointed for the treasure-house wherein these sums were laid up, and where, at the general assembly, the captains of those forces sent by the confederates were, for form sake, called to consultation ; but the Athenians, who were stronger by sea than all Greece besides, had locked up the common treasure in an island under their own protection, from whence they might transport it at their pleasure, as afterwards they did.

The general commander in this war was Cimon, the son of Miltiades, who first took Eion, upon the river Strymon ; then the isle of Scyros, inhabited by the Dolopes. They mastered the Carystii, and brought into servitude the Naxii, contrary to the form of the confederacy : so did they other the inhabitants of Greece, if at any time they failed of their contribution, or disobeyed their commandments ; taking upon them and usurping a kind of sovereign authority over the rest ; which they exercised the more assuredly, because they were now become lords of the sea, and could not be resisted. For many of the confederated cities and nations, weary of the war in their own persons, and given up altogether to their ease, made choice rather to pay their parts in money, than either in men of war, or in ships ; leaving the provision of both to the Athenians. Hereby the one grew weak in all their sea defences, and in the exercise of the wars ; the other greatly strengthened their navy and their experiences, being always armed and employed in honourable services, at the cost of those who, having lifted them into their saddles, were now enforced to become their footmen. Yet was the

tribute-money, levied upon these their confederates, employed so well by the Athenians at the first, (as ill proceedings are often founded upon good beginnings,) that no great cause of repining was given. For they rigged out a great fleet of galleys, very well manned, wherein Cimon the admiral, scouring the Asiatic seas, took in the city of Phaselis; which having formerly pretended neutrality, and refused to relieve or any way assist the Greeks, was enforced to pay ten talents for a fine, and so to become followers of the Athenians, paying yearly contribution.

From thence he set sail for the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, where the Persian fleet rode, being of six hundred sail, or (according to the most sparing report) three hundred and fifty; and having a great land-army encamped upon the shore: All which forces, having been provided for advancing the king's affairs in Greece, were utterly defeated in one day, and two hundred ships taken by the Athenians, the rest being broken to pieces, or sunk ere they had ever swam in the Grecian seas. Cimon having in in one day obtained two great victories, the one by sea, and the other by land, was very soon presented with a third. For fourscore sail of Phœnicians, (who were the best of all seamen,) under the Persian command, thinking to have joined themselves with the fleet before destroyed, arrived upon the same coast, ignorant of what had passed, and fearing nothing less than what ensued. Upon the first notice of their approach Cimon weighed anchor, and meeting them at an head-land called Hydra, did so amaze them, that they only sought to run themselves on ground; by which means preserving few of their men, they lost all their ships. These losses did so break the courage of the Persian, that, omitting all hope of prevailing upon Greece, he condescended to whatsoever articles it pleased the Athenians to propound; granting liberty unto all the Greeks inhabiting Asia;

and further covenanting, that none of his ships of war should sail to the westward of the isles, called Cyanæ and Chelidoniæ.

This was the most honourable peace that ever the Greeks made ; neither did they in effect, after this time, make any war that redounded to the profit or glory of the whole nation, till such time as under Alexander they overthrew the empire of Persia ; in which war few, or perhaps none of them, had any place of great command, but served altogether under the Macedonians.

SECT. III.

The death of Xerxes by the treason of Artabanus.

BESIDES these losses, which could not easily have been repaired, the troubles of the empire were at this time such, as gave just cause to the Persian of seeking peace upon any terms not altogether intolerable. For Artabanus, the uncle of Xerxes, perceiving that the king his master did easily take small occasions to shed the blood of such as in kindred or place were near unto him, began to repose less hope of safety in remaining faithful, than of obtaining the sovereignty by destroying a prince that was so hated for his cruelty, and despised for his cowardice and misfortunes. Having conceived this treason, he found means to execute it by Mithridates, an eunuch, in such close manner, that, as if he himself had been innocent, he accused Darius the son of Xerxes, and caused him to suffer death as a parricide. Whether it be true, that by this great wickedness he got the kingdom, and held it seven months ; or whether intending the like evil to Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, he was by him prevented and surprized, it were hard to affirm any certainty. But all writers agree upon this, that taken he was, and, with his whole family, put to death by extreme torments, according to the

sentence, whereof the truth is more ancient than the verse.

Raro antecedentem scelestum
Deseruit pede pœna claudo.

Seldom the villain, though much haste he make;
Lame-footed vengeance fails to overtake.

SECT. IV.

The banishment of Themistocles. His flight to Artaxerxes, newly reigning in Persia; and his death.

ARTAXERXES being established in his kingdom, and having so compounded with the Athenians as the present necessity of his affairs required, began to conceive new hopes of better fortune against the Greeks than he or his predecessors had ever hitherto found; for the people of Athens, when the Persians were chased out of Greece, did so highly value their own merits in that service, that they not only thought it fit for themselves to become the commanders over many towns and islands of the Greeks, but even within their own walls they would admit none other form of government than merely democratical. Herein they were so insolent, that no integrity nor good desert was able to preserve the estate of any such as had borne great office, longer than, by flattering the rascally multitude, he was contented to frame all his words and deeds to their good liking.

This their intolerable demeanour, much offended Themistocles; who, though in former times he had laid the foundations of his greatness upon popularity, yet now, presuming upon his good services done to the state, he thought that, with great reason, they might grant him the liberty to check their inordinate proceedings. But, contrariwise, they were so highly offended with his often rehearsing the benefits which they had received from him, that they laid upon him the punishment of *ostracism*, whereby he was banish-

ed for ten years, as a man over-burdensome to the commonwealth.

Before the time of his return was half expired, a new accusation was brought against him by the Lacedæmonians, who charged him of consulting with Pausanias about betraying the whole country of Greece unto Xerxes. Hereupon Themistocles, finding no place of security against the malice of two such mighty cities, was driven, after many troublesome flights and dangerous removings, to adventure himself into Persia, where he found Artaxerxes newly settled, and was by him very honourably entertained. But the great hope which Artaxerxes had conceived of advancing his affairs by the counsel and assistance of Themistocles, proved altogether fruitless. For when the Athenians, in favour of Inarus, the Libyan, (who infested Egypt, causing it to rebel against the Persian,) had sent a fleet to sea, landing an army in Egypt, and scouring those eastern seas, to the great hindrance of Artaxerxes, and, (for ought that I can understand,) to the manifest breach of that peace which, to their great honour, they had concluded with Xerxes; then did the king send his letters to Themistocles, requiring him to make good the hopes which he had given,—of assuring the Persian estate against the Greeks. But whether Themistocles perceived much unlikeliness of good success in leading a great army of dastardly Persians against the warlike people of Greece, or else, (as in favour of his virtue it is more commonly reported,) the love of his country would not permit him to seek honour by the ruin of it; sure it is, that being appointed by Artaxerxes to undertake the conduct of great forces against the Athenians, he decided the great conflict between thankfulness to his well-deserving prince, and natural affection to his own ill-deserving people, by finishing his life with a cup of poison.

SECT. V.

How the Athenians, breaking the peace which, to their great honour, they had made with the Persian, were shamefully beaten in Egypt.

THEN was Artaxerxes driven to use the service of his own captains in the Egyptian war, wherein it appeared well, that a just cause is a good defence against a strong enemy. An Athenian fleet, two hundred sail strong, was sent forth under Cimon to take in the isle of Cyprus; which conquest seemed easy both to make and to maintain, the Persian being utterly broken st sea, and thereby unable to relieve the island. Now, although it were so that a peace had been concluded, (which was likely to have been kept sincerely by the Persian, who had made so good proof of the Grecian valour that he was nothing desirous to build any ships of war, without which the Greeks could receive no harm from him, whereof, if any one should be found sailing towards Greece, the peace was immediately broken, and if not his whole estate, yet all the sea-coast, no small part of his dominions, exposed to the waste of an enemy too far over-matching him;)—yet, whether the Athenians were in doubt, lest the league, which in his own worser fortunes he had made with them, he would break in theirs, and therefore sought to get such assurance into their hands as might utterly disable him from attempting ought against them; or whether the increase of their revenues and power, by adding that rich and great island to their empire, caused them to measure honour by profit,—they thought it the wisest way to take, whilst they might, whatsoever they were able to get and hold, and he unable to defend.

The isle of Cyprus, lying in the bottom of the straits between Cilicia, Syria, and Egypt, is very fitly seated for any prince or state, that being mighty

at sea, doth either seek to enrich himself by trade with those countries, or to infest one or more of them when they are his enemies. And this being the purpose of the Athenians, their ambition, which had already devoured, in conceit, this island, was on the sudden well nigh choked with a greater morsel, to snatch at which they let Cyprus alone, which they might easily have swallowed and digested. For Inarus, king of the Libyans, (confining Egypt,) having found how greatly the country was exhausted by the late wars, and how weakly defended by very slender Persian garrisons, conceived rightly, that if such small forces as the satrapa, or viceroy, could make on the sudden of his own guards, or levy out of the ordinary garrisons, were by him defeated, the naturals of the country, not long since oppressed by Cambyses, and after a revolt very lately subdued by Xerxes, would soon break faith with him, who had no other title to that kingdom than a good sword. Further, he persuaded himself, that the people, unable to defend themselves against the Persian without assistance, would easily be drawn to accept him, the author of their deliverance, for king. Neither did this hope deceive him; for having taken, and cruelly slain Achæmenes the viceroy, divers cities forthwith declared themselves for him, and, proclaiming him king, shewed the most of their endeavour for prosecution of the war. But he, considering his own weakness, and that the means of the Egyptians, his adherents, were not answerable to their desires, perceived well, that, to resist the power of Artaxerxes, far greater forces than his or theirs were to be procured, at what price soever he obtained them. Therefore, hearing of the great Athenian fleet, and knowing well the virtue of the soldiers therein embarked, he invited the commanders to share with him the kingdom of Egypt, as a far greater reward of their adventure, than such an addition as that of Cyprus could be to their estate.

Whether he or they, (if things had wholly sorted according to their expectation,) would have been contented with an equal share, and not have fallen out in the partition, were perhaps a divination unnecessary. He was possessed of the people's love; they were of most power. But the issue of those affairs was such as left them nothing to communicate but misfortunes, which they shared somewhat equally. Yet had the beginnings of their enterprise very good and hopeful success; for they entered the land as far as to Memphis, the principal city; and of the city itself they took two parts; to the third part, which was called the White Wall, they laid such hard siege, that neither those forces of the Persians, which then were in Egypt, were strong enough to remove them, neither could Artaxerxes well devise what means to use for the recovery of that which was lost, or for the preservation of the remainder. The best of his hope was by setting the Lacedæmonians upon Athens, to enforce the Athenians to look homewards to their own defence. This was the first time that the Persian sought to procure the assistance of the Greeks one against the other, by stirring them up with gold to the entertainment of private quarrels for the good of their common enemy. To this purpose he sent Magabyzus to Sparta with much treasure; who, after great expense, finding that the Lacedæmonians were nothing forward in employing their whole force against the Athenians, whom in many conflicts of great importance they had found to be their matches, notwithstanding the absence of their army in Egypt, he thought it his wisest way to employ the rest of his money and means to their relief, who had now the space of six years defended his master's right in Egypt. Therefore, he hastily dispatched another of his name, the son of Zopyrus, who, arriving in Egypt, was first encountered by the revolted people, over whom he obtained victory, which made him master of the country, whilst the Athenians lay busied a-

bout Memphis, the great city. It cannot be doubted, but that long abode in a strange air, and want of supply, had much enfeebled the Athenians; sure it is, that when Megabyzus, having reduced the country to obedience, attempted the city itself,—whether his former success had amended the courage of the Persians, or want of necessaries made the Athenians inferior to themselves,—he chased them out of Memphis, and pursued them so near, as they were forced to fortify themselves in the isle of Prosopitis¹; where Magabyzus, after eighteen months siege, turning away one part of the river by divers trenches, assaulted the Athenians, without impediment of waters, took their galleys, and put all to the sword, save a few that saved themselves by flight into Libya. The same entertainment had fifty other galleys, which they sent to the succour of the first two hundred. For those Athenians having heard nothing that their fleet and army was consumed, entered by the branch of Nilus called Mendesium², and fell unawares among the Phœnician galleys and the Persian army: so as the Persians recovered all Egypt, but that part held by Amyrteus, Inarus, the king of Libya, being by them taken and hanged. This was the end of the Athenians' six years war in Egypt, and the reward of their vanity and indiscretion to undertake many enterprises at once.

SECT. VI.

Of other wars made by the Athenians, for the most part with good success, about the same time.

NOTWITHSTANDING these overthrows in Egypt, yet the Athenians, in their home-wars, waded through many difficulties, and held the reputation of their

¹ Prosopitis, an island between the rivers of Taly and Pharmutiacus, two of the outlets of Nilus towards Alexandria.

² Mendesium is an island in the mouth of Nilus, between the outlet called Busiriticus and Diolcos, but the branch of Nilus called Mendesium, runneth into the sea by the city Panæphysis.

forces against the Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, and others, rather to their advantage than otherwise : for as they were beaten near unto Halia by the Corinthians and Epidaurians, so they obtained two great victories soon after ; the one over the Peloponnesians, near unto Cecryphalia ; the other over the Ægines, near unto Ægina ; where they sunk and carried away threescore and ten galleys of their enemies. Furthermore, they landed their forces on the sudden, and besieged Ægina, from whence they could not be moved, notwithstanding that the Corinthians, to divert them, invaded Megara ; where, after a great fight, with equal loss, the Corinthians, when they returned again to set up their trophy, as victors in the former battle, were utterly broken and slaughtered by the Athenian garrisons and Megarians, to their great loss and dishonour.

Again, as the Athenians were discomfited near to Tanagra, by the Lacedæmonians, who returned from the succour of the Dorians against the Phocians, (at which time the Thessalian horsemen turned from their allies, the Athenians, and fought against them,) so, about threescore days after, the Athenians entered Bœotia, under the conduct of Myronides, where, beating that nation, they won Phocis, on the gulf Ceteus, and evened the walls of Tanagra to the ground. Finally, they enforced Ægina to surrender upon most base conditions ; as, to beat down the walls of their city, and to give them hostages for tribute ; the siege whereof they had continued, notwithstanding all their other brabbles and attempts elsewhere. Besides these victories, they sacked and spoiled many places upon the sea-coast of Peloponnesus, belonging to the Lacedæmonians ; won upon the Corinthians, and overthrew the Sicyonians that came to their succour. These were the undertakings of the Athenians and their allies during the time of those six years that a part of their forces made war in Egypt : In the end whereof they attempted

Thessaly, persuaded thereunto by Orestes, but were resisted by the king Pharsalus, who had chased Orestes out of his dominions. They also landed in Sicyonia, and had victory over those that resisted; after which they made truce with the Peloponnesians for five years, and sent Cimon into Cyprus with two hundred ships; but they were again allured by Amyrteus, one of the race of their former kings, who held the marshy and woody parts of Egypt from the Persians, to whom they sent sixty of their ships. The rest of their army failing in their enterprise of Cyprus, and their fortunate and victorious leader, Cimon, dying there, as they coasted the island, they encountered a fleet of the Phoenicians and Cilicians, over both which nations they returned victorious into Greece; as also those returned safe which were sent into Egypt.

SECT. VII.

Of Artaxerxes Longimanus; that he was Ahasuerus, the husband of Queen Esther.

THESE Egyptian troubles being ended, the reign of Artaxerxes continued peaceable; whereof the length is by some restrained unto twenty years, but the more and better authors give him forty; some allow him four and forty. He was a prince of much humanity, and noted for many examples of gentleness. His favour was exceeding great to the Jews, as appeareth by the histories of Esdras and Nehemiah, which fell in his time.

To prove that this was the king who gave countenance and aid to that great work of building the temple, it were a needless travel; considering that all the late divines have taken very much pains to shew that those two prophets were licensed by him, and succoured in that building, in such sort as appears in their writings. This was likewise that king Ahasuerus who married Esther: whereof, if it be needful to give proof, it may suffice, that Ahasuerus liv-

ed in Susa, reigning from India to Ethiopia, and therefore must have been a Persian; that he lived in peace, as appears by the circumstances of the history, and used the counsel of 'the seven princes,'—the authority of which princes began under Darius, the son of Hystaspes; wherefore he could be neither Cyrus nor Cambyses.

The continual wars which exercised king Darius, the son of Hystaspes, together with the certainty of his marriages with sundry wives, from none of whom he was divorced, but left his first wife Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, alive, in great honour, she being mother to Xerxes the succeeding king,—do manifestly prove that Esther was not his. Whereunto is added, by Philo the Jew, that, at the persuasion of Mardocheus, Jehoiakim, the high priest, the son of Jeshua, caused the feast of *Purim* to be instituted in memory of that deliverance. Now, the time of Jehoiakim was in the reign of Artaxerxes, at the coming of Esdras and Nehemiah; Jeshua, his father, dying about the end of Darius.

The same continuance of wars, with others his furious and tragical loves, wherewith Xerxes did consume such little time as he had free from war, are enough to prove that the story of Esther pertained not unto the time of Xerxes, who lived but one and twenty years; whereas the two and thirtieth of Ahasuerus, or Artasastha, is expressed by Nehemiah. Again, it is well known, that Xerxes, in the seventh year of his reign, (wherein this marriage must have been celebrated,) came not near to Susa. Of the princes that succeeded Artaxerxes Longimanus, to prove that none of them could be Ahasuerus, it is enough to say, that Mardocheus, having been carried from Jerusalem captive with Jehoniah by Nebuchadnezzar, was unlikely to have lived unto their times. But of this Artaxerxes it is true that he lived in Susa; reigned from India to Ethiopia; lived in peace; was contemporary with

Jehoiakim, the high priest; and, further, he had, happily, by his lieutenants, reclaimed the rebellious Egyptians in that seventh year of his reign; which good fortune might well give occasion to such a royal feast as is described in the beginning of the book of Esther.

This is the sum of the arguments brought to prove the age of Esther's story, by the learned and diligent Krentzhemius, who adds the authorities of Josephus, affirming the same, and of Philo, giving to Mardocheus eighteen years more than Isaac the patriarch lived; namely, one hundred fourscore and eighteen years in all; which expire in the five and thirtieth year of this Artaxerxes, if we suppose him to have been carried away captive, being a boy of ten years old.

SECT. VIII.

Of the troubles in Greece foregoing the Peloponnesian war.

BUT it is fit that we now return to the affairs of the Greeks, who, from this time forward, more vehemently prosecuting their civil wars, suffered the Persians for many ages to rest in peace, this Egyptian expedition being come to nought. Soon after this, the Lacedæmonians undertook the war called Sacred; recovered the temple and isle of Delphi, and delivered both to the inhabitants; but the Athenians regained the same, and gave it in charge to the Phocians. In the meanwhile the banished Bœotians re-entered their own land, and mastered two of their own towns possessed by the Athenians, which they soon recovered again from them; but, in their return towards Athens, the Bœotians, Eubœans, and Locrians, (nations oppressed by the Athenians,) set upon them with such resolution, as the Athenians were in that fight all slain or taken, whereby the Bœotians recovered their former liberty, restoring to the Athenians their prisoners. The islanders of

Eubœa took such courage upon this that they revolted wholly from the Athenians ; whom when Pericles intended to re-conquer, he was advertised that the Megarians, (who first left the Lacedæmonians and submitted themselves to Athens,) being now weary of their yoke, had slain the Athenian garrisons, and joined themselves with the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians. These news hastened Pericles homeward with all possible speed ; but, ere he could recover Attica, the Peloponnesians, led by Plistoanax, the son of Pausanias, had invaded it, pillaged and burnt many parts thereof ; after whose return, Pericles went on with his first intent, and recovered Eubœa. Finally, the Athenians began to treat of peace with the Peloponnesians, and yielded to deliver up all the places which they held in the country of Peloponnesus ; and this truce was made for thirty years.

After six of these years were expired, the Athenians, (favouring the Milesians against the Samians,) invaded Samos by Pericles, and after many repulses and some great losses, both by sea and land, the citizens were forced to yield themselves upon most lamentable conditions, namely, to deliver up all their ships ; to break down their own walls ; to pay the charge of the war ; and to restore whatsoever had been taken by themselves, or by their practice, from the Athenians. In the neck of which followed that long and cruel Peloponnesian war, whereof I have gathered this brief following ; the same contention taking beginning fifty years after the flight of Xerxes out of Greece. But because there was no city thereof, which either in the beginning of this war, or in the continuance of it, was not drawn into the quarrel, I hold it convenient, now, at the first, to shew briefly the estate of the country at that time, and especially the condition of those two great cities, Athens and Sparta, upon which all the rest had most dependence,

CHAP. VIII.

OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

SECT. I.

Upon what terms the two principal cities of Greece, Athens and Sparta, stood at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

GREECE was never united under the government of any one prince or estate until Philip of Macedon, and after him Alexander, brought them rather to a union and league against the Persian, whereof they were captains, than into any absolute subjection; for every estate held their own, and were governed by laws far different, and by their own magistrates, notwithstanding the power of the Macedonians, to whom they did yield obedience no other than as to such who were (perforce) their leaders in the Persian war, (deemed the general quarrel of Greece,) and took the profit and honour of the victory to their own use and increase of greatness. But the kings which afterwards reigned in Macedonia, did so far enlarge their authority, that all Greece was by them brought under such obedience as differed little from servitude, very few excepted, who could hardly, sometimes with arms, and sometimes with gifts, preserve their liberty, of whom the Lacedæmonians and Athenians were chief; which two people deserved best the plague of tyranny, having first given occasion thereunto by their great ambition, which wearied and weakened all the country by perpetual war: for

until these two cities of Athens and Sparta distracted all Greece, drawing every state into the quarrel on the one or other side, and so gave beginning to the Peloponnesian war, (the effects whereof, in true estimation, ceased not before the time that Philip had over-mastered all, forasmuch as every conclusion of one war afforded henceforth matter to some new distraction of the whole country,) the wars commenced between one city of Greece and another, were neither great nor of long continuance. All controversies were soon decided, either by the authority of the Amphietyones, who were the general council of Greece, or by the power of the Lacedæmonians, whose aid was commonly held as good as the assurance of victory.

These Lacedæmonians had lived about four hundred years under one form of government, when the Peloponnesian war began. Their education was only to practise feats of arms, wherein they so excelled, that a very few of them were thought equal to very great numbers of any other people. They were poor, and cared not much for wealth; every one had an equal portion of the common field, which sufficed to maintain him in such a manner of life as they used. For bravery they had none, and curious building or apparel they regarded not. Their diet was simple, their feasts and ordinary meals being in common halls, where all fared alike. They used money of iron, whereof they could not be covetous nor great hoarders. Briefly, they lived Utopian-like, save that they used no other occupation than war, placing all their felicity in the glory of their valour. Hereby it came to pass, that in all enterprises, whereof they were partakers, the leading and high command was granted to them, and all Greece followed their conduct. But the Athenians were in all points contrary to this; for they sought wealth, and measured the honours of their victories by the profit; they used mercenary soldiers in their wars, and exacted great tribute of

their subjects, which were for the most part islanders, compelled to obey them, because the Athenian fleet was great.

As in form of policy, and in course of life, so in conditions natural, the difference between these two people was very much. The Athenians were eager and violent, sudden in their conclusions, and as hasty in the execution; the Lacedæmonians very slow in their deliberations, full of gravity, but very resolute, and such as would in cold blood perform what the Athenians did usually in flagrant. Whereby it came to pass that the Lacedæmonians had all the estates of Greece depending upon them, as on men firm and assured, that sought honour and not riches; whereas the Athenians were followed by such as obeyed them perforce, being held in strait subjection. But the seignory of the Athenians was nothing large, until such time as the Persian Xerxes had invaded Greece, pretending only a quarrel to Athens. For then the citizens perceiving well, that the town of Athens could not be defended against his great army of seventeen hundred thousand men, bestowed all their wealth upon a navy; and, (assisted by the other Grecians,) overthrew the fleet of Xerxes, whose land-forces were soon after discomfited by them, and the Greeks, who all served under conduct of the Spartans. After these victories, the Athenians being now very mighty in fleet, reduced all the islands of the Grecian seas under their obedience, imposing upon them a hard tribute, for maintenance, (as they pretended,) of war against the Persian; though indeed they employed their forces chiefly to the conquest of such islands, and haven towns, of their own countrymen, as stood out against them. All which was easily suffered by the Lacedæmonians, who were in-landers, and men that delighted not in expeditions to be made far from home.

But afterwards perceiving the power of the Athenians to grow great, they held them in much jea-

lousy, and were very apt to quarrel with them; but much more willing to breed contention between them and other estates. Wherefore at such time as the Thebans would have oppressed the Plataeans, when they of Plataea repaired to Sparta for succour, they found there no other aid, than this advice, that they should seek help at Athens. Hereby it was thought, that the Athenians should be entangled in a long and tedious war with their neighbours of Thebes. But it proved otherwise, for their force was now so great, that all such occasions did only serve to encrease their honour and puissance.

SECT. II.

How Sparta and Athens entered into a war.

NEVERTHELESS many estates of Greece were very ill affected to Athens, because that city grew very insolent upon sudden prosperity; and maintaining the weaker towns against the stronger, encroached apace upon their neighbours, taking their dependents from them. Especially the Corinthians were much enraged, because the people of the island Corcyra, their colony, which had rebelled against them, and given them a great overthrow by sea, was by the Athenians (who desired to increase their fleet by adjoining that of Corcyra unto it,) taken into protection, and the Corinthians thereby impeded of that revenge which else they would have taken. Now, howsoever it were so, that these dealings of the Athenians were not directly against the conditions of peace agreed upon among the Greeks, yet were the complaints made at Sparta so vehement, that (though with much ado) they concluded to redress by war the injuries done to their allies.

First therefore seeking religious pretences, they required the Athenians to expiate certain offences committed against the gods; whereunto having for answer, that they themselves should expiate other

the like offences committed in Sparta, they began to deal plainly, and required that the people of some towns, oppressed by the state of Athens, should be set at liberty ; and that a decree made against those of Megara, whereby they were forbidden to enter any port of the Athenians, should be reversed. This last point they so earnestly pressed, that if they might obtain it, they promised to desist from their purpose of making war.

This they desired, not as a matter of any great importance (for it was a trifle) but only that by seeming to have obtained somewhat, they might preserve their reputation without entering into a war, which threatened them with greater difficulties apparent than they were very willing to undergo.

But the Athenians would yield to nothing ; for it was their whole desire that all Greece should take notice, how far they were from fear of any other city. Hereupon they prepared on both sides, very strongly, all that was needful to the war ; wherein the Lacedæmonians were superior, both in number and quality, being assisted by most of the cities in Greece, and having the general favour, as men that pretended to set at liberty such as were oppressed. But the Athenians did as far exceed them in all provisions, of money, shipping, engines, and absolute power of command among their subjects ; which they held, and afterwards found, of greater use in such need, than the willing readiness of friends, who soon grow weary, and are not easily assembled.

SECT. III.

The beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

THE first and second years expedition was very grievous to the city of Athens. For the fields were wasted ; the trees cut down ; the country people driven to fly, with their wives, children, and cattle, into the town ; whereby a most furious pestilence grew

in the city, such as before they had never felt, nor heard of. Hereunto was added the revolt of the Mytilenians, in the isle of Lesbos, and the siege of Plataea their confederated city, which they durst not adventure to raise; besides some small overthrows received. The Lacedæmonians assembling as great forces as they could raise out of Peloponnesus, did in the beginning of summer enter the country of Attica, and therein abide, until victuals began to fail, wasting and destroying all things round about: the governors of the Athenians would not suffer the people to issue into the field against them, for they knew the valour of their enemies; but used to send a fleet into Peloponnesus, which wasted as fast all the sea-coast of their enemies, whilst they were making war in Attica. So the Peloponnesians being the stronger by land, won the town of Plataea, which wanted rescue; the Athenians likewise being more mighty by sea, did subdue Mytilene, which had rebelled, but could not be succoured from Sparta.

By these proceedings in that war, the Lacedæmonians began to perceive how unfit they were to deal with such enemies. For after that Attica was thoroughly wasted, it lay not greatly in their power to do any offence, equal to such harm as they themselves might, and did receive. Their confederates began to set forward very slowly in their expeditions into Attica; perceiving well, that Athens was plentifully relieved with all necessaries, which came by sea from the islands that were subject unto that state; and therefore these invaders took but small pleasure in beholding the walls of that mighty city, or in wasting a forsaken field, which was to them a pattern of the calamities with which their own territory was the while afflicted. Wherefore they began to set their care to build a strong navy, wherein they had little good success, being easily vanquished by the Athenians, who both had more and better ships; and were so skilful in sea-fights, that a few vessels of theirs

durst undertake a great number of the Peloponnesians.

SECT. IV.

Of the great loss which the Spartans received at Pylus.

AMONG other losses which the Spartans had felt by sea, they received at Pylus a very sore blow, that compelled them to sue for peace. A fleet of Athenian ships, bound for Coreyra, wasting in that passage, as their manner was, the coast of Laconia, and all the half-isle of Peloponnesus, was by contrary winds detained at Pylus, which is a ragged promontory, joining to the main by a strait neck of land. Before it, there lies a small barren island, of less than two miles compass, and within that a creek, which is a good harbour for ships, the force of weather being borne off by the head-land and isle. This promontory the Athenians fortified as well as in haste they might; and what was wanting in their artificial fortification, was supplied by the natural strength and site of the place. By holding this piece of ground and haven, they reasonably expected many advantages against their enemies. For the country adjoining was inhabited by the Messenians, who in ancient times had held very strong and cruel war with Sparta; and, though quite subdued, they were held in strait subjection; yet was not the old hatred so extinguished, that, by the near neighbourhood and assistance of the Athenians, it might not be revived. Furthermore, it was thought, that many ill-willers to the Lacedæmonians, and as many of their bond-slaves as could escape from them, would repair to Pylus, and from thence make daily excursions into Laconia, which was not far off; or, if other hopes failed, yet would the benefit of this haven, lying almost in the midway between them and Corcyra, make them able to surround all Peloponnesus, and waste it at their pleasure.

The news of these doings at Pylus, drew the Peloponnesians thither in all haste out of Attica, which they had entered a few days before with their whole army. But now they brought not only their land-forces, but all their navy, to recover this piece, (which how bad a neighbour it might prove in time they well foresaw,) little fearing the grievous loss at hand, which they there in a few days received. For when they in vain made a general assault on all sides, both by sea and land, finding that small garrison which the Athenians had left very resolute in the defence, they occupied the haven, placing four hundred and twenty choice men, all of them citizens of Sparta, in the island beforementioned ; at each end whereof is a channel, that leads into the port, but so narrow that only two ships in front could enter between the isle and Pylus ; likewise but seven or eight ships could enter at once by the further channel, between the island and the main. Having thus taken order to shut up this new town by sea, they sent part of their fleet to fetch wood, and other stuff, wherewith to fortify round about, and block up the piece on all sides. But in the mean season, the Athenian fleet, hearing of their danger that were left at Pylus, returned thither, and with great courage entering the haven, did break and sink many of their enemies vessels, took five, and enforced the residue to run themselves a-ground.

Now was the town secure, and the Spartans abiding in the island as good as lost : wherefore the magistrates were sent from Sparta to the camp (as was their custom in great dangers) to advise what were best for the public safety ; who, when they did perceive that there was no other way to rescue their citizens out of the isle, than by composition with their enemies, they agreed to entreat with the Athenians about peace, taking truce in the meanwhile with the captains at Pylus. The conditions of the truce were,—That the Lacedæmonians should deliver up all the ships which were on the coast, and that

they should attempt nothing against the town, nor the Athenians against the camp: That a certain quantity of bread, wine, and flesh, should be daily carried into the isle, but that no ships should pass into the island secretly: That the Athenians should carry the Lacedæmonian ambassadors to Athens, there to treat of peace, and should bring them back, at whose return the truce should end; which, if in the mean time it were broken in any one point, should be held utterly void in all: That when the truce was expired, the Athenians should restore the Peloponnesian ships, in as good case as they received them. The ambassadors coming to Athens were of opinion, that as they themselves had begun the war, so might they end it when they pleased; wherefore they told the Athenians how great an honour it was that the Lacedæmonians did sue to them for peace; advising them to make an end of the war, whilst with such reputation they might. But they found all contrary to their expectation: for instead of concluding upon even terms, or desiring of meet recompence for loss sustained, the Athenians demanded certain cities to be restored to them, which had been taken from them by the Lacedæmonians long before this war began; refusing likewise to continue the treaty of peace, unless the Spartans, which were in the isle, were first rendered unto them as prisoners. Thus were the ambassadors returned without effect, at which time the truce being ended, it was desired of the Athenian captains, that they should, according to their covenant, restore the ships which had been put into their hands. Whereunto answer was made, that the condition of the truce was, That if any one article were broken, all should be held void: now (said the Athenians) ye have assaulted our garrisons, and thereby are we acquitted of our promise to restore the ships. This and the like frivolous allegations which they made, were but mere shifts; yet profit so far over-weighed honour, that better answer

none could be got. Then were the Lacedæmonians driven to use many hard means for conveyance of victuals into the isle, which finally was taken by force, and the men that were in it carried prisoners to Athens, where it was decreed, that when the Peloponnesians next invaded Attica, these prisoners should all be slain. Whether fearing the death of these men, or withheld by the troubles, which (according to the Athenians hope) fell upon them, the Lacedæmonians were so far from wasting Attica, that they suffered their own country to be continually over-run, both by the Athenians, who landed on all parts of their coast, and by those who issued out of Pylus; which became the rendezvous of all that were ill-affected unto them.

SECT. V.

How the Lacedæmonians hardly, and to their great disadvantage, obtained a peace, that was not well kept.

THEREFORE they endeavoured greatly to obtain peace; which the Athenians would not hearken unto. For they were so puffed up with the continuance of good success, that having sent a few bands of men into Sicily, to hold up a faction there, and make what profit they might of the Sicilians quarrels, when afterwards they heard that the differences in that isle were taken away, and their bands returned without either gain or loss, they banished the captains, as if it had been merely through their default that the isle of Sicily was not conquered; which (besides the longer distance) was, in power to offend others, or defend itself, no whit inferior to Peloponnesus. Yet was this their overweening much abated shortly after, by some disasters received, especially in Thrace; where, in a battle which they lost at Amphipolis, Cleon, and Brasidas, generals of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces, were both slain;

which two had most been adversaries to the peace. As the Athenians, by their losses, were taught moderation, so the Lacedæmonians, who not only felt the like wounds, but through the great navy which they had received at Pylus, were fain to proceed lamely in the war, against such as, through commodity of their good fleet, had all advantages that could be found in expedition, were fervently desirous to conclude the business, ere fortune by any new favour should revive the insolence which was at this time well mortified in their enemies. Neither was it only a consideration of their present estate, that urged them to bring the treaty of peace to a good and speedy effect; but other dangers hanging over their heads, and ready to fall on them, which, unless they compounded with the Athenians, they knew not how to avoid. The estate of Argos, which had ancient enmity with them, was now, after a truce of thirty years, well nigh expired, ready to take the benefit of their present troubles, by joining with those who alone found them work enough. Argos was a rich and strong city, which, though inferior to Sparta in valour, yet was not so unwarlike, nor held such ill correspondence with the neighbouring estates, that the Lacedæmonians could ever far prevail upon it, when they had little else to do. This was a thing that in the beginning of this war had not been regarded: for it was then thought, that by wasting the territory of Athens with sword and fire, the quarrel should easily, and in short time, have been ended; whereby not only the Athenians should have been brought to good order, but the Corinthians and others, for whose sake the war was undertaken, have been so firmly knit to the Lacedæmonians, that they should for love of them have abandoned the Argives to their own fortunes. But now the vanity of those hopes appeared, in that the Athenians, abounding in ready money, and means to raise more, were able to secure themselves by a strong fleet from any great

harm that the Peloponnesians, wanting wherewith to maintain a navy, could do unto them; yea, as masters of the sea, to weary them out, as in effect already they had done. As for the confederates of Sparta, they could now endure neither war nor peace; their daily travels and many losses had so wearied and incensed them. Wherefore the Lacedæmonians were glad to use the occasion, which the inclination of their enemies did then afford, of making a final peace, (which with much ado they procured,) as seemed equal and easy, but was indeed impossible to be performed, and therefore all their travel was little effectual.

The restitution of prisoners and places taken being agreed upon, it fell out by lot, that the Lacedæmonians should restore first. These had won more towns upon the continent from the Athenians, than the Athenians had from them; but what they had won, they had not won absolutely. For they had restored some towns to such of their allies from whom the state of Athens had taken them; some, and those the most, they had set at liberty, (as reason required,) which had opened their gates unto them, as to their friends and deliverers, and not compelled them to break in as enemies. Now, concerning the towns which were not in their own hands, but had been rendered unto their confederates, the Spartans found means to give some satisfaction, by permitting the Athenians to retain others, which they had gotten in the war; as for the rest, they promised more than afterwards they could perform. The cities which they had taken into protection, could not endure to hear of being abandoned; neither would they by any means yield themselves into the hands of their old lords, the Athenians, whom they had offended by revolting, notwithstanding whatsoever articles were drawn and concluded, for their security and betterance in time to come. This dull performance of conditions on the side of the Spartans, made the A-

thenians become as backward in doing those things which on their part were required ; so that restoring only the prisoners which they had, they deferred the rest, until such time as they might receive the full satisfaction according to the agreement. But before such time as these difficulties broke out into matter of open quarrel, the Lacedæmonians entered into a more strait alliance with the Athenians ; making a league offensive and defensive with them. Hereunto they were moved by the backwardness of the Argives, who being, (as they thought,) likely to have sued for peace at their hands, as soon as things were once compounded between Athens and Sparta, did shew themselves plainly unwilling to give ear to any such motion. Thinking therefore, that by cutting from Argos all hope of Athenian succour, they should make sure work, the Spartans regarded not the affections of other states, whom they had either bound unto them by well-deserving in the late war, or found so troublesome, that their enmity, (if perhaps they durst let it appear,) were little worse than friendship. It bred great jealousy in all the cities of Greece, to perceive such a conjunction between two so powerful signiories ; especially one clause threatening every one, that was any thing apt to fear, with a secret intent that might be harboured in their proud conceits, of subduing the whole country, and taking each what they could lay hold on. For, besides the other articles, it was agreed, That they might by mutual consent add new conditions, or alter the old at their own pleasures. This impression wrought so strongly in the Corinthians, Thebans, and other ancient confederates of Sparta, that the hate which they had borne to the Athenians their professed enemies, was violently thrown upon the Lacedæmonians, their unjust friends ; whereby it came to pass, that they who had lately borne chief sway in Greece, might have been abandoned to the discretion of their enemies, as already in effect they were, had the enemies wisely used the advantage.

SECT. VI.

Of the negotiations, and practices, held between many states of Greece, by occasion of the peace that was concluded.

THE admiration wherein all Greece held the valour of Sparta, as irresistible, and able to make way through all impediments, had been so excessive, that when, by some sinister accidents, that city was compelled to take and seek peace, upon terms not sounding very honourable, this common opinion was not only abated, but, (as happens usually in things extreme,) was changed into much contempt. For it was never thought that any Lacedæmonian would have endured to lay down his weapons, and yield himself prisoner, nor that any misfortune could have been so great, as should have drawn that city to relieve itself otherwise than by force of arms. But when once it had appeared, that many of their citizens, among whom were some of especial mark, being overlaid by enemies, in the island before Pylus, had rather chosen to live in captivity, than to die in fight; and that Pylus itself, sticking as a thorn in the foot of Laconia, had bred such anguish in that estate, as utterly wearying the accustomed Spartan resolution, had made it sit down, and seek to refresh itself by dishonourable ease; then did not only the Corinthians and Thebans begin to conceive basely of those men which were virtuous, though unfortunate, but other lesser cities, joining with these in the same opinion, did cast their eyes upon the rich and great city of Argos, of whose ability, to do much, they conceived a strong belief, because of long time it had done nothing. Such is the base condition, which, through foolish envy, is become almost natural in the greater part of mankind. We curiously search into their vices, in whom had they kept some distance, we should have discerned only the virtues;

and comparing injuriously our best part with their worst, are justly plagued with a false opinion of that good in strangers which we know to be wanting in ourselves.

The first that published their dislike of Sparta, were the Corinthians, at whose vehement intreaty, (though moved rather by envy at the greatness of Athens daily increasing,) the Lacedæmonians had entered into the present war. But these Corinthians did only murmur at the peace, alleging as grievances, that some towns of theirs were left in the Athenians hands. The Mantineans, who, during the time of war, had procured some part of the Arcadians to become their followers, and forsake their dependency upon the state of Sparta, did more freely and readily discover themselves; fear of revenge to come, working more effectually than indignation at things already past. The Argives feeling the gale of prosperous fortune that began to fill their sails, prepared themselves to take as much of it as they could stand under; giving for that purpose, unto twelve of their citizens, a full and absolute commission to make alliance between them and any free cities of Greece, (Athens and Sparta excepted,) without any further trouble of propounding every particular business to the multitude. When the gates of Argos were thus set open to all comers, the Mantineans began to lead the way, and many cities of Peloponnesus following them, entered into this new confederacy; some incited by private respects, others thinking it the wisest way to do as the most did.

What inconvenience might arise to them by these courses, the Lacedæmonians easily discerned; and therefore sent ambassadors to stop the matter at Corinth, where they well perceived that the mischief had been hatched. These ambassadors found in the Corinthians a very rough disposition, with a gravity expressing the opinion which they had conceived of their present advantage over Sparta. They

had caused all cities which had not entered yet into the alliance with Argos, to send their agents to them, in whose presence they gave audience to the Lacedæmonians; the purport of whose embassy was this: That the Corinthians, without breach of their oath, could not forsake the alliance which they had long since made with Sparta, and that reason did as well bind them to hold themselves contented with the peace lately made, as religion enforced them to continue in their ancient confederacy; forasmuch as it had been agreed between the Spartans and their associates, that the consent of the greater part (which had yielded unto peace with Athens) should bind the lesser number to perform what was concluded, if no divine impediment withstood them. Hereunto the Corinthians made answer, that the Spartans had first begun to do them open wrong, in concluding the war, wherein they had lost many places, without provision of restitution; and that the very clause alledged by the ambassadors, did acquit them from any necessity of subscribing to the late peace; forasmuch as they had sworn unto those people whom they persuaded to rebel against Athens, that they would never abandon them, nor willingly suffer them to fall again into the tyrannous hands of the Athenians. Wherefore they held themselves bound both in reason and religion, to use all means of upholding those whom by common consent they had taken into protection; for that an oath was no less to be accounted a divine impediment, than were pestilence, tempest, or any the like accident, hindering the performance of things undertaken. As for the alliance with Argos, they said that they would do as they should find cause. Having dismissed the ambassadors with this answer, they made all haste to join themselves with Argos, and caused other states do the like, so that Sparta and Athens were in a manner left to themselves, the Thebans and Megarians being also upon the point to have entered into this new confederacy. But as the

affections were divers, which caused this hasty confluence of sudden friends to Argos, it so likewise came to pass, that the friendship itself, such as it was, had much diversity both of sincerity and of continuance. For some there were that hated or feared the Lacedæmonians; as the Mantineans and Eleans; these did firmly betake themselves to the Argives, in whom they knew the same affection to be inveterate: others did only hate the peace concluded; and these would rather have followed the Spartans than the Argives in war, yet rather the Argives in war than the Lacedæmonians in peace: Of this number were the Corinthians, who knowing that the Thebans were affected like unto themselves, dealt with them to enter into the society of the Argives, as they had done; but the different forms of government used in Thebes and Argos, caused the Thebans to hold rather with Sparta, that was ruled by the principal men, than to incur the danger of innovation, by joining with such as committed the whole rule to the multitude.

This business having ill succeeded, the Corinthians began to bethink themselves of their own danger, who had not so much as any truce with Athens, and yet were unprepared for war. They sought therefore to come to some temporary agreement with the Athenians, and hardly obtained it; for the Athenians, who had dealt with all Greece at one time, did not greatly care to come to any appointment with one city, that had shewed against them more stomach than force; but gave them to understand that they might be safe enough from them, if they would claim the benefit of that alliance which Athens had lately made with Sparta and her dependants: yet, finally, they granted unto these Corinthians, (which were loth to acknowledge themselves dependents of Sparta,) the truce that they desired; but into private confederacy they would not admit them, it being an article of the league between them and

the Spartans, that the one should not make peace nor war without the other.

Herein, as in many other passages, may clearly be seen the great advantage which absolute lords have, as well in peace as in war, over such as are served by voluntaries. We shall hardly find any one signiory that hath been so constantly followed as Sparta was, by so many states, and some of them little inferior to itself, being all as free; whereas contrariwise, the Athenians had lately, and by compulsive means, gotten their dominion, wherein they demeaned themselves as tyrants. But in performance of conditions agreed upon, the Athenians were able to make their words good, by excluding any state out of their confederacy, and giving up such places as were agreed upon; of which the Lacedæmonians could do neither the one nor the other. For such towns as their old allies had gotten by their means in the late war, could not be restored without their consent, which had them in present possession; and particularly the town of Panacte, which the Thebans held, could by no means be obtained from them by the Lacedæmonians (who earnestly desired it, that by restitution thereof unto the Athenians, as earnestly demanding it, themselves might recover Pylus) unless they would agree to make a private alliance with Thebes; which thereupon they were constrained to do, though knowing it to be contrary to the last agreement between them and Athens.

The Lacedæmonians having broken one article of the league made between them and the Athenians, that by so doing they might enable themselves to the performance of another, were shamefully disappointed of their hopes by the Thebans, who did not give up the town of Panacte till first they had utterly demolished it, and made it of no worth to the Athenians. This was sought to have been excused by the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, who coming to Athens (whither they had sent home all prisoners that had been

detained at Thebes) hoped with gentle words to salve the matter; saying, that from henceforth no enemy to Athens should nestle in Panacte, for it was destroyed. But these ambassadors had not to deal with tame fools: for the Athenians told them in plain terms, that of three principal conditions agreed upon in their late league, they had not performed any one, but used such base collusion as stood not with their honour: having made private alliance with the Thebans; having destroyed a town which they should have restored; and not having forced their dependents, by war, to make good the covenants of the late concluded peace. Hereupon they dismissed the ambassadors with rough words, meaning with as rough deeds to anger those that sent them.

There were at that time, both in Athens and Sparta, many that were ill contented with the peace; among whom were the ephori, chosen for that year in Sparta, and Alcibiades, a powerful young gentleman in Athens. But the ephori, though desiring to renew the war, yet wished that first they might get from the Athenians as much as was to be rendered to them by covenant, especially Pylus, that had so sorely troubled them. Alcibiades, whose nobility, riches, and favour with the people, made him desire war, as the means whereby himself might procure some honourable employment, used all means to set the quarrel on foot, while the Athenians had yet both advantage enough, as not having rendered ought save their prisoners, and pretence enough to use that advantage of breaking the peace, by reason that the Lacedæmonians (though indeed against their wills) had broken all covenants with them. Now the state of Athens had fully determined to retain Pylus, and to perform nothing that the Lacedæmonians should and might require, until they had first, without any longer halting, fulfilled all articles whereunto they were bound, even to the utmost

point. This was enough to make them sweat, who having already done the most that they could, had as yet got nothing in recompense, except the delivery of their citizens which were prisoners. But Alcibiades wishing a speedy beginning of open war, sent privily to the Argives, and gave them to understand how fitly the time served for them to associate themselves with Athens, which was enough to give them security against all enemies.

The Argives upon the first confluence of many estates unto their society, had embraced great hopes of working wonders, as if they should have had the conduct of all Greece against the Athenians, robbing Sparta of that honour, as having ill used it, and thereby leaving their old enemies in case of much contempt and disability. But these sudden apprehensions of vain joy, were suddenly changed into as vain fear; which ill agreed with the great opinion that had lately been conceived of Argos. For when the Thebans had refused their alliance; when the Corinthians had sought security from Athens; and when a false rumour was noised abroad, that Athens, Thebes, and Sparta, were come to a full agreement upon all points of difference,—then began the Argives to let fall their crests, and sue for peace unto the Lacedæmonians, who needing it as much as they, or more, yet held their gravity, and were not overhasty to accept it. At this time, and in this perturbation, the message of Alcibiades came very welcome to the Argives, which were not now consulting to become the chief of all others, but how to save themselves. Wherefore they sent away presently to Athens their own ambassadors, accompanied with the Mantineans and Eleans, to make a league, offensive and defensive, between their estates and the Athenians.

Of this business the Lacedæmonians knew not what to think; for well they saw, that such a com-

bination tended to their great hurt, and therefore were desirous to prevent it. But to keep the love of the Athenians, the new Ephori thought that more was already done, than stood with their honour or profit; others held it the wisest way, having done so much, not to stick at a little more, but rather by giving full satisfaction, to retain the friendship of that state, which was more to be valued than all the rest of Greece. This resolution prevailing, they sent away such of their citizens as were best affected to the peace; who coming to Athens with full commission to make an end of all controversies, did earnestly labour in the council-house, to make the truth of things appear,—saying, that their confederacy with the Thebans had tended to none other end than the recovery of Panacte; concerning which town, or any other business, that it much grieved the Lacedæmonians to see things fall out in such wise as might give to the Athenians cause of displeasure; but that all should be done which in reason might be required for making matters even between them; to which purpose they shewed that themselves had absolute commission. Wherefore they desired that Pylus might be restored unto them, and especially for the present, that the negotiations with the Argives might be called aside. Favourable audience was given to this proposition; the rather, because they, which promised amends, had power to make their words good. But all this fair likelihood of good agreement was dashed on the sudden, by the practice of Alcibiades, who secretly dealing with the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, persuaded them well of his friendship towards their city, and advised them to take all care, that their absolute power to conclude what they pleased in the name of Sparta, might not be known to the commonalty of Athens, lest the insolent multitude should thereupon grow peremptory, and yield to nothing, unless they could draw them to unreasonable conditions. The ambassadors be-

lieved him, and fashioned their tale in the assembly of the people as he had advised them. Hereupon the same Alcibiades taking presently the advantage, which their double dealing afforded, inveighed openly against them, as men of no sincerity, that were come to Athens for none other purpose than to hinder the people from strengthening themselves with friends, meaning to draw the Argives and their adherents to their own alliance, as, (contrary to their oath,) already they had the Thebans. The people of Athens, whom a pleasing errand would hardly have satisfied, or brought into a good opinion of the Lacedæmonians, (whose honest meanings had been so ill seconded with good performance,) were now so incensed with the double dealing of the ambassadors, and the strong persuasions of Alcibiades, that little wanted of concluding the league with Argos. Yet for the present, so far did Nicias, an honourable citizen, and great friend to the peace, prevail with them, that the business was put off, till he himself, with other ambassadors, might fetch a better answer from Sparta.

It may seem a great wonder, how so poor a trick of Alcibiades was able to carry a matter of such importance, when the Spartan ambassadors might have cast the load upon his own shoulders, by discovering the truth. But the gravity which was usually found in the Lacedæmonians, hindered them, perhaps, from playing their game handsomely against so nimble a wit; and they might well have been thought untrusty men, had they professed themselves such as would say and unsay for their most advantage.

Nicias and his companions had a sour message to deliver at Sparta; being peremptorily to require performance of all conditions, and, among the rest, that the Lacedæmonians should take the pains to rebuild Panacte, and should immediately renounce their alliance made with the Thebans; letting them under-

stand, that otherwise the Athenians, without further delay, would enter into confederacy with the Argives and their adherents. The ephori at Sparta had no mind to forsake the Thebans, assured friends to their state; but wrought so hard, that the anger of the Athenians was suffered to break out what way it could; which to mitigate they would do no more, than only, (at the request of Nicias their honourable friend, who would not seem to have effected nothing,) swear anew to keep the articles of the league between them and Athens. Immediately therefore upon return of the ambassadors, a new league was made between the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and very ample provision for holding the same common friends and enemies; wherein, though the Lacedæmonians were passed over with silence, yet was it manifest that the whole intent of this confederacy did bend itself chiefly against them, as in short while after was proved by effect.

At this time the Lacedæmonians were in ill case, who having restored all that they could unto the Athenians, and procured others to do the like, had themselves recovered nothing of their own, (prisoners excepted,) for default of restoring all that they should. But that which did most of all disable them was the loss of reputation, which they had not more impaired in the late war by misfortunes, than in sundry passages between them and the Athenians; to procure and keep whose amity, they had left sundry of their old friends to shift for themselves. Contrariwise, the Athenians, by the treaty of peace, had recovered the most part of that which they lost in war; all their gettings they had retained; and were strengthened by the access of new confederates.

SECT. VII.

How the peace between Athens and Sparta was ill kept, though not openly broken.

It was not long ere the Argives and their fellows had found business wherewith to set the Athenians on work, and make use of this conjunction. For, presuming upon the strength of their side, they began to meddle with the Epidaurians, whom it concerned the state of Sparta to defend. So many acts of hostility were committed, wherein Athens and Sparta did not, (as principals,) infest each other, but came in collaterally, as to the aid of their several friends.

By these occasions, the Corinthians, Beotians, Phocians, Locrians, and other people of Greece, began anew to range themselves under the Lacedæmonians, and follow their ensigns. One victory, which the Lacedæmonians obtained by their mere valour, in a set battle near to Mantinea, against the Argive side, helped well to repair their decayed reputation, though otherwise it yielded them no great profit. The civil dissension, arising shortly after within Argos itself, between the principal citizens and the commons, had almost thrown down the whole frame of the new combination. For the chief citizens getting the upper hand, made a league with Sparta, wherein they proceeded so far as to renounce the amity of the Athenians in express words, and forced the Mantineans to the like. But in short space of time the multitude prevailing, reversed all this, and having chased away their ambitious nobility, applied themselves to the Athenians as closely as before.

Besides these uproars in Peloponnesus, many essays were made to raise up troubles in all parts of Greece, and likewise in Macedon, to the Athenians; whose forces and readiness for execution prevented some things, revenged other, and requited all with

some prosperous attempts. Finally, the Athenians wanting matter of quarrel, and the Lacedæmonians growing weary, they began to be quiet, retaining still that enmity in their hearts, which they had sufficiently discovered in effects, though not yet breaking out into terms of open war.

SECT. VIII.

The Athenians, sending two fleets to sack Syracuse, are put to flight, and utterly discomfited.

DURING this intermission of open war, the Athenians re-entertained their hopes of subduing Sicily, whither they sent a fleet so mighty as never was set forth by Greece in any age before or after. This fleet was very well manned, and furnished with all necessaries to so great an expedition;—all which came to nought, partly by the factions in Athens, whence Alcibiades, author of that voyage, and one of the generals of their fleet, was driven to banish himself for fear of such judgment as else he was like to have undergone among the incensed people; partly by the invasion which the Lacedæmonians made upon Attica, whilst the forces of that state were so far from home. Hereunto was added the aid of the king of Persia, who supplied the Peloponnesians with money.

Neither was the success of things in Sicily such as, without help from Athens, could give any likelihood of a good end in that war; for although, in the beginning, the enterprise had so well succeeded that they besieged Syracuse, the chief city of the island, and one of the fairest towns which the Greeks inhabited, obtaining the better in sundry battles by land and sea, yet, when the town was relieved with strong aid from Peloponnesus, it came to pass that the Athenians were put to the worse on all sides, in such wise that their fleet was shut up in the haven of Syracuse, and could not issue out.

As the Athenian affairs went very ill in Sicily, so did they at home stand upon hard terms; for the Lacedæmonians, who had been formerly accustomed to make wearisome yearly journeys into Attica, (which having pillaged and foraged, they returned home,) did now, by counsel of Alcibiades, (who seeking revenge upon his own citizens, was fled unto them,) fortify the town of Decelea, which was near to Athens, whence they ceased not, with daily excursions, to harry all the country round about, and sometimes give alarm unto the city itself. In these extremities, the perverse obstinacy of the Athenians was very strange; who leaving at their backs, and at their own doors, an enemy little less mighty than themselves, did yet send forth another fleet into Sicily, to invade a people no less puissant, which never had offended them.

It often happens, that prosperous events make foolish counsel seem wiser than it was; which came to pass many times among the Athenians, whose vain conceits Pallas was said to turn unto the best: but where unsound advice finding bad proof is obstinately pursued, neither Pallas nor fortune can be justly blamed for a miserable issue. This second fleet of the Athenians, which better might have served to convey home the former that was defeated, after some attempts, made to small purpose, against the Syracusans, was finally, (together with the other part of the navy, which was there before,) quite vanquished, and barred up in the haven of Syracuse; whereby the camp of the Athenians, utterly deprived of all benefit by sea, either for succour or departure, was driven to break up and fly away by land; in which flight they were overtaken, routed, and quite overthrown, in such wise that scarce any man escaped.

This mischief deservedly fell upon the Athenians, who had wickedly condemned into exile Sophocles and Pthiodorus, generals, formerly sent into

that isle, pretending that they had taken money for making peace in Sicily, whereas indeed there was not any means or possibility to have made war. Hereby it came to pass, that Nicias, who had the chief command in this unhappy enterprise, did rather choose to hazard the ruin of his country, by the loss of that army, wherein consisted little less than all the power of Athens, than to adventure his own estate, his life, and his honour, upon the tongues of shameless accusers, and the sentence of judges before his trial resolved to condemn him, by retiring from Syracuse, when wisdom and necessity required it. ‘ For, (said he,) they shall give sentence upon ‘ us, who know not the reason of our doings, nor ‘ will give ear to any one that would speak in our behalf, but altogether hearken to suspicious and vain ‘ rumours that shall be brought against us; yea, these ‘ our soldiers, who now are so desirous to return in ‘ safety, will, in our danger, be well contented to ‘ frame their tales to the pleasure of the lewd and ‘ insolent multitude.’

This resolution of Nicias, though it cannot be commended, (for it is the part of an honest and valiant man to do what reason willeth, not what opinion expecteth, and to measure honour or dishonour by the assurance of his well-informed conscience, rather than by the malicious report and censure of others,) yet it may be excused; since he had before his eyes the injustice of his people, and had well understood that a wicked sentence is infinitely worse than a wicked fact, as being held a precedent and pattern, whereby oppression beginning upon one, is extended as warrantable upon all. Therefore his fear of wrongful condemnation was such, as a constant man could not easily have over-mastered; but, when afterwards, the army having no other expectation of safety than the faint hope of a secret flight, he was so terrified with an eclipse of the moon happening when they were about to dislodge, that he would not consent to

have the camp break up till seven and twenty days were passed, his timorousness was even as foolish and ridiculous as the issue of it was lamentable; for he should not have thought that the power of the heavens, and the course of nature, would be as unjust as his Athenians, or might portend less evil to the slothful than to such as did their best. Neither do I think, that any astrologer can allege this eclipse as either a cause or prognostication of that army's destruction, otherwise than as the folly of men did, by application, turn it to their own confusion. Had C. Cassius, the Roman, he who slew Julius Cæsar, imitated this superstition of Nicias, he had surely found the same fortune in a case very like. But when he, retiring with the broken remainder of Crassus's army, defeated by the Parthian archers, was advised, upon such an accident as this, to continue where he then was, till the sun were past the sign of *Scorpio*, he made answer, that he stood not in such fear of *Scorpio*, as of *Sagittarius*. So adventuring rather to abide the frowning of the heavens, than the nearer danger of enemies upon earth, he made such a safe and honourable retreat, as did both shew his noble resolution, and give a fair example to that good rule,

———Sapiens dominabitur astris.

Thus we see that God, who ordinarily works by concatenation of means, deprives the governors of understanding when he intends evil to the multitude; and that the wickedness of unjust men is the ready means to weaken the virtue of those who might have done them good.

SECT. IX.

Of the troubles whereinto the state of Athens fell, after the great loss of the fleet and army in Sicily.

The loss of this army was the ruin of the Athenian dominion, and may be well accounted a very little less calamity to that estate than was the subversion of the walls, when the city about seven years after was taken by Lysander. For now began the subjects of the Athenian estate to rebel; of whom, some they reduced under their obedience, others held out; some for fear of greater inconvenience were set at liberty, promising only to be their good friends, as formerly they had been their subjects; others, having a kind of liberty offered by the Athenians, were not therewith contented, but obtained a true and perfect liberty by force. Among these troubles it fell out very unseasonably, that the principal men of Athens, being wearied with the people's insolency, took upon them to change the form of that estate, and bring the government into the hands of a few. To which purpose, conspiring with the captains which were abroad, they caused them to set up the form of an aristocracy in the towns of their confederates; and in the meantime, some that were most likely to withstand this innovation being slain, at Athens, the commonalty were so dismayed, that none durst speak against the conspirators, whose number they knew not; but every man was afraid of his neighbour, lest he should be a member of the league. In this general fear the majesty of Athens was usurped by four hundred men, who observing in shew the ancient form of proceeding, did cause all matters to be propounded unto the people, and concluded upon by the greater part of voices; but the things propounded were only such as were first allowed in private among themselves; neither had the commonalty any other liberty, than only to approve and

give consent ; for whosoever presumed any further, was quickly dispatched out of the way, and no inquiry made of the murder. By these means were many decrees made, all tending to the establishment of this new authority, which nevertheless endured not long. For the fleet and army which then was in the isle of Samos, did altogether detest these dealings of the four hundred usurpers, and held them as enemies; whereupon they revoked Alcibiades out of banishment, and by his assistance procured that the supplies which the Persian king had promised unto the Lacedæmonians, were, by Tissaphernes, his lieutenant, made unprofitable through the slow and bad performance.

Alcibiades had at the first been very well entertained in Sparta, whilst his service done to that state was not grown to be the object of envy. But when it appeared that in counsel and good performance he so far excelled all the Lacedæmonians, that all their good success was ascribed to his wit and valour, then were all the principal citizens weary of his virtue; especially Agis, one of their kings, whose wife had so far yielded herself to the love of this Athenian, that among her inward friends she could not forbear to call her young child by his name. Hereupon order was taken that Alcibiades should be killed out of the way. But he discovering the Spartan treachery, conveyed himself unto Tissaphernes, whom he so bewitched with his great beauty, sweet conversation, and sound wit, that he soon became the master of that barbarous viceroy's affections, who had free power to dispose the great king's treasures and forces in those parts. Then began he to advise Tissaphernes, not so far forth to assist the Lacedæmonians that they should quite overthrow the state of Athens, but rather to help the weaker side, and let them one consume another, whereby all should fall at length into the hands of the Persian. By this counsel he made way to other practices, wherein by

strength of his reputation (as the only favourite of so great a potentate) he played his own game, procuring his restitution. At length his banishment being repealed by the army, but not by the citizens, (who then were oppressed by the four hundred,) he laboured greatly to reconcile the soldiers to the governors, or at least to divert their heat another way, and turn it upon the common enemy. Some of the four hundred approved his motion, as being weary of the tyranny whereof they were partakers; partly because they saw it could not longer endure; and partly for that themselves, being less regarded by the rest of their companions than stood with their good liking, sought to acquit themselves of it as honestly as they might. But the most of that faction laboured to obtain peace of the Lacedæmonians, desiring chiefly to maintain both their own authority, and the greatness of their city, if they might; but if this could not be, they did rather wish to preserve their own power, or safety at least, than the good estate of the commonwealth. Therefore they made sundry overtures of peace to the Lacedæmonians, desiring to compound in as good terms as they might, and affirming that they were fitter to be trusted than the wavering multitude; especially considering that the city of Sparta was governed by an aristocracy, to which form they had now reduced Athens. All these passages between the four hundred, (or the most and chief of them,) and the Lacedæmonians, were kept as secret as might be. For the city of Athens hoping, without any great cause, to repair their losses, was not inclined to make composition; from which, upon juster ground, the enemy was much more averse, trusting well that the discord of the Athenians, (not unknown abroad,) might yield some fair opportunity to the destruction of itself; which in effect (though not then presently) came to pass. And upon this hope king Agis did sometimes bring his forces from Decelea to Athens,

where, doing no good, he received some small losses. Likewise the navy of Peloponnesus made shew of attempting the city, but seeing no likelihood of success, they bent their course from thence to other places, where they obtained victories, which, in the better fortune of the Athenians, might more likely have been regarded, than in this their decayed estate. Yet it seems, without any disparagement to their wisdom, they should rather have forborne to present unto the city, or to the countries near adjoining, any terror of the war. For the dissention within the walls might soon have done more hurt than could be received from the fleet or army without; which indeed gave occasion to set the citizens at unity, though it lasted not very long. The four hundred, by means of these troubles, were fain to resign their authority, which they could not now hold, when the people, having taken arms to repel foreign enemies, would not lay them down, till they had freed themselves from such as oppressed the state at home. Yet was not this alteration of government a full restitution of the sovereign command unto the people, or whole body of the city, but only to five thousand; which company the four hundred (when their authority began) had pretended to take unto them as assistants; herein seeming to do little wrong or none to the commonalty, who seldom assembled in great number. But now when the highest power was come indeed into the hands of so many, it was soon agreed that Alcibiades and his companions should be recalled from exile, and that the army at Samos should be requested to undertake the government, which was forthwith reformed according to the soldiers' desire.

SECT. X.

How Alcibiades won many important victories for the Athenians, was recalled from exile, made their general, and again deposed.

THIS establishment of things in the city was accompanied with some good success in the wars. For the Lacædemonians were about the same time overthrown at sea, in a great battle, by the Athenian fleet, which had remained at Samos; to which Alcibiades afterwards joining such forces as he could raise, obtained many victories. Before the town of Abydos, his arrival with eighteen ships gave the honour of a great battle to the Athenians; he overthrew and utterly destroyed the fleet of the Lacædemonians, commanded by Mindarus; took the towns of Cyzicus and Perinthus; made the Selymbrians ransom their city, and fortified Chrysopolis. Hereupon letters were sent to Sparta, which the Athenians, intercepting, found to contain the distress of the army in these few words: ‘ All is lost, Mindarus is slain, the soldiers want victuals, we know not what to do.’

Shortly after this, Alcibiades overthrew the Lacædemonians in fight by land at Chalcedon, took Selymbria, besieged and won Byzantium, now called Constantinople, which even in those days was a goodly, rich, and very strong city. Hereupon he returned home with very great welcome, and was made high admiral of all the navy.

But this his honour continued not long; for it was taken from him, and he driven to banish himself again; only because his lieutenant, contrary to the express command of Alcibiades, fighting with the enemies in his absence, had lost a great part of the fleet.

The second banishment of Alcibiades was to the Athenians more harmful than the first; and the loss

which they thereupon received was, (though more heavy to them,) yet less to be pitied of others, than that which ensued upon his former exile. For whereas at the first, he had sought revenge upon his own city, now, as inured to adversity, he rather pitied their fury, who in time of such danger had cast out him that should have repaired their weak estate, than sought by procuring or beholding the calamity of his people, to comfort himself after injury received. Before they, who were instituted in the place of Alcibiades, arrived at the fleet, he presented battle to Lysander the Lacedæmonian admiral, who was not so confident upon his former victory, as to undertake Alcibiades himself, bringing more ships in number (notwithstanding the former loss of fifteen) than his enemies had, and better ordered than they had been under his lieutenant. But when the decree of the people was published in the navy, then did Alcibiades withdraw himself to a town upon Hellespont, called Bisanthe, where he had built a castle.

SECT. XI.

The battle at Arginusæ, and condemnation of the victorious Athenian captains by the people.

AFTER this time the Athenians, receiving many losses and discomfitures, were driven to fly into the haven of Mytilene, where they were straitly besieged both by land and sea. For the raising of this siege necessity enforced them to man all their vessels, and to put the uttermost of their forces into the hazard of one battle. This battle was fought at Arginusæ, where Callicratidas, admiral of the Lacedæmonians, losing the honour of the day, preserved his own reputation by dying valiantly in the fight. It might well have been expected, that the ten captains, who jointly had command in chief over the Athenian fleet, should for that good day's service,

and so happy a victory, have received great honour of their citizens. But contrariwise they were forthwith called home, and accused as if wilfully they had suffered many of the citizens, whose ships were broken and sunk, to be cast away, when, by appointing some vessels to take them up, they might have saved them from being drowned. Hereto the captains readily made a very just answer; that they, pursuing the victory, had left part of the fleet, under sufficient men, to save those that were wrecked; which if it were not well accomplished, it was because a tempest, arising about the end of the fight, had hindered the performance of that and other their intendments. This excuse availed not: for a lewd fellow was brought forth, who said, that he himself escaping in a meal-tub, had been intreated by those who were in peril of drowning, to desire of the people revenge of their deaths upon the captains. It was very strange, that upon such an accusation, maintained with so slender evidence, men, that had well deserved of their country, should be overthrown. But their enemies had so incensed the rascally multitude, that no man durst absolve them, save only Socrates the wise and virtuous philosopher, whose voice in this judgment was not regarded. Six of them were put to death, of whom one had hardly escaped drowning, and was with much ado relieved by other vessels in the storm: but the captains which were absent escaped; for when the fury of the people was over-passed, this judgment was reversed, and the accusers called into question for having deceived and perverted the citizens. Thus the Athenians went about to free themselves from the infamy of injustice; but the divine justice was not asleep, nor would be so deluded.

SECT. XII.

The battle at Ægos-Potamos, wherein the whole state of Athens was ruined; with the end of the Peloponnesian war.

THE Peloponnesian fleet under Lysander, the year next following, having scoured the Ægean seas, entered Hellespont, where (landing soldiers) it besieged and took the town of Lampsacus. Hereupon all the navy of Athens, being an hundred and fourscore sail, made thither in haste; but finding Lampsacus taken before their coming, they put in at Sestos, where having refreshed themselves, they sailed to the river called Ægos-Potamos, which is (as we might name it) Goats-brook, or the river of the Goat, being on the continent, opposite to Lampsacus; and there they cast anchors, not one whole league off from Lysander, who rode at Lampsacus in the harbour. The next day after their arrival, they presented fight unto the Peloponnesians, who refused it; whereupon the Athenians returned again to Ægos-Potamos; and thus they continued five days, braving every day the enemy, and returning to their own harbour when it drew towards evening.

The castle of Alcibiades was not far from the navy, and his power in those places was such as might have greatly availed his countrymen, if they could have made use of it. For he had waged mercenaries, and making war in his own name upon some people of the Thracians, had gathered much wealth, and obtained much reputation among them. He perceiving the disorderly course of the Athenian commanders, repaired unto them, and shewed what great inconvenience might grow, if they did not soon foresee and prevent it. For they lay in a road subject to every weather, neither near enough to any town where they might furnish themselves with necessaries, nor so far off as had been more expedient. Sestos was the next market-town; thither

both soldiers and mariners resorted, flocking away from the navy every day, as soon as they were returned from braving the enemy. Therefore Alcibiades willed them either to lie at Sestos, which was not far off; or at the least, to consider how near their enemy was, whose fear proceeded rather from obedience to their general, than from any cowardice. This admonition was so far despised, that some of the commanders willed him to meddle with his own matters, and to remember that his authority was out of date. Had it not been for these opprobrious words, he could (as he told his familiars) have compelled the Lacedæmonians either to fight upon unequal terms, or utterly to quit their fleet. And like enough it was that he might so have done, by transporting the light-armed Thracians his confederates, and others his followers, over the straits, who assaulting the Peloponnesians by land, would either have compelled them to put to sea, or else to leave their ships to the mercy of the Athenians. But finding their acceptance of his good counsel no better than hath been rehearsed, he left them to their fortune, which how evil it would be he did prognosticate.

Lysander all this while defending himself by the advantage of his haven, was not careless in looking into the demeanour of the Athenians. When they departed, his manner was to send forth some of his swiftest vessels after them, who observing their doings, related unto him what they had seen. Therefore understanding in what careless fashion they roamed up and down the country, he kept all his men aboard after their departure, and the fifth day gave especial charge to his scouts, that when they perceived the Athenians disembarking, as their custom was, and walking towards Sestos, they should forthwith return, and hang up a brazen shield in the prow, as a token for him to weigh anchor.

The scouts performed their charge, and Lysander being in readiness, made all speed that strength of

oars could give, to Ægos-Potamos, where he found very few of his enemies aboard their ships, not many near them, and all in great confusion, upon the news of his approach. Insomuch, that the greatest industry which the Athenians then shewed, was in the escape of eight or nine ships, which knowing how much that loss imported, gave over Athens as desperate, and made a long flight unto the isle of Cyprus ; all the rest were taken, and such of the soldiers as came in to the rescue cut in pieces. Thus was the war, which had lasted twenty-seven years, with variable success, concluded in one hour ; and the glory of Athens in such wise eclipsed, that she never after shone in her perfect light.

Immediately upon this victory, Lysander having taken such towns as readily did yield upon the first fame of his exploit, he set sail for Athens, and joining his forces with those of Agis and Pausanias, kings of Sparta, summoned the city ; which finding too stubborn to yield, and too strong to be won on the sudden, he put forth again to sea, and rather by terror than violence, compelling all the islands, and such towns of the Ionians as had formerly held of the Athenians, to submit themselves to Sparta, he did thereby cut off all provision of victuals and other necessities from the city, and enforced the people by mere famine to yield to these conditions: That the long walls leading from the town to the port, should be thrown down ; that all cities subject to their estate, should be set at liberty ; that the Athenians should be masters only of their own territories, and the fields adjoining to their town ; and that they should keep no more than twelve ships ; that they should hold as friends or enemies the same whom the Lacedæmonians did, and follow the Lacedæmonians as leaders in the wars.

These articles being agreed upon, the walls were thrown down, with great rejoicing of those who had borne displeasure to Athens, and not without some

consultation of destroying the city, and laying waste the land about it. Which advice though it was not entertained, yet were thirty governors, or rather cruel tyrants, appointed over the people, who recompensed their former insolency and injustice over their captains, by oppressing them with all base and intolerable slavery.

The only small hope then remaining to the Athenians, was, that Alcibiades might perhaps repair what their own folly had ruined. But the thirty tyrants perceiving this, advertised the Lacedæmonians thereof, who contrived, and, (as now domineering in every quarter,) soon effected his sudden death.

Such end had the Peloponnesian war. After which, the Lacedæmonians abusing the reputation and great power which they had therein obtained, grew very odious to Greece, and by combination of many cities against them, were dispossessed of their high authority, even in that very age in which they had subdued Athens. The greatest foil that they took was of the Thebans, led by Epaminondas, under whom Philip of Macedon, father to Alexander the Great, had the best of his education. By these Thebans, the city of Sparta, (besides other great losses received,) was sundry times in danger of being taken. But these haughty attempts of the Thebans came finally to nothing; for the several estates and seignories of Greece were grown so jealous of one another's greatness, that the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, Argives, and Thebans, which were the mightiest, associating themselves with the weaker party, did so counterpoise the stronger, that no one city could extend the limits of her jurisdiction so far as might make her terrible to her neighbours. And thus all parts of the country remained rather evenly balanced than well agreeing, till such time as Philip, and after him Alexander, kings of Macedon, (whose forefathers had been dependants and followers, yea, almost mere vassals to the estates of Athens and

Sparta,) found means, by making use of their factions, to bring them all into servitude, from which they never could be free, till the Romans, presenting them with a shew of liberty, did themselves indeed become their masters.

CHAP. IX.

OF MATTERS CONCURREING WITH THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, OR SHORTLY FOLLOWING IT.

SECT. I.

How the affairs of Persia stood in these times.

DURING the times of this Peloponnesian war, and those other less expeditions foregoing it, Artaxerxes Longimanus, having peaceably enjoyed a long reign over the Persians, left it by his death either to Darius, who was called Darius Nothus, or the Bastard, whom the Greek historians (lightly passing over Xerxes the second, and Sogdianus, as usurpers, and for their short reign little to be regarded,) place next unto him, or to Xerxes the second; who, and his brother Sogdianus after him, (seeming to have been the sons of Hester,) held the kingdom but one year between them, the younger succeeding his elder brother. It is not my purpose (as I have said before) to pursue the history of the Persians from henceforth, by rehearsal of all the particulars, otherwise than as they shall be incident to the affairs of Greece. It may therefore suffice to say, that Xerxes the second being a vicious prince, did perish after a month or two, if not by surfeit, then by treachery of his, as riotous, brother Sogdianus. Likewise of Sogdianus it is found, that being as ill as his brother, and more cruel, he

slew unjustly Bagorazus a principal eunuch, and would have done as much to his brother Darius the bastard, had not he foreseen it, and by raising a stronger army than this hated king Sogdianus could levy, seized at once upon the king and kingdom. Darius having slain his brother, held the empire nineteen years. Amyrtæus of Sais, an Egyptian, rebelled against him, and having partly slain, partly chased out of the land, the Persian garrisons, allied himself so firmly with the Greeks, that by their aid he maintained the kingdom, and delivered it over to his posterity, who (notwithstanding the fury of their civil wars) maintained it against the Persian all the days of this Darius, and of his son Artaxerxes Mnemon. Likewise Amorgès, a subject of his own, and of the royal blood, being lieutenant of Caria, rebelled against him; confederating himself with the Athenians. But the great calamity before spoken of, which fell upon the Athenians in Sicily, having put new life into the Spartans, and given courage to the islanders and others subject to the state of Athens, to shake off the yoke of their long-continued bondage; it fell out well for Darius, that the Lacedæmonians, being destitute of money wherewith to defray the charge of a great navy, without which it was impossible to advance the war against the state of Athens, that remained powerful by sea, were driven to crave his assistance, which he granted unto them; first upon what conditions best pleased himself, though afterwards the articles of the league between him and them were set down in more precise terms, wherein it was concluded, that he and they should make war jointly upon the Athenians, and upon all that should rebel from either of them, and (which was highly to the king's honour and profit) that all the cities of Asia, which had formerly been his, or his predecessors, should return to his obedience. By this treaty, and the war ensuing, (of which I have already spoken,) he recovered all that his grandfather and father had lost in Asia. Likewise by assistance of the Lacedæmonians, he got Amorgès

alive into his hands, who was taken in the city of Jassus ; the Athenians wanting either force or courage to succour him. Nevertheless Egypt still held out against him ; the cause whereof cannot be the employment of the Persian forces on the parts of Greece, for he abounded in men, of whom he had enough for all occasions; but they wanted manhood, which caused him to fight with gold, which effected for him, by soldiers of other nations, and his natural enemies, what the valour of his own subjects was insufficient to perform. Darius had in marriage Parysatis his own sister, who bore unto him (besides other children) Artaxerxes, called Mnemon, that is to say, the *mindful*, or the rememberer, who succeeded in the kingdom; and Cyrus the younger, a prince of singular virtue, and accounted, by all that knew him, the most excellent man that ever Persia bred after Cyrus the great. But the old king Darius intending to leave unto his elder son Artaxerxes the inheritance of that great empire, did cast a jealous eye upon the doings of young Cyrus, who, being lieutenant of the Lower Asia, took more upon him than befitted a subject : for which cause his father sent for him, with intent to have taken some very sharp course with him, had not his own death prevented the coming of his younger son, and placed the elder in his throne. Of the war between these brethren, and summarily of Artaxerxes, we shall have occasion to speak somewhat in more convenient place.

SECT. II.

How the thirty tyrants got their dominion in Athens.

I HOLD it in this place very convenient to shew the proceedings of the Greeks, after the subversion of the walls of Athens, which gave end to that war called the Peloponnesian war, but could not free the unhappy country of Greece from civil broils. The thirty governors, commonly called the thirty tyrants

of Athens, were chosen at first by the people to compile a body of their law, and make a collection of such ancient statutes as were meet to be put in practice, the condition of the city standing as it did in that so sudden alteration. To this charge was annexed the supreme authority, either as a recompence of their labours, or because the necessity of the times did so require it; wherein the law being uncertain, it was fit that such men should give judgment in particular causes, to whose judgment the laws themselves, by which the city was to be ordered, were become subject. But these thirty, having so great power in their hands, were more careful to hold it, than to deserve it by faithful execution of that which was committed to them in trust.

Therefore apprehending such troublesome fellows as were odious to the city, though not punishable therefore by law, they condemned them to death; which proceeding was by all men highly approved, who considered their lewd conditions, but did not withal bethink themselves, how easy a thing it would be unto these thirty men to take away the lives of innocents, by calling them perturbors of the peace, or what else they listed, when condemnation without due trial and proof had been once well allowed. Having thus plausibly entered into a wicked course of government, they thought it best to fortify themselves with a sure guard, ere they broke out into those disorders, which they must needs commit for the establishing of their authority. Wherefore dispatching two of their own company to Sparta, they informed the Lacedæmonians, that it was the full intent of the thirty to keep the city free from all rebellious motions, to which purpose it behoved them to cut off such as were seditious; and therefore desired the Lacedæmonians to send them a garrison, which they promised at their own cost to maintain. This motion was well approved, and a guard sent, the captain of which was so well entertained by the thirty, that none of their misdeeds could want his high com-

mendations at Sparta. Hereupon the tyrants began to take heart, and looking no more after base and detested persons, invaded the principal men of the city, sending armed men from house to house, who drew out such as were of great reputation, and likely, or able, to make any head against this wicked form of government; whereby there was such effusion of blood, as to Theramenes (one of the thirty) seemed very horrible, and unable to escape vengeance. His dislike of their proceedings being openly discovered, caused his fellows to bethink themselves, and provide for their own security and his destruction, lest he should make himself a captain of the discontented, (which were almost the whole city,) and redeem his own peace with their ruin. Wherefore they selected three thousand of the citizens, whom they thought meetest, and gave unto them some part of public authority; the rest they disarmed; and having thus increased their own strength, and weakened their opposites, they began afresh to shed the blood, not only of their private enemies, but of such whose money or goods might enrich them, and enable them for the payment of their guard. And to this purpose they concluded, that every one of them should name one man upon whose goods he should seize, putting the owner to death. But when Theramenes uttered his detestation of so wicked an intent, then did Critias, who of all the thirty was most tyrannical, accuse him to the council as a treacherous man; and whereas one main privilege of the three thousand was, that none of them should suffer death at the appointment of the thirty, but have the accustomed trial, he took upon him to strike out of that number the name of Theramenes, and so reduced him under the trial and sentence of that order. It was well alleged by Theramenes, that his name was not more easy to be blotted out of the catalogue than any other man's; upon which consideration, he advised them all to conceive no

otherwise of his case, than as of their own, who were liable to the same form of proceeding; but, (every man choosing rather to preserve his own life by silence, than presently to draw upon himself the danger, which as yet concerned him little, and perhaps would never come near him,) the tyrants interpreting silence as consent, condemned him forthwith, and compelled him to drink poison.

SECT. III.

The conspiracy against the thirty tyrants, and their deposing.

AFTER the death of Theramenes, the thirty began to use such outrage as excelled their former villanies. For having three thousand (as they thought) firm unto them, they robbed all others without fear or shame, despoiling them of lands and goods, and causing them to fly into banishment for safeguard of their lives. This flight of the citizens procured their liberty, and the general good of the city. For the banished citizens, who were fled to Thebes, entered into consultation, and resolved to hazard their lives in setting free the city of Athens.

The very thought of such a practice had been treason at home, which had no other danger abroad than might be found in the execution. Seventy men, or thereabouts, were the first undertakers, who with their captain Thrasybulus took Phyla, a place of strength in the territory of Athens. No sooner did the thirty hear of their exploit, than seek means to prevent further danger; assembling the three thousand, and the Lacedæmonian guard, with which force they attempted Phyla, but were with some loss of their men repelled. Finding the place too strong to be taken by assault, they intended to besiege it; which purpose came to nought by means of snow that fell, and other stormy weather, against which they had not made provision. Retiring therefore to

the city, which above all they were to make good, they left the most of their guard, and two companies of horse, to weary out them which lay in Phyla with a flying siege. But it was not long ere the followers of Thrasybulus were increased from seventy to seven hundred, which adventured to give charge upon those guards, of whom they cut off above an hundred and twenty. These small, but prosperous beginnings added more to the number of those in Phyla, who now with a thousand men got entrance into Piræus, the suburb of Athens, lying on the port. Before their coming, the thirty had resolved to fortify the town of Eleusin to their own use, wherein to they might make an easy retreat, and save themselves from any sudden peril. It may well seem strange, that whereas their barbarous manner of government had brought them into such danger, they were so far from seeking to obtain men's good-will, that contrariwise, to assure themselves of Eleusin, they got all of the place who could bear arms into their hands by a train, and wickedly (though under form of justice) murdered them all. But 'Sceleribus tutum per scelera est iter;' the mischiefs which they had already done were such as left them no hope of going backward, nor any other apparent likelihood of safety, than by extending their cruelty unto all, seeing few or none were left whom they could trust. When Thrasybulus and his fellows, who as yet were termed conspirators, had taken the Piræus, then were the three thousand armed again by the tyrants, and brought to assault it; but in this enterprise Thrasybulus had the better, and repelled his enemies, of whom, although there were slain to the number of seventy only, yet the victory seemed the greater, because Critias, and one other of the thirty, perished in that fight. The death of Critias, and the stout defence of Piræus, together with some exhortations used by Thrasybulus to the citizens, wrought such an effect, that the thirty were deposed.

Nevertheless there were so many of the three thousand who having communicated with the thirty in their misdeeds, feared to be called to a sharp account, that no peace, nor quiet form of government could be established. For ambassadors were sent to Sparta, who craving aid against Thrasybulus, and his followers, had favourable audience, and a power sent to their assistance, both by land and sea, under the conduct of Lysander and his brother; whom Pausanias the Spartan king did follow, raising an army of the cities confederate with the Lacedæmonians. And here appeared first the jealousy wherein some people held the state of Sparta. The Beotians and Corinthians, who in the late wars had been the most bitter enemies to Athens, refused to follow Pausanias in this expedition, alleging that it stood not with their oaths to make war against that people, who had not hitherto broken any one article of the league; but fearing, indeed, lest the Lacedæmonians should annex the territory of Athens to their own domains. It is not to be doubted that Pausanias took this answer in good part. For it was not his purpose to destroy those against whom he went, but only to cross the proceedings of Lysander, whom he envied. Therefore having, in some small skirmishes against them of Thrasybulus's party, made a shew of war, he finally wrought such means, that all things were compounded quietly: the thirty men, and such others as were like to give cause of tumult, being sent to Sparta. The remainder of that tyrannical faction having withdrawn themselves to Eleusin, were shortly after found to attempt some innovation; whereupon the whole city rising against them, took their captains as they were coming to parley, and slew them: which done, to avoid further inconvenience, a law was made, that all injuries past should be forgotten, and no man called into question for wrongs committed. By which order, wisely made, and carefully observed, the city returned to her former quietness.

CHAP. X.

THE EXPEDITION OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER.

SECT. I.

The grounds of Cyrus's attempt against his brother.

THE matters of Greece now standing upon such terms, that no one estate durst oppose itself against that of Lacedæmon, young Cyrus, brother to Artaxerxes king of Persia, having in his father's lifetime very carefully prosecuted the war against Athens, did send his messengers to Sparta, requesting that their love might appear no less to him than that which he had shewed towards them in their dangerous war against the Athenians. To this request, being general, the Lacedæmonians gave a suitable answer, commanding their admiral to perform unto Cyrus all service that he should require of him. If Cyrus had plainly discovered himself, and the Lacedæmonians bent their whole power to his assistance, very likely it is, that either the kingdom of Persia should have been the recompence of his deserts, or that he perishing in battle, as after he did, the subversion of that empire had forthwith ensued. But it pleased God, rather to shew unto the Greeks the ways, which, under the Macedonian ensigns, the victorious footsteps of their posterity should measure; and opening unto them the riches, and withal the weakness of the Persian, to kindle in them both desire and hope of that conquest which he reserved to another generation, than to give into their hands that mighty kingdom, whose hour was

not yet come. The love which Parysatis, the queen-mother of Persia, bare unto Cyrus her younger son, being seconded by the earnest favour of the people and ready desires of many principal men, had moved this young prince, in his father's old age to aspire after the succession. But being sent for by his father, (as hath before been shewed,) whose meaning was to curb this ambitious youth, he found his elder brother Artaxerxes established so surely by the old king's favour, that it were not safe to attempt any means of displanting him, by whose disfavour himself might easily lose the place of a viceroy, which he held in Asia the Less, and hardly be able to maintain his own life. The nearest neighbour to Cyrus of all the king's deputies in the Lower Asia, was Tissaphernes, a man compounded of cowardice, treachery, craft, and all vices which accustomedly branch out of these. This man accompanied Cyrus to his father, using by the way all fair shews of friendship, as to a prince for whom it might well be thought that queen Parysatis had obtained the inheritance of that mighty empire. And it was very true that Parysatis had used the best of her endeavour to that purpose; alleging that (which in former ages had been much available to Xerxes, in the like disceptation with his elder brother,) Artaxerxes was born whilst his father was a private man, but Cyrus, when he was a crowned king. All which not sufficing, when the most that could be obtained for Cyrus, was the pardon of some presumptuous demeanour, and confirmation of his place in Lydia, and the parts adjoining; then did this Tissaphernes discover his nature, and accuse his friend Cyrus to the new king Artaxerxes, of a dangerous treason intended against his person. Upon this accusation, whether true or false, very easily believed, Cyrus, was arrested, and by the most vehement intreaty of his mother very hardly delivered, and sent back in to his own province.

SECT. II.

The preparations of Cyrus, and his first entry into the war.

THE form of government which the Persian lieutenants used in their several provinces, was in many points almost regal. For they made war and peace, as they thought it meet, not only for the king's behoof, but for their own reputation; usually indeed with the king's enemies, yet sometimes one with another: which was the more easily tolerated, because their own heads were held only at the king's pleasure; which caused them to frame all their doings to his will, whatsoever it were, or they could conjecture it to be. Cyrus, therefore, being settled in Lydia, began to consider with himself the interest that he had in the kingdom; the small assurance of his brother's love, held only by his mother's intercession; the disgrace endured by his late imprisonment; and the means which he had by love of his own people, and that good neighbourhood of the Lacedæmonians, whom he had bound unto him, to obtain the crown for himself. Neither was it expedient that he should long sit idle, as waiting till occasion should present itself, but rather enterprise somewhat whilst yet his mother lived, who could procure a good interpretation to all his actions, if they were no worse than only questionable. Hereupon he first began to quarrel with Tissaphernes, and seized upon many towns of his jurisdiction, annexing them to his own province; which displeased not Artaxerxes at all, who (besides that he was of condition somewhat simple) being truly paid by Cyrus the accustomable tributes out of those places, was well contented to see his brother's hot spirit exercised in private quarrels. But Tissaphernes, whose base conditions were hated, and cowardice despised, although he durst not adventure to take

arms against Cyrus, yet perceiving that the Milesians were about to give up themselves into the hands of that young prince, as many other towns of the Ionians had done, thought by terror to preserve his reputation, and keep the town in his own hands. Wherefore he slew many, and many he banished, who flying to Cyrus were gently entertained, as bringing fair occasion to take arms, which was no small part of his desire. In levying soldiers he used great policy ; for he took not only the men of his own province, or of the countries adjoining, whose lives were ready at his will, but secretly he furnished some Grecian captains with money, who being very good men of war, entertained soldiers therewith, some of them warring in Thrace, others in Thessaly, others elsewhere in Greece ; but all of them ready to cross the seas at the first call of Cyrus, till which time they had secret instructions to prolong their several wars, that the soldiers might be held in continual exercise, and ready in arms upon the sudden. Cyrus having sent a power of men to besiege Miletus, forthwith summoned these bands of the Greeks, who very readily came over to his assistance, being thirteen thousand very firm soldiers, and able to make head (which is almost incredible) against the whole power of Artaxerxes. With this army, and that which he had levied before, he could very easily have forced Miletus, and chased away Tissaphernes out of Asia the Less ; but his purpose was not so to lose time in small matters, that was to be employed in the accomplishment of higher designs. Pretending, therefore, that the Pisidians, a people of Asia the Less, not subject to the Persian, had invaded his territory, he raised the siege of Miletus, and with all speed marched eastward ; leaving Tissaphernes much amazed, who had no leisure to rejoice that Cyrus had left him to himself, when he considered that so great an army, and so strong, was never levied against the rovers of Pisidia, but rather

against the great king his master. For which cause taking a band of five-hundred horse, he posted away to carry tidings to the court of this great preparation.

SECT. III.

How Cyrus took his journey into the Higher Asia, and came up close to his brother.

THE tumult which his coming brought was very great, and great the exclamations of the queen Statura, against Parysatis, the queen-mother, whom she called the author and occasioner of the war. But whilst the king in great fear was arming the high countries in his defence, the danger hastened upon him very fast. For Cyrus made great marches, having his numbers much increased, by the repair of his countrymen, though most strengthened by the access of seven hundred Greeks, and of other four hundred of the same nation, who revolted unto him from the king. How terrible the Greeks were to the Barbarians, he found by trial in a muster, which (to please the queen of Cilicia, who had brought him aid) he made in Phrygia; where the Greeks by his directions, making offer of a charge upon the rest of his army, which contained an hundred thousand men; the whole camp (not perceiving that this was but a bravery) fled again, the victuallers and baggagers forsaking their cabins, and running all away for very fear. This was to Cyrus a joyful spectacle, who knew very well that his brother was followed by men of the same temper, and the more unlikely to make resistance, because they were pressed to the war against their will and dispositions, whereas his army was drawn along by mere affection and good will. Nevertheless he found it a hard matter to persuade the Greeks to pass the river of Euphrates. For the very length of the way which they had trodden, wearied them with the conceit of the tedi-

ous return. Therefore he was driven, being in Cilicia, to seek excuses, telling them, that Abrocomas, one of the king's principal captains, and his own great enemy, lay by the river, against whom he requested them to assist him. By such devices, and excessive promise of reward, he brought them to Euphrates, where some of the Greeks considering, that whoso passed the river first should have the most thanks, and might safely return if the rest should refuse to follow them, they entered the fords, whereby were all finally persuaded to do as some had begun ; and being allured by great hopes, they resolved to seek out Artaxerxes, wheresoever he was to be found. The king in the meantime having raised an army of nine hundred thousand men, was not so confident upon this huge multitude, as to adventure them in trial of a plain battle. Abrocomas, who, with three hundred thousand men, had undertaken to make good the straits of Syria, which were very narrow, and fortified with a strong wall, and other defences of nature and art, which made the place seem impregnable, had quitted the passage, and retired himself towards the king's forces, not daring to look Cyrus in the face ; who, despairing to find any way by land, had procured the Lacedæmonian fleet, by the benefit whereof to have transported his army. I do not find that this cowardice of Abrocomas, or of his soldiers, who arrived not at the camp till five days were passed after the battle, received either punishment or disgrace ; for they towards whom he withdrew himself were all made of the same metal.

Therefore, Artaxerxes was upon the point of retiring to the uttermost bounds of his kingdom, until by Teribazus, one of his captains, he was persuaded not to abandon so many goodly provinces to the enemy, who would thereby have gathered addition of strength, and (which in the sharp disputation of title to a kingdom is most available,) would have

grown superior in reputation. By such advice, the king resolved upon meeting with his brother, who now began to be secure, being fully persuaded that Artaxerxes would never dare to abide him in the field. For the king having cast up a trench of almost forty miles in length, about thirty feet broad, and eighteen feet deep, intended there to have encamped; but his courage failing him, he abandoned that place, thinking nothing so safe as to be far distant from his enemies.

SECT. IV.

The battle between Cyrus and Artaxerxes.

THE army of Cyrus having overcome many difficulties of evil ways and scarcity of victuals, was much encouraged by perceiving this great fear of Artaxerxes; and being passed this trench, marched carelessly in great disorder, having bestowed their arms in carts and upon beasts of carriage, when on the sudden one of their van-currors brought news of the king's approach. Hereupon, with great tumult, they armed themselves, and had ranged their battles in good order upon the side of the river Euphrates, where they waited for the coming of their enemies, whom they saw not till it was afternoon. But when they saw the cloud of dust raised by the feet of that huge multitude, which the king drew after him, and perceived, by their near approach, how well they were marshalled, coming on very orderly, in silence; whereas it had been expected, that, rushing violently with loud clamours, they should have spent all their force upon the first brunt; and when it appeared that the fronts of the two armies were so unequal in extent, being all embattled in one body and square, that Cyrus, taking his place, (as was the Persian manner,) in the midst of his own, did not, with the corner and utmost point thereof, reach to the half breadth of Artaxerxes's battle, who carried a

front proportionable to his number, exceeding nine times that of Cyrus;—then did the Greeks begin to distrust their own manhood, which was not accustomed to make proof of itself upon such excessive odds. It was almost incredible that so great an army should be so easily chased. Nevertheless, it quickly appeared, that these Persians, having learned, (contrary to their custom,) to give charge upon their enemies with silence, had not learned, (for it was contrary to their nature,) to receive a strong charge with courage. Upon the very first offer of onset made by the Greeks, all that beastly rabble of cowards fled amain, without abiding the stroke, or staying till they were within reach of a dart. The chariots, armed with hooks and scythes, (whereof Artaxerxes had two hundred, and Cyrus not twenty,) did small hurt that day, because the drivers of them leaping down, fled away on foot. This base demeanour of his enemies gave so much confidence to Cyrus and his followers, that such as were about him forthwith adored him as king. And certainly the title had been assured unto him that day, had not he sought how to declare himself worthy of it ere yet he had obtained it; for, perceiving that Artaxerxes, who found that part of the field which lay before him void, was about to encompass the Greeks, and to set upon them in the rear, he advanced with six hundred horse, and gave so violent a charge upon a squadron of six thousand which lay before the king, that he broke it, slaying the captain thereof, Artageres, with his own hands, and putting all the rest to flight. Hereupon his whole company of six hundred, very few excepted, began to follow the chase, leaving Cyrus too ill attended; who, perceiving where the king stood in troop, uncertain whether to fight or leave the field, could not contain himself, but said, ‘I see the man!’ and presently, with a small handful of men about him, ran upon his brother, whom he struck through the cuirass, and wounded in the

breast. Having given this stroke, which was his last, he received immediately the fatal blow, which gave period at once to his ambition and life,—being wounded under the eye with a dart, thrown by a base fellow ; wherewith astonished, he fell dead from his horse, or so much hurt, that it was impossible to have recovered him, though all which were with him did their best for his safety, not caring afterwards for their own lives when once they perceived that Cyrus their master was slain. Artaxerxes caused the head and right hand of his brother to be forthwith struck off, and shewed to his people, who, now pursuing them, fled apace, calling upon the name of Cyrus, and desiring him to pardon them. But when this great accident had breathed new courage into the king's troops, and utterly dismayed such Persian captains as were now, even in their own eyes, no better than rebels, it was not long ere the camp of Cyrus was taken, being quite abandoned ; from whence Artaxerxes, making all speed, arrived quickly at the quarters of the Greeks, which was about three miles from the place where Cyrus fell. There he met with Tissaphernes, who having made way through the battle of the Greeks, was ready now to join with his master in spoiling their tents. Had not the news which Artaxerxes brought with him of his brother's death, been sufficient to countervail all disasters received, the exploit of Tissaphernes in breaking through the Greeks would have yielded little comfort ; for Tissaphernes had not slain any one man of the Greeks ; but, contrariwise, when he gave upon them, they, opening their battle, drove him with great slaughter through them, in such wise, that he rather escaped as out of an hard passage, than forced his way through the squadron of the Greeks. Hereof the king being informed by him, and that the Greeks, as masters of the field, gave chase to all that came in their sight, they ranged their companies into good order, and followed after these Greeks,

intending to set upon them in the rear. But these good soldiers perceiving the king's approach, turned their faces, and made head against him; who, not intending to seek honour with danger of his life, wheeled about and fled; being pursued into a certain village that lay under a hill, on the top whereof he made a stand, rather in a bravery, than with a purpose to attempt upon these bold fellows any further. For he knew well that his brother's death had secured his estate, whom he would seem to have slain with his own hand, thinking that fact alone sufficient to give reputation to his valour; and this reputation he thought that he might now preserve well enough, by shewing a manly look half a mile off. On the top of this hill, therefore, he advanced his standard,—a golden eagle displayed on the top of a spear. This ensign might have encouraged his people, had not some of the Greeks espied it, who not meaning that he should abide so near them, with all their power marched towards him. The king, discovering their approach, fled upon the spur, so that none remained in the place of battle save only the Greeks, who had lost that day not one man, nor taken any other harm than that one of them was hurt with an arrow. Much they wondered that they heard no news of Cyrus; but thinking that he was pursuing the army, they thought it was fittest for them, having that day done enough, to return to their quarters, and take their supper, to which they had good appetite, because the expectation of the king's coming had given them no leisure.

SECT. V.

The hard estate of the Greeks after the fight; and how Artaxerxes in vain sought to have made them yield unto him.

It was now about the setting of the sun, and they bringing home dark night with them, found their

camp spoiled, little or nothing being left that might serve for food ; so that wanting victuals to satisfy their hunger, they refreshed their weary bodies with sleep. In the mean season, Artaxerxes returned to his camp, which he entered by torch-light, could not enjoy the pleasure of his good fortune entire, because he perceived that the baseness of his people, and weakness of his empire, was now plainly discovered to the Greeks ; which gave him assurance, that if any of these who had beheld the shameful demeanour of his army, should live to carry tidings home, it would not be long ere, with greater forces, they disputed with him for his whole seignory. Wherefore he resolved to try all means whereby he might bring them to destruction, and not let one escape to carry tidings of that which he had seen ; to which purpose he sent them a brave message the next morning, charging them to deliver up their arms, and come to his gates to wait there upon his mercy. It seems that he was in good hope to have found their high courages broken, upon report of his brother's death ; but he was greatly deceived in that thought. For the Greeks being advertised that morning from Ariæus, a principal commander under Cyrus, that, his master being slain, he had retired himself to the place of their last encamping, about eight miles from them, whence intending to return into Ionia, his meaning was to dislodge the next day, awaiting for them so long if they would join with him, but resolving to stay no longer ;—they sent answer back to Ariæus, that having beaten the king out of the field, and finding none that durst resist them, they would place Ariæus himself on the king's throne, if he would join with them and pursue the victory. Before they received any reply to this answer, the messengers of Artaxerxes arrived at the camp, whose errand seemed to the captains very insolent ; one told them, that it was not for the vanquishers to yield their weapons ; another, that he would die ere he

yielded to such a motion ; a third asked, whether the king, as having the victory, required their weapons ; if so, why did he not fetch them ? or, whether he desired them in way of friendship ? for then would they first know with what courtesy he meant to requite their kindness. To this question, Phalinus, a Grecian, waiting upon Tissaphernes, answered, that the king, having slain Cyrus, knew no man that could pretend any title to his kingdom, in the midst whereof he held them fast, inclosed with great rivers, being able to bring against them such numbers of men, as they wanted strength to kill, if they would hold up their throats ; for which cause he accounted them his prisoners.

These words to them who knew themselves to be free, were nothing pleasant. Therefore one told Phalinus, that having nothing left but their arms and valour, whilst they kept their arms, their valour would be serviceable ; but should they yield them, it was to be doubted that their bodies would not long remain their own. Hereat Phalinus laughed, saying, this young man did seem a philosopher, and made a pretty speech ; but that his deep speculation shewed his wits to be very shallow, if he thought with his arms and his valour to prevail against the great king. It seems that Phalinus, being a courtier, and employed in a business of importance, thought himself too profound a statesman to be checked in his embassy by a bookish discourser. But his wisdom herein failed him ; for whatsoever he himself was, (of whom no more is known than that he brought an dishonest message to his own countrymen, persuading them basely to surrender their weapons and lives to the merciless Barbarians,) this young scholar by him despised was that great Xenophon, who, when all the principal commanders were surprised by treachery of the Persians, being a private gentleman, and having never seen the wars before, undertook the conduct of the army, which he brought safe into Greece, freeing it from all those

and from greater dangers than Phalinus could propound. Some there were who promised to be faithful to the king, as they had been to Cyrus, offering their service in Egypt, where they thought Artaxerxes might have use of them. But the final answer was, that without weapons they could neither do the king good as friends, nor defend themselves from him as enemies. Hereupon Phalinus delivered the king's further pleasure, which was to grant them truce, whilst they abode where they then were, denouncing war if they stirred thence; whereunto he required their answer. Clearchus, the general, told him they liked it. How, (saith Phalinus,) must I understand you? As choosing peace, if we stay, or otherwise war, said Clearchus. But whether war or peace? quoth this politic ambassador. To whom Clearchus, (not willing to acquaint him with their purpose,)—Let our doings tell you; and so dismissed him no wiser than he came. All that day the Greeks were fain to feed upon their horses, asses, and other beasts, which they roasted with arrows, darts, and wooden targets, thrown away by the enemies.

SECT. VI.

How the Greeks began to return homewards.

AT night they took their way towards Ariæus, to whom they came at midnight, being forsaken by four hundred foot and forty horse, all Thracians, who fled over to the king, by whom how they were entertained I do not find. Like enough it is that they were cut in pieces; for had they been kindly used, it may well be thought that some of them should have accompanied Tissaphernes, and served as stales to draw in the rest. Ariæus being of too base a temper and birth to think upon seeking the kingdom for himself, with such assistance as might have given it unto Cyrus, was very well pleased to make covenant with them for mutual assistance unto the last; where-

unto both parts having sworn, he advised them to take another way homeward, which should be somewhat longer, yet safer and fitter to relieve them with victuals than that by which they came. The next day, having made a wearisome march, and tired the soldiers, they found the king's army, which had coasted them, lodged in certain villages, where they purposed themselves to have encamped; towards which Clearchus made directly, because he would not seem, by declining them, to shew fear or weakness. That the king's men were contented to remove, and give place to their betters, it cannot be strange to any that hath considered their former behaviour; nor strange, that the Greeks, being weary and hungry, and lying among enemies in an unknown country, should be very fearful; but it is almost past belief, that the noise which was heard of these poor men, calling one to another tumultuously, as the present condition enforced them to do, should make the Persians fly out of their camp, and so affright the great king, that, instead of demanding their arms, he should crave peace of them. The next day very early, came messengers from Artaxerxes, desiring free access for ambassadors to entreat of peace. Were it not that such particulars do best open the quality of the persons by whom things were managed, I should hold it fitter to run over the general passages of those times than to dwell among circumstances. But surely it is a point very remarkable, that when Clearchus had willed the messengers to bid the king prepare for battle, because the Greeks, (as he said,) wanting whereupon to dine, could not endure to hear of truce till their bellies were full; Artaxerxes, dissembling the indignity, was contented sweetly to swallow down this pill, sending them guides, who conducted them to a place where was plenty of victuals to relieve them.

SECT. VII.

How Tissaphernes, under colour of peace, betrayed all the captains of the Greeks.

HITHERTO the Greeks, relying upon their own virtue, had rather advanced their affairs, than brought themselves into any straits or terms of disadvantage. But now came unto them the subtile fox Tissaphernes, who, circumventing the chief commanders by fine slights, did mischievously entrap them, to the extreme danger of the army. He told them, that his province lying near unto Greece, had caused him greatly to desire that their deliverance might be wrought by his procurement, knowing well that, in time to come, both they and their countrymen at home would not be unthankful for such a benefit. Herewithal he forgot not to rehearse the great service that he had done to his master, being the first that advertised him of Cyrus's intent, and having not only brought him a good strength of men, but in the day of battle shewed his face to the Greeks, when all others turned their backs; that he, together with the king, did enter their camp, and gave chase to the Barbarians that stood on the part of Cyrus. All this (quoth he) did I allege to the king, intreating that he would give me leave to conduct you safe into Greece; in which suit I have good hope to speed, if you will send a mild answer to him, who hath willed me to ask you, for what cause you have borne arms against him. The captains hearing this, were contented to give gentle words, which Tissaphernes relating to the king, procured, (though very hardly as he said,) that peace should be granted; the conditions whereof were,—that they should pass freely through all the king's dominions, paying for what they took, and committing no spoil; yet that it should be lawful for them to take victuals by force, in any place that refused to afford them an open market.

Hereupon both parties having sworn, the league was concluded, and Tissaphernes returning to the king to take leave, and end all business, came unto them again after twenty days, and then they set forward. This interim of twenty days, which Tissaphernes did spend at the court, ministered great occasion of mistrust to his new confederates. For besides his long absence, which alone sufficed to breed doubt, the brethren and kindred of Ariæus repairing daily to him, and other Persians to his soldiers, did work him and them so with assurance of pardon, and other allurements, that he daily grew more strange to the Greeks than formerly he had been. This caused many to advise Clearchus, rather to pass forward as well as he might, than to rely upon covenants, and sit still whilst the king laid snares to entrap them. But he, on the contrary, persuaded them to rest contented whilst they were well, and not to cast themselves again into those difficulties, out of which they were newly freed by the late treaty; reciting withal their own wants, and the king's means, but especially the oaths mutually given and taken, wherewith he saw no reason why the enemy should have clogged himself if he meant mischief, having power enough to do them harm by a fair and open war.

Tissaphernes was a very honourable man, (if honour may be valued by greatness and place in court,) which caused his oath to be the more esteemed; forasmuch as no inforcement, or base respect, was like to have drawn it from him. But his falsehood was such, both in substance and success, as may fitly expound that saying, which proceeded from a fountain of truth, 'I hate a rich man a liar.' A lie may find excuse when it grows out of fear; for that passion hath his original from weakness. But when power, which is a character of the Almighty, shall be made the supporter of untruth, the falsehood is most abominable; for the offender, like proud Luci-

fer, advancing his own strength against the Divine Justice, doth commit that sin with an high hand, which commonly produceth lamentable effects, and is followed with sure vengeance. It was not long ere Tissaphernes found means to destroy all the captains, whom he subtilly got into his power by a train, making the general Clearchus himself the means to draw in all the rest. The business was contrived thus: Having travelled some days together in such wise that the Persians did not encamp with the Greeks, who were very jealous of the great familiarity appearing between Tissaphernes and Ariæus; Clearchus thought it convenient to root out of Tissaphernes's brains all causes of distrust, whereof many had grown in that short time. To which purpose, obtaining private conference with him, he rehearsed the oath of confederacy which had passed between them, shewing how religiously he meant to keep it; and repeating the benefits which the Greeks did receive by the help of Tissaphernes, he promised that their love should appear to him not unfruitful, if he would make use of their service against the Mysians or Pisidians, who were accustomed to infest his province, or against the Egyptians, who were then rebels to the great king. For which cause he desired him, that whereas all divine and human respects had linked them together, he would not give place to any close accusation or suspicion, whereby might grow sudden inconvenience to either of them, upon no just ground. The faithless Persian was very much delighted with this speech, which ministered fair occasion to the execution of his purpose. Therefore he told Clearchus, that all this was by him wisely considered, wishing him further to call to mind how many ways he could have used to bring them to confusion, without peril to himself, especially by burning the country, through which they were to pass, whereby they must needs have perished by mere famine. For which cause he said that it had been great folly

to seek by perjury, odious to God and man, the destruction of such as were already in his hands ; but the truth was, that his own love to them had moved him to work their safety ; not only for those ends which Clearchus had recounted, of pleasures that might redound to himself, and the king, by their assistance ; but for that he might, by their friendship, hope to obtain what Cyrus had missed. Finally, he invited the credulous gentleman to supper, and sent him away so well assured of his good will, that he promised to bring all the captains with him to the same place, where, in presence of them all, Tissaphernes likewise promised to tell openly, which of them had by secret information sought to raise dissension between them.

Clearchus himself being thus deceived, with great importunity drew all the chief commanders, and many of the inferior leaders, to repair with him to the camp of Tissaphernes, whither followed them about two hundred of the common soldiers, as it had been to some common fair. But being there arrived, Clearchus with other the five principal colonels were called into the tent, the rest staying without, where they had not waited long ere a sign was given, upon which they within were apprehended, and the residue slain. Forthwith certain bands of the Persian horsemen scoured the field, killing as many Greeks as they met ; and riding up to the very camp of the Grecians, who wondered much at the tumult, whereof they knew not the cause, till one, escaping sorely wounded, informed of all that had been done. Hereupon the Greeks took arms in haste, thinking that the enemy would forthwith have assailed their camp. Anon they might perceive the ambassadors of Tissaphernes, among whom were his own brother, and Ariæus, followed with three hundred horse, who called for the principal men in the army, saying, that they brought a message from the king, which Ariæus delivered to this effect : That

Clearchus, having broken his faith, and the league made, was justly rewarded with death: That Menon and Proxenus, two other of the five colonels, for detecting his treachery, were highly honoured; and finally, That the king required them to surrender their arms, which were due to him, as having belonged unto his servant Cyrus. When some altercation had followed upon this message, Xenophon told the ambassadors, that if Clearchus had in such sort offended, it was well that he was in such sort punished; but he willed them to send back Menon and Proxenus, whom they had so greatly honoured, that by them, as by common friends to both nations, the Greeks might be advised how to answer the Persian. Hereunto the ambassadors knew not how to frame any reply, and therefore departed without speaking one word more. Clearchus and the other four were sent to Artaxerxes, by whose commandment their heads were struck off.

I hold it not amiss to prevent the order of time, annexing to this perfidiousness of Tissaphernes the reward which he afterward received. He saw his province wasted by the Greeks, against whom, receiving from his master convenient aid of men and money, he did so ill manage his affairs, that neither subtilty nor perjury, (to which he failed not to have recourse,) availed him; finally, the king was jealous of his cunning head, and sent a new lieutenant into those parts, who took it from his shoulders. Such was the recompence of his treachery, which made him so mistrusted at home, that the service which he could not do, he was thought upon private ends to neglect, and so hated abroad that he knew not which way to fly from the stroke, all the world being shut against him. But now let us return to the prosperity, wherein he triumphed without great cause, having betrayed braver men than himself, and intending to bring the like mischief upon the whole army.

SECT. VIII.

How Xenophon heartened the Greeks, and in despite of Tissaphernes went off safely.

GREAT was the heaviness of the soldiers, being now left destitute of leaders, and no less their fear of the evil hanging over their heads, which they knew not well how to avoid. Among the rest, Xenophon, whose learning supplied his want of experience, finding the deep sadness of the whole army to be such as hindered them from taking any course of preventing the danger at hand, began to advise the under officers of Proxenus's companies, whose familiar friend he had been, to bethink themselves of some means whereby their safety might be wrought, and the soldiers encouraged ; setting before their eyes whatsoever might serve to give them hope, and, above all, persuading them in nowise to yield to the mercy of their barbarous enemies.

Hereupon they desired him to take upon himself the charge of that regiment ; and so, together with him, the same night calling up such as were remaining of any account, they made choice of the fittest men to succeed in the places of those who were slain, or taken. This being done, and order set down for disburdening the army of all superfluous impediments, they easily comforted themselves for the loss of Tissaphernes's assistance, hoping to take victuals by force better cheap than he had been wont to sell them ; to which purpose they intended to take up their lodging two or three miles further, among some plentiful villages, and so to proceed, marching towards the heads of those great rivers which lay in their way, and to pass them where they were fordable. Many attempts were made upon them by Tissaphernes, whom they, serving all on foot, were not able to requite for the harm which they received by the Persian archers, who shot at a farther distance than the

Greeks could reach. For this cause did Xenophon provide slings, wherewith he over-reached the enemy ; and finding some horses fit for service, that were employed among the carriages, he set men upon them ; training likewise his archers, to shoot compass, who had been accustomed to the point-blank. By these means did he bear off the Persians who assailed him ; and sometimes gave them chase with that band of fifty horse, which being well backed with a firm body of footmen, and seconded with troops of the light-armed shot and slingers, compelled the enemy to lie a-loof. Tissaphernes, not daring to come to handy-gripes with these resolute men, did possess the tops of mountains, and places of advantage, by which they were to pass. But finally, when their valour made way through all such difficulties, he betook himself to that course, which was indeed the surest, of burning the country. With great sorrow did the Greeks behold the villages on fire, and thereby all hope of victuals cut off. Some advised to defend the country as granted by the enemy himself to be theirs ; others, to make more fires ; if so, perhaps the Persians might be ashamed to do that which were the desire of such as made passage in hostile manner ; but these were faint comforts. The best counsel was, that being near unto the Carduchi, a people enemy to the Persian, they should enter into their country, passing over some high mountains which lay between them. This course they followed, which could not have availed them, if Tissaphernes had begun sooner to cut off their victuals, rather than to seek to force, or to circumvent them by his fine wit.

SECT. IX.

The difficulties which the Greek army found in passing through the land of the Carduchi.

ENTERING upon the land of the Carduchi, they were encountered with many difficulties of ways, but much more afflicted by the fierce inhabitants, who, accustomed by force to defend themselves against the huge armies of the Persian, were no way inferior to the Greeks in daring, but only in the art of war. They were very light of foot, skilful archers, and used the sling well; which weapons, in that mountainous country, were of much use against these poor travellers, afflicting them in seven days, which they spent in that passage, far more than all the power of the great king had done. Between the territory of these Carduchi and the parts of Armenia confining them, ran Centrites, a great river, upon which the Greeks refreshed themselves one day, rejoicing that they had so well escaped these dangers, and hoping that the remainder would prove easy. But next morning they saw certain troops of horse, that lay to forbid their passage. These were levied by the king's deputies in those parts, Tissaphernes and his companies having taken their way towards Ionia. The river was broad and deep, so that it was not possible for such as would enter it, to make resistance against those which kept the opposite banks. To increase these dangers, the Carduchi following upon them, lay on the side of a mountain, within less than a mile of the water. But it was their good hap to discover a ford, by which the greater number of them passing over, did easily chase away the subjects of the Persian; and then sending back the most expedite men, gave succour to the rearward, against which the Carduchi, being slightly armed, could not on plain ground make resistance hand to hand. These Carduchi seem to have inhabited the moun-

tains of Niphates, which are not far from the spring of Tigris, though Ptolemy place them far more to the east upon the river of Cyrus in Media; wherein he differs much from Xenophon, whose relation being grounded upon his own knowledge, doth best in this case deserve credit. Of the river Centrites (as of many other rivers, towns, and places mentioned by Xenophon,) I will not labour to make a conjecture, which may endure the severity of a critic. For Ptolemy, and the whole nation of geographers, add small light to this expedition; only of this last, I think it the same which falleth into Tigris, not much above Artasigarta, springing out of Niphates, and running by the town of Sardeva in Gordene, a province of Armenia the Great, wherein the Greeks, having passed Centrites, did arrive.

SECT. X.

How Teribazus, governor of Armenia, seeking to entrap the Greeks with terms of feigned peace, was disappointed, and shamefully beaten.

THE army finding in Armenia good provision, marched without any disturbance about fifty or threescore miles to the heads of the river Tigris, and passing over them, travelled as far further without resistance, till they were encountered by Teribazus at the river Teleboa, which Xenophon commends as a goodly water, though small; but Ptolemy and others omit it. Teribazus governed that country for the Persian, and was in great favour with Artaxerxes, whose court may seem to have been a school, where the art of falsehood was taught as wisdom. He desired peace of the Greeks, which was made upon this condition: That they should take away what they pleased, but not burn down the towns and villages in their way. As soon as he had made this league, he levied an army, and besetting the straits of certain mountains which they were to pass, hoped well to

make such benefit of their security, as might give him the commendation of being no less craftily dishonest than Tissaphernes. Yet his cunning failed of success. For a great snow fell, which caused the Greeks to make many fires, and scatter themselves abroad in the villages. Teribazus also made many fires, and some of his men wandered about seeking relief. By the fires he was discovered; and by a soldier of his that was taken prisoner, the whole plot was revealed. Hereupon the Greeks, taking this captive with them for a guide, sought him out; and coming upon his camp, did so affright him, that before the whole army could arrive there, the shout which was raised by the van-currors, chased him away. They took his pavilion, wherein (besides many slaves that were artificers of voluptuousness,) very rich furniture was left by the treacherous coward, who returned no more to challenge it. From hence the army went northward, and passing the Euphrates, not far below the spring thereof, travelled with much difficulty through deep snow; being followed aloof by the enemy, who durst not approach them, but did cut off such as they found straggling behind. The inhabitants of the country through which they marched had their wintering-houses under ground, wherein was found great plenty of victuals, and of cattle, which likewise did winter in the same cellars with the owners. Having refreshed themselves in those parts, and taken sufficient ease after the miserable journey, which had consumed many of them with extreme cold, they departed, leading with them many bond-slaves, and taking away (besides other horses and cattle) some colts that were bred up for the great king.

SECT. X.

The passage of the army to Trebizond, through the countries bordering upon the river of Phasis, and other obscure nations.

So without impediment they came to the river Phasis, near whereunto the people called Phasiani Tacchi, and Chalybes were seated. These nations were joined together, and occupying the tops of a ledge of mountains which the Greeks were to pass, made countenance of war; but some companies being sent by night to seize upon a place of equal height to that whereon the enemies lay, making good the piece of ground which they had taken, secured the ascent of the rest; which caused these people to fly, every one retiring to the defence of his own. The first upon whose country the Greeks did enter were the Tacchi, who conveying all their provision of victuals into strong holds, brought the army into much want, until with hard labour one place was forced, wherein great store of cattle were taken; the people, to avoid captivity, threw themselves headlong down the rocks, the very women throwing down first their own children, and then casting themselves upon them. Here was taken a great booty of cattle, which served to feed them travelling through the land of the Chalybes, of whom they got nothing but strokes. The Chalybes were a very stout nation, well armed at all points, and exceeding fierce. They encountered the Greeks hand to hand, killing as many as they took prisoners, and cutting off their heads, which they carried away, singing and dancing, to the great grief of their companions living; who were glad, when, after seven days journey, they escaped from those continual skirmishes wherewith they had been vexed by these barbarians. Hence, travelling through a good corn country, inhabited by an obscure nation, called the Scythini, they came to

a rich town, the lord whereof, and of the region adjoining, used them friendly, and promised to guide them to a mountain, whence they might discover the Euxine sea. From Gymnias (which was the name of his town) he led them through the territory of his enemies, desiring them to waste it with sword and fire. After five days march, they came to a mountain called Teches, being (as I think) a part of the mountains called Moschici, whence their guide shewed them the sea, towards which they bent their course; and passing friendly through the region of the Macrones, (with whom, by means of an interpreter, found among themselves, who, born in that place, had been sold into Greece, they made a good peace;) they arrived in the land of Colchos, wherein stands the city of Trebizond¹, called then Trapezus, a colony of the Greeks. The Colchians entertaining them with hostility, were requited with the like; for the army, having now good leisure to repose themselves among their friends the Trapezuntians, did spoil the country thirty days together, forbearing only the borderers upon Trebizond, at the citizens request.

SECT. XII.

How the army began at Trebizond to provide a fleet, wherewith to return home by sea: how it came into the territory of Sinope, and there prosecuted the same purpose.

HAVING now found a haven-town, the soldiers were desirous to take shipping, and change their tedious land journies into an easy navigation. To which purpose Cherisophus, a Lacedæmonian, one of the principal commanders, promised, by means of Anaxibius the Lacedæmonian admiral, who was his friend, that he would provide vessels to embark them. Having thus concluded, they likewise took order for the staying of such ships as should pass

¹Trebizond, a colony of the Greeks, situated in the bottom of the Euxine sea.

that way, meaning to use them for their navigation. Lest all this provision should be found insufficient for the transportation of the whole army, Xenophon persuaded the cities adjoining to clear the ways, and make an easy passage for them by land; whereunto the soldiers were utterly unwilling to give ear, being desirous to return by sea: but the country fearing what inconvenience might grow by their long stay, did readily condescend to Xenophon's request. Two ships they borrowed of the Trapezuntians, which they manned and sent to sea; the one of them sailed directly into Greece, forsaking their companions who had put them in trust to bring ships into the port of Trebizond: the other took merchants and passengers, whose goods were safely kept for the owners, but the vessels were stayed to increase the fleet. After long abode, when victuals began to fail, by reason that all the land of the Colchians, near unto the camp, was already quite wasted, they were fain to embark their sick men, with the women, children, and such of the baggage as might best be spared, in those few ships which they had already provided. The rest of the army took their way by land to Cerasus, a Greek town, where the fleet likewise arrived. Here the army being mustered, was found to consist of eight thousand and six hundred men. From hence they passed through the country of the Mosynæci¹, who were divided into factions. The stronger party despising their friendship, caused them to join with the weaker, whom they left masters of all.

The next place of their abode was Cotyora², a Greek town likewise, and a colony of the Sinopians, as Trapezus and Cerasus were; but the entertainment which they here found was very churlish, having neither an open market afforded to them, nor the sick men that were among them admitted into

¹ Mosynæci, a nation of Pontus Cappadocius. the same region.

² Cotyora, a port town in

any house. Hereupon the soldiers entered the town by force, and (committing no outrage) bestowed those which were sick in convenient lodgings, taking into their own hands the custody of the gates. Provision for the army they made by strong hand, partly out of the territory of the Paphlagonians, partly out of the lands belonging to the town. These news were unwelcome to Sinope³, whence ambassadors were sent to the camp, who complaining of these dealings, and threatening to join with the Paphlagonians, if redress could not otherwise be had, were roundly answered by Xenophon, that mere necessity had enforced the army to teach those of Cotyora good manners in so bad a method; letting them know, that he feared not to deal with them and the Paphlagonian at once, though perhaps the Paphlagonian would be glad to take Sinope itself; to which, if cause were given, they would lend assistance. Upon this answer the ambassadors grew better advised, promising all friendship that the state of Sinope could shew; and commanding the town of Cotyora to relieve the soldiers as well as they might. Further, they promised to assist them with shipping, letting them understand how difficult the passage by land would prove, in regard of the many and great rivers, as Thermodon, Iris, Halys, and Parthenius, which crossed their way. This good counsel, and the fair promises accompanying it, were kindly accepted by the army, which well perceived that the city of Sinope would spare for no cost, to be freed from such a neighbourhood. It was therefore decreed, that they would pass the rest of the way by sea; provided, that if there should want such number of vessels as might serve to embark every one of them, then would they not put from the shore.

³ Sinope, a port town in Leucosyria, a colony of the Milesians.

SECT. XIII.

Of dissension which arose in the army ; and how it was embarked.

HITHERTO the danger of enemies, and miseries of weather and wants, had kept the company in firm unity ; which now began to dissolve and to thaw, by the neighbouring air of Greece, warming their heads with private respects to their several ends and purposes. Whilst they, who were sent as agents from the camp, remained at Sinope, Xenophon, considering the strength and valour of his men, and the opportunity of the coast whereon they lay, thought it would be an honourable work to build a city in those parts, which were soon like to prove great and wealthy, in regard both of their own puissance, and of the great repair of the Greeks into that quarter. For this cause he made sacrifice, according to the superstition of his time and country, divining of his success by the entrails of beasts. The soothsayer whom he employed, had received a great reward of Cyrus for conjecturing aright, that Artaxerxes would not give battle in ten days ; he therefore having preserved his money carefully, was desirous to be soon at home, that he might freely enjoy his gettings. By him the purpose of Xenophon was divulged, which was interpreted according to the diversity of men's opinions ; some approving the motion, but the greater part rejecting it. They of Sinope and Heraclea being informed of this consultation, were sore afraid, lest the poverty of the soldiers, who had not wherewith to maintain themselves at home, should give success to the project ; which to prevent, they promised to supply the army with a sufficient fleet, and likewise offered money to some of the captains, who thereupon undertook to give the soldiers pay, if they would presently set sail for Greece. One of these captains being a banished man, desired them to follow him into Troas ;

another offered to lead them into Chersonesus. Xenophon, who only desired the common good, was pleased greatly with these propositions, and professed openly that he would have them to set forward, and hold together in any case, punishing him as a traitor that should forsake the army, before such time as they were arrived at their journey's end. Silanus the soothsayer, who had uttered Xenophon's purpose, was hereby stayed from outrunning his fellows, and driven to abide with his wealth among poor men, longer than stood with his good liking. Also the other captains were much troubled and afraid, when they perceived that ships were prepared sufficient for their navigation, but that the money promised to them, and by them to the soldiers, came not. For the people of Sinope and Heraclea, knowing that the army was now resolved for the voyage, and that Xenophon, whom they feared, had persuaded them to this resolution, thought it the wisest way to furnish them with a navy whilst they were in good readiness to depart, but to keep the money to themselves. The captains therefore who, being disappointed by these towns, found themselves in great danger of their men, whom they had deceived with fair hopes, repented much of their hasty offers, and signifying as much to Xenophon, prayed him to make proposition to the army, of taking the ships, and sailing to Phasis, where they might seize upon lands, and plant themselves in such wise as should stand best with their good liking. But finding him cold in the business, they began to work the principal of their own followers, hoping by them to draw in all the rest. This news becoming public, bred a suspicion of Xenophon, as if he had won the rest of the captains to his purpose, and meant now to carry the army quite another way from their own home. Wherefore assembling the companies, he gave them satisfaction, and withal complained of some disorders, which he caused them to redress. A general inqui-

sition was likewise made of offences committed since the death of Cyrus ; which being punished, all things were in quiet. Shortly after came ambassadors from Corylas, lord of the Paphlagonians, who sending presents desired peace of the Greeks. The ambassadors were friendly entertained, and peace concluded ; which needed not to have been sought, for that the Greeks having now their fleet in readiness, did soon weigh anchors, and set sail for Harmene, the port of Sinope, whither Cherisophus came, bringing with him a few gallies from the admiral Anaxibius, who promised to give the army pay as soon as they came into the parts of Greece.

SECT. XIV.

*Another great dissension and distraction of the army.
How the mutineers were beaten by the Barbarians,
and rescued by Xenophon.*

THE nearer they approached to Greece, the greater was their desire to make provision for themselves, that they might not return home empty-handed. Wherefore trusting well, that if the charge of the army were absolutely committed to one sufficient man, he might more conveniently procure the good of them all, they determined to make Xenophon sole commander of all ; in whose favour, as well the captains as the common soldiers were very earnest and violent. But he, either fearing to displease the Lacedæmonians, who were jealous of him already, (being incensed by that fugitive who forsook the army at Trebizond, flying with one of their two ships,) or moved by some tokens appearing in the entrails, that threatened ill success to his government, procured with vehement contention, that this honour was laid upon Cherisophus a Lacedæmonian. It seems that Xenophon, considering the vexations incident to the conduct of a voluntary army, wanting pay, did wisely in yielding to such tokens as forbad him to ac-

cept it; especially, knowing so well their desire, which was, by right or by wrong, to get wealth wheresoever it might be found, without all regard of friend or of foe. Cherisophus had been general but six or seven days when he was deposed, for having been unwilling to rob the town of Heraclea, which had sent presents to the camp, and been very beneficial unto them in lending ships for their transportation. Two days they had sailed by the coast of Asia, when being passed those great rivers, which would have given impediment to their journey by land, they touched at Heraclea, where consulting how to take their way onward, whether by land or by sea, one seditious man began to put them in mind of seeking to get somewhat for themselves; telling them, that all their provision would be spent in three days, and that being now come out of the enemies country, victuals and other necessities could not be had without money; for which cause he gave advice to send messengers into the town of Heraclea, giving the citizens to understand what their wants were, and demanding of them three thousand pieces of money, called Cyzicens; which sum amounteth to two thousand and five hundred pounds sterling, or thereabouts. This motion was greatly applauded, and the sum raised to ten thousand Cyzicens at least; which to require, they thought Cherisophus, as being general, the fittest man; others had more desire to send Xenophon: but in vain, for they both refused it, and renounced the action as dishonest. Lest therefore either of these should fail in managing the business which agreed not with his disposition, others of more impudence and less discretion were sent; who in such wise delivered their insolent message, that the citizens taking time to deliberate upon their request, brought what they could out of the fields into the town, and shutting the gates, did forthwith man the walls.

When the soldiers perceived themselves to be disappointed of their ravenous purpose, they fell

to mutiny, saying, that their leaders had betrayed them; and being for the most part of them Arcadians and Achæans, they forsook immediately Cherisophus, and Xenophon, choosing new leaders out of their own number. Above four thousand five hundred they were, all heavily armed, who, electing ten captains, sailed unto the port of Calpas, which is the mid-way between Heraclea and Byzantium, with purpose to assail the Bithynians on the sudden. With Cherisophus there abode two thousand and one hundred, of whom one thousand and four hundred were armed weightily; Xenophon had two thousand foot, three hundred whereof were lightly armed, and forty horse; which small band had done good service already, and could not have been spared now. Cherisophus had agreed with Cleander governor of Byzantium, to meet him at the mouth of the river Calpas, whither Cleander promised to bring some gallies to convey him over into Greece; for which cause he took his way thither by land, leaving to Xenophon such shipping as he had; who passing some part of the way by sea, landed upon the confines of Heraclea, and Thracia Asiatica, intending to make a cut through the mid-land country to the Propont. The mutineers, who had landed at Calpas. by night, with purpose to take spoils in Bithynia, divided themselves into ten companies, every captain leading his own regiment into some village, five or six miles from the sea; in the greater towns were two regiments quartered; and so was that part of the country surprised on the sudden, and sacked all at one time. The place of rendezvous was an high piece of ground, where some of them arrived, finding no disturbance; others, not without much trouble and danger; two companies were broken and defeated, only eight men escaping; the rest were all put to the sword. For the Thracians, which had slipt first out of the soldiers hands, did raise the country, and finding the Greeks loaden with booty, took the advantage of

their disorder, cutting in pieces those two regiments; which done, they attempted the rest, encompassing the hill whereon they encamped. One great advantage the Thracians had, that being all light-armed, they could at pleasure make retreat from these Arcadians and Achæans; who wanting the assistance of horse, and having neither archers nor slingers among them, were driven to stand merely upon their defence, bearing off with great danger, and many wounds received, the darts and arrows of the Barbarians, till finally they were driven from their watering place, and enforced to crave parley. Whatsoever the articles of composition were, the Thracians yielded to all; but pledges of assurance they would give none, without which the Greeks well knew, that all promises of such people, especially incensed, were nothing worth.

In the mean time Xenophon, holding his way quietly through the inland region, did enquire of some travellers, whether they knew ought of any Grecian army passing along those parts, and receiving by them true information of the desperate case into which these gallants had foolishly thrown themselves, he marched directly towards the place where they lay, taking with him for guides them who gave him the intelligence. His horsemen he sent before to discover and to scour the ways; the light armed footmen took the hill tops on either hand; all of them setting fire on whatsoever they found combustible, whereby the whole country seemed to be on a light flame, to the great terror of the enemies, who thought that some huge army had approached. That night he encamped on a hill, within five miles of the Arcadians, increasing still the number of his fires, which he caused hastily to be quenched soon after supper. The enemies perceiving this, thought certainly that he would have fallen upon them in the dark, which caused them in all haste to dislodge. Early the next morning Xenophon coming thither in very good order, to have

given battle, found that his device to affright the Thracians had taken full effect; but he marvelled that the Greeks were also departed; concerning whom he learned by enquiry, that they removed at break of day, and perceived by signs that they had taken the way to the port of Calpas, in which journey he overtook them. They embraced him and his with great joy, confessing that they themselves had thought the same which the enemies did, looking that he should have come by night; wherein finding themselves deceived, they were afraid lest he had forsaken them, and therefore hastened away to overtake him, and join with him. So they arrived at the haven of Calpas, where it was decreed, that whosoever from thenceforth made any motion to disjoin the army should suffer death.

SECT. XV.

Of divers pieces of service done by Xenophon; and how the army returned into Greece. The occasions of the war between the Lacedæmonians and the Persian.

THE haven of Calpas lay under a goodly headland, that was very strong, and abounding with all kind of grain and fruits, except olives. There was also timber for building and shipping, and a very convenient seat for a great city. All which commodities that might have allured the soldiers to stay there and to plant, caused them to haste away, fearing lest Xenophon should find some device to have settled himself and them in that place. For the greater part of them had good means to live at home; neither did they so much for hope of gain follow Cyrus in that war, as in regard of his honour, and the love which they bare unto him: the poorer sort were such as left their parents, wives, and children, to whom, (though failing of the riches which they had hoped to purchase,) they were now desirous to return. But

whether it were so, that Xenophon found advantage by their own superstition, to make them stay, which they greatly suspected; or whether the signs appearing in the entrails did indeed forbid their departure;—so long they were enforced to abide in the place, till victuals failed; neither would the captains lead them forth to forage the country, until the sacrifices should promise good success. Chersiphos was dead of an ague, and his ships were gone, being returned to the Heracleans, of whom they were borrowed. His followers were joined to the rest of the army, which the greater it was, the more provision it needed, and the sooner felt want. For which cause, he that was chosen colonel into the place of Chersiphos, would needs adventure to gratify the soldiers with the spoil of some villages that stood near at hand; in which enterprise he found ill success, the whole country lying in wait to entrap him; and an army of horse being sent by Pharnabazus, the satrapa or viceroy of Phrygia, to the assistance of these Bithynian Thracians; which troops falling upon the Greeks that were scattered abroad in seeking booty, slew five hundred of them, and chased the rest to a certain mountain thereby.

The news of this overthrow coming to Xenophon, he led forth a part of the army to the rescue of those that survived, and brought them safe to the camp; upon which the Bithynians made an offer that night, and breaking a *corps du garde*, slew some, pursuing the rest to the very tents. This new courage of the enemy, together with the present condition of the army, so disheartened and unfurnished of necessities, caused the Greeks to remove their camp to a place of more strength; which having intrenched, and committed to the defence of such as were least able to endure travail, Xenophon with the firmest and best able men went forth, both to bury those which were lately slain, and to abate the pride of the Thracians, and their assistants. In this journey his demeanour was very honourable. For having given

burial to the dead, the enemy was discovered, lying on the tops of the hills adjoining; to whom, (notwithstanding that the way was very rough and troublesome, so that some thought it a matter of too great danger to leave at their backs a wood scarce passable,) he marched directly,—telling his men plainly, that he had rather follow the enemy with half the number than turn his back to them with twice as many; and letting them further know, that if they did not charge the Barbarian, he would not fail with the greater resolution to pursue them; from whom, if they could safely retire to the camp, yet what should they do there, wanting victuals to sustain them in the place, and ships to carry them away? Wherefore he willed them rather to fight well that day, having eaten their dinners, than another day fasting; and not to regard the uneasy return, which might serve to stay cowards from running away, but to wish unto the enemy a fair and easy way by which he might fly from them. These persuasions were followed with so valiant execution, that both Persians and Bithynians being chased out of the field, abandoned the country forthwith; removing their families, and leaving all that could not suddenly be conveyed away to the discretion of the Greeks, who at good leisure gathered the harvest of these bad neighbours' fields.

This was the last fight which they had on the side of Asia. For they were not only suffered quietly to enjoy the spoil of the country, but when the opinion grew common in those parts, that it was the intent of Xenophon to plant a colony on the port of Calpas, ambassadors were sent from the neighbour people, to desire friendship, and make offer of their best assistance. But the soldiers had no mind to stay. Wherefore entering further into Bithynia, they took a great booty, which they carried away to Chrysopolis, a city near unto Chalcedon, where they sold it. Pharnabazus, lieutenant in Phrygia to Artaxerxes, did greatly fear, lest their long stay in that

country might breed in them a desire to visit his province, where they might have found great wealth, and little power to guard it. Therefore he sent to the Lacedæmonian admiral, intreating him with much instance and large promises to waft them over into Europe; to whom Anaxibius the admiral condescending, promised to give the soldiers pay as soon as they arrived at Byzantium. So were they carried out of Asia at the entreaty of the Persian, who in the height of his pride, had thought them so surely imprisoned with mighty rivers, that he not only denied to permit their quiet departure, but willed them to surrender their arms into his hands, and so to yield their lives to his discretion. How discourteously they were entreated by Anaxibius, and how to requite his injurious dealings, they seized upon Byzantium, which by Xenophon's persuasion they forbare to sack, I hold it superfluous to relate. For the residue of their doings appertain little to the general course of things. But this expedition, as in all ages it was glorious, so did it both discover the secrets of Asia, and stir up the Greeks to think upon greater enterprises than ever their forefathers had undertaken. Likewise it was the only remarkable action which the time afforded. For the Roman wars did hitherto extend no further than to the next neighbouring towns of Italy; and in Greece all things were quiet, the Lacedæmonians ruling insolently, but without disturbance. True it is, that the seeds of the war shortly following, which the Lacedæmonians made upon Artaxerxes, were already sown, before these companies returned out of the high countries of Asia. For the towns of Ionia, which had sided with young Cyrus against Tissaphernes, if not against the great king, prepared to rebel; which they thought safer than to fall into the hands of Tissaphernes, who was now appointed lieutenant, both of his old province, and of all that had belonged to

Cyrus. Wherefore the Ionians besought the Lacedæmonians to send them aid, whereby to recover their liberty; and obtained their request. For a power was sent over, under conduct of Thimbron, a Spartan, who bestowed his men in such towns as had already revolted, to secure the cities and their fields, but not to make any offensive war.

CHAP. XI.

OF THE AFFAIRS OF GREECE WHILST THEY WERE MANAGED BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS.

SECT. I.

How the Lacedæmonians took courage by example of Xenophon's army to make war upon Artaxerxes.

IT seems that the Lacedæmonians did well perceive in how ill part Artaxerxes took their favour shewed unto his brother, and yet were timorous in beginning an open war against him, thinking it sufficient to take all care that no advantage might slip which could serve to strengthen their estate, by finding the Persian work beyond the sea. But when Xenophon's army had revealed the baseness of those effeminate Asiatics, and rehearsed the many victories which they themselves had gotten, upon terms of extreme disadvantage; then was all Greece filled with desire of undertaking upon this huge unwieldy empire, thinking it no hard matter

for the joint forces of that whole nation, to hew out the way to Susa, whereof one handful had opened the passage to Babylon; and further, finding no power that was able to give them resistance, in all that long journey of thirty four thousand two hundred and fifty five furlongs spent in going and returning, (which make of English miles about four thousand two hundred and eighty one,)—a very painful march of one year and three months. Nevertheless the civil distraction wherewith Greece was miserably torn, and especially that hot fire of the Theban war, which, kindled with Persian gold, broke forth suddenly into a great flame, drew back out of Asia the power of the Lacedæmonians, to the defence of their own estate; leaving it questionable whether Agesilaus, having both the same, and far greater forces, could have wrought proportionable effects. Sure it is, that in the whole space of two years, which he spent in Asia, his deeds procured more commendation of magnanimity and fair behaviour, than of stout courage, and great or profitable achievements. For how highly soever it pleased Xenophon, who was his friend, and follower in this, and in other wars, to extol his virtue; his exploits, being only a few incursions into the countries lying near the sea, carry no proportion to Xenophon's own journey, which I know not whether any age hath paralleled: the famous retreat of Conon the Briton with six thousand men from Aquileia, to his own country, through all the breadth of Italy, and length of France, in despite of the emperor Theodosius, being rather like it than equal. But of Agesilaus, and his wars in Asia and Greece, we shall speak more in due place.

SECT. II.

The prosperous beginnings of the war in Asia.

THIMBRON receiving Xenophon's men, began to take in towns, and to entertain all such as were willing to revolt from the Persian, who were many, and some of them such as had been highly beholden to the king; who seem to have had no other cause of discontent, than that they were to live under the government of Tissaphernes, whom all others did as vehemently hate as the king his master did love him. The managing of the war begun by Thimbron was, for his oppressions, taken out of his hands, and committed to Dercyllidas, a Spartan, who behaved himself as a good man of war, and a wise commander. For whereas the rule of the low countries of Asia was divided between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, who did ill agree; Pharnabazus being the worthier man, but the other, by his prince's favour, the greater, and having the chief command in those wars against the Greeks; Dercyllidas, who did bear a private hatred to Pharnabazus, (knowing well that Tissaphernes was of a mischievous nature, and would not be sorry to see his co-rival thoroughly beaten, though to the king's loss,) made an appointment with Tissaphernes, and forthwith entered Æolis, which was under the jurisdiction of Pharnabazus; which province, in few days, he brought into his own power.

That country of Æolis had about the same time suffered a violent alteration, which gave easy success to the attempts of Dercyllidas. Zenis, a Dardanian, had been deputy to Pharnabazus in those parts; after whose death his wife Mania procured his office, wherein she behaved herself so well, that she not only was beloved of the people under her government, but enlarged her territory, by the conquest of certain towns adjoining; and sundry times

gave assistance to Pharnabazus in his wars against the Mysians and Persians. For she had in pay some companies of Greeks, whose valour by her good usage did her great service. But somewhat before the arrival of Dercyllidas in those parts, a son-in-law of hers, called Midias, whom she trusted and loved much, being blinded with ambition, found means to stifle her, and kill her son of seventeen years old ; which done, he seized upon two of her principal towns, wherein her treasure lay, hoping to have been admitted into possession of her whole estate. Being denied entrance by her soldiers that lay in garrison, he sent messengers with presents to Pharnabazus, desiring him to make him governor in the place of Mania. His presents were not only rejected by Pharnabazus, but revenge of his foul treason threatened ; whereby the wicked villain was driven into terms of almost utter desperation. In the meantime came Dercyllidas, to whom the towns of Mania, that held against Midias, did quickly open their gates. One only town stood out for four days, (against the will of the citizens, who were covetous of liberty,) the governor striving in vain to have kept it to the use of Pharnabazus. Now remained only two cities, Gergithum and Scepsis, which the traitor held, who fearing all men, as being loved of none, sent ambassadors to Dercyllidas, desiring leave to speak with him, and pledges for his security : upon the delivery of which he issued out of Scepsis, and coming into the camp made offer to join with the Greeks upon such conditions, as might seem reasonable. But he was plainly told by Dercyllidas, that other conditions there were none, than to set the citizens freely at liberty. And presently upon these words they marched toward Scepsis. When Midias perceived that it was in vain to strive against the army, and the townsmen, who were all of one mind, he quietly went along with Dercyllidas ; who remaining but a few hours in the city, did a sacrifice

to Minerva, and then leading away the garrison of Midias, he left the city free, and departed towards Gergithum. Midias did not forsake his company, but followed him, earnestly entreating that he might be suffered to retain Gergithum : but coming to the gates, he was bidden to command his soldiers that they should be opened ; for (quoth Dercyllidas) I must here likewise do a sacrifice to Minerva. The traitor not daring to make denial, caused his mercenaries to open the gates, whereby Dercyllidas, taking possession of the place, tendered pay to the garrison, who did not refuse to serve under his ensigns. This done, all the goods of Mania were seized upon, as belonging to one that had been subject to Pharnabazus, who was enemy to the Greeks ; and so the murderous wretch was sent away naked, not knowing in what part of the world he might find any place to hide his detested head. Dercyllidas, having in eight days taken nine cities, purposed, for the ease of his confederates, to winter in Bithynia, to which end he took truce with Pharnabazus, who had not any desire of war. That winter, and the summer ensuing, the truce being recontinued, held ; in which time, besides the wasting of Bithynia, the neck of land joining Cherronea to the main was fortified, being four or five miles in breadth ; by which means eleven towns, with much good land belonging to them, were freed from the incursions of the wild Thracians, and made fit and able to victual the camp. Likewise the city of Aterne was taken, which was of great strength, and very well stored with provision.

After this, Dercyllidas had command from Sparta to divert the war into Caria, where was the seat of Tissaphernes ; for that hereby it was thought not uneasy to recover all the towns of Ionia : Pharax, the admiral of the fleet (which was a yearly office) being appointed to join with him. Though it was manifest that Tissaphernes had neglected Pharnabazus in time of necessity, yet was he not in his own

danger requited with the like. For Pharnabazus having respect to the king's service, came to assist his private enemy Tissaphernes, and so passing into Caria, they thrust garrisons into all places of strength; which done, they marched towards Ionia, hoping to find the towns ill manned for resistance. As these Persians were desirous to keep the war from their own doors, so was Dercyllidas willing to free his confederates the Ionians from the spoil and danger of the war, by transferring it into Caria. For which cause he passed the river Mæander, and not looking to have been so soon encountered, marched carelessly through the country; when on the very sudden, the whole army of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus was discovered, consisting of Persians, Carians, and some mercenary Greeks, who were all marshalled in very good order to present battle. The odds was too apparent, both in numbers of men, and in readiness, as also in advantage of ground: for the Persian had a great multitude of horse, the Greek very few and feeble, being to fight in an open plain. Therefore all the Ionians, together with the islanders and others of such places as bordered upon the king's dominions, did either betake themselves to present flight, or, abiding a while for shame, did plainly discover by their looks, that they meant not to be more bold than wise. Only Dercyllidas with his Peloponnesians, regarding their honour, prepared to endure the fight; which must needs have brought them to destruction, if the counsel of Pharnabazus had been followed, who perceiving the opportunity of so great a victory, was not willing to let it slip. But Tissaphernes, who was naturally a coward, seeing that countenance of resistance was made, began to consider what strange defence the soldiers of Xenophon had shewed, and thinking that all the Greeks were of the like resolution, held it the wisest way to crave parley; the conclusion of which was, that a truce should be made, to last until

Tissaphernes might receive answer from the king, and Dercyllidas from Sparta, concerning the demands propounded in the treaty ; which were, on the one part, that all the Greeks in Asia might enjoy their own liberty and laws ; but contrariwise on the other side, that the Lacedæmonians should depart Asia, and leave the towns to the king's pleasure. This treaty was of none effect ; only it served to free the Greeks from the present danger, and to gain time unto Tissaphernes, who desired to avoid the war by procrastination, which he durst not adventure to finish by trial of a battle.

SECT. III.

How the Lacedæmonians took revenge upon the Eleans for old displeasure. The discontents of the Corinthians and Thebans, conceived against the state of Sparta.

IN the mean season, the Lacedæmonians, who found none able to withstand them in Greece, began to call the Eleans to account for some disgraces received by them during the late wars, when leisure was wanting to the requital of such petty injuries. These Eleans being presidents of the Olympian games, had set a fine upon the city of Sparta ; for non-payment of which they forbad them to come to the solemnity, and publicly whipped one of them, that was a man of note, for presuming to contend against their decree. Likewise they hindered Agis, king of Sparta, from doing sacrifice to Jupiter ; and in all points used great contempt toward the Spartans, who had now no business that could hinder them from taking revenge ; and therefore sent a peremptory message to the Eleans, commanding them to set at liberty the cities which they held in subjection. This was the usual pretence which they made the ground of all their wars ; though little they cared for the liberty of such towns, which they caused afterwards to be-

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How the Lacedæmonians took revenge upon the Eleans for old displeasure. The discontents of the Corinthians and Thebans, conceived against the state of Sparta.

IN the mean season, the Lacedæmonians, who found none able to withstand them in Greece, began to call the Eleans to account for some disgraces received by them during the late wars, when leisure was wanting to the requital of such petty injuries. These Eleans being presidents of the Olympian games, had set a fine upon the city of Sparta ; for non-payment of which they forbad them to come to the solemnity, and publicly whipped one of them, that was a man of note, for presuming to contend against their decree. Likewise they hindered Agis, king of Sparta, from doing sacrifice to Jupiter ; and in all points used great contempt toward the Spartans, who had now no business that could hinder them from taking revenge ; and therefore sent a peremptory message to the Eleans, commanding them to set at liberty the cities which they held in subjection. This was the usual pretence which they made the ground of all their wars ; though little they cared for the liberty of such towns, which they caused afterwards to be-

in the meanwhile make truce. Truce was therefore made, which Tissaphernes had sought only to win time of making provision for the war, and getting supply of men and money from Artaxerxes, whilst Agesilaus was busy in settling the estates of his confederate cities on that side of the sea. The end of this long vacation from war, was at the coming down of the forces which Artaxerxes had sent; at what time Agesilaus received a plain message from Tissaphernes, that either he must forthwith depart out of Asia, or make good his abode by strong hand. Agesilaus, returning word that he was glad to hear that his enemies had by perjury deserved vengeance from heaven, prepared to invade them; and sending word to all the towns which lay between him and Caria, that they should provide victuals and other necessaries for his army, did easily make Tissaphernes believe, that his intent was to invade that province wherein Tissaphernes dwelt, and which was unfit for horse, in which part of his forces the Persian had most confidence. Therefore Tissaphernes bestowing all his companies of foot in Caria, entered with his horse into the plains of Mæander, hoping thereby to stop the passage of a heavy foot army, not suffering them to pass into that country which was fittest for their service. But the Greeks left him waiting there in vain, and marched directly into Phrygia, where they took great spoil without resistance, till such time as the horsemen of Pharnabazus met them, who in a small skirmish having the better of the Greeks, were the occasion that Agesilaus returned to Ephesus. Although in this last fight only twelve men were lost, yet Agesilaus perceiving by that trial how hard it would be to prevail, and hold the mastery of the field, without a greater strength of horse, took all possible care to increase that part of his forces. By which means having enabled himself, whilst winter lasted, he entered upon the country of Tissaphernes as soon as the season

of the year would permit ; and not only took a great booty, but finding the horsemen of Tissaphernes in the plain of Mæander, without assistance of their infantry, he gave them battle, and had a great victory, taking their camp, in which he found great riches. The blame of this loss fell heavy upon Tissaphernes, who either upon cowardice had absented himself from the battle, or, following some other business, was then at Sardis. For which cause his master having him in distrust, and thinking that peace might be the sooner had, which he much desired, if the man, so odious to the whole nation of the Greeks, were taken out of the way, he sent into those parts Tithraustes, a Persian, to cut off the head of Tissaphernes, and succeed him in the government. Such was the end of this base and cowardly politician, who little caring to offend heaven, when by perjury he would advance his purposes on earth, failed at the last, through too much over-weening of his own wisdom, even in that part of cunning wherein he thought himself most perfect. For supposing, that by his great skill in subtle negociation he should one way or other circumvent the Greeks, and make them weary of Asia ; he did not seek to finish the war, and, according to his master's wish, bring all things speedily to quiet ; but rather to temporise, till he might find some opportunity of making such end as best might stand with the king's honour and his own. Wherein it seems that he much mistook his prince's disposition, who, though he had highly rewarded him for the aid which he did bring in his time of danger, yet would he much more gladly have taken it, if he could have found such means whereby the danger itself might have been avoided ; as not loving to have war, whilst by any conditions, (honourable or not,) he might obtain peace. And this appeared well by the course which Tithraustes took at his first possession of the low countries. For he sent ambassadors to Agesilaus in very friendly sort, letting him

know, that the man who had been author of the war, was now taken out of the way ; and that it was the king's pleasure to let the Greeks enjoy their own laws and liberty, upon condition that they should pay him the tribute accustomed, and the army be forthwith dismissed. The answer to this proposition was by Agesilaus referred to the council of Sparta ; in the mean season he was content to transfer the war into the province of Pharnabazus, at the request of Tithraustes who bought his departure with thirty talents.

This was a strange manner of war, both on the offensive and on the defensive part. For Agesilaus, having entertained great hopes of vanquishing the great king, was contented to forbear his several provinces, at the intreaty of the lieutenants ; and those lieutenants being employed by the king to maintain his estates against all enemies, (wherein if they failed, they knew that their heads might easily be taken from their shoulders,) were little offended at any loss that fell on their next neighbour princes, which were subject likewise to the same crown of Persia, so long as their own government could be preserved free from waste and danger. The cause of this disorder on the Persian side, I can ascribe to nothing so deservedly as to the corrupted estate of the court, wherein eunuchs, concubines, and ministers of pleasure, were able, by partial construction, to countenance or disgrace the actions of such as had the managing of things abroad ; and to that foolish manner of the king's, (which was so usual that it might be called a rule,) to reward or punish the provincial governor, according to the benefit or loss which the country given in charge unto each of them received during the time of his rule. Whereby it came to pass, that as every one was desirous to make his own territory yield a large increase of the king's treasure ; so no man was careful to assist his borderers, if loss or danger might thereby grow to himself and his ;

but sat still as an idle beholder, when perhaps, by joining their forces, it had not been uneasy to recompense the spoil of one country, by conquering another, or defending a third from far greater miseries.

SECT. V.

The war and treaty between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus.

AGESILAUS, having thus compounded with Tithraustes, entered Phrygia, burning and wasting the country without resistance. He took the palace of Pharnabazus, and by his lieutenant drove him out of his camp. These actions, together with his honourable behaviour, which added much to their lustre, were more glorious than profitable. For he did not win cities and places of strength, which might have increased his power, and given assurance to the rest of his proceedings; but purchased fame and high reputation, by which he drew unto him some that were discontented and stood upon bad terms with the great king, whom he lost again as easily, by means of some slight injury done to them by his under-captains. Pharnabazus did not inclose himself in any town, for fear of being besieged, but kept the field, lying as near as he could safely to the enemies, with whom it was not his purpose to fight, but to make some good end by composition, which he found not uneasy to do. For the pleasures by him formerly done to the states of Sparta, in the times of their most necessity, had been so great, that when he (obtaining parley) did set before their eyes his bounty towards them, and his love, (which had been such that, besides many other hazards of his person, he had, for the rescue of their fleet, when it was driven to run ashore at Abydos, adventured to ride into the sea, as far as he could find any ground, and fight on horseback against the Athenians,) together

with his faith, which had never been violated in word or deed;—they knew not how to excuse their ingratitude, otherwise than by telling him that, having war with his master, they were enforced against their will to offend him. Agesilaus did make a fair offer to him, that if he would revolt from the king to them, they would maintain him against the Persian, and establish him free prince of the country wherein he was at that time only deputy to Artaxerxes. But Pharnabazus told him plainly, that if the king his master did put him in trust to make war against them, he would not fail to do the best that he could as their enemy; if the charge were taken out of his hand, and he commanded to obey another, he would then shift side, and betake himself to their alliance. The issue of this parley was, that the army should no longer abide in Phrygia, nor again return into it, whilst employment could be found elsewhere. The excuse made by Agesilaus, and the withdrawing of his forces out of those parts, were not sufficient to appease Pharnabazus, whom he had not invaded for want of more necessary business elsewhere, but because his country would yield great booty, and for the hire of thirty talents. By this means the Lacedæmonians changed an honourable friend into a hot enemy, who afterwards requited their unthankfulness with full revenge.

SECT. VI.

The great commotions raised in Greece by the Thebans and others, that were hired with gold from the Persian.

IN the meanwhile Tithraustes, perceiving that Agesilaus meant nothing less than to return into Greece, and let Artaxerxes rest quietly in Asia, took a wise course, whereby the city of Sparta was not only driven to look to her own, and give over

her great hopes of subverting the empire, but was beaten out of all that had been gotten by many late victories, and saw her dominion restrained unto the narrow bounds of her own territory. He sent into Greece fifty talents of silver, to be employed in raising war against the Lacedæmonians; which treasure was, by the subtle practice of him that was put in trust with it, in such wise dispersed among the principal men of the Thebans, Argives, and Corinthians, that all those estates having formerly borne secret hate to that of Sparta, were now desirous of nothing so much as open war. And lest this great heat of the incensed multitude should, for want of present exercise, begin to faint, and vanish away in idle words, occasion was found out to thrust the Lacedæmonians into arms, that they themselves might seem authors of the quarrel. Some land there was in the tenure of the Locrians, to which the Thebans had in former time laid claim; but the Phocians, either having the better title, or finding the greater favour, had it adjudged unto them, and received yearly money for it. This money the Locrians were either hired or persuaded to pay now to the Thebans, who readily accepted it. The Phocians, not meaning so to lose their rent, made a distress by strong hand, recovering a great deal more than their own; which the Thebans (as in protection of their new tenants) requited with an invasion made upon Phocis, wasting that country in the manner of open war.

Such were the beginnings of professed hostility between Thebes and Sparta, and the first breaking out of their close enmity, that had long time, though hardly, been concealed. For when the Phocian ambassadors came to Sparta, complaining of the violence done by the Thebans, and requesting succour, they had very favourable audience, and ready consent to their suit; it being the manner of the Lacedæmonians, to defer the acknow-

ledgment of injuries received until occasion of revenge were offered, and then to discover their indignation in cold blood. At this time they had very good opportunity to work their own wills, having no other war to disturb them in Greece, and hearing out of Asia no news that could offend or trouble them. Wherefore they sent Lysander to raise all the countries about Phocis, and, with such forces as he could levy, to attend the coming of Pausanias, king of Sparta, (for Sparta, as hath been shewed before, had two kings,) who should follow him with the strength of Peloponnesus. Lysander did as he was appointed, and being of great reputation in those parts, he drew the Orchomenians to revolt from Thebes. Pausanias likewise raised all Peloponnesus, except the Corinthians, (who refused to assist him in that enterprise,) meaning to join with Lysander, and make a speedy end of the war. The consideration of so great a danger approaching so swiftly, caused the Thebans to seek what help they could abroad, forasmuch as their own strength was far too little to make resistance against such mighty preparations. It was not unknown to them, that many followers of the Lacedæmonians were otherwise affected in heart than they durst utter in countenance; but the good wishes of such people were little available, considering that the most which could be expected from them was, that they should do as little hurt as they could: by which manner of tergiversation, the Corinthians did at that present cast themselves into the displeasure of the Spartans, to the no great benefit of Thebes. Wherefore it was thought the safest course to procure the assistance of some estate that might presently declare itself on their side, which would cause many others to follow the example, and make their party strong. To this end they sent ambassadors to Athens, excusing old offences, as either not committed by public allowance, or done in time of the general war,

and recompensed with friendship lately shewn in their refusal of assisting Pausanias, when he came in behalf of the thirty tyrants, against the good citizens of Athens. In regard of which, and for their own honour's sake, they requested of them aid in the present war, offering to do the best that they could for the restoring of Athens to her former estate and dignity. Thrasybulus and his friends, who, persecuted by the thirty, had been well entertained at Thebes, procured now the city to make a large requital of the courtesy which they had received. For it was decreed, that the state of Athens should not only refuse to aid the Lacedæmonians in this war, but that it should assist the Thebans, and engage itself in their cause. Whilst Pausanias lay still, waiting the arrival of his confederates, Ly-sander, being desirous to do somewhat that might advance the business in hand, came to Haliartus, where, though Pausanias did not meet him, as had been appointed, yet he attempted the town, and was slain in fight by the Thebans, who came hastily to the rescue. As this victory did encourage the Thebans, so the coming of Pausanias with his great army did again amaze them with presentation of extreme danger; but their spirits were soon revived by the strong succour which was brought from Athens; in consideration of which, and of the late battle, Pausanias durst not hazard a new fight with them, but, receiving the bodies of those that were slain by composition, departed out of their territory; for which, either cowardice or indiscretion, he was, at his return to Sparta, condemned as a traitor, and driven to fly into Tegea, where he ended his days in banishment.

SECT. VII.

How Agesilaus was called out of Asia to help his country. A victory of the Spartans. Conon, the Athenian, assisted by Pharnabazus, overcomes the Lacedæmonian fleet, recovers the mastery of the seas, and rebuilds the walls of Athens.

THIS good success, and the confederacy made with Athens, gave such reputation to the Thebans, that the Argives, Corinthians, Eubeans, Locrians, and Acarnanians, did forthwith side with them, and raising a strong army, determined to give battle to the Lacedæmonians, as near as they might to their own doors; considering that the force of Sparta itself was not great, but grew more and more by the adjunction of their confederates. The magistrates of Sparta perceiving the danger, sent for Agesilaus, who readily obeyed them, and promising his friends in Asia to return speedily to their assistance, passed the straits of Hellespont into Europe. In the mean time the cities of the new league had given battle to the Lacedæmonians, and the remainder of their associates, but with ill success. For when the right wing of each part had gotten the better hand, the Argives and Thebans returning from the chase in some disorder, were broken and defeated by the Lacedæmonians, who meeting them in good order, won from them the honour which they had gotten by forcing the left wing of the Lacedæmonians, and made the victory of that day entirely their own. The report of this battle meeting Agesilaus at Amphipolis, were by him sent over into Asia, where it is not likely that they brought much comfort unto his friend, who had since his departure seen the Spartan fleet beaten, and Lysander the admiral slain. The same man, whose endeavour had brought the Athenians into order, by advancing the sea forces of the Lacedæmonians with money, and all manner

of supplies, was now the occasion that the power of Athens grew strong at sea, when the city was despoiled of her old reputation, and scarcely able to maintain an army by land for her own defence. Pharnabazus considering how much it imported the king his master, to have the Greeks divided into such factions as might utterly disable them from undertaking abroad, thought it the safest way for himself, during these broils, to take such order, that he should not need any more to seek peace by entreaty, and commemoration of old benefits, at their hands, who unprovoked had sold his love for thirty talents. To which purpose he furnished Conon the Athenian with eight ships, who had escaped when the fleet of Athens was surprised by Lysander at Ægos-Potamos; giving him the command of a great navy, wherewith he requited the loss received at Ægos-Potamos, by repaying the Lacedæmonians with the like destruction of their fleet at Cnidus. After this victory Conon sailed to Athens, bringing with him, partly as the liberality of Pharnabazus, partly as the fruit of his victory, so strong a navy, and so much gold, as encouraged the Athenians to rebuild their walls, and think more hopefully upon recovering the seigniory which they had lost.

SECT. VIII.

Of sundry small victories gotten on each part. The Lacedæmonians lose all in Asia. The Athenians recover some part of their old dominion.

NEVERTHELESS the Lacedæmonians, by many victories at land, maintained for some years the honour of their estate, endangered very greatly by this loss at sea. For Agesilaus obtained the better with his horsemen from the Thessalians who were accounted the best riders in Greece: He wasted Bœotia, and fought a great battle at Coronea against the Thebans, and their allies, whom he overthrew; and

by his marshal Gylis foraged the country of Locris : which done, he returned home.

The gain of these victories was not great, and the reputation of them was, by many losses, much defaced. For the Thebans did, in the battle of Coronea, vanquish the Orchomenians, who stood opposite unto them, and retired unbroken unto mount Helicon, opening way perforce when Agesilaus charged them in their return from the pursuit. Likewise Gylis was slain, with a great part of his army, by the Locrians ; and some other exploits by the Lacedæmonians, performed against the Corinthians, were repaid with equal damage received in the parts adjoining ; many towns being easily taken, and as easily recovered. The variety of which interfeats was such, that the Thebans themselves were drawn, by the loss of the haven of Corinth, to sue for peace, but could not get audience till such time as the news came of a great victory obtained by Iphicrates, general of the Athenian forces at Lechæum ; whereupon the Theban ambassadors being sent for, and willed to do their message, required only in scorn, to have a safe conduct given them, that they might enter into Corinth.

From this time forward the war was made for a while only by incursions, wherein the Achæans, confederates of Sparta, felt most loss ; their whole state being endangered by the Acarnanians, who held with the contrary side, until Agesilaus repaid these invaders with equal or greater calamities, brought upon their own lands, which did so afflict the Acarnanians that they were driven to sue for peace. But the affairs at sea were of most consequence, upon which the success of all depended. For when the towns of Asia perceived that the Lacedæmonians were not only entangled in an hard war at home, but almost disabled to pass the seas, having lost their fleet at Cnidus, they soon gave ear to Pharnabazus, who promised to allow that they should use their own laws, if they

would expel the Spartan governors. Only the city of Abydos did stand firm, wherein Dercyllidas lay, who did his best to contain all the towns about Hellespont in the alliance of the Lacedæmonians; which he could not do, because the Athenian fleet under Thrasybulus took in Byzantium, Chalcedon, and other places thereabout, reducing the isle of Lesbos to their ancient acknowledgment of Athens.

SECT. IX.

The base conditions offered unto the Persians by the Lacedæmonians. Of sundry fights, and other passages in the war. The peace of Antalcidas.

ABOUT this time the Spartans began to perceive how uneasy a thing it would be, to maintain the war against men as good as themselves, assisted with the treasures of Persia; wherefore they craved peace of Artaxerxes, most basely offering, not only to renounce the Greeks inhabiting Asia, and to leave them to the king's disposition, but withal to set the islanders, and every town in Greece, as well the little as the great, at full and absolute liberty, whereby they said that all the principal estates of their country would so be weakened, that no one, nor all of them, should be able to stir against the great king. And sure it was, that the power of the country being so broken, and rent into many small pieces, could neither have disquieted the Persian by an offensive war, nor have made any good defence against him, but would have left it easy for him, in continuance of time, to have taken the cities, one after another, till he had made himself master of all. The Spartans were not ignorant of this, but were so carried with envy, that, perceiving how the dominion of the seas was like to return to Athens, they chose rather to give all from themselves and others, and make all alike weak, than to permit that any of their own nation

should grow stronger than themselves, who so lately had commanded all.

Yet this great offer was not at the first accepted, both in regard that the other estates of Greece, who had in the king's behalf joined together against the Lacedæmonians, did by their several ambassadors oppose themselves unto it ; and for that it was thought safest for Artaxerxes, rather to weaken the Lacedæmonians yet more, than by interposing himself, to bring friends and foes on the sudden to an equality. Especially Struthas, whom Artaxerxes had sent as his lieutenant into the low countries, did seek to repay the harm done by Agesilaus in those parts ; which his intent appearing plain, and all hope of the peace being thereby cut off, Thimbron was sent into Asia, to make war upon Struthas, and others were appointed to other places ; whereby the war, being scattered about all the isles and towns on the firm land grew almost to the manner of piracy and robbery, affording many skirmishes but few great actions worthy of remembrance. Thimbron was slain by Struthas, and in his place Diphridas was sent, who demeaned himself more warily. Dercyllidas was removed from his charge at Abydos, because he had not impeached Thrasybulus in his enterprises about Hellespont ; Anaxibius, who succeeded him, was surprised and slain in a skirmish by Iphicrates the Athenian. Thrasybulus, departing from Lesbos towards Rhodes, was slain by the way at Aspendus. The city of Rhodes had long before joined with the Lacedæmonians, who erected there (as was their manner) an aristocracy, or the government of a few of the principal citizens ; whereas contrariwise, the Athenians were accustomed to put the sovereignty into the hands of the people ; each of them seeking to assure themselves, by erecting in the towns of their confederates a government like unto their own ; which doing (where more especial cause did not hinder) caused the nobility to favour Sparta, and the commons to incline to Athens. The people of

Ægina roved upon the coast of Attica, which caused the Athenians to land an army in Ægina, and besiege their town ; but this siege being raised by the assistance of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the islanders began anew to molest Attica, which caused the Athenians to man their ships again that returned beaten, having lost four of thirteen. The loss of these ships was soon recompensed by a victory which Chabrias the Athenian general had in Ægina ; whereupon the islanders were fain to keep home, and leave to the Athenians the seas free. It may well seem strange that the city of Athens, having but newly raised her walls, having not by any fortunate and important battle secured her estate from dangers by land, but only depending upon the assistance of such confederates, as carried unto different ends, had often discovered themselves irresolute in the common cause, would send a fleet and an army to Cyprus, in defence of Evagoras, when the mastery of the seas was so ill assured, that an island lying in the eye of Piræus had ability to vex the coast of Attica. But as the overweening of that city did cause it usually to embrace more than it could compass ; so the insolency and shameless injustice of the people, had now bred in the chief commanders a desire to keep themselves far out of sight, and to seek employments at such distance as might secure them from the eyes of the envious, and from public judgments, out of which few or one escaped. For which cause Timotheus did pass away much part of his time in the isle of Lesbos, Iphicrates in Thrace, and Chabrias did now carry away into Cyprus a greater force than his country well could have spared ; with which he returned not when the business in Cyprus came to an end, but sought new adventures in Egypt, whereby arose neither thanks to himself, nor profit to his city, though honour both to him and it. The Athenians being thus careless of things at hand, had a notable blow given unto them, shortly after Chabrias was gone to Cyprus, even within their own haven.

For Teletias, a Lacedæmonian, being made governor of Ægina, conceived a strong hope of surprising the navy of Athens, as it lay in Piræus ; thinking aright, that it was a harder matter to encounter with ten ships prepared for the fight, than with twenty lying in harbour, whose mariners were asleep in their cabins, or drinking in taverns. Wherefore he sailed by night unto the mouth of the port, which entering at the break of day, he found, (according to his expectation,) most of the men on shore, and few or none left aboard to make resistance; by which means he took many ships laden with merchandises, many fishermen, passengers, and other vessels, also three or four gallies, having sunk or broken, and made unserviceable, as many of the rest as the time would suffer. About this time, Pharnabazus, the lieutenant of Phrygia, had one of the king's daughters given to him in marriage, with whom he lived about the court; and many officers that favoured the Lacedæmonians were placed in the Lower Asia; by whose assistance, the fleet of Sparta grew victorious about Hellespont; in such wise, that perhaps they should not have needed the peace, which they themselves procured by Antalcidas, from the great king, the conditions whereof were such as are mentioned before,—giving freedom to all the cities of Greece, and dividing the country into as many several states as there were petty boroughs in it.

Thus Artaxerxes, having bought his own peace with money, did likewise by his money become arbitrator and decider of controversies between the Greeks, disposing of their business in such wise as stood best with his own good. The tenor of Artaxerxes's decree was, that all Asia and Cyprus should be his own; the isles of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scirus be subject to Athens; all other Greek towns, as well the little as the great, be set at liberty; and that whosoever should refuse this peace, upon them the approvers of it should make war, the king assisting them by land and sea, with men, and

ships, and treasure. The Athenians were so discouraged by their losses at sea, the Lacedæmonians by revolt of their confederates, and the necessity of maintaining many garrisons, for which they wanted money, and other states by the miseries of the war, whereof they saw no end,—that all, excepting the Thebans, did consent unto these articles. This was called the peace of Antalcidas; whereof the Lacedæmonians taking upon themselves the execution, did not only compel the Argives to depart out of Corinth, (which under pretence of defending they held by garrisons, lately thrust into it, not as patrons but as lords,) and the Thebans to leave Bœotia free, of which province Thebes had always held the government, the Thebans themselves being also comprehended under the name of Bœotians; but caused the Mantineans to throw down their own city, and to dwell in villages; alleging, that they had formerly been accustomed so to do, though purposing indeed to chastise them, as having been ill affected to Sparta in the late war. By these courses the Lacedæmonians did hope that all the small towns in Greece would, when occasion should require it, willingly follow them in the wars, as authors of their liberty, and that the great cities, having lost all their dependants, would be unable to make opposition.

SECT. X.

The war which the Lacedæmonians made upon Olynthus. They take Thebes by treason, and Olynthus by famine.

WHILST these wars, which ended without either victory or profit, consumed the riches and power of Greece, the city of Olynthus in Thrace was grown so mighty, that she did not only command her neighbour towns, but was also become terrible to places far removed, and to Sparta itself. Great part of Macedonia, together with Pella, the principal city

of that kingdom, was taken by the Olynthians, who following the usual pretence of the Lacedæmonians, to set at liberty the places over which king Amyntas did tyrannize, had almost now driven him out of his dominions, and taken all to themselves. The citizens of Acanthus and of Apollonia, being nearest unto the danger of those encroaching neighbours, acquainted the Lacedæmonians with their fear, affirming that this dominion of the Olynthians would be too strong for all Greece, if continuance of time should give it reputation, which only it wanted; wherefore they requested assistance, but in such terms as did sound of compulsion, protesting that either they must war upon Olynthus, or become subject unto her, and fight in her defence. Hereupon was made a hasty levy of men, two thousand being presently sent away with promise of being seconded by a greater army. Whilst these two thousand gave such beginning to the war as agreed with their small number, the body of the army following them, surprised the citadel of Thebes, which was betrayed into the hand of Phoebidas the Lacedæmonian, by some of the magistrates, who sought to strengthen their faction by the slavery of their country. The Thebans were ill affected to Sparta, but had not in any one point violated the peace lately made between them; which caused the Lacedæmonians to doubt whether this act of Phoebidas were more worthy of reward or of punishment. In conclusion, profit so far over-weighed honesty, that the deed was approved, many principal citizens of Thebes condemned to death, many driven into banishment, and the traitors rewarded with the government of the city; by whose authority, and the force of the garrison, the Thebans were compelled to serve the Lacedæmonians, in all, and more than all that they could require. This access of power having strengthened the Lacedæmonians, caused them to entertain the greater forces about Olynthus, which, (notwith-

standing the loss of one great battle, and some other disasters,) they compelled at length by famine to render itself to their obedience.

SECT. XI.

How the Thebans recovered their liberty, driving out the Lacedæmonian garrison.

AFTER this Olynthian war, which endured almost three years, it seemed that no estate in Greece was able to make head against that of Sparta; but it was not long ere the Thebans found means to shake off their yoke, and gave both example and means to others to do the like. One of the banished men found by conference with a scribe of the Theban magistrates coming to Athens, that the tyranny wherewith his country was oppressed, pleased him no better than it did those who for fear of it were fled from home. Whereupon a plot was laid between these two, that soon found very good success, being managed thus. Seven of the banished men forsook Athens privily, and entered by night into the fields of Thebes, where spending the next day secretly, they came late in the evening to the gates like husbandmen returned from work, and so passed undiscovered unto the house of Charon, whom Phyllidas the scribe had drawn into the conspiracy. The day following, a solemn feast being then held in the city, Phyllidas promised the governors, who were insolent and lustful men, that he would convey unto them that night the most beautiful dames of the town, with whom they should take their pleasure. Having cheered them with such hope, and plenty of good wine, he told them when the time of performance, (which they urged,) came, that he could not make good his promise, unless they would dismiss their followers; because the gentlewomen, who attended without in a chamber, would not endure, that any of the servants should see their faces. Upon this

occasion the attendants were dismissed, and the conspirators attired like ladies and their maids, brought into the place; who taking advantage of the governors loose behaviour, slew them all upon the sudden with daggers, which they brought hidden under their garments. Then presently casting off their disguise, they went to other places, where feigning themselves to come to the governors upon business, they got admittance, and likewise slew those that were of the Lacedæmonian faction. By the like device they broke into the prison, slew the goaler, and set at liberty such as they thought meet; and being followed by these desperate men, proclaimed liberty, making the death of the tyrants known. The captain of the castle hearing the sudden proclamation, thought the rebels to be stronger than indeed they were; the citizens contrariwise mistrusted, that it was a practise to discover such, as would be forward upon occasion of revolting. But as soon as daylight revealed the plain truth, all the people took arms, and besieged the castle, sending hastily to Athens for succour. The garrison also sent for aid unto the towns adjoining, whence a few broken troops coming to the rescue, were defeated on the way by the horsemen of Thebes. On the other side, the banished Thebans did not only make speed to assist their countrymen, but procured some Athenians to join with them, and thereby came so strong into the city, that the castle was yielded more through fear than any necessity, upon condition that the soldiers might quietly depart with their arms; for which composition the captain at his return to Sparta was put to death. When the news of the doings at Thebes, and the success, arrived at Sparta, an army was raised forthwith, and all things prepared as earnestly for the recovering of that city, as if some part of their ancient inheritance had been taken from the Lacedæmonians, and not a town perfidiously usurped by them, restored to her own liberty. Cleombrotus,

one of the kings, was sent on this expedition ; who, having wearied his followers with a toilsome winter's journey, returned home without any good or harm done, leaving Sphodrias, with part of his army, at Thespies, to infest the Thebans ; who, doing them some displeasures, made large amends by a foolish attempt upon the haven of Athens, which failing to take, he wasted the country adjoining, and drove away cattle, causing by this outrage the Athenians to enter with all their power into the war, out of which they were before very carefully seeking how to withdraw themselves.

CHAP. XII.

OF THE FLOURISHING ESTATE OF THEBES, FROM
THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA TO THE BATTLE OF
MANTINEA.

SECT. I.

*How Thebes and Athens joined together against Sparta.
How the Athenians made peace for themselves and others,
out of which the Thebans were excluded. The battle
of Leuctra, and beginning of the Theban greatness.*

THE Lacedæmonians were men of great resolution, and of much gravity in all their proceedings, but one dishonourable rule they held, that all respects withstanding the commodity of Sparta were to be neglected ; the practice of which doctrine, even by the best and wisest of them, did greatly blemish that estate ; but when it was put in execu-

tion by insufficient overweening men, it seldom failed to bring upon them, instead of profit unjustly expected, both shame and loss. And so it befel them in these enterprises of Phœbidas upon the castle of Thebes, and Sphodrias upon the Piræus. For howsoever Agesilaus did spoil the country about Thebes, in which he spent two summers, yet the diligence of the Thebans repaired all, who, by the good success of some attempts, grew stronger than they were at the first.

The Athenians likewise began to look abroad, sailing to the isle of Corcyra, where they ordered things at their pleasure, and having in some fights at sea prevailed, began, as in the Peloponnesian war, to surround Peloponnesus with a navy; afflicting so the Lacedæmonians, that had not the Thebans by their insolency wearied their friends, and caused them to seek for peace, it had been very likely that the course of this war should have soon come to a good end; which nevertheless being prosecuted by the Thebans, (who opposed at once both these two great estates,) left the city of Sparta as much dejected as the beginning found it proud and tyrannous. But the Athenians perceiving how Thebes encroached every day upon her weak neighbours, not sparing such as had been dependants upon Athens, and finding themselves, whilst engaged in such a war, unable to relieve their complaining friends, resolved to settle the affairs of Greece, by renewing that form of peace which Antalcidas had brought from the Persian. Wherefore they sent messengers to Thebes, peremptorily signifying, that it was their intent to finish the war; to which purpose they willed the Thebans to send ambassadors along with them to Sparta; who readily condescended, fearing otherwise that they should be left out of the treaty of peace; which came to pass, being so wrought by the courageous wisdom of Epaminondas, who understood, far better than his countrymen, what was to be fear-

ed or hoped. In this treaty the Lacedæmonians and Athenians did soon agree ; but when the Thebans offered to swear to the articles in the name of the Bœotians, Agesilaus required them to swear in their own name, and to leave the Bœotians free, whom they had lately reduced unto their obedience. Whereunto Epaminondas made answer, that the city of Sparta should give example to Thebes, by setting the Laconians free ; for that the seignory of Bœotia did by as good right appertain to the Thebans, as that of Laconia to the Spartans. This was well and truly spoken ; but was heard with no patience : For Agesilaus bearing a vehement hatred unto those of Thebes, by whom he was drawn back out of Asia into Greece, and disappointed of all the glory which he had hoped to atchieve by the Persian war, did now passionately urge that point of setting the Bœotians at liberty, and finding it as obstinately refused, he dashed the name of the Thebans out of the league. At the same time Cleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, lay in Phocis, who received command from the governors of Sparta forthwith to enter upon the land of the Thebans with all his power ; which he did, and was there slain at Leuctra, and with him the flower of his army. This battle of Leuctra being one of the most famous that ever were fought between the Greeks, was not so notable for any circumstance foregoing it, or for the managing of the fight itself, as for the death of the king, and many citizens of Sparta ; but especially, for that after this battle, (between which and the conclusion of the general peace there passed but twenty days,) the Lacedæmonians were never able to recover the strength and reputation which had formerly made them redoubted far and near ; whereas contrariwise the Thebans, whose greatest ambition had in former times confined itself unto the little region of Bœotia, did now begin to undertake the leading and command of many people and estates, in such wise, that soon after they brought

an army of threescore and ten thousand strong unto the gates of Sparta. So much do the afflictions of an hard war violently endured advance the affairs of the distressed, and guide them into the way of conquest, by stiffening that resolution with a manly temper, which wealth and ease had through luxury, recklessness, and many other vices or vanities, made rusty and effeminate.

SECT. II.

How the Athenians took upon them to maintain the peace of Greece. New troubles hence arising. Epaminondas invadeth and wasteth the territory of Lacedæmon.

THE Athenians refusing to take advantage of this overthrow fallen upon their old enemies and new confederates the Lacedæmonians, did nevertheless finally give them to understand, that their dominion was expired, and therefore their pride might well be laid away. For, taking upon themselves the maintenance of the peace lately concluded, which Agesilaus, (perhaps of purpose to make benefit of quarrels that might arise,) had left unperfect, they assembled the deputies of all the estates confederated at Athens, where the general liberty of all towns, as well small as great, was ratified, under the style of the Athenians, and their associates. Hereupon began fresh garboils. The Mantineans claiming power by this decree to order their affairs at their own pleasure did, (as it were,) in despite of the Spartans, who had enforced them to raze their town, re-edify it, and ally themselves with such of the Arcadians as stood worst affected to Sparta. The Arcadians, a strong nation, consisting of many cities, were distracted with factions; some desiring to hold good correspondence with the Lacedæmonians, some to weaken and keep them low; yet all pretending other ends. The Lacedæmonians durst not give impeach-

ment to the Mantineans, nor take upon them to correct their ill-willers among the Arcadians, till such time as the factions broke out into violence, and each part called in foreign help. Then was an army sent from Sparta, as it were in defence of the people of Tegea, against the Mantineans, but indeed against them both. Agesilaus had the leading of it, but effected nothing. The Thebans had by this time subdued the Phocians, and were become head of the Locrians, Acarnanians, Eubæans, and many others; with the power of which countries, they entered Peloponnesus in favour of the Arcadians, who had, upon expectation of their coming, abstained from giving battle to Agesilaus. The army of the Spartans being dismissed, and Epaminondas joined with the Arcadians, the region of Laconia was invaded and spoiled; a thing so strange, that no oracle could have found belief if any had foretold it. Almost six hundred years were spent, since the Dorians, under the posterity of Hercules, had seized upon Laconia, in all which time the sound of an enemy's trumpet was not heard in that country; ten years were not fully past since all Greece was at the devotion of the Spartans; but now the region which neither Xerxes with his huge army could once look upon, nor the mighty forces of Athens, and other enemy-states had dared to set foot on, saving by stealth, was all on a light fire, the very smoke whereof the women of Sparta were ashamed to behold. All which indignity notwithstanding, the Lacedæmonians did not issue out of Sparta to fight, but sought how to preserve the town, setting at liberty as many of their Helotes or slaves, as were willing to bear arms in defence of the state, and somewhat pitifully intreated the Athenians to give them succour. From Corinth and some towns of Peloponnesus they received speedy assistance; the Athenians came forward more slowly, so that Epaminondas returned without battle, having rebuilt the city of Messene, and peopled

it anew, by calling home the ancient inhabitants, whom the Lacedæmonians many ages before had chased away into other countries, possessing their territories themselves.

SECT. III.

The composition between Athens and Sparta for command in war against the Thebans, who again invade and spoil Peloponnesus. The unfortunate presumption of the Arcadians.

THIS journey therefore utterly defaced the reputation of the Spartans, in such wise that they did no longer demand the conduct of the army which was to be raised, nor any manner of precedence; but sending ambassadors from Sparta, and from all the cities which held league with it, unto Athens, they offered to yield the admiralty to the Athenians, requesting that they themselves might be generals by land. This had been a composition well agreeing with the situation and quality of these two cities; but it was rejected, because the mariners and others that were to be employed at sea, were men of no mark or estimation, in regard of those companies of horse and foot whereof the land army was compounded, who being gentlemen or citizens of Athens were to have served under the Lacedæmonians. Wherefore it was agreed that the authority should be divided by time, the Athenians ruling five days, the Lacedæmonians other five, and so successively that each of them should have command of all both by land and sea. It is manifest, that in this conclusion vain ambition was more regarded than the common profit, which must of necessity be very slowly advanced, where consultation, resolution, and performance are so often to change hands. This appeared by a second invasion of Peloponnesus, wherein the Thebans found their enemies so unable to impeach them, that having fortified Isthmus from sea to sea,

as in former times they had done against Xerxes, they were driven out of their strength by Epaminondas, who foraged the country without resistance. But as the articles of this league between Athens and Sparta did, by dividing the conduct in such manner, disable the society, and make it insufficient to those ends for which it was concluded; so the example of it wrought their good, by filling the enemies heads with the like vanity. For the Arcadians considering their own numbers which they brought into the field, and having found by many trials that their people were not inferior to others in strength of body, in courage, or in good soldiership, thought it good reason that they should in like manner share the government with their friends the Thebans; and not always continue followers of others, by increasing whose greatness they should strengthen their own yoke. Hereupon they began to demean themselves very insolently, whereby they grew hateful to their neighbours, and suspected of the Thebans, in an ill time. For a motion of general peace having been made, (which took not effect, because the city of Messene was not abandoned to the Lacedæmonians,) the next enterprise of the Spartans and their friends was upon these Arcadians, who, relying too much upon their own worth, were overthrown in a great battle, their calamity being as pleasing to their confederates as to their enemies.

SECT. IV.

The great growth of the Theban estate. Embassages of the Greeks to the Persian; with the reasons why he most favoured the Thebans. Troubles in the Persian empire. The fruitless issue of the embassages.

THE Thebans especially rejoiced at the Arcadians misfortune, considering that, without their aid, the success of all enterprises proved so ill; whereas they

themselves had by their own power accomplished very well whatsoever they took in hand, and were become not only victorious over the Lacedæmonians, but patrons over the Thessalians, and moderators of the great quarrels that had risen in Macedonia; where compounding the differences about that kingdom, as pleased them best, they carried Philip the son of Amyntas, and father of Alexander the Great, as an hostage unto Thebes. Having therefore obtained such reputation that little seemed wanting to make them absolute commanders of all Greece, they sought means of alliance with the Persian king, to whom they sent ambassador the great and famous captain Pelopidas, whose reputation drew Artaxerxes to grant unto the Thebans all that they desired; whereof two especial points were, that Mesene should remain free from the Lacedæmonians, and that the Athenians should forbear to send their ships of war to sea; only the latter of these two was somewhat qualified with reference to farther advice. The other states of Greece did also send their ambassadors at the same time, of whom few or none received much contentment. For the king having found by long experience, how far it concerned him to maintain a sure party in Greece, did upon many weighty considerations resolve to bind the Thebans firmly unto him; justly expecting, that their greatness should be on that side his own security. The Athenians had been ancient enemies to his crown, and, having turned the profit of their victories upon the Persian, to the purchase of a great estate in Greece, maintained their seignory in such puissant manner, that, (sundry grievous misfortunes notwithstanding,) they had endured a terrible war, wherein the Lacedæmonians being followed by most of the Greeks, and supplied with treasure, and all sorts of aid, by Darius Nothus, were not able to vanquish them, till their own indiscretion brought them on their knees. The Lacedæmonians being victorious over Athens,

had no sooner established their dominion at home, than they undertook the conquest of Asia, from which, though by the commotion raised in Greece with Persian gold they were called back, yet having renewed their power, and settled things in Greece, it was not unlikely that they should upon the next advantage have pursued the same enterprise, had not they been impeached by this Theban war. But the Thebans, contrariwise, had always discovered a good affection to the crown of Persia. They had sided with Xerxes in his invasion of Greece, with Darius and the Lacedæmonians against Athens, and, finally, having offered much contumely to Agesilaus, when he put to sea, they drew him home by making war on the confederates of Sparta. Besides all these their good deservings, they were no seamen, and therefore unlikely to look abroad, whereunto if perchance they should have desire, yet were they disabled by the want of good haven towns, which they could not seize upon without open breach of that peace, whereof they intended to become the executors, giving liberty to all cities that had at any time been free. Wherefore Artaxerxes did wholly condescend unto the requests of Pelopidas, as far forth as he might, without giving open defiance to the rest of Greece; and by that means he purchased his own quiet, being never afterwards molested by that nation in the Lower Asia. The ill means which the Greeks had to disturb Artaxerxes, was very beneficial to the estate of Persia shortly after these times, in that great rebellion of all the maritime provinces. For had then the affairs of Greece been so composed, that any one city might, without impeachment of the rest, have transported an army to assist the revolting satrapæ, or viceroys of Caria, Phrygia, Lydia, Mysia, Lycia, Pisidia, Pamphilia, Cilicia, Syria, and Phœnicia, human reason can hardly find the means by which the empire could have been preserved from that ruin, which the divine counsel had

deferred unto the days of Alexander. But this great conspiracy of so many large and wealthy provinces, wanting a firm body of good and hardy soldiers, was in short space dismissed, and vanished like a mist, without effect; these effeminate Asiatics, wearied quickly with the travels and dangers incident to war, forsaking the common cause, and each man striving to be the first that, by treason to his company, should both redeem the former treason to his prince, and purchase withal his own promotion, with increase of riches.

Of this commotion, which in course of time followed some actions not as yet related, I have rather chosen to make short mention in this place, than hereafter to interrupt the narration of things more important; but for that it was likely a sudden storm, rashly commenced, idly followed, and foolishly laid down, having made a great noise without effect, and having small reference to any other action regardable; as also because, in the whole reign of Artaxerxes, from the war of Cyrus to the invasion of Egypt, I find nothing (this insurrection, and a fruitless journey against the Cadusians, excepted,) worthy of any mention, much less of digression from the course of the business in Greece. All, or the most of his time, passed away so quietly, that he enjoyed the pleasures which an empire so great and wealthy could afford unto so absolute a lord, with little disturbance. The troubles which he found were only or chiefly domestical, growing out of the hatred which Parysatis, the queen-mother, bore unto his wife Statira, and to such as had been the greatest enemies to her son Cyrus, or gloried in his death; upon whom, when by poison and mischievous practices she had satisfied her feminine appetite of revenge, thenceforth she wholly applied herself to the king's disposition, cherishing in him the lewd desire of marrying his own daughter, and filling him with the persuasion, which princes, not endued with an especial grace, do readily entertain, that his own will

was the supreme law of his subject, and the rule by which all things were to be measured, and adjudged to be good or evil. In this imaginary happiness Pelopidas, and the other ambassadors of Greece, both found and left him ; but left him by so much more assured than they found him, by how much the conclusion of his treaty with them, being altogether to his own advantage, did seem to promise, if not the perpetuity, a long endurance of the same felicity to him and his, or, at the least, a full security of danger from Greece, whence only could any danger be feared.

But such foundations of eternity laid by mortal men in this transitory world, like the tower of Babel, are either shaken from heaven, or made vain and unprofitable, ere the frame can be raised to full height, by confusion of tongues among the builders. Hereof was found a good example in the Thebans, and other estates of Greece, that had sent ambassadors to the Persian. For whereas it had been concluded, that all towns, as well the little as the great, should be set at liberty, and the Thebans made protectors of this common peace, who thereby should become the judges of all controversies that should arise, and leaders in war of all that would enter into this confederacy ; the king's letters being solemnly published at Thebes, in the presence of ambassadors, drawn thither from all parts of Greece ; when an oath was required for observation of the form of peace therein set down, a dilatory answer was made by the ambassadors, who said that they were sent to hear the articles, not to swear unto them. Hereby the Thebans were driven to send unto each of the cities to require the oath, but in vain. For when the Corinthians had boldly refused it, saying, That they did not need it,—others took courage by their example to do the like, disappointing the Thebans of their glorious hopes, to whom this negotiation with Artaxerxes gave neither addition nor confirmation of

greatness, but left them as it found them, to rely upon their own swords.

SECT. V.

How all Greece was divided, between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians on the one side, and Thebans on the other. Of the great tumults rising in Arcadia.

THE condition of things in Greece at that time did stand thus. Athens and Sparta, which in former times had commanded all that nation, and each upon envy of the other's greatness drawn all their followers into a cruel intestine war, by which the whole country, and especially the estate of these two cities, was brought very low, did now conjoin their forces against the Thebans, who sought to make themselves lords of all. The Eleans, Corinthians, and Achæans followed the party of these ancient governing cities; either for the old reputation of them, and benefits received, or in dislike of those who by strong hand were ready to become rulers, to which authority they could not suddenly aspire, without some injury and much envy. The city of Thebes abounding with men whom necessity had made warlike, and many victories in few years had filled with great spirits, and being so mighty in dependants that she had reduced all the continent of Greece without Peloponnesus (the region of Attica, and very little part beside excepted,) under such acknowledgment as wanted not much of mere vassalage, did hope to bring all Peloponnesus to the like obedience, wherein already she had set good footing by her conjunction with the states of Argos and of Arcadia. The Argives had been always bad neighbours to the Spartans, to whom they thought themselves in ancient nobility superior; but were far under them in valour, having been often beaten out of the field by them, and put in danger of losing all; which caused

them to suspect and envy nothing more than the greatness and honour of Sparta; taking truce with her when she was at rest and had leisure to bend her whole force against them, but firmly joining with her enemies whensoever they found her entangled in a difficult war. As the Argives were, in hatred of Sparta, sure friends of Thebes, so the Arcadians, transported with a great opinion of their own worthiness, had formerly renounced and provoked against them their old confederates and leaders the Lacedæmonians, and were now become very doubtful adherents to the Thebans. In which regard it was thought convenient by Epaminondas, and the state of Thebes, to send an army into Peloponnesus, before such time as these wavering friends should fall further off, and become either neutral, or, which was to be feared, open enemies. And surely great cause there was to suspect the worst of them, considering that, without consent of the Thebans, they had made peace with Athens; which was very strange, and seemed no less to the Athenians themselves, who holding a firm league with Sparta at the same time when the Arcadians treated with them, did nevertheless accept this new confederacy, not relinquishing the old, because they found, that howsoever these Arcadians were enemies to the Lacedæmonians, they should hereby be drawn somewhat further from their alliance with Thebes, which, without them, was unlikely to invade Peloponnesus with a strong army. But this did rather hasten, than by any means stay the coming of Epaminondas; who finding the way somewhat more clear for him, (because the city of Corinth, which lay upon the isthmus, and had been adverse to Thebes, was now, by miseries of this grievous war, driven to become neutral,) took occasion hereby, and by some disorders among the Arcadians, to visit Peloponnesus with an army, consisting of all the power of Thebes. A great tumult had arisen in Arcadia about consecrated money,

which many principal men among them had laid hands on, under pretence of employing it to public uses. In compounding the differences grown upon this occasion, such as had least will to render account of the money which had come into their hands, procured the captain of some Theban soldiers, lying in Tegea, to take prisoners many of their countrymen, as people desirous of innovation. This was done: but the uproar thereby caused was so great, that the prisoners were forthwith enlarged, and the Arcadians, who had in great numbers taken arms, with much ado scarce pacified. When the complaints of the captain's proceedings came to Thebes, Epaminondas turned all the blame upon them who had made the peace with Athens, letting them know that he would be shortly among them, to judge of their fidelity, by the assistance which they should give him in that war which he intended to make in Peloponnesus. These lordly words did greatly amaze the Arcadians; who needing not the aid of so mighty a power as he drew along with him, did vehemently suspect that great preparation to be made against themselves. Hereupon such of them as had before sought means to settle the affairs of their country, by drawing things to some good conclusion of peace, did now forthwith send to Athens for help; and withal dispatched some of the principal among them as ambassadors to Sparta, by whom they offered themselves to the common defence of Peloponnesus, now ready to be invaded. This embassy brought much comfort to the Lacedæmonians, who feared nothing more than the coming of Epaminondas, against whom they well knew that all their forces, and best provisions, would be no more than very hardly sufficient. Forbearing, therefore, to dispute about prerogatives, they (who had been accustomed unto such a supremacy, as they would in nowise communicate with the powerful city of Athens, till other hope of securing their own estate could not be thought upon,) did

now very gently yield to the Arcadians, that the command of the army in chief should be given for the time to that city in whose territory it lay.

SECT. VI.

A terrible invasion of Peloponnesus by Epaminondas.

CERTAIN it is, that the condition of things did at that time require a very firm consent and uniform care of the common safety. For besides the great forces raised out of the other parts of Greece, the Argives and Messenians prepared with all their strength to join with Epaminondas; who having lain a while at Nemea, to intercept the Athenians, received there intelligence, that the army coming from Athens would pass by sea; whereupon he dislodged, and came to Tegea, which city, and the most of all Arcadia besides, forthwith declared themselves his. The common opinion was, that the first attempt of the Thebans would be upon such of the Arcadians as had revolted; which caused the Lacedæmonian captains to fortify Mantinea with all diligence, and to send for Agesilaus to Sparta, that he bringing with him all that small force of able men, which remained in the town, they might be strong enough to abide Epaminondas there. But Epaminondas held so good espial upon his enemies, that had not an unknown fellow brought hasty advertisement of his purpose to Agesilaus, who was then well onward in the way to Mantinea, the city of Sparta had suddenly been taken. For thither with all speed and secrecy did the Thebans march, who had surely carried the city, notwithstanding any defence that could have been made by that handful of men remaining within it, but that Agesilaus in all-flying haste got into it with his companies, whom the army of his confederates followed thither to the rescue as fast as it was able. The arrival of the Lacedæmonians and their friends, as it cut off all hope from E-

paminondas of taking Sparta, so it presented him with a fair advantage upon Mantinea. It was the time of harvest, which made it very likely that the Mantineans, finding the war to be carried from their walls into another quarter, would use the commodity of that vacation, by fetching in their corn, and turning out their cattle into their fields, whilst no enemy was near that might impeach them. Wherefore he turned away from Sparta to Mantinea, sending his horsemen before him, to seize upon all that might be found without the city. The Mantineans, (according to the expectation of Epaminondas,) were scattered abroad in the country; far more intent upon their harvest-business, than upon the war, whereof they were secure, as thinking themselves out of distance. By which presumption it fell out, that great numbers of them, and all their cattle, being unable to recover the town, were in a desperate case; and the town itself in no great likelihood of holding out, when the enemy should have taken all their provision of victuals with so many of the people as had not over-dearly been redeemed by that city's returning to society with Thebes. But at the same time, the Athenians coming to the succour of their confederates, whom they thought to have found at Mantinea, were very earnestly entreated by the citizens to rescue their goods and people from the danger whereinto they had fallen, if it were possible by any courageous adventure to deliver those who otherwise were given as lost. The Thebans were known at that time to be the best soldiers of all the Greeks, and the commendation of good horsemen had been always given to the Thessalians, as excelling in that quality all other nations; yet the regard of honour so wrought upon the Athenians, that for the reputation of their city, which had entered into this war upon no necessity of her own, but only in desire of relieving her distressed friends, they issued forth of Mantinea, not abiding so long

as to refresh themselves or their horses with meat; and giving a lusty charge upon the enemy, who as bravely received them, after a long and hot fight, they remained masters of the field, giving by this victory a safe and easy retreat to all that were without the walls. The whole power of the Bœotians arrived in the place soon after this battle, whom the Lacedæmonians and their assistants were not far behind.

SECT. VII.

The great battle of Mantinea. The honourable death of Epaminondas, with his commendation.

EPAMINONDAS, considering that his commission was almost now expired, and that his attempts of surprising Sparta and Mantinea having failed, the impression of terror, which his name had wrought in the Peloponnesians, would soon vanish, unless by some notable act he should abate their courage in their first growth, and leave some memorable character of his expedition, resolved to give them battle, whereby he reasonably hoped both to settle the doubtful affections of his own associates, and to leave the Spartans as weak in spirit and ability as he found them, if not wholly to bring them into subjection. Having therefore warned his men to prepare for that battle, wherein victory should be rewarded with lordship of all Greece; and finding the alacrity of his soldiers to be such as promised the accomplishment of his own desire, he made shew of declining the enemy, and intrenching himself in a place of more advantage, that so by taking from them all expectation of fighting that day, he might allay the heat of their valour, and afterwards strike their senses with amazement, when he should come upon them unexpected. This opinion deceived him not: for with very much tumult in so great and sudden a danger, the enemy ran to arms, necessity enforcing their resolution, and the consequence of that day's service urging them to do as well as they might.

The Theban army consisted of thirty thousand foot, and three thousand horse; the Lacedæmonians and their friends were short of this number, both in horse and foot, by a third part. The Mantineans (because the war was in their country) stood in the right wing, and with them the Lacedæmonians; the Athenians had the left wing, the Achæans, Eleans, and others of less account, filled the body of the army. The Thebans stood in the left wing of their own battle, opposite to the Lacedæmonians, having by them the Arcadians; the Eubæans, Locrians, Sicyonians, Messenians, and Thessalians, with others, compounding the main battle; the Argives held the right wing; the horsemen on each part were placed in the flanks, only a troop of the Elæans were in rear. Before the footmen could join, the encounter of the horse on both sides was very rough, wherein finally the Thebans prevailed, notwithstanding the valiant resistance of the Athenians; who, not yielding to the enemy either in courage or skill, were overlaid with numbers, and so beaten upon by Thessalian slings, that they were driven to forsake the place, and leave their infantry naked. But this retreat was the less disgraceful, because they kept themselves together, and did not fall back upon their own footmen; but finding the Theban horse to have given them over, and withal discovering some companies of foot which had been sent about by Epaminondas, to charge their battle in the rear, they broke upon them, routed them, and hewed them all in pieces. In the mean season, the battle of the Athenians had not only to do with the Argives, but was hardly pressed by the Theban horsemen, in such wise that it began to open, and was ready to turn back, when the Elæan squadron of horse came up to the relief of it, and restored all on that part.

With far greater violence did the Lacedæmonians and Thebans meet, these contending for dominion, the other for the maintenance of their ancient honour; so

that equal courage and equal loss on both sides made the hope and appearance of victory to either equally doubtful; unless, perhaps, the Lacedæmonians, being very firm abiders, might seem the more likely to prevail, as having borne the first brunt and fury of the onset, which was not hitherto remitted; and being framed by discipline, as it were by nature, to excel in patience, whereof the Thebans, by practice of a few years, cannot be thought to have gotten a habit so sure and general. But Epaminondas perceiving the obstinate stiffness of the enemies to be such, as neither the bad success of their own horse, nor all the force of the Bœotian army, could abate so far as to make them give one foot of ground; taking a choice company of the most able men, whom he cast into the form of a wedge, or diamond,—by the advantage of that figure against a squadron, and by his own exceeding virtue, accompanied with the great strength and resolution of them which followed him, did open their ranks, and cleave the whole battle, in despite of all resistance. Thus was the honour of that day won by the Thebans, who may justly be said to have carried the victory, seeing that they remained masters of the ground whereon the battle was fought, having driven the enemy to lodge farther off. For that which was alleged by the Athenians, as a token that the victory was partly theirs, the slaughter of those mercenaries upon whom they lighted by chance in their own flight, finding them behind their army, and the retaining of their dead bodies; it was a ceremony regardable only among the Greeks, and served merely for ostentation, shewing that by the fight they had obtained somewhat which the enemy could not get from them otherwise than by request. But the Thebans arrived at the general immediate end of battle, none daring to abide them in the field; whereof a manifest confession is expressed from them who forsake the place which

they had chosen or accepted, as indifferent for trial of their ability and prowess.

This was the last work of the incomparable virtue of Epaminondas, who being in the head of that warlike troop of men, which broke the Lacedæmonian squadron, and forced it to give back in disarray, was furiously charged on the sudden by a desperate company of the Spartans, who all at once threw their darts at him alone; whereby receiving many wounds, he nevertheless, with a singular courage, maintained the fight, using against the enemy many of their darts which he drew out of his own body; till at length, by a Spartan, called Anticrates, he received so violent a stroke with a dart, that the wood of it broke, leaving the iron and a piece of the truncheon in his breast. Hereupon he sunk down, and was soon conveyed out of the fight by his friends; having by his fall somewhat animated the Spartans, (who fain would have got his body,) but much more inflamed with revengeful indignation the Thebans, who, raging at this heavy mischance, did, with great slaughter, compel their disordered enemies to leave the field; though long they followed not the chace, being wearied more with the sadness of this disaster than with all the travail of the day. Epaminondas being brought into his tent, was told by the physicians, that when the head of the dart should be drawn out of his body, he must needs die. Hearing this he called for his shield, which to have lost was held a great dishonour; it was brought unto him. He bade them tell him which part had the victory; answer was made, that the Bœotians had won the field. Then said he, it is fair time for me to die: and withal sent for Iolidas and Diophantes, two principal men of war that were both slain; which being told him, he advised the Thebans to make peace, whilst with advantage they might, for that they had none left that was able to discharge the office of a general. Herewithal he willed that the head of the weapon should be drawn

out of his body ; comforting his friends that lamented his death and want of issue, by telling them that the victories of Leuctra and Mantinea were two fair daughters, in whom his memory should live.

So died Epaminondas, the worthiest man that ever was bred in that nation of Greece, and hardly to be matched in any age or country ; for he equalled all others in the several virtues which in each of them were singular. His justice and sincerity, his temperance, wisdom, and high magnanimity, were no way inferior to his military virtue ; in every part whereof he so excelled, that he could not properly be called a *wary*, a *valiant*, a *politic*, a *bountiful*, or an *industrious* and a *provident* captain,—all these titles, and many other, being due unto him ; which, with his notable discipline and good conduct, made a perfect composition of an heroic general. Neither was his private conversation unanswerable to those high parts which gave him praise abroad ; for he was grave, and yet very affable and courteous ; resolute in public business, but in his own particular easy, and of much mildness ; a lover of his people, bearing with mens infirmities ; witty and pleasant in speech, far from insolence ; master of his own affections, and furnished with all qualities that might win and keep love. To these graces were added great ability of body, much eloquence, and very deep knowledge in all parts of philosophy and learning ; wherewith his mind being enlightened, rested not in the sweetness of contemplation, but broke forth into such effects as gave unto Thebes, which had evermore been an underling, a dreadful reputation among all people adjoining, and the highest command in Greece.

SECT. VIII.

Of the peace concluded in Greece after the battle of Mantinea. The voyage of Agesilaus into Egypt. His death and qualities; with an examination of the comparison made between him and Pompey the Roman.

THIS battle of Mantinea was the greatest that ever had been fought in that country between the naturals and the last. For at Marathon and Plataea, the populous armies of the barbarous nations gave rather a great fame than a hard trial to the Grecian valour; neither were the practice of arms and art military so perfect in the beginnings of the Peloponnesian war, as long continuance and daily exercise had now made them. The times following produced no actions of worth or moment, those excepted which were undertaken against foreign enemies, proving for the most part unfortunate. But in this fight all Greece was interested, which never had more able soldiers, and brave commanders, nor ever contended for victory with greater care of the success, or more obstinate resolution. All which, notwithstanding the issue being such as hath been related, it was found best for every particular estate, that a general peace should be established; every one retaining what he presently had, and none being forced to depend upon another. The Messenians were by name comprised in this new league, which caused the Lacedaemonians not to enter into it. Their standing out hindered not the rest from proceeding to conclusion; considering that Sparta was now too weak to offend her neighbours, and therefore might well be allowed to shew that anger in ceremonies which had no power to declare itself in execution. This peace, as it gave some breath and refreshing to all the country, so, to the cities of Athens and Sparta, it afforded leisure to seek after wealth by foreign employment in Egypt,

whither Agesilaus was sent with some small forces to assist, or indeed, as a mercenary, to serve under Tachos, king of Egypt, in his war upon Syria. Chabrias, the Athenian, who had before commanded under Acoris, king of Egypt, went now as a voluntary, with such forces as he could raise by entreaty, and offer of good pay, to the same service. These Egyptian kings, descended from Amyrtæus of Sais, who rebelled against Darius Nothus, having retained the country notwithstanding all intestine dissensions and foreign invasions, during three generations of their own race, were so well acquainted with the valour of the Greeks, that by their help, (easily procured with gold,) they conceived great hope, not only to assure themselves, but to become lords of the provinces adjoining, which were held by the Persian. What the issue of this great enterprise might have been, had it not fallen by domestic rebellion, it is uncertain. But very likely it is that the rebellion itself had soon come to nothing, if Agesilaus had not proved a false traitor, joining with Nectanebus, who rose against his prince, and helping the rebel with that army which the money of Tachos had waged. This falsehood Agesilaus excused, as tending to the good of his own country; though it seems rather that he grudged because the king took upon himself the conduct of the army, using his service only as lieutenant, who had made full account of being appointed the general. Howsoever it came to pass, Tachos being shamefully betrayed by them in whom he had reposed his chief confidence, fled unto the Persian, who, upon his submission, gave him gentle entertainment; and Nectanebus, (who seems to have been the nephew of Tachos,) reigned in his stead. At the same time the citizens of Mendes had set up another king, to whom all, or most of the Egyptians, yielded their obedience. But Agesilaus fighting with him in places of advantage, prevailed so far, that he left Nectanebus in quiet possession of the kingdom;

who, in recompence of his treason to the former king, Tachos, and good service done to himself, rewarded him with two hundred and thirty talents of silver, with which booty sailing homewards he died by the way.

He was a prince very temperate and valiant, and a good leader in war ; free from covetousness, and not reproached with any blemish of lust ; which praises are the less admirable in him, for that the discipline of Sparta was such as did endue every one of the citizens, (not carried away by the violent stream of an ill nature,) with all or the chief of these good qualities. He was, nevertheless, very arrogant, perverse, unjust, and vain-glorious, measuring all things by his own will, and obstinately prosecuting those courses whose ends were beyond hope. The expedition of Xenophon had filled him with an opinion, that by his hand the empire of Persia should be overthrown ; with which conceit being transported, and finding his proceedings interrupted by the Thebans and their allies, he did ever after bear such hatred unto Thebes, as compelled that estate, by mere necessity, to grow warlike and able, to the utter dishonour of Sparta, and the irreparable loss of all her former greatness. The commendations given to him by Xenophon, his good friend, have caused Plutarch to lay his name in the balance against Pompey the Great, (whose actions, the solemn gravity of carriage excepted,) are very disproportionable. Yet we may truly say, that as Pompey made great wars under sundry climates, and in all the provinces of the Roman empire, exceeding, in the multitude of employments, all that were before him ; so Agesilaus had at one time or other some quarrel with every town in Greece, had made a war in Asia, and meddled in the business of the Egyptians ; in which variety he went beyond all his predecessors ; yet not winning any countries, as Pompey did many, but obtaining large wages, which Pompey never took.

Herein also they are very like : Each of them was the last great captain which his nation brought forth in time of liberty, and each of them ruined the liberty of his country by his own lordly wilfulness. We may therefore well say, *Similia magis omnia quam paria*, the resemblance was nearer than the equality. Indeed the freedom of Rome was lost with Pompey, falling into the hands of Cæsar, whom he had enforced to take arms; yet the Roman empire stood, the form of government only being changed : but the liberty of Greece, or of Sparta itself, was not forfeited unto the Thebans, whom Agesilaus had compelled to enter into a victorious war ; yet the seignory and ancient renown of Sparta was presently lost ; and the freedom of all Greece being wounded in this Theban war, and, after much blood lost, ill healed by the peace ensuing, did very soon, upon the death of Agesilaus, give up the ghost ; and the lordship of the whole country was seized by Philip, king of Macedon, whose actions are now on foot, and more to be regarded than the contemporary passages of things in any other nation.

THE
HISTORY
OF
THE WORLD,
IN FIVE BOOKS.

THE FOURTH BOOK.

ENTREATING OF THE TIMES FROM THE REIGN OF PHILIP
OF MACEDON TO THE ESTABLISHING OF THAT KING-
DOM IN THE RACE OF ANTIGONUS.

CHAP. I.

OF PHILIP, THE FATHER OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT,
KING OF MACEDON.

SECT. I.

What kings reigned in Macedon before Philip.

THE Greeks, of whom we have already made large discourse, not as yet wearied with intestine war, nor made wise by their vain contention for superiority, do still, as in former times, continue the invasion and vastation of each other. Against Xerxes,

the greatest monarch of that part of the world, they defended their liberty with as happy success as ever nation had, and with no less honour than hath ever been acquired by deeds of arms. And having had a trial, and experience more than fortunate, against those nations, they so little regarded what might come from them, who had so often forfeited the reputation of their forces, as whatsoever could be spared from their own distraction at home they transported over the Hellespont, as sufficient to entertain and busy them withal.

But, as it commonly falleth out with every man of mark in the world, that they underfall and perish by the hands and harms which they least fear, so it fared at this time with the Greeks; for of Philip of Macedon, (of whom we are now to speak,) they had so little regard, as they grew even then more violent in devouring each other, when the fast-growing greatness of such a neighbour king should, in regard of their own safeties, have served them for a strong argument of union and accord. But the glory of their Persian victories, wherewith they were pampered and made proud, taught them to neglect all nations but themselves, and the rather to value at little the power and purposes of the Macedonians, because those kings and states which sat nearer them than they did, had, in the time of Amyntas, the father of Philip, so much weakened them, and won upon them, that they were not, (as they persuaded themselves,) in any one age, likely to recover their own, much less to work any wonders against their borderers. And indeed it was not in their philosophy to consider, that all great alterations are, storm-like, sudden and violent; and that it is then over-late to repair the decayed and broken banks, when great rivers are once swollen, fast running, and enraged. No, the Greeks did rather employ themselves in breaking down those defences which stood between them and this inundation, than seek to rampire and reinforce

their own fields, which, by the level of reason, they might have found to have lain under it. It was therefore well concluded by Orosius, *Græciæ civitates dum imperare singulæ cupiunt, imperium omnes perdiderunt*¹: the cities of Greece lost their command, by striving each of them to command all.

The kingdom of Macedon, so called of Macedon, the son of Osiris, or, as other authors affirm, of Jupiter and Ethra, is the next region towards the north which bordereth Greece; it hath to the east the Ægean sea; it is bounded on the north and north-west by the Thracians and Illyrians; and on the south and south-west by Thessaly and Epirus. Their kings were of the family of Temenus, of the race of Hercules, and by nation Argives, who are listed as followeth:—About some six years after the translation of the Assyrian empire, Arbaces then governing Media, Caranus of Argos, commanded by an oracle to lead a colony into Macedon, departed thence with many people; and as he was marching through that country, the weather being rainy and tempestuous, he espied a great herd of goats, which fled the storm as fast as they could, hasting them to their known place of covert. Whereupon Caranus calling to mind, that he had also by another oracle been directed to follow the first troop of beasts that should either lead him or fly before him²; he pursued these goats to the gates of Edessa, and being undiscovered by the inhabitants, by reason of the darkness of the air, he entered the city without resistance, and possessed it. Soon after this, by the overthrow of Cisseus, Caranus became lord of the rest of Macedon, and held it eight and twenty years³. Cenus succeeded Caranus, and reigned twelve years. Tyrimas followed Cenus, and ruled eight and twenty years.

Perdiccas the first, the son of Tyrimas, governed one and fifty years; a prince, for his great valour and many other virtues, much renowned. Solinus⁴,

¹ Orosius, l. iii. c. 12.

³ Euseb. in Chron.

² Paul. Dion. Chus. Theop. Antioc. vi.

⁴ Sol. c. xiv. Plin. l. iv. c. 10.

Pliny, Justin, Eusebius, Theophilus Antiochenus, and others, affirm, that he appointed a place of burial for himself, and for all the kings of Macedon, his successors, at Egæ; assuring them, that the kingdom should so long continue in his line and race, as they continued to lay up their bodies in that sepulchre; wherein it is said, that because Alexander the Great failed, therefore the posterity of the Temenidæ failed in him: a thing rather devised after the effect, as I conceive, than foretold by Perdiccas.

Argeus succeeded unto Perdiccas⁵, and ruled eight and twenty years.

Philip the first, his successor, reigned twenty-eight years.

Europus followed Philip, and governed six and twenty years; in whose infancy the Illyrians invaded Macedon, and having obtained a great victory, they pursued the same, to the great danger of that state. Whereupon the Macedonians gathering new forces, and resolving either to recover their former loss, or to lose at once both their kingdom and their king, they carried him with them in his cradle into the field, and returned victorious; for they were either confident that their nation could not be beaten, (their king being present,) or rather they persuaded themselves, that there was no man so void of honour and compassion as to abandon their natural lord⁶, being an infant, and no way, (but by the hands of his servants,) able to defend himself from destruction. The like is reported by Aimonius, of Clotarus the son of Fredegunda.

Alcetas succeeded Europus, and ruled nine and twenty years.

Amyntas the first succeeded Alcetas, and reigned fifty years. He lived at such time as Darius Hystaspes, after his unprosperous return out of Scythia, sent Megabazus with an army into Europe, who, in Xerxes's name, required Amyntas to acknowledge

⁵ Euseb. in Chron. ⁶ Euseb. Justin. Ammian. The. Ant. Aim. &c. l. iii. c. 92.

him for his supreme lord, by yielding unto him earth and water ; but his ambassadors, as you have heard before, were, for their insolent behaviour towards the Macedonian ladies ⁷, slain by the direction of Alexander, who was the son of Amyntas and his successor.

Alexander, surnamed the Rich, the son of Amyntas, governed Macedon three and forty years. He did not only appease the wrath of Megabazus, for the slaughter of the Persian ambassadors, by giving Gygea, his sister, to Bubares of the blood of Persia ; but by that match he grew so great in Xerxes's grace, as he obtained all that region between the mountains of Olympus and Hemus, to be united to the kingdom of Macedon. Yet could not these benefits buy his affection from the Greeks ; for Xerxes being returned into Asia, and Mardonius made general of the Persian army, Alexander acquainted the Greeks with all his intents and purposes against them⁸. He had three sons, Perdiccas, Alcetas, and Philip.

Perdiccas the second, the son of Alexander, lived in the time of the Peloponnesian war, and reigned in all eight and twenty years. The wars which he made were not much remarkable ; the story of them is found here and there by pieces, in Thucydides's first six books. He left behind him two sons ; Perdiccas, who was very young, and Archelaus, who was base born.

Perdiccas the third, being delivered to the custody and care of Archelaus, was, at seven years of age, cast into a well and drowned by his false guardian ; who, excusing this fact to Cleopatra, the mother of the young king, said, that the child, in following a goose hastily, fell thereinto by misadventure. But Archelaus stayed not here : for having thus dispatched his brother, he slew both his uncle Alcetas, the son of Alexander the Rich, and Alexander the son of

⁷ Her. Euseb. Justin. &c.

⁸ Her. l. viii. Plut. Euseb. Just. &c.

this Alcetas, his cousin-german, and enjoyed the kingdom of Macedon himself four and twenty years.

This Archelaus⁹, of whom both Plato and Aristotle make mention, though he made himself king by wicked murder, yet he performed many things greatly to the profit of his nation. It is said, that he sought by all means to draw Socrates unto him, and that he greatly loved and honoured Euripides the tragedian. He had two sons, Archelaus and Orestes.

Archelaus the second succeeded his father, and having reigned seven years, he was slain in hunting, either by chance or of purpose, by Cratæus.

Orestes, his younger son, was committed to the education of Æropus, of the royal blood of Macedon, and had the same measure which Archelaus had measured to his pupil; for Æropus murdered him and usurped the kingdom, which he held some six years; the same who denied passage to Agesilaus, king of Sparta, who desired, after his return from the Asian expedition, to pass by the way of Macedon into Greece.

This usurper left three sons, Pausanias, Argæus, and Alexander¹⁰. Pausanias succeeded his father Æropus, and having reigned one year, he was driven out by Amyntas, the son of Philip, the son of the first Perdiccas, the son of Alexander the Rich; which Philip was then preserved, when Archelaus the bastard slew his brother Perdiccas, his uncle Alcetas, and his son Alexander. This Amyntas reigned, though very unquietly, twenty-four years; for he was not only infested by Pausanias, (assisted by the Thracians, and by his brother Argæus, encouraged by the Illyrians,) and by the said Argæus for two years dispossessed of Macedon; but on the other side, the Olynthians, his neighbours, near the Ægean sea, made themselves for a while masters of Pella, the chief city of Macedon.

Amyntas the second had, by his wife Eurydice,

⁹ Plat. in Gorg. Arist. in Pol. v.

¹⁰ Diod. Polyæan. in Demet.

the Illyrian, three sons, Alexander the second, Perdicas the third, and Philip the second, father of Alexander the Great, and one daughter, called Euryone, or Exione : he had also by his second wife, Gygea, three sons, Archelaus, Argæus, and Menelaus, afterwards slain by their brother Philip. He had, moreover, by a concubine, Ptolemy, surnamed Alorites, of the city Alorus, wherein he was born.

Alexander the second reigned not much above one year, in which time he was invaded by Pausanias, the son of Æropus, but defended by Iphicrates the Athenian, while he was at that time about Amphipolis. He was also constrained, (for the payment of a great sum of money,) to leave his youngest brother, Philip, in hostage with the Illyrians, who had subjected his father Amyntas to the payment of tribute. After this, Alexander being invited by the Alevadæ against Alexander the tyrant of Pheræ in Thessaly, having redeemed his brother Philip, to draw the Thebans to his assistance, entered into confederacy with Pelopidas, being at that time in the same country, with whom he also left Philip, with divers others principal persons for the gage of his promises to Pelopidas. But Eurydice, his mother, falling in love with her son-in-law, who had married her daughter Euryone, or Exione, practised the death of Alexander her son, with a purpose to confer the kingdom on her paramour, which Ptolemy Alorites did put in execution; by means whereof he held Macedon for three years, but was soon after slain by Perdicas, the brother of Alexander. Diodorus hath it otherwise of Philip's being made pledge¹¹; and saith, that Amyntas his father delivered him for hostage to the Illyrians, by whom he was conveyed to Thebes, there to be kept. Others report, that Philip, (while his father was yet living,) was first engaged to the Thebans, and deli-

¹¹ Diod. l. xv. and xvi.

vered for hostage a second time by Alexander his brother.

Perdiccas the third, after he had slain Alorites, his base brother, governed Macedon five years, and was then slain in battle against the Illyrians, according to Diodorus; but Justin affirmeth, that he perished by the practice of Eurydice his mother, as Alexander did¹².

SECT. II.

The beginning of Philip's reign, and how he delivered Macedon from the troubles wherein he found it entangled.

PHILIP the second, the youngest son of Amyntas by Eurydice, having been instructed in all knowledge requisite unto the government of a kingdom, in that excellent education which he had under Epaminondas¹, making an escape from Thebes, returned into Macedon, in the first year of the hundred and fifth Olympiad, which was after the building of Rome three hundred fourscore and thirteen years; and finding the many enemies and dangers wherewith the kingdom was environed, he took on him, not as a king, (for Perdiccas left a son, though but an infant,) but as the protector of his nephew, and commander of the men of war. Yet his fruitful ambition soon overgrew his modesty, and he was easily persuaded by the people to accept both the title of king, and withal the absolute rule of the kingdom. And to say the truth, the necessity of the state of Macedon at that time required a king both prudent and active. For, besides the incursions of the Illyrians and Pannonians, the king of Thrace did set up in opposition Pausanias; the Athenians, Argæus; sons of the late usurper Æropus, each of these labouring to place in Macedon a king of their own election. These heavy burthens when Philip could not well bear, he

¹² Just. l. 7.

¹ Diod. l. 16.

bought off the weightiest by money, and by fair promises unloaded himself of so many of the rest, as he ran under the remainder happily enough. For notwithstanding that his brother Perdiccas had his death accompanied with four thousand Macedonians, besides those that were wounded and taken prisoners, and that the Pannonians were destroying all before them in Macedon, and that the Athenians with a fleet by sea, and three thousand soldiers by land under Mantias, did beat upon him on all sides and quarters of his country; yet after he had practised the men of war of Pannonia, and corrupted them with gifts, and had also bought the king of Thrace from Pausanias, he forthwith made head against the Athenians his stiffest enemies; and, for the first, he prevented their recovery of Amphipolis, a city on the frontier of Macedon; and did then pursue Argæus the son of Æropus, set against him by the Athenians, and followed him so hard at the heels in his retreat from Æges, that he forced him to abide the battle, which Argæus lost, having the greatest part of his army slain in the place. Those of the Athenians, and others which remained unbroken, took the advantage of a strong piece of ground at hand, which though they could not long defend, yet avoiding thereby the present fury of the soldiers, they obtained of the vanquishers life and liberty to return into Attica. Whereupon a peace was concluded between him and the Athenians for that present; and for this clemency he was greatly renowned and honoured by all the Greeks.

SECT. III.

The good success which Philip had in many enterprises.

Now had Philip leisure to look northward, and to attend the Illyrians and Pæonians, his irreconcilable enemies and borderers; both which he invaded with

so prosperous success, as he slew Bardillas, king of the Illyrians, with seven thousand of his nation, and thereby recovered all those places which the Illyrians held in Macedon. And withal, upon the death of the king of Pannonia, he pierced that country, and, after a main victory obtained, he enforced them to pay him tribute. This was no sooner done, than (without staying to take longer breath) he hasted speedily towards Larissa, upon the river Peneus in Thessaly, of which town he soon made himself master, and thereby he got good footing in that country, whereof he made use in time following. Now, although he resolved either to subdue the Thessalians, or to make them his own against all others, because the horsemen of that country were the best, and most feared in that part of Europe; yet he thought it most for his safety to close up the entrances out of Thrace, lest while he invaded Thessaly and Greece towards the south, those ample nations, lying towards the north, should either withdraw him, or overrun Macedon, as in former times. He therefore attempted Amphipolis, seated on the famous river of Strymon, which parteth Thrace from Macedon, and won it. He also recovered Pydna; and (to the north of Amphipolis) the city of Crenides (sometime Datus) and called it after his own name Philippi, to the people whereof St Paul afterward directed one of his epistles. This place, wherein Philippi stood, is very rich in mines of gold, out of which, greatly to the advancement of Philip's affairs, he drew yearly a thousand talents, which make six hundred thousand French crowns.

And that he might with the more ease disburden the Thracian shores of the Athenian garrisons, to which he had given a great blow by the taking in of Amphipolis, he entered into league with his father's malicious enemies, the Olynthians, whom the better to fasten unto him, he gave them the city of Pydna, with the territory, meaning nothing less than

that they should enjoy it, or their own estate, many years.

Now that he might by degrees win ground upon the Greeks, he took the fair occasion to deliver the city of Pheræ in Thessaly from the tyranny of Lycophron and Tisiphonus, who, after they had conspired with Thebe the wife of Alexander, who had usurped the liberty of that state, they themselves (Alexander being murdered) held it also by the same strong hand and oppression that Alexander did; till by the assistance of Philip they were beaten out, and Pheræ restored to her former liberty; which act of Philip did for ever after fasten the Thessalians unto him, and, to his exceeding great advantage, bind them to his service.

SECT. IV.

Of the Phocian war, which first drew Philip into Greece.

ABOUT this time, to wit, in the second year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad, eight years after the battle of Mantinea, and about the eighth year of Artaxerxes Ochus, began that war, called Sacred. Now, as all occasions concur towards the execution of eternal Providence, and, of every great alteration in the world, there is some preceding preparation, though not at the first easily discerned; so did this revengeful hatred by the Thebans, Thessalians, and Locrians, conceived against the Phocians, not only teach Philip how he might with half a hand wrest the sword out of their fingers, but the Greeks themselves beating down their own defences, to give him an easy passage, and beating themselves, to give him victory without peril, left nothing unperformed towards their own slavery, saving the title and imposition. Of this war the Thebans (made over proud by their victory at Leuctra) were the inflammers. For at the council of the Amphictyons, or of the

general estates of Greece, in which, at that time, they swayed most, they caused both the Lacedæmonians and Phocians to be condemned in greater sums of money than they could well bear; the one for surprising the castle of Cadmea in the time of peace, the other for ploughing up a piece of ground belonging to the temple of Delphos. The Phocians being resolved not to obey this edict, were secretly set on and encouraged by the Lacedæmonians, and for refusal were exposed as sacrilegers, and accursed to all their neighbour nations, for whom it was then lawful to invade and destroy them at their pleasures.

The Phocians, persuaded thereunto by Philomelus, a captain of their own, cast the same dice of hazard that Cæsar after many ages following did, but had not the same chance. Yet they dealt well enough with all the enemies of their own nation. And the better to bear out an ungracious quarrel, of which there was left no hope of composition, they resolved to sack the temple itself. For seeing, that for the ploughing of a piece of Apollo's ground, they had so much offended their neighbour god, and their neighbour nations, as worse could not befall them than already was intended, they resolved to take the gold with the ground, and either to perish for all, or to prevail against all that had commission to call them to account. The treasure which they took out of the temple in the beginning of the war was ten thousand talents, which in those days served them to wage a great many men; and such was their success in the beginning of the war, as they won three great battles against the Thebans, Thesalians, and Locrians; but being beaten in the fourth, their leader Philomelus cast himself headlong over the rocks.

In the meanwhile, the cities of Chersonesus, both to defend themselves against their bad neighbour Philip, who encroached upon them, and to draw others into their quarrel, rendered themselves to the

Athenians. Philip prepared to get them into his hands, and at the siege of Methone lost one of his eyes. It is said, that he that shot him did purposely direct his arrow towards him, and that it was written on the shaft thereof, ‘Aster Philippo,’ Aster to Philip; ² for so he was called, that gave him the wound. This city he evened with the soil.

The tyrant Lycophron before-mentioned, while Philip was busied on the border of Thrace, and the Thessalians engaged in the holy war, entered Thessaly with new forces, being assisted by Onomarchus, commander of the Phocian army, in the place of Philomelus. For hereby the Phocians hoped so to entertain the Thessalians at home, as they should not find leisure to invade them. Hereupon was Philip the second time called into Thessaly; but both the Thessalians and Macedonians (Philip being present) were utterly overthrown by Onomarchus, and great numbers of both nations lost. From Thessaly, Onomarchus drew speedily towards Bœotia, and with the same victorious army broke the forces of the Bœotians, and took from them their city of Coronea. But Philip, impatient of his late misadventure, after he had reinforced his army, returned with all speed into Thessaly, there to find again the honour which he lately lost, and was the second time encountered by Onomarchus, who brought into the field twenty thousand foot, and five hundred horse. All this great preparation sufficed not; for Onomarchus was by Philip surmounted, both in number and good fortune, his army overturned, six thousand slain, and three thousand taken, of which number himself being one, was among others hanged by Philip. Those that fled were in part received by the Athenian gallies, which sailed along the coast, commanded by Chares; but the greatest number of those that took the sea were therein devoured ere they recovered them. Lycophron was now again

driven out of Thessaly, and Pheræ made free as before.

SECT. V.

Of the Olynthian war. The ambitious practices of Philip.

FROM hence Philip resolved to invade Phocis itself, but the Athenians did not favour his entrance into those parts; and therefore with the help of the Lacedæmonians they retrenched his passage at the straits of Thermopylæ. Whereupon he returned into Macedon, and after the taking of Micyberne, Torone, and other towns, he quarrelled with the Olynthians, whom not long before he had wooed to his alliance, and bought his peace of them. For the Olynthians were very strong, and had evermore both braved and beaten the Macedonians. It is said, that Philip having put to death Archelaus his half-brother, (for Amyntus had three sons by Eurydice the mother of Philip, and three other sons by Gygæa, but Philip's elder brother by the same mother being dead, he determined to rid himself also of the rest,) the two younger held themselves within Olynthus; and that the receiving of them by the Olynthians was the cause of the war, Justin affirmeth¹. But just quarrels are balanced by just princes; for to this king all things were lawful that might any way serve his turn; all his affections and passions, how diverse soever in other men, were in his ambition swallowed up, and thereinto converted. For he neither forbore the murder of his own brothers, the breach of faith, the buying of other mens fidelity: he esteemed no place strong where his ass loaden with gold might enter; nor city or state unconquerable, where a few of the greatest, to be made greater, could lose the sense of other mens sorrow and subjection. And because he thought it vain to practise the winning of Olyn-

¹ Just. l. 8.

thus, till he had inclosed all the power they had within their own walls, he entered their territory, and by the advantage of a well-compounded and trained army, he gave them two overthrows ere he sat down before the city itself; which done, he bought Euthicrates and Lasthenes from their people, and from the service of their country and commonweal; by whose treason he entered the town, slew his brothers therein, sacked it, and sold the inhabitants for slaves by the drum. By the spoil of this place he greatly enriched himself, and had treasure sufficient to buy in other cities withal, which he daily did. For so was he advised by the oracle in the beginning of his undertaking, that he should make his assaults with silver spears; whereupon Horace well and truly said²,

——*Diffidit urbium*

Portas vir Macedo, & subruit æmulos

Reges muneribus.——

By gifts the Macedon clave gates asunder,
And kings envying his estate brought under.

And it is true that he won more by corruption and fraud, than he did by force. For as he had in all the cities of Greece his secret workers, (which way of conquest was well followed by Philip the second of Spain,) so when, in the contention between the competitors for the kingdom of Thrace, he was chosen the arbitrator, he came not to the council accompanied with piety and justice, but with a powerful army, and having beaten and slain both kings, gave sentence for himself, and made the kingdom his own.

² Hor. Carm. Od. 16.

SECT. VI.

How Philip ended the Phocian war.

THE war still continuing between the Phocians and the associates of the holy war, the Bœotians, finding themselves unable to subsist without some present aid, sent unto Philip for succour, who willingly yielded to their necessities, and sent them such a proportion of men as were neither sufficient to master their enemies, nor to assure themselves, but yet to enable them to continue the war, and to waste the strength of Greece. They also sent to Artaxerxes Ochus for supply of treasure, who lent them thirty talents, which makes an hundred and fourscore thousand crowns; but when with these supplies they had still the worst in all their attempts against the Phocians, who held from them three of their strongest cities within Bœotia itself, they then besought Philip of Macedon that he would assist them in person, to whom they would give an entrance into their territory, and in all things obey his commandments in that war.

Now had Philip what he longed for; for he knew himself in state to give the law to both; and so quitting all his other purposes towards the north, he marched with a speedy pace towards Bœotia; where being arrived, Phaleccus, who commanded the Phocian army, fearing to shock with this victorious king, made his own peace, and withdrew himself, with a regiment of eight thousand soldiers, into Peloponnesus, leaving the Phocians to the mercy of the conqueror; and for conclusion, he had the glory of that war, called sacred, which the Grecians with so many mutual slaughters had continued for ten years; and, besides the glory, he possessed himself of Orchomene, Coronea, and Corsia, in the country of the Bœotians, who invited him to be victorious over themselves. He brought the Phocians into servitude,

and wasted their cities, and gave them but their villages to inhabit, reserving to himself the yearly tribute of threescore talents, which make thirty-six thousand French crowns. He also hereby (besides the fame of piety for service of the gods) obtained the same double voice in the council of Amphictyons which the Phocians had, with the superintendency of the Pythian games, forfeited by the Corinthians by being partakers in the Phocian sacrilege.

SECT. VII.

How Philip with ill success attempted upon Perinthus, Byzantium, and the Scythians.

PHILIP, after his triumphant return into Macedon, by the lieutenant of his army Parmenio, slaughtered many thousands of the Illyrians and Dardanians, and brought the Thracians to pay him the tenth part of all their revenues. But his next enterprise against the Perinthians staid his fury. Perinthus was a city of Thrace seated upon Propontis, in the mid-way between Sestos and Byzantium; a place of great strength, and a people resolved to defend their liberty against Philip, where the Athenians encouraged and assisted them. Philip sat down before it with a puissant army, made many fair breaches, gave many furious assaults, built many overtopping and commanding towers about it. But he was repelled with equal violence. For whereas Philip thought by his continual assaults to weary them, and waste both their men and munition, they were supplied not only from the Persian with men and money, and succoured from Byzantium, which stood upon the same sea-coast, but they were relieved from Athens, Chio, and Rhodes, by the conduction of Phocion, with whatsoever was wanting to their necessity. But because those of Byzantium, by reason of their neighbourhood, and the easy passage by water, gave them often and ready help, Philip removed with the one

half of his army, and besieged it, leaving fifteen thousand foot before Perinthus, to force it if they could; but, to be short, he failed in both attempts, (as all princes commonly do that undertake divers enterprises at one time) and returned into Macedon with no less dishonour than loss: whereupon he made an overture of peace with the Athenians, and greatly desired it; to which, though Phocion persuaded them in all he could, and that by the occasion offered they might greatly advantage their conditions, yet Demosthenes with his eloquence prevailed in the refusal. In the meanwhile, Philip having digested his late affront, and supplied his expence by the taking of an hundred and threescore and ten merchants ships, he gathered new forces, and, being accompanied with his son Alexander, led them into Scythia; but he was also unprosperous in this enterprise; for the Triballi, a people of Mœsia, set on him in his return, wounded him, and took from him the greatest part of his spoils which he had gathered.

SECT. VIII.

*How Philip, overthrowing the Greeks in the battle of Chaeronea, was chosen captain-general of Greece.
The death of Philip.*

AMONG these northern nations, (part of which he suppressed, and part quieted,) he spent some eight years; and in the ninth year, after the end of the holy war, he was to his great advantage invited again by the Grecians to their assistance. For the citizens of Amphissa having disobeyed the decree of the Amphictyons, in which Philip had a double voice, (and who by reason that the Thebans and Locrians gave countenance and aid to the Amphisseanians, the rest were not of themselves able to constrain them,) they besought Philip to come in person to their assistance. Now you must think that Philip

was not long in resolving upon this enterprise; he needed no drawing on, whom nothing could keep back; nor other dissuasion than a mastering power could hold thence. He therefore commanded his army forthwith to march; the same being compounded of thirty thousand foot, and two thousand horse; and with as much expedition as could be made, he entered Phocis, won Plataea, and brought into subjection all that region.

The rest, and especially the Athenians, although they had good cause to fear that a great part of this storm would fall on themselves, yet were they dissuaded by Demosthenes from accepting such reasonable conditions of peace as Philip offered; and rather made choice (having drawn the Thebans to join with them,) to leave the enjoying their estates and their freedom to the chance of one battle, than to hold it either by composition, or by the grace of Philip. But this their orator's eloquence cost them dear. It is true, that he could far more easily mind them of the virtue of their ancestors, than make them to be such as they were. He might repeat unto them, (with words moving passion) the wonders they wrought at Marathon, but he could not transform the Macedonians into Persians, or draw from the dead a Miltiades, an Aristides, a Themistocles, or a Cimon, or any of those famous commanders, whose great virtues they had paid with the greatest ingratitude that ever nation did. A Phocian they had, but by the strength of a contrary faction he was at this time in disgrace, and not employed; in so much as, when the armies of Philip and the confederates encountered, although some thousand of the Athenians did abide the killing, and the like number well near of the Thebans died with them; yet the want of worthy men on that side to hold up the rest, and to draw them on, and the many choice captains of the Macedonians, encouraged by a king of a growing fortune, as it gave to Philip so shining

a victory, that Alexander by the light thereof found his way, (in despite of all the nations interjacent,) into Persia, India, and Egypt; so it cut to the ground, and gave end and date to all the Grecian glory: yea, their liberty, (saith Curtius) with their large dominion won with so many difficulties, continued for so many ages, and so often defended against the greatest kings, was now lost in a moment, and for ever lost.

Now this advised king, (never passionate to his disadvantage,) to the end he might obtain the sovereignty over all Greece, and be acknowledged for their captain-general against the Persians, without any further hazard or trouble, was content to let go those Athenians that were taken at this battle of Chæronea, as he also forbore to attempt any thing against their city: but in Thebes, (which lately by the virtue of Epaminondas triumphed over the rest,) he lodged a garrison of Macedonians. And being soon after, (according unto the long desire which he had nourished of this sovereignty,) by the general states of Corinth, stiled the first commander of all the Grecians, and contribution of men and money granted him, he compounded an army of great strength, and, under the commandment of Attalus and Parmenio, transported the same over the Hellespont into Asia, to begin the war. Of his enterprise against Persia, he sought the success from the oracle at Delphos, from whence he received such another convertible riddle, as Croesus did when he attempted Cyrus, and was in like sort mistaken in the exposition.

But as it is hard to discern and withstand the flatteries of our own appetites, so did Philip's ambitious desire to invade Persia abuse his judgment so far, that the death, wherewith himself was threatened, he understood to be delivered of his enemy, whom he intended presently to invade. Before his purposed departure into Asia, he prepared for the mar-

riage of his daughter Cleopatra with Alexander, king of Epirus; to which feast and pastimes thereat appointed, he invited all his friends and allies, with the principal persons of the Grecian cities, from whom he received much honour and many rich presents; but this was indeed the feast of his funeral. For having refused to do justice to one Pausanias, a gentleman of his guard, whom Attalus (greatly favoured by Philip,) had first made drunk, and then left to be carnally abused by divers base persons, this Pausanias grew into so great detestation of the king's partiality in so foul a fact, as when Philip was passing towards the theatre, he drew a sword from under his long garment and wounded him to death, when he had lived six and forty years, and reigned five and twenty. Justin reports it¹, that Olympias encouraged Pausanias to murder the king her husband, which after his death she boldly avowed, by the honour she did unto Pausanias, in crowning his dead body, in consecrating his sword unto Apollo, by building for him a monument, and other like graces.

SECT. IX.

What good foundations of Alexander's greatness were laid by Philip. Of his laudable qualities, and issue.

Now although he were then taken from the world, when he had mastered all opposition on that side of the sea, and had seen the fruits of his hopes and labours changing colour towards ripeness and perfection, yet he was herein happy, that he lived to see his son Alexander at man's estate, and had himself been an eye-witness of his resolution and singular valour in this last battle.

The foundation of whose future greatness he had laid so soundly for him, with so plain a pattern of

the buildings which himself meant to erect, as the performance and finishing was far more easy to Alexander, though more glorious, than the beginnings were unto Philip, though less famous. For besides the recovery of Macedon itself, in competition between him and the sons of Europus, the one assisted by the Thracians, the other by the Athenians; and besides the regaining of many places possessed by the Illyrians, the crushing of all those northern kings his neighbours, the overthrow of Olynthus, a state that despised the power of his father; the many maritime cities taken, of great strength and ancient freedom, and the subjection of that famous nation of Greece, which for so many ages had defended itself against the greatest kings of the world, and won upon them;—he had left unto his son, and had bred up for him, so many choice commanders, as the most of them, both for their valour and judgment in the war, were no less worthy of crowns than himself was that wore a crown: for it was said of Parmenio, (whom Alexander, ungrateful to so great virtue, impiously murdered,) that Parmenio had performed many things challenging eternal fame, without the king; but the king, without Parmenio, never did any thing worthy of renown. As for the rest of his captains, though content to obey the son of such a father, yet did they not after Alexander's death endure to acknowledge any man superior to themselves.

Of this prince, it is hard to judge whether his ambition had taught him the exercise of more vices, than nature and his excellent education had enriched him with virtues. For besides that he was valiant, wise, learned, and master of all his affections, he had this savour of piety, that he rather laboured to satisfy those that were grieved, than to suppress them. Whereof, (among many other,) we find a good example in his dealing with Arcadion and Nicanor; whom when, for their evil speech of Philip,

his familiars persuaded him to put to death ; he answered them,—that first it ought to be considered, whether the fault were in them that gave him ill language, or in himself; secondly, that it was in every man's own power to be well spoken of: and this was shortly proved; for after Philip had relieved their necessities, there was none within his kingdom that did him more honour than they did. Whereupon he told those that had persuaded him to use violence, that he was a better physician for evil speech than they were. His epistles to Alexander his son are remembered by Cicero and Gellius ; and by Dion and Chrysostom exceedingly commended¹. His stratagems are gathered by Polyænus and Frontinus; his wise sayings by Plutarch.

And albeit he held Macedon as in his own right all the time of his reign, yet was he not the true and next heir thereof; for Amyntas the son of his brother Perdiccas, (of whom he had the protection during his infancy,) had the right. This Amyntas he married to his daughter Cyna, who had by him a daughter called Eurydice, who was married to Philip's base son Aridæus, her uncle by the mother's side ; both which Olympias, Philip's first wife, and mother to Alexander the Great, put to death ; Aridæus by extreme torments, Eurydice she strangled.

Philip had by this Olympias, the daughter of Neoptolemus, king of the Molossians, (of the race of Achilles,) Alexander the Great ; and Cleopatra was married to her uncle Alexander, king of Epirus, and was after her brother Alexander's death slain at Sardis, by the command of Antigonus.

By Audata, an Illyrian, his second wife, he had Cyna, married as is shewed before.

By Nicasipolis, the sister of Jason, tyrant of Phæra, he had Thessalonica, whom Cassander, after he

¹ Cic. Off. 2. Gell. l. ix. c. 3. Dion. 2. de Rege.

had taken Pidna, married ; but she was afterwards by her father in law, Antipater, put to death.

By Cleopatra, the niece of Attalus, he had Caranus², whom others call Philip : him, Olympias, the mother of Alexander the Great, caused to be roasted to death in a copper pan. Others lay this murder to Alexander himself. By the same Cleopatra he had likewise a daughter, called Europa, whom Olympias also murdered at the mother's breast.

By Phila and Meda he had no issue.

He had also two concubines, Arsinoe, whom, after he had gotten with child, he married to an obscure man, called Lagus, who bare Ptolemy, king of Egypt, called the son of Lagus, but esteemed the son of Philip : by Philina, his second concubine, a public dancer, he had Aridæus, of whom we shall have much occasion to speak hereafter.

CHAP. II.

OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

SECT. I.

A brief rehearsal of Alexander's doings, before he invaded Asia.

ALEXANDER, afterwards called the Great, succeeded unto Philip his father ; being a prince no less valiant by nature, than by education well instructed, and enriched in all sorts of learning and good arts. He began his reign over the Macedoni-

² Athen. l. xiii. c. 2. Just. l. iii.

ans four hundred and seventeen years after Rome was built, and after his own birth twenty years. The strange dreams of Philip his father, and that one of the gods, in the shape of a snake, begat him on Olympias, his mother, I omit as foolish tales ; but that the temple of Diana, (a work the most magnificent of the world,) was burnt upon the day of his birth, and that so strange an accident was accompanied with the news of three several victories obtained by the Macedonians, it was very remarkable, and might, with the reason of those times, be interpreted for ominous, and foreshewing the great things by Alexander afterwards performed.

Upon the change of the king, the neighbour-nations, whom Philip had oppressed, began to consult about the recovery of their former liberty, and to adventure it by force of arms. Alexander's young years gave them hope of prevailing, and his suspected severity increased courage in those who could better resolve to die than to live slavishly. But Alexander gave no time to those swelling humours, which might speedily have endangered the health of his estate ; for after revenge taken upon the conspirators against his father, whom he slew upon his tomb, and the celebration of his funerals, he first fastened unto him his own nation, by freeing them from all exactions and bodily slavery, other than their service in his wars ; and used such kingly austerity towards those that contemned his young years, and such clemency to the rest that persuaded themselves of the cruelty of his disposition, as all affections being pacified at home, he made a present journey into Peloponnesus ; and so well exercised his spirits among them, as, by the council of the states of Greece, he was, according to the great desire of his heart, elected captain-general against the Persians ; upon which war, Philip his father, had not only resolved, (who had obtained the same title of general commander,) but had transported, under the leading of Parmenio and Attalus, a part of his army

to recover some places on Asia side, for the safe descent of the rest.

This enterprise against the Persian occupied all Alexander's affections: those fair marks of riches, honour, and large dominion, he now shot at both sleeping and waking; all other thoughts and imaginations were either grievous or hateful. But a contrary wind ariseth;—for he receiveth advertisement, that the Athenians, Thebans, and Lacedæmonians, had united themselves against him, and, by assistance from the Persian, hoped for the recovery of their former freedom. Hereto they were persuaded by Demosthenes, himself being thereto persuaded by the gold of Persia. The device he used was more subtle than profitable; for he caused it to be bruited, that Alexander was slain in a battle against the Triballi, and brought into the assembly a companion, whom he had corrupted, to affirm, that himself was present and wounded in the battle. There is indeed a certain doctrine of policy, (as policy is now a-days defined by falsehood and knavery,) that devised rumours and lies, if they serve the turn but for a day or two, are greatly available. It is true, that common people are sometimes mocked by them, as soldiers are by false alarms in the wars; but in all that I have observed, I have found the success as ridiculous as the invention. For as those that find themselves at one time abused by such like bruits, do at other times neglect their duties, when they are upon true reports, and in occasions perilous, summoned to assemble; so do all men, in general, condemn the venders of such trumpery, and for them fear, upon necessary occasions, to entertain the truth itself. This labour unlooked for, and loss of time, was not only very grievous to Alexander, but by turning his sword from the ignoble and effeminate Persians, against which he had directed it, towards the manly and famous Grecians, of whose assistance he thought himself assured, his present undertaking

was greatly disordered. But he that cannot endure to strive against the wind, shall hardly attain the port which he purposeth to recover : and it no less becometh the worthiest men to oppose misfortunes, than it doth the weakest children to bewail them.

He therefore made such expedition towards these revoltors, as that himself, with the army that followed him, brought them the first news of his preparation. Hereupon all stagger ; and the Athenians, as they were the first that moved, so were they the first that fainted ; seeking by their ambassadors to pacify the king, and to be received again into his grace. Alexander was not long in resolving ; for the Persians persuaded him to pardon the Grecians. Wise men are not easily drawn from great purposes by such occasions as may easily be taken off ; neither hath any king ever brought to effect any great affair, who hath entangled himself in many enterprises at once, not tending to one and the same certain end.

And having now quieted his borderers towards the south, he resolved to assure those nations which lay on the north-side of Macedon, viz. the Thracians, Triballi, Peones, Getes, Agrians, and other savage people, which had greatly vexed with incursions, not only others of his predecessors, but even Philip his father ; with all which, after divers overthrows given them, he made peace, or else brought them into subjection. Notwithstanding this good success, he could not yet find the way out of Europe. There is nothing more natural to man than liberty ; the Greeks had enjoyed it overlong, and lost it too late to forget it ; they therefore shake off the yoke once again. The Thebans, who had in their citadel a garrison of a thousand Macedonians, attempt to force it ; Alexander hasteth to their succour, and presents himself with thirty thousand foot, all old soldiers, and three thousand horse, before the city, and gave the inhabitants some days to resolve, being even

heart-sick with the desire of passing into Asia. So unwilling indeed he was to draw blood of the Grecians, by whom he hoped to serve himself elsewhere, that he offered the Thebans remission, if they would only deliver into his hands Phœnix and Prothytes, the stirrers up of the rebellion. But they, opposing the mounting fortune of Alexander, (which bore all resistance before it, like the breaking in of the ocean-sea,) instead of such an answer as men besieged and abandoned should have made, demanded Philotas and Antipater to be delivered unto them; as if Thebes alone, then laid in the balance of fortune with the kingdom of Macedon, and many other provinces, could either have evened the scale, or swayed it. Therefore in the end they perished in their obstinacy. For while the Thebans oppose the army assailant, they are charged at the back by the Macedonian garrison, their city taken and razed to the ground, six thousand slain, and thirty thousand sold for slaves at the price of four hundred and forty talents. This the king did to the terror of the other Grecian cities.

Many arguments were used by Cleadas, one of the prisoners, to persuade Alexander to forbear the destruction of Thebes. He prayed the king to believe that they were rather misled by giving hasty credit to false reports, than any way malicious; for being persuaded of Alexander's death, they rebelled but against his successor. He also besought the king to remember, that his father Philip had his education in that city; yea, that his ancestor Hercules was born therein: but all persuasions were fruitless; the times wherein offences are committed do greatly aggravate them. Yet for the honour he bore to learning, he pardoned all of the race of Pindarus the poet, and spared and set at liberty Timoclea, the sister of Theogenes, who died in defence of the liberty of Greece against his father Philip. This noble

woman being taken by a Thracian, and by him ravished, he threatened to take her life, unless she would confess her treasure; she led the Thracian to a well, and told him that she had therein cast it; and when the Thracian stooped to look into the well, she suddenly thrust him into the mouth thereof, and stoned him to death.

Now, because the Athenians had received into their city so many of the Thebans as had escaped and fled unto them for succour, Alexander would not grant them peace, but upon condition to deliver into his hands both their orators, which persuaded this second revolt, and their captains; yet in the end, it being a torment unto him to retard the enterprise of Persia, he was content that the orators should remain, and accepted of the banishment of the captains, wherein he was exceeding ill advised, had not his fortune, or rather the providence of God, made all the resistance against him unprofitable; for these good leaders of the Grecians betook themselves to the service of the Persian, whom after a few days he invaded.

SECT. II.

How Alexander, passing into Asia, fought with the Persians upon the river of Granicus.

WHEN all was now quieted at home, Alexander committing to the trust of Antipater both Greece and Macedon, in the first of the spring did pass the Hellespont, and being ready to disembark, he threw a dart towards the Asian shore, as a token of defiance, commanding his soldiers not to make any waste in their own territory, or to burn or deface those buildings, which themselves were presently, and in the future, to possess. He landed his army, consisting of two and thirty thousand foot, and five thousand horse, all old soldiers, near unto Troy, where he

offered a solemn sacrifice upon Achilles's tomb, his maternal ancestor.

But before he left his own coast, he put to death, without any offence given him, all his mother-in-law's kinsmen, whom Philip his father had greatly advanced, not sparing such of his own as he suspected. He also took with him many of his tributary princes, of whose fidelity he doubted, thinking by unjust cruelty to assure all things, both in the present and future. Yet the end of all fell out contrary to the policy which his ambition had commended unto him, though agreeing very well with the justice of God; for all that he had planted was soon after withered, and rooted up: those whom he most trusted, were the most traitorous; his mother, friends, and children, fell by such another merciless sword as his own, and all manner of confusion followed his dead body to the grave, and left him there.

When the knowledge of Alexander's landing on Asia side was brought to Darius, he so much scorned the army of Macedon, and had so contemptible an opinion of Alexander himself, as having stiled him his servant in a letter which he wrote unto him, reprehending his disloyalty and audacity, (for Darius entitled himself king of kings, and the kinsman of the gods,) he gave order withal to his lieutenants of the Lesser Asia, that they should take Alexander alive, whip him with rods, and then convey him to his presence; that they should sink his ships, and send the Macedonians taken prisoners beyond the Red sea, belike unto Ethiopia, or some other unhealthy part of Africa.

In this sort did this glorious king, confident in the glittering but heartless multitude which he commanded, dispose of the already vanquished Macedonians; but the ill destinies of men bear them to the ground, by what strong confidence soever armed. The great numbers which he gathered together, and brought in one heap into the field, gave rather an

exceeding advantage to his enemies, than any discouragement at all. For, besides that they were men utterly unacquainted with dangers ; men, who, by the name and countenance of their king, were wont to prevail against those of less courage than themselves ; men, that took more care to embroider with gold and silver their upper garments, as if they attended the invasion of the sun-beams, than they did to arm themselves with iron and steel against the sharp pikes, swords, and darts of the hardy Macedonians;—I say, besides all these, even the opinion they had of their own numbers, of which every one in particular hoped that it would not fall to his turn to fight, filled every one of them with the care of their own safety, without any intent at all to hazard any thing but their own breath, and that of their horses, in running away. The Macedonians as they came to fight, and thereby to enrich themselves with the gold and jewels of Persia, both which they needed, so the Persians, who expected nothing in that war but blows and wounds, which they needed not, obeyed the king, who had power to constrain them in assembling themselves for his service ; but their own fears and cowardice, which in time of danger had most power over them, they only then obeyed, when their rebellion against so servile a passion did justly and violently require it. For saith Vegetius, ‘ *Quemadmodum bene exercitatus miles prælium cupit, ita formidat indoctus ; nam sciendum est in pugna usum amplius prodesse quam vires :* As the well-practised soldier desires to come to battle, so the raw one fears it ; for we must understand, that in fight it more avails to have been accustomed unto the like, than only to have rude strength.

What manner of men the Persians were, Alexander discovered in the first encounter ; before which time it is said, by those that writ his story, that it was hard to judge, whether his daring to undertake the conquest of an empire so well peopled, with a handful

of men, or the success he had, were more to be wondered at. For at the river of Granicus, which severeth the territory of Troy from Propontis, the Persians sought to stop his passage, taking the higher ground and bank of the river to defend, which Alexander was forced (as it were,) to climb up unto, and scale from the level of the water; great resistance, (saith Curtius,) was made by the Persians, yet in the end Alexander prevailed. But it seems to me, that the victory then gotten was exceeding easy, and that the twenty thousand Persian footmen said to be slain, were rather killed in the back in running away, than hurt in the bosoms by resisting. For had those twenty thousand foot, and two hundred and fifty horsemen, or, after Plutarch, two thousand and five hundred horsemen, died with their faces towards the Macedonians, Alexander could not have bought their lives at so small a rate as with the loss of four and thirty of all sorts of his own. And if it were also true, that Plutarch doth report, how Alexander encountered two of the Persian commanders Spithridates and Rhosaces, and that the Persian horsemen fought with great fury, though in the end scattered; and lastly, how those Grecians in Darius's pay, holding themselves in one body upon a piece of ground of advantage did (after mercy was refused them,) fight it out to the last;—how doth it then resemble truth, that such resistance having been made, yet of Alexander's army there fell but twelve footmen and two and twenty horsemen?

SECT. III.

*A digression concerning the defence of hard passages.
Of things following the battle of Granicus.*

THE winning of this passage did greatly encourage the Macedonians, and brought such terror upon all those of the Lesser Asia, as he obtained all the kingdoms thereof without a blow, some one or two towns

excepted. For in all invasions, where the nations invaded have once been beaten upon a great advantage of the place, as in defence of rivers, straits, and mountains, they will soon have persuaded themselves, that such an enemy, upon equal terms and even ground, can hardly be resisted. It was therefore Machiavel's counsel, that he which resolved to defend a passage, should with his ablest force oppose the assailant. And to say truth, few regions of any great circuit are so well fenced, that armies of such force as may be thought sufficient to conquer them, can be debarred all entrance by the natural difficulty of the ways. One passage or other is commonly left unguarded; if all be defended, then must the forces of the country be distracted; and yet likely some one place will be found that is defended very weakly. How often have the Alps given way to armies breaking into Italy? Yea, where shall we find that ever they kept out an invader? Yet are they such, as, (to speak briefly,) afflict with all difficulties those that travel over them; but they give no security to those that lie behind them, for they are of too large extent. The towns of Lombardy persuaded themselves that they might enjoy their quiet when the warlike nations of the Switzers had undertaken to hinder Francis the French king from descending into the duchy of Milan; but whilst these patrons of Milan, whom their own dwelling in those mountains had made fittest of all other for such a service, were busied in custody of the Alps, Francis appeared in Lombardy, to so much the greater terror of the inhabitants, by how much the less they had expected his arrival. What shall we say of those mountains, which lock up whole regions in such sort as they leave but one gate open? The straits, or, (as they are called,) the gates of Taurus, in Cilicia, and those of Thermopylæ, have seldom been attempted, perhaps because they were thought impregnable; but how seldom (if ever) have they been attempted

in vain? Xerxes, and long after him the Romans, forced the entrance of Thermopylæ; Cyrus the younger, and after him Alexander, found the gates of Cilicia wide open: how strongly soever they had been locked and barred, yet were those countries open enough to a fleet that should enter on the back-side.

The defence of rivers, how hard a thing it is, we find examples in all histories that bear good witness. The deepest have many fords; the swiftest and broadest may be passed by boats, in case it be found a matter of difficulty to make a bridge. He that hath men enough to defend all the length of his own bank, hath also enough to beat his enemy; and may therefore do better to let him come over, to his loss, than by striving in vain to hinder the passage, as a matter tending to his own disadvantage, fill the heads of his soldiers with an opinion that they are in an ill case, having their means of safeguard taken from them, by the skill or valour of such as are too good for them. Certainly if a river were sufficient defence against an army, the isle of Mona, now called Anglesey, which is divided from North Wales by an arm of the sea, had been safe enough against the Romans invading it under conduct of Julius Agricola. But he wanting, and not meaning to spend the time in making vessels to transport his forces, did assay the fords; whereby he so amazed the enemies, attending for ships and such like provision by sea, that surely believing nothing could be hard or invincible to men, which came so minded to war, they humbly entreated for peace, and yielded the island. Yet the Britons were men stout enough, the Persians very dastards. It was therefore wisely done of Alexander to pass the river of Granicus in face of the enemy; not marching higher to seek an easier way, nor labouring to convey his men over it by some safer means; for having beaten them upon their own ground, he did thereby cut off no less of their reputation than

of their strength, leaving no hope of succour to the partakers and followers of such unable protectors.

Soon after this victory, he recovered Sardis, Ephesus, the cities of the Trallians, and Magnesia, which were rendered unto him. The inhabitants of which, with the people of the country, he received with great grace, suffering them to be governed by their own laws. For he observed it well, *Novum imperium inchoantibus utilis clementiæ fama* : it is commodious unto such as lay the foundation of a new sovereignty to have the fame of being merciful. He then, by Parmenio, won Miletus, and by force mastered Halicarnassus, which, because it resisted obstinately, he razed to the ground. From whence he entered into Caria, where Ada, the queen, who had been cast out of all that she held (except the city of Alindæ) by Darius's lieutenant, presented herself unto him, and adopted him her son and successor ; which Alexander accepted in so gracious part, as he left the whole kingdom to her disposing. He then entered into Lycia and Pamphylia, and obtained all the sea-coasts ; and subjecting unto him Pisidia, he directed himself towards Darius, (who was said to be advancing towards him with a marvellous army,) by the way of Phrygia ; for all the province of Asia the Less, bordering upon the sea, his first victory laid under his feet.

While he gave order for the government and settling of Lycia and Pamphylia, they sent Cleander to raise some new companies in Peloponnesus, and marching towards the north, he entered Celenas, seated on the river Mæander, which was abandoned unto him, the castle only holding out, which also, after forty days, was given up ; for so long time he gave them to attend succour from Darius. From Celenas he passed on through Phrygia, towards the Euxine sea, till he came to a city called Gordium, the regal seat, in former times, of king Midas. In this city it was that he found the Gordian knot, which,

when he knew not how to undo, he cut it asunder with his sword : for there was an ancient prophecy did promise to him that could untie it the lordship of all Asia ; whereupon Alexander, not respecting the manner how, so it were done, assumed to himself the fulfilling of the prophecy, by hewing it in pieces.

But, before he turned from this part of Asia the Less towards the east, he took care to clear the sea-coast on his back, and to thrust the Persians out of the islands of Lesbos, Scio, and Coos ; the charge whereof he committed unto two of his captains, giving them such order as he thought to be most convenient for that service ; and delivering unto them fifty talents to defray the charge ; and withal, out of his first spoil gotten, he sent threescore talents more to Antipater, his lieutenant in Greece and Macedon. From Celenas he removed to Ancyra, now called Anguri, standing on the same river of Sangarius, which runneth through Gordium ; there he mustered his army, and then entered Paphlagonia, whose people submitted themselves unto him, and obtained freedom of tribute ; where he left Catus governor, with one regiment of Macedonians, lately arrived.

Here he understood of the death of Memnon, Darius's lieutenant, which heartened him greatly to pass on towards him ; for of this only captain he had more respect than of all the multitude by Darius assembled, and of all the commanders he had besides. For so much hath the spirit of some one man excelled, as it hath undertaken and effected the alteration of the greatest states and commonwealths, the erection of monarchies, the conquest of kingdoms and empires, guided handfuls of men against multitudes of equal bodily strength, contrived victories beyond all hope and discourse of reason, converted the fearful passions of his own followers into magnanimity, and the valour of his enemies into cowardice :—such spirits have been stirred up in sundry ages of the

world, and in divers parts thereof, to erect and cast down again, to establish and to destroy, and to bring all things, persons, and states, to the same certain ends, which the infinite spirit of the universal, piercing, moving, and governing all things hath ordained. Certainly the things that this king did were marvellous, and would hardly have been undertaken by any man else ; and though his father had determined to have invaded the Lesser Asia, it is like enough that he would have contented himself with some part thereof, and not have discovered the river of Indus, as this man did. The swift course of victory wherewith he ran over so large a portion of the world, in so short a space, may justly be imputed unto this, that he was never encountered by an equal spirit, concurring with equal power against him. Hereby it came to pass, that his actions, being limited by no greater opposition than desert places, and the mere length of tedious journies could make, were, like the Colossus of Rhodes, not so much to be admired for the workmanship, though therein also praise-worthy, as for the huge bulk. For certainly the things performed by Xenophon, discover as brave a spirit as Alexander's, and working no less exquisitely, though the effects were less material, as were also the forces and power of command by which it wrought. But he that would find the exact pattern of a noble commander, must look upon such as Epaminondas, that, encountering worthy captains, and those better followed than themselves, have, by their singular virtue, overtopped their valiant enemies, and still prevailed over those that would not have yielded one foot to any other. Such as the seare do seldom live to obtain great empires ; for it is a work of more labour and longer time to master the equal forces of one hardy and well-ordered state, than to tread down and utterly subdue a multitude of servile nations, compounding the body of a gross unwieldy empire. Wherefore these *parvo potētes*, men that with little

have done much upon enemies of like ability, are to be regarded as choice examples of worth ; but great conquerors, to be rather admired for the substance of their actions than the exquisite managing ; exactness and greatness concurring so seldom, that I can find no instance of both in one, save only that brave Roman, Cæsar.

Having thus far digressed, it is now time that we return unto our eastern conqueror, who is travelling hastily towards Cilicia, with a desire to recover the straits thereof before Darius should arrive there. But first making a dispatch into Greece, he sent to those cities in which he reposed most trust, some of the Persian targets which he had recovered in his first battle ; upon which, by certain inscriptions, he made them partakers of his victory. Herein he well advised himself ; for he that doth not as well impart of the honour which he gaineth in the wars, as he doth of the spoils, shall never be long followed by those of the better sort. For men which are either well born or well bred, and have more of wealth than of reputation, do as often satisfy themselves with the purchase of glory, as the weak in fortune, and strong in courage, do with the gain of gold and silver.

The governor of Cilicia, hearing of Alexander's coming on, left some companies to keep the straits, which were indeed very defensible ; and withal, as Curtius noteth, he began over-late to prize and put in execution the counsel of Memnon ; who in the beginning of the wars advised him to waste all the provisions for men and horse that could not be lodged in strong places, and always to give ground to the invader, till he found some such notable advantage as might assuredly promise him the obtaining of victory. For the fury of an invading army is best broken by delays, change of diet and want, eating sometimes too little and sometimes too much, sometimes reposing themselves in beds and oftener upon

the cold ground. These and the like sudden alterations bring many diseases upon all nations out of their own countries. Therefore, if Darius had kept the Macedonians but a while from meat and sleep, and refusing to give or take battle had wearied them with his light horse, as the Parthians afterwards did the Romans, he might perchance have saved his own life and estate; for it was one of the greatest encouragements given by Alexander to the Macedonians, in the third and last fatal battle, that they were to fight with all the strength of Persia at once.

Xerxes, when he invaded Greece, and fought abroad, in being beaten, lost only his men; but Darius being invaded by the Greeks, and fighting at home, by being beaten lost his kingdom. Pericles though the Lacedæmonians burnt all in Attica to the gates of Athens, yet could not be drawn to hazard a battle; for the invaded ought evermore to fight upon the advantage of time and place. Because we read histories to inform our understanding by the examples therein found, we will give some instances of those that have perished by adventuring in their own countries to charge an invading army.

The Romans, by fighting with Hannibal, were brought to the brink of their destruction.

Pompey was well advised for a while when he gave Cæsar ground; but when, by the importunity of his captains, he adventured to fight at Pharsalia, he lost the battle, lost the freedom of Rome, and his own life.

Ferdinand, in the conquest of Naples, would needs fight a battle with the French, to his confusion; though it was told him by a man of sound judgment, that those counsels which promise surety in all things are honourable enough.

The constable of France made frustrate the mighty preparations of Charles V. when he invaded Provence, by wasting the country, and forbearing the fight; so did the duke of Alva weary the French in

Naples, and dissolve the boisterous army of the Prince of Orange in the Low Countries.

The Leigers, contrary to the advice of their general, would needs fight a battle with the Bourgonians invading their country, and could not be persuaded to linger the time, and stay their advantage,—but they lost eight and twenty thousand upon the place. Philip of Valois set upon king Edward at Cressy; and king John (when the English were well nigh tired out, and would in short time, by an orderly pursuit, have been wasted to nothing) constrained the Black Prince, with great fury, near Poitiers, to join battle with him:—but all men know what lamentable success these two French kings found. Charles V. of France made another kind of Fabian warfare; and though the English burnt and wasted many places, yet this king held his resolution to forbear blows, and followed his advice, which told him, that the English could never get his inheritance by smoke: and it is reported by Bellay and Herrault, that king Edward was wont to say of Charles, that he won from him the duchy of Guienne without ever putting on his armour.

But where God hath a purpose to destroy, wise men grow short-lived, and the charge of things is committed unto such as either cannot see what is for their good, or know not how to put in execution any sound advice. The course which Memnon had propounded, must, in all appearance of reason, have brought the Macedonian to a great perplexity, and made him stand still awhile at the straits of Cilicia, doubting whether it were more shameful to return or dangerous to proceed: for had Cappadocia and Paphlagonia been wasted whilst Alexander was far off, and the straits of Cilicia been defended by Arsenes, governor of that province, with the best of his forces, hunger would not have suffered the enemy to stay the trial of all means that might be thought upon of forcing that passage; or if the place could not

have been maintained, yet might Cilicia, at better leisure have been so thoroughly spoiled, that the heart of his army should have been broken, by seeking out miseries by painful travel.

But Arsenes, leaving a small number to defend the straits, took the best of his army with him, to waste and spoil the country, or rather, as it may seem, to find himself some work, by pretence of which he might honestly run further away from Alexander. He should rather have adventured his person in custody of the straits, whereby he might perhaps have saved the province; and in the mean time, all that was in the fields would have been conveyed into strong towns. So should his army, if it were driven from the place of advantage, have found good entertainment within walled cities, and himself, with his horsemen, have had the less work, in destroying that little which was left abroad. Handling the matter as he did, he gave the Cilicians cause to wish for Alexander's coming, and as great cause to the keepers of the passage not to hinder it;—for cowards are wise in apprehending all forms of danger. These guardians of the straits hearing that Arsenes made all haste to join himself with Darius, burning down all as he went, like one despairing of the defence, began to grow circumspect, and to think, that surely their general, who gave as lost the country behind their backs, had exposed themselves unto certain death, as men that were good for nothing else but to dull the Macedonian swords. Wherefore, not affecting to die for their prince and country, (which honour they saw that Arsenes himself could well forbear,) they speedily followed the footsteps of their general, gleaning after his harvest. Thus Alexander, without labour, got both the entrance of Cilicia abandoned by the cowardice of his enemies, and the whole province that had been alienated from the Persian side by their indiscretion.

SECT. IV.

Of the unwarlike army levied by Darius against Alexander. The unadvised courses which Darius took in this expedition. He is vanquished at Issus, where his mother, wife, and children are made prisoners. Of some things following the battle of Issus.

IN the mean season Darius approached, who, (as Curtius reports,) had compounded an army of more than two hundred and ninety thousand soldiers, out of divers nations: Justin musters them at three hundred thousand foot, and an hundred thousand horse; Plutarch at six hundred thousand.

The manner of his coming on, as Curtius describes it, was rather like a masker than a man of war, and like one that took more care to set out his glory and riches, than to provide for his own safety; persuading himself, as it seemed, to beat Alexander with pomp and sumptuous pageants. For before the army there was carried the holy fire, which the Persians worshipped, attended by their priests, and after them three hundred and threescore and five young men, answering the number of the days of the year, covered with scarlet; then the chariot of Jupiter, drawn with white horses, with their riders clothed in the same colour, with rods of gold in their hands; and after it, the horse of the sun. Next after these followed ten sumptuous chariots, inlaid and garnished with silver and gold; and then the vant-guard of their horse, compounded of twelve several nations, which, the better to avoid confusion, did hardly understand each other's language, and these, marshalled in the head of the rest, being beaten, might serve very fitly to disorder all that followed them: in the tail of these horses the regiment of foot marched, with the Persians called immortal, because if any died the number was presently supplied; and these were armed with chains of gold, and their coats with

the same metal embroidered, whereof the sleeves were garnished with pearls;—baits either to catch the hungry Macedonians withal, or to persuade them that it were great incivility to cut and deface such glorious garments. But it was well said, ‘*Sumptuose indutus miles, se virtute superiorem aliis non existimet; cum in prælis oporteat fortitudine animi, et non vestimentis muniri, quoniam hostes vestibus non debellantur:*’ Let no man think that he exceedeth those in valour, whom he exceedeth in gay garments; for it is by men armed with fortitude of mind, and not by the apparel they put on, that enemies are beaten. And it was perchance from the Roman Papirius that this advice was borrowed, who, when he fought against the Samnites in that fatal battle wherein they all swore either to prevail or die, thirty thousand of them having apparelled themselves in white garments, with high crests and great plumes of feathers, bade the Roman soldiers to lay aside all fear; ‘*Non enim cristas vulnera facere, et per picta atque aurata scuta transire Romanum pilum:*’ for these plumed crests would wound nobody, and the Roman pile would bore holes in pointed and gilded shields.

To second this court-like company, fifteen thousand were appointed, more rich and glittering than the former, but apparelled like women, (belike to breed the more terror,) and these were honoured with the title of the king’s kinsmen. Then came Darius himself, the gentlemen of his guard-robe riding before his chariot, which was supported with the gods of his nation, cast and cut in pure gold: these the Macedonians did not serve, but they served their turns of these, by changing their massy bodies into thin, portable, and current coin. The head of his chariot was set with precious stones, with two little golden idols, covered with an open-winged eagle of the same metal; the hinder part being raised high, whereon Darius sat, had a covering of inestimable

value. This chariot of the king was followed with ten thousand horsemen, their lances plated with silver, and their heads gilt, which they meant not to embroe in the Macedonian blood, for fear of marring their beauty. He had for the proper guard of his own person two hundred of the blood-royal, blood too royal and precious to be spilt by any valorous adventure; (I am of opinion that two hundred sturdy fellows, like the Switzers, would have done him more service;) and these were backed with thirty thousand footmen, after whom again were led four hundred spare horses for the king, which, if he had meant to have used, he would have marshalled somewhat nearer him.

Now followed the rearward, the same being led by Sisygambis the king's mother, and by his wife, drawn in glorious chariots, followed by a great train of ladies, their attendants, on horseback, with fifteen waggons of the king's children, and the wives of the nobility, waited on by two hundred and fifty concubines, and a world of nurses and eunuchs, most sumptuously apparelled; by which it should seem that Darius thought that the Macedonians had been comedians or tumblers; for this troop was far fitter to behold those sports than to be present at battles. Between these and a company of slight-armed slaves, with a world of valets, was the king's treasure, charged on six hundred mules and three hundred camels, brought, as it proved, to pay the Macedonians. In this sort came the may-game-king into the field, encumbered with a most unnecessary train of strumpets, attended with troops of various nations, speaking divers languages, and for their numbers impossible to be marshalled; and for the most part so effeminate, and so rich in gold and in garments, as the same could not but have encouraged the nakedest nation of the world against them. We find it in daily experience, that all discourse of magnanimity, of national virtue, of religion, of liberty, and

whatsoever else hath been wont to move and encourage virtuous men, hath no force at all with the common soldier, in comparison of spoil and riches. The rich ships are boarded upon all disadvantages, the rich towns are furiously assaulted, and the plentiful countries willingly invaded. Our English nation have attempted many places in the Indies, and run upon the Spaniards headlong, in hope of their royals of plate, and pistolets; which, had they been put to it upon the like disadvantages in Ireland, or in any poor country, they would have turned their pieces and pikes against their commanders, contesting that they had been brought without reason to the butchery and slaughter. It is true, that the war is made willingly, and for the most part with good success, that is ordained against the richest nations; for as the needy are always adventurous, so plenty is wont to shun peril; and men that have well to live, do rather study how to live well, I mean wealthily, than care to die (as they call it) honourably. ‘*Car où il n’y a rien à gagner que des coups, volontiers il n’y va pas*: No man makes haste to the market where there is nothing to be bought but blows.’

Now, if Alexander had beheld this preparation before his consultation with his soothsayers, he would have satisfied himself by the outsides of the Persians, and never have looked into the entrails of beasts for success. For leaving the description of this second battle (which is indeed nowhere well described, neither, for the confusion and hasty running away of the Asians, could be,) we have enough by the slaughter that was made of them, and by the few that fell of the Macedonians, to inform us what manner of resistance was made. For if it be true that threescore thousand Persian footmen were slain in this battle, with ten thousand of their horsemen; or (as Curtius saith) an hundred thousand footmen, with the same number of horsemen; and besides this slaughter, forty thousand taken prisoners; while of

Alexander's army there miscarried but two hundred and fourscore of all sorts, of which numbers Arianus and other historians cut off almost the one-half;—I do verily believe that this small number rather died with the over-travel and pains-taking in killing their enemies, than by any strokes received from them. And surely, if the Persian nation (at this time degenerate, and the basest of the world,) had had any savour remaining of the ancient valour of their forefathers, they would never have sold so good cheap, and at so vile a price, the mother, the wife, the daughters, and other the king's children, had their own honour been valued by them at nothing, and the king's safety and his estate at less. Darius by this time found it true what Charidemus, a banished Grecian of Athens, had told him, when he made a view of his army about Babylon, to wit, that the multitude which he had assembled of divers nations, richly attired, but poorly armed, would be found more terrible to the inhabitants of the country, whom in passing by they would devour, than to the Macedonians, whom they meant to assail; who being all old and obedient soldiers, embattled in gross squadrons, which they call their Phalanx, well covered with armour for defence, and furnished with weapons for offence of great advantage, would make so little account of his delicate Persians, loving their ease and their palate, being withal ill armed and worse disciplined, as except it would please him to entertain (having so great abundance of treasure to do it withal) a sufficient number of the same Grecians, and so to encounter the Macedonians with men of equal courage, he would repent him overlate, as taught by the miserable success like to follow.

But this discourse was so displeasing to Darius, (who had been accustomed to nothing so much as to his own praises, and to nothing so little as to hear truth,) as he commanded that this poor Grecian

should be presently slain : who, while he was asunder in the tormentor's hands, used this speech to the king, That Alexander, against whom he had given this good counsel, should assuredly revenge his death, and lay deserved punishment upon Darius for despising his advice. It was the saying of a wise man, '*Desperata ejus principis salus est, cujus aures ita formatae sunt, ut aspera quæ utilia, nec quicquam nisi jucundum accipiat :*' That prince's safety is in a desperate case whose ears judge all that is profitable to be too sharp, and will entertain nothing that is unpleasant. For liberty in counsel is the life and essence of counsel : '*Libertas consilii est ejus vita, et essentia, qua erepta consilium evanescit.*'

Darius did likewise value at nothing the advice given him by the Grecian soldiers that served him, who intreated him not to fight in the straits : but had they been counsellors and directors in that war, as they were underlings and commanded by others, they had, with the help of a good troop of horsemen, been able to have opposed the fury of Alexander, without any assistance of the Persian footmen. For when Darius was overthrown with all his cowardly and confused rabble, those Grecians, under their captain Amyntas, held firm and marched away in order, in despite of the vanquishers. Old soldiers are not easily dismayed : we read in histories ancient and modern, what brave retreats have been made by them, though the rest of the army in which they have served hath been broken.

At the battle of Ravenna, where the Imperialists were beaten by the French, a squadron of Spaniards, old soldiers, came off unbroken and undismayed ; whom when Gaston de Foix, duke of Nemours, and nephew to Lewis the Twelfth, charged, as holding the victory not entire by their escape, he was overthrown and slain in the place. For it is truly said of those men, who, by being acquainted with dan-

gers, fear them not, that, ‘*Neglecto periculo imminentis mali, opus ipsum quantumvis difficile aggrediuntur:*’ They go about the business itself, how hard soever it be, not standing to consider of the danger, which the mischief hanging over their heads may bring. And as truly of those that know the wars but by hearsay, ‘*Quod valentes sunt et prævalentes ante pericula, in ipsis tamen periculis discedunt:*’ They have ability enough and to spare, till dangers appear; but when peril indeed comes, they get them gone.

These Grecians also that made the retreat, advised Darius to retire his army into the plain of Mesopotamia, to the end that Alexander, being entered into those large fields, and great champaigns, he might have environed the Macedonians on all sides with his multitude; and withal they counselled him to divide that his huge army into parts, (not committing the whole to one stroke of fortune,) whereby he might have fought many battles, and have brought no greater numbers at once than might have been well marshalled and conducted. But this counsel was so contrary to the cowardly affections of the Persians, as they persuaded Darius to environ the Grecians which gave the advice, and to cut them in pieces as traitors. The infinite wisdom of God doth not work always by one and the same way, but very often in the alteration of kingdoms and estates, by taking understanding from the governors, so as they can neither give nor discern of counsels. For Darius, that would needs fight with Alexander upon a straitened piece of ground, near unto the city of Issus, where he could bring no more hands to fight than Alexander could, (who by the advice of Parmenio staid there, as in a place of best advantage,) was utterly overthrown, his treasure lost, his wife, mother and children (whom the Grecians his followers persuaded him to leave in Babylon, or elsewhere,) taken prisoners, and all their train of ladies spoiled

of their rich garments, jewels, and honour. It is true, that both the queen, with her daughters, who had the good hap to be brought to Alexander's presence, were entertained with all respect due unto their birth, their honours preserved, and their jewels and rich garments restored unto them; and though Darius's wife was a most beautiful lady, and his daughters of excellent form, yet Alexander mastered his affections towards them all: only it is reported out of Aristobulus the historian, that he embraced the wife of the valiant Memnon, (her husband lately dead,) who was taken flying from Damascus by Parmenio; at which time the daughters of Ochus, who reigned before Darius, and the wives and children of all the nobility of Persia, in effect fell into captivity; at which time also Darius's treasure (not lost at Issus) was seized, amounting to six thousand and two hundred talents of coin, and of bullion five hundred talents, with a world of riches besides. Darius himself, leaving his brother dead, with divers others of his chief captains, (casting the crown from his head,) hardly escaped.

After this overthrow given unto Darius, all Phœnicia (the city of Tyre excepted) was yielded to Alexander, of which Parmenio was made governor. Aradus, Sidon, and Biblus, maritime cities of great importance, of which one Strato was king, (but hated of the people,) acknowledged Alexander. Good fortune followed him so fast, that it trod on his heels; for Antigonus, Alexander's lieutenant in Asia the Less, overthrew the Cappadocians, Paphlagonians, and others lately revolted; Aristodemus, Darius's admiral, had his fleet partly taken, and in part drowned by the Macedonians newly levied; the Lacedæmonians that warred against Antipater were beaten; four thousand of those Greeks which made the retreat at the last battle, forsaking both the party of Darius and of Alexander, and led by Amyntas into Egypt, to hold it for themselves,

were buried there ; for the time was not yet come to divide kingdoms.

Alexander, to honour Hephæstion, whom he loved most, gave him power to dispose of the kingdom of Sidon. A man of a most poor estate, that laboured to sustain his life, being of the royal blood, was commended by the people unto him, who changed his spade into a sceptre, so as he was beheld both a beggar and a king in one and the same hour. It was a good desire of this new king, when speaking to Alexander, he wished that he could bear his prosperity with the same moderation, and quietness of heart, that he had done his adversity ; but ill done of Alexander, in that he would not perform in himself that which he commended in another man's desire ; for it was a sign that he did but accompany, and could not govern, his felicity.

While he made some stay in those parts, he received a letter from Darius, importing the ransom of his wife, his mother, and his children, with some other conditions of peace ; but such as rather became a conqueror, than one that had now been twice shamefully beaten, not vouchsafing, in his direction, to stile Alexander king. It is true, that the Romans, after that they had received an overthrow by Pyrrhus, returned him a more scornful answer upon the offer of peace, than they did before the trial of his force. But as their fortunes were then in the spring, so that of Darius had already cast leaf ; the one a resolved, well armed, and disciplined nation ; the other, cowardly and effeminate. Alexander disdained the offers of Darius, and sent him word, that he not only directed his letter to a king, but to the king of Darius himself.

SECT. V.

How Alexander besieged and won the city of Tyre.

ALEXANDER coming near to the city of Tyre received from them the present of a golden crown, with great store of victuals, and other presents, which he took very thankfully, returning them answer, that he desired to offer a sacrifice to Hercules, the protector of their city, from whom he was descended. But the Tyrians like not his company within their walls, but tell him, that the temple of Hercules was seated in the old city adjoining, now abandoned and desolate. To be short, Alexander resolved to enter it by force; and though it were a place in all mens opinion impregnable, because the island, whereon it was built, was eight hundred furlongs from the main; yet with the labour of many hands, having great store of stone from the old Tyre, and timber sufficient from Libanus, he filled the passage of the sea between the island and the main, which being more than once carried away by the strength of the sea upon a storm of wind,—sometimes by the Tyrians fired,—and sometimes torn asunder,—yet with the help of his navy, which arrived (during the siege) from Cyprus, he overcame all difficulties, and prevailed, after he had spent seven months in that attempt. The Tyrians, in the beginning of the siege, had barbarously drowned the messengers sent by Alexander, persuading them to render the city; in respect whereof, and of the great loss of time and men, he put eight thousand to the sword, and caused two thousand of those that escaped the first fury to be hanged on crosses on the sea shore, and reserved for slaves, (saith Diodorus) thirteen thousand: Arianus reckons them at thirty thousand¹. Many more had died, had not the Sidonians, that served

¹ Arian.

Alexander, conveyed great numbers away by shipping unto their own city².

Happy it was for Apollo that the town was taken; for one of the Tyrians having dreamt, that this god meant to forsake the city, they bound him fast with a golden chain to the idol of Hercules; but Alexander, like a gracious prince, loosened him again.

It is true, that it was a notable enterprise, and difficult; but great things are made greater. For Nabuchodonosor had taken it before, and filled up the channel that lay between the island and the main.

The government of this territory he gave to Philotas, the son of Parmenio; Cilicia he committed to Socrates and Andromachus, lieutenants under Parmenio; Hephæstion had the charge of the fleet, and was directed to find Alexander at Gaza, towards Egypt.

SECT. VI.

How Darius offered conditions of peace to Alexander: Alexander wins Gaza; and deals graciously with the Jews.

IN the meanwhile Darius sends again to Alexander, sets before him all the difficulties of passing on towards the east, and layeth the loss of the last battle to the straitness of the place. He hoped to terrify him, by threatening to encompass him in the plain countries; he bid him to consider, how impossible it was to pass the rivers of Euphrates, Tigris, Araxes, and the rest, with all such other fearful things; for he, that was now filled with nothing but fear, had arguments enough of that nature to present unto another. All the kingdoms between the river of Halys and the Hellespont he offered him in dower with his beloved daughter. But Alexander answered, that he offered him nothing but his own, and that which victory and his own virtue had possessed him of; that he was to give conditions, and not to

receive any; and that he having passed the sea itself, disdained to think of resistance in transporting himself over rivers. It is said, that Parmenio, who was now old and full of honour and riches, told the king, 'That were he Alexander, he would accept of Darius's offers;' to which Alexander answered, 'That so would he, if he were Parmenio.'

But he goes on towards Egypt, and coming before Gaza, Betis, a faithful servant to Darius, shuts the gate against him, and defends the town with an obstinate resolution; at the siege whereof Alexander received a wound in his shoulder, which was dangerous, and a blow on his leg with a stone. He found better men in this place than he did at the former battles; for he left so many of his Macedonians buried in the sands of Gaza, that he was forced to send for a new supply into Greece. Here it was that Alexander first began to change condition, and to exercise cruelty. For after that he had entered Gaza by assault, and taken Betis, (whom Josephus calls Babemesis ³) that was weakened with many wounds, and who never gave ground to the assailants, he bored holes through his feet, and caused him to be drawn about the streets, whilst he was yet alive; who being as valiant a man as himself, disdained to ask him either life, or remission of his torments. And what had he to countenance this his tyranny, but the imitation of his ancestor Achilles, who did the like to Hector! It is true, that cruelty hath always somewhat to cover her deformity.

From Gaza (saith Josephus ⁴) he led his army towards Jerusalem, a city, for the antiquity and great fame thereof, well known unto him while he lay before Tyre: he had sent for some supply thither, which Jaddus, the high-priest, being subject and sworn to Darius, had refused him. The Jews therefore fearing his revenge, and unable to resist, committed the care of their estates and safety to Jad-

³ Joseph. Ant. l. 11. c. 8. ⁴ L. 11. c. ult.

dus, who, being taught by God, issued out of the city covered with his pontifical robes, to wit, an upper garment of purple, embroidered with gold, with his mitre, and the plate of gold wherein the name of God was written, the priests and Levites in their rich ornaments, and the people in white garments, in a manner so unusual, stately, and grave, as Alexander greatly admired it. Josephus reports it, that he fell to the ground before the high-priest, as reverencing the name of God, and that Parmenio reprehended him for it: howsoever it was, I am of opinion, that he became so confident in his enterprise, and so assured of the success after the prophecy of Daniel had been read unto him, wherein he saw himself, and the conquest of Persia, so directly pointed at, as nothing thenceforth could discourage him or daunt him. He confessed to Parmenio (saith Josephus) that in Dio, a city of Macedon, when his mind laboured the conquest of Asia, he saw in his sleep such a person as Jaddus, and so apparelled, professing one and the same God, by whom he was encouraged to pursue the purpose he had in hand, with assurance of victory. This apparition, formerly apprehended only by the light of his phantasy, he now beheld with his bodily eyes, wherewith he was so exceedingly pleased and emboldened, as, contrary to the practice of the Phœnicians, (who hoped to have sacked and destroyed Jerusalem,) he gave the Jews all, and more than they desired, both of liberty and immunity, with permission to live under their own laws, and to exercise and enjoy their own religion.

SECT. VII.

Alexander wins Egypt, and makes a journey to the temple of Ammon.

FROM Jerusalem, Alexander turned again towards Egypt, and entered it, where Darius's lieutenant, Astaces, received him, and delivered into his hand

the city of Memphis, with eight hundred talents of treasure, and all other the king's riches. By this we see that the king of Persia, who had more of affection than of judgment, gave to the valiantest man he had but the command of one city, and to the veriest coward the government of all Egypt. When he had set things in order in Egypt, he began to travel after godhead towards Jupiter Ammon,—so foolish had prosperity made him. He was to pass over the dangerous and dry sands, where, when the water which he brought on his camels backs was spent, he could not but have perished, had not a marvellous shower of rain fallen upon him when his army was in extreme despair. All men that know Egypt, and have written thereof, affirm that it never rains there: but the purposes of the mighty God are secret, and he bringeth to pass what it pleaseth him; for it is also said, that when he had lost his way in those vast deserts, that a flight of crows flew before the army; who making faster wing when they were followed, and fluttering slowly when the army was cast back, guided them over those pathless sands to Jupiter's temple.

Arianus¹, from the report of Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, says, that he was led by two dragons; both which reports may be alike true: but many of those wonders and things prodigious are feigned by those that have written the story of Alexander;—as, that an eagle lay hovering directly over his head at the battle of Issus; that a swallow flew about his head when he slept, and could not be affrighted from him till it had wakened him, at Halicarnassus; foreshewing the treason of Eropus, practised by Darius, to have slain him; that from the iron-bars, of which the Tyrians made their defensive engines when Alexander besieged them, there fell drops of blood; and that the like drops were found in a loaf of bread broken by a Macedonian soldier at the same time;

1 Arian. l. iiii.

that a turf of earth fell on his shoulder when he lay before Gaza, out of which there flew a bird into the air. The Spaniards, in the conquest of the West Indies, have many such pretty tales ; telling how they have been assisted in battle by the presence of Our Lady, and by angels riding on white horses, with the like Romish miracles, which I think themselves do hardly believe. The strangest thing that I have read of in this kind, being certainly true, was, that the night before the battle of Novara, all the dogs which followed the French army ran from them to the Switzers, leaping and fawning upon them, as if they had been bred and fed by them all their lives ; and in the morning following, Trivulzi and Tremoville, generals for Louis the Twelfth, were, by these Imperial Switzers, utterly broken and put to ruin.

The place of this idol of Jupiter Ammon is ill described by Curtius ; for he bounds it by the Arabian Troglodites on the south, between whom and the territory of Ammon, the region Thebais, or the Superior Egypt, with the mountains of Libya, and the river of Nilus, are interjacent ; and on the north he joins it to a nation called Nassamones, who, bordering the sea-shore, live (saith he) upon the spoils of shipwreck ; whereas the temple or grove of this idol hath no sea near it by two hundred miles and more, being found on the south part of Libya² ; these Nassamones being due west from it in the south part of Marmarica.

When Alexander came near the place, he sent some of his parasites before him to practise the priests attending the oracle, that their answer might be given in all things agreeable to his mad ambition, who affected the title of Jupiter's son. And so he was saluted son of Jupiter, by the devil's prophet ; whether prepared before to flatter him, or rather (as some think) defective in the Greek tongue ; for whereas he meant to say *O-pai-dion*, he said *O-pai-dios* ; that

² Ptol. Aziz, Tab. iii.

is, *O son of Jupiter!* instead of, *O dear son!* for which grammatical error he was richly rewarded, and a rumour presently spread, that the great Jupiter had acknowledged Alexander for his own.

He had heard that Perseus and Hercules had formerly consulted with this oracle; the one when he was employed against Gorgon, the other against Antæus and Busiris; and seeing these men had derived themselves from the gods, why might not he? By this it seems that he hoped to make his followers and the world fools, though indeed he made himself one, by thinking to cover from the world's knowledge his vanities and vices; and the better to confirm his followers in the belief of his deity, he had practised the priests to give answer to such as consulted with the oracle, that it should be pleasing to Jupiter to honour Alexander as his son³.

Who this Ammon was, and how represented, either by a bos carried in a boat, or by a ram, or a ram's head, I see that many wise men have troubled themselves to find out. But, as Arianus speaks of Dionysius, or Liber Pater, (who lived, saith St Augustine, in Moses's time,)—‘*Ea quæ de diis veteres fabulis suis conscripsere, non sunt nimium curiosè pervestiganda;*’ We must not over-curiously search into the fables which the ancients have written of their gods.

But this is certain and notable, that after the gospel began to be preached in the world, the devil in this and in all other idols became speechless: for that this Ammon was neglected in the time of Tiberius Cæsar, and in the time of Trajan altogether forgotten, Strabo and Plutarch witness.

There is found near this temple a fountain, called *Fons Solis*, (though Ptolemy, in his third African table, sets it farther off,) that at midnight is as hot as boiling water, and at noon as cold as any ice; to which I cannot but give credit, because I have heard of some other wells of like nature, and because it is

reported by St Augustine, by Diodorus, Herodotus, Pliny, Mela, Solinus, Arianus, Curtius, and others ; and indeed our baths in England are much warmer in the night than in the day.

SECT. VIII.

How Alexander, marching against Darius, was opposed very unskilfully by the enemy.

FROM the temple of Ammon he returned to Memphis, where, among many other learned men, he heard the philosopher Psammones, who, belike understanding that he affected the title of Jupiter's son, told him, that God was the father-king of all men in general ; and, refining the pride of this haughty king, brought him to say, That God was the father of all mortal men, but that he acknowledged none for his children save good men.

He gave the charge of the several provinces of Egypt to several governors ; following the rule of his master, Aristotle, ' That a great dominion should not ' be continued in the hands of any one ' : ' whom therein the Roman emperors also followed, not daring to commit the government of Egypt to any of their senators, but to men of meaner rank and degree. He then gave order for the founding of Alexandria upon the westmost branch of Nilus. And having now settled (as he could) the estate of Egypt, with the kingdoms of the Lesser Asia, Phœnicia, and Syria, (which being but the pawns of Darius's ill fortune, one happy victory would readily have redeemed;) he led his army towards Euphrates, which passage, though the same was committed to Mazeus to defend, yet was it abandoned, and Alexander, without resistance, passed it. From thence he marched towards Tigris ; a river, for the swiftness thereof, called by the Persians *the Arrow*. Here, as Curtius², and reason itself telleth us, might Darius easily have

1 Arist. Pol. l. v.

2 Curt. l. iv.

repelled the invading Macedonian ; for the violent course of the stream was such, as it drove before it many weighty stones ; and those that moved not, but lay in the bottom, were so round and well polished by continual rolling, that no man was able to fight on so slippery a footing, nor the Macedonian footmen to wade the river, otherwise than by joining their hands, and interlacing their arms together, making one mighty and entire body, to resist the swift passage and furious race of the stream. Besides this notable help, the channel was so deep towards the eastern shore, where Darius should have made head, as the footmen were enforced to lift their bows and arrows and darts over their heads, to keep them from being moistened and made unserviceable by the waters. But it was truly and understandingly said of Homer,

*Talis est hominum terrestrium mens,
Qualem quotidie ducit pater virorumque Deorumque.*

*The minds of men are ever so affected,
As by God's will they daily are directed.*

And it cannot be denied, that as all the estates of the world, by the surfeit of misgovernment, have been subject to many grievous, and sometimes mortal diseases ; so had the empire of Persia at this time brought itself into a burning and consuming fever, and thereby become frantic and without understanding, forshewing manifestly the dissolution and death thereof.

But Alexander hath now recovered the eastern shores of Tigris, without any other difficulty than that of the nature of the place ; where Mazeus (who had charge to defend the passage both of Euphrates and it,) presented himself to the Macedonians, followed with certain companies of horsemen, as if with uneven forces he durst have charged them on even ground, when as with a multitude far exceed-

ing them he forsook the advantage, which no valour of his enemies could easily have overcome. But it is commonly seen, that fearful and cowardly men do ever follow those ways and counsels whereof the opportunity is already lost.

It is true that he set all provisions a-fire where-with the Macedonians might serve themselves over Tigris, thinking thereby greatly to have distressed them; but the execution of good counsel is fruitless when unseasonable. For now was Alexander so well furnished with carriages, as nothing was wanting to the competency of the army which he conducted. Those things also which he sought to waste, Alexander being now in sight, were by his horsemen pursued and recovered. This, Mazeus might have done some days before at good leisure; or at this time, with so great a strength of horsemen, as the Macedonians durst not have pursued them, leaving the strength of their foot out of sight, and far behind.

SECT. IX.

The new provisions of Darius, Accidents foregoing the battle of Arbela.

DARIUS, upon Alexander's first return out of Egypt, had assembled all the forces which those regions next him could furnish, and now also were the Arians, Scythians, Indians, and other nations arrived; nations (saith Curtius) that rather served to make up the names of men, than to make resistance. Arrianus hath numbered them with their leaders, and finds of footmen of all sorts ten hundred thousand, and of horse four hundred thousand, besides armed chariots, and some few elephants. Curtius, who musters the army of Darius at two hundred thousand foot, and near fifty thousand horse, comes (I think) nearer to the true number; and yet seeing that he had more confidence in the

multitude than in the valour of his vassals, it is like enough that he had gathered together of all sorts some three or four hundred thousand, with which he hoped in those fair plains of Assyria to have overborne the few numbers of the invading army. But it is a rule in the philosophy of war, 'In omni prælio non tam multitudo, et virtus indoc-ta, quam ars et exercitium solent præstare victo-riam':¹ In every battle skill and practice do more towards the victory, than multitude and rude audacity.

While Alexander gave rest to his army after their passage over Tigris, there happened an eclipse of the moon, of which the Macedonians, not knowing the cause and reason, were greatly affrighted. All that were ignorant, (as the multitude always are,) took it for a certain presage of their overthrow and destruction; insomuch as they began not only to murmur, but to speak it boldly, That for the ambition of one man, a man that disdained Philip for his father, and would needs be called the son of Jupiter, they should all perish; for he not only enforced them to make war against worlds of enemies, but against rivers, mountains, and the heavens themselves.—Hereupon Alexander being ready to march forward, made a halt; and, to quiet the minds of the multitude, he called before him the Egyptian astrologers which followed him thence, that by them the soldiers might be assured that this defection of the moon was a certain presage of good success; for that it was natural they never imparted to the common people, but reserved the knowledge to themselves, so as a sorry almanack-maker had been no small fool in these days.

Of this kind of superstitious observation Cæsar made good use when he fought against Ariovistus and the Germans; for they being persuaded by the

¹ Veget.

casting of lots, that if they fought before the change of the moon, they should certainly lose the battle, Cæsar forced them to abide it, though they durst not give it; wherein having their minds already beaten by their own superstition, and being resolutely charged by the Romans, the whole army in effect perished.

These Egyptians gave no other reason than this, that the Grecians were under the aspect of the sun, the Persians of the moon; and therefore the moon failing and being darkened, the state of Persia was now in danger of falling, and their glory of being obscured. This judgement of the Egyptian priests being noised through all the army, all were satisfied, and their courage redoubled. It is a principle in the war, which, though devised since, was well observed then, ‘*Exercitum terrore plenum dux ad pugnam non ducat:*’ Let not a captain lead his army to the fight, when it is possessed with matter of terror. It is truly observed by Curtius, that the people are led by nothing so much as by superstition; yea, we find it in all stories, and often in our own, that by such inventions, devised tales, dreams and prophecies, the people of this land have been carried head-long into many dangerous tumults and insurrections, and still to their own loss and ruin.

As Alexander drew near the Persian army, certain letters were surprised written by Darius to the Grecians, persuading them for great sums of money, either to kill or betray Alexander. But these, by the advice of Parmenio, he suppressed.

At this time also Darius’s fair wife, oppressed with sorrow and wearied with travel, died. Which accident Alexander seemed no less to bewail than Darius, who upon the first bruit suspected that some dishonourable violence had been offered her; but being satisfied by an eunuch of his own that attended her of Alexander’s kingly respect towards her, from the day of her being taken, he desired the immortal Gods, that if they

had decreed to make a new master of the Persian empire, then it would please them to confer it on so just and continent an enemy as Alexander; to whom he once again, before the last trial of battle, offered these conditions of peace:

That with his daughter in marriage he would deliver up and resign all Asia the Less, and with Egypt, all those kingdoms between the Phœnician sea and the river of Euphrates; that he would pay him for the ransom of his mother, and his other daughters, thirty thousand talents, and that for the performance thereof he would leave his son Ochus in hostage:—to this they sought to persuade Alexander by such arguments as they had. Alexander causing the ambassadors to be removed, advised with his counsel, but heard no man speak but Parmenio, the very right hand of his good fortune, who persuaded him to accept of these fair conditions. He told him, that the empire between the Euphrates and Hellespont was a fair addition to Macedon; that the retaining of the Persian prisoners was a great cumber, and the treasure offered for them of far better use than their persons, with divers other arguments; all which Alexander rejected. And yet it is probable, that if he had followed his advice, and bounded his ambition within those limits, he might have lived as famous for virtue as for fortune, and left himself a successor of able age to have enjoyed his estate, which afterward, indeed, he much enlarged, rather to the greatening of others than himself,—who, to assure themselves of what they had usurped upon his issues, left not one of them to draw breath in the world within a few years after. The truth is, that Alexander, in going so far into the east, left behind him the reputation which he brought out of Macedon; the reputation of a just and prudent prince, a prince temperate, advised, and grateful; and, being taught new lessons by abundance of prosperity, became a lover of wine, of his own

flattery, and of extreme cruelty. Yea, as Seneca hath observed, the taint of one unjust slaughter, amongst many, defaced and withered the flourishing beauty of all his great acts and glorious victories obtained.

But the Persian ambassadors stay his answer, which was to this effect: That whatsoever he had bestowed on the wife and children of Darius, proceeded from his own natural clemency and magnanimity, without all respect to their master; thanks to an enemy was improper: That he made no wars against adversity, but against those that resisted him; not against women and children, but against armed enemies: and although by the reiterated practice of Darius to corrupt his soldiers and by great sums of money to persuade his friends to attempt upon his person, he had reason to doubt that the peace offered was rather pretended than meant; yet he could not (were it otherwise and faithful) resolve in haste to accept the same, seeing Darius had made the war against him, not as a king with royal and overtforce, but as a traitor, by secret and base practice: That for the territory offered him, it was already his own, and if Darius could beat him back again over Euphrates, which he had already passed he would then believe that he offered him somewhat in his own power; otherwise he propounded to himself for the reward of the war which he had made, all those kingdoms as yet in Darius's possession, wherein, whether he were abused by his own hopes or no, the battle which he meant to fight in the day following should determine. For, in conclusion, he told them, that he came into Asia to give, and not to receive; that the heavens could not hold two suns; and therefore if Darius could be content to acknowledge Alexander for his superior, he might perchance be persuaded to give him conditions fit for a second person and his inferior.

SECT. X.

The battle of Arbela ; and that it could not be so strongly fought as report hath made it.

WITH this answer the ambassadors return ; Darius prepares to fight, and sends Mazeus to defend a passage, which he never yet dared so much as to hazard. Alexander consults with his captains ; Parmenio persuades him to force Darius's camp by night, so that the multitude of enemies might not move terror in the Macedonians, being but few. Alexander disdains to steal the victory, and resolves to bring with him the day-light, to witness his valour. But it was the success that made good Alexander's resolution, though the counsel given by Parmenio was more sound : for it is a ground in war, ' Si pauci necessario cum multitudine pugnare cogantur, consilium est noctis tempore belli fortunam tentare. Notwithstanding, upon the view of the multitude at hand, he staggers and entrenches himself upon a ground of advantage, which the Persian had abandoned ; and whereas Darius, for fear of surprise, had stood with his army in armour all the day, and forborne sleep all the night, Alexander gave his men rest and store of food : for reason had taught him this rule in the war, ' In pugna milites validius resistunt, si cibo potuque refecti fuerint ; nam fames intrinsecus magis pugnat, quam ferrum exterius : ' Soldiers do the better stand to it in fight, if they have their bellies full of meat and drink ; for hunger within fights more eagerly than steel without.

The numbers which Alexander had, saith Arrianus, were forty thousand foot, and seven thousand horse ; these belike were of the European army ; for he had besides both Syrians, Indians, Egyptians, and Arabians, that followed him out of those regions. He used but a short speech to his soldiers to

encourage them ; and I think that he needed little rhetoric ; for by the two former battles upon the river of Granicus and in Cilicia, the Macedonians were best taught with what men they were to encounter. And it is a true saying ; ‘ *Victoria victoriam parat, animumque victoribus auget, et adversariis aufert :*’ One victory begets another, and puts courage into those that have already had the better, taking spirit away from such as have been beaten.

Arrianus and Curtius make large descriptions of this battle, fought at Gaugamela ; they tell us of many changes and rechanges ; that the victory inclined sometimes to the Persians, sometimes to the Macedonians ; that Parmenio was in danger of being overthrown, who led the left wing ; that Alexander’s rear guard was broken, and his carriages lost ; that for the first and valorous encounters on both sides, Fortune herself was long unresolved on whom to bestow the garland ; and, lastly, that Alexander in person wrought wonders, being charged in his retreat. But, in conclusion, Curtius delivers us in account but three hundred dead Macedonians, in all this terrible day’s work ; saying, that Hephæstion, Perdicas, and others of name, were wounded. Arrianus finds not a third part of this number slain ; of the Persians there fell forty thousand, (saith Curtius ;) thirty thousand, according to Arrianus ; ninety thousand, if we believe Diodorus. But what can we judge of this great encounter, other than that, as in the two former battles, the Persians upon the first charge ran away, and that the Macedonians pursued ? for if of these four or five hundred thousand Asians brought into the field by Darius, every man had cast but a dart, or a stone, the Macedonians could not have bought the empire of the east at so easy a rate as six or seven hundred men in three notorious battles. Certainly, if Darius had fought with Alexander upon the banks of Euphrates, and

had armed but fifty or threescore thousand of this great multitude, only with spades, (for the most of all he had were fit for no other weapon,) it had been impossible for Alexander to have passed that river so easily, much less the river of Tigris. But, as a man whose empire God in his providence had determined, he abandoned all places of advantage, and suffered Alexander to enter so far into the bowels of his kingdom, as all hope and possibility of escape by retreat being taken from the Macedonians, they had presented unto them the choice, either of death or victory; to which election Darius could no way constrain his own, seeing they had many large regions to run into from those that invaded them.

SECT. XI.

Of things following the battle of Arbela. The yielding of Babylon and Susa.

DARIUS, after the route of his army, recovered Arbela the same night, better followed in his flight, than in the fight. He propounded unto them that ran after him his purpose of making a retreat into Media, persuading them that the Macedonians, greedy of spoil and riches, would rather attempt Babylon, Susa, and other cities, filled with treasure, than pursue the vanquished. This miserable resolution his nobility rather obeyed than approved.

Alexander, soon after Darius's departure, arrives at Arbela, which, with a great mass of treasure and princely ornaments, was rendered unto him; for the fear which conducted Darius took nothing with it but shame and dishonour. He that had been twice beaten should rather have sent his treasure into Media, than brought it to Arbela, so near the place where he did abide the coming of his enemies; if he had been victorious, he might have brought it after him at leisure; but being overcome, he knew it impossible to drive mules and camels laden with gold

from the pursuing enemy, seeing himself, at the overthrow he had in Cilicia, cast the crown from his head, to run away with the more speed. But errors are then best discerned, when most incurable; ‘*Et præterita magis reprehendi possunt, quam corrigi:*’ It is easier to reprehend than amend what is passed.

From Arbela, Alexander took his way towards Babylon, where Mazeus, in whom Darius had most confidence, rendered himself, his children, and the city. Also the captain of the castle, who was keeper of the treasure, strewed the streets with flowers, burnt frankincense upon altars of silver as Alexander passed by, and delivered unto him whatsoever was committed to his trust. The Magi, (the Chaldæan astrologers,) followed this captain in great solemnity to entertain their new king; after these came the Babylonian horsemen, infinite rich in attire, but exceeding poor in warlike furniture. Between these, (though not greatly to be feared,) and himself, Alexander caused his Macedonian footmen to march. When he entered the castle he admired the glory thereof, and the abundance of treasure therein found, amounting to fifty thousand talents of silver uncoined. The city itself I have elsewhere described, with the walls, the towers, the gates, and the circuit, with the wonderful place of pleasure about two miles in circuit, surrounded with a wall of fourscore foot high, and on the top thereof, (being under-borne with pillars,) a grove of beautiful and fruitful trees, which it is said that one of the kings of Babylon caused to be built, that the queen and other princesses might walk privately therein. In this city¹, rich in all things, but most of all in voluptuous pleasures, the king rested himself and the whole army four and thirty days, consuming that time in banqueting, and in all sorts of effeminate exercise; which so much softened the

minds of the Macedonians, not acquainted till now with the like delicacies, as the severe discipline of war, which taught them the sufferances of hunger and thirst, of painful travel, and hard lodging, began rather to be forgotten than neglected.

Here it was that those bands of a thousand soldiers were erected, and commanders appointed over them, who thereupon were stiled Chiliarchi. This new order Alexander brought in, was to honour those captains which were found by certain selected judges to have deserved best in the late war. For before this time the Macedonian companies consisted but of five hundred.—Certainly the drawing down of the footbands in this latter age hath been the cause, (saith the marshal Monluct,) that the title and charge of a captain hath been bestowed on every *Picque Bœuf*, or spurn-cow; for when the captains of foot had a thousand soldiers under one ensign, and after that five hundred, as in the time of Francis the First, the title was honourable, and the kings were less charged, and far better served. King Henry the Eighth of England never gave the commandment of any of his good ships but to men of known valour, and of great estate; nay, sometimes he made two gentlemen of quality commanders in one ship; but all orders and degrees are fallen from the reputation they had.

While Alexander was yet in Babylon, there came to him a great supply out of Europe; for Antipater sent him six thousand foot, and five hundred horse; out of Macedon, of Thracians three thousand foot, and the like number of horse; and out of Greece, four thousand foot, and four hundred horse; by which his army was greatly strengthened: for those that were infected with the pleasures of Babylon could hardly be brought again, ‘*de quitter la plume pour dormir sur la dure* ;’ To change from soft beds to hard boards.

He left the castle and city of Babylon, with the territories about it, in charge with three of his own captains, to wit, Agathon, Minethus, and Apollidorus; to supply all wants, a thousand talents; but to grace Mazeus, who rendered the city unto him, he gave him the title of his lieutenant over all, and took with him Bagistanes that gave up the castle; and having distributed to every soldier a part of the treasure, he left Babylon, and entered into the province Satrapene; from thence he went on towards Susa in Persia, the same which Ptolemy, Herodotus, and E-lianus call Memnonia, situate on the river Euleus, a city sometime governed by Daniel the prophet. Abulites also, governor of this famous city, gave it up to the conqueror, with fifty thousand talents of silver, in bullion, and twelve elephants for the war, with all other the treasures of Darius². In this sort did those vassals of fortune, lovers of the king's prosperity, not of his person, (for so all ambitious men are,) purchase their own peace and safety with the king's treasures. And herein was Alexander well advised, that whatsoever titles he gave to the Persians, yet he left all places of importance in trust with his own captains; to wit, Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, with other cities and provinces by him conquered; for if Darius, (as yet living,) had beat the Macedonians but in one battle, all the nobility of Persia would have returned to their natural lord. Those that are traitors to their own kings, are never to be used alone in great enterprises by those princes that entertain them, nor ever to be trusted with the defences of any frontier town, or fortress of weight, by the rendering whereof they may redeem their liberty and estates lost. Hereof the French had experience, when Don Pedro de Navarra, being banished out of Spain, was trusted with Fonterabe, in the year 1523.

² Diodorus speaketh of more than forty thousand talents in bullion, and of nine millions of gold. Sub dorrica forma excusi.

While Alexander spoiled Arbela, Mazeus might have furnished the king from Babylon ; and while he staid four and thirty days at Babylon, Abulites might have holpen him from Susa ; and while he feasted there, Tiridates from Persepolis might have relieved him, for the great mass of treasure was laid up in that city. But who hath sought out and friended fearful adversity? It is certain, that benefits bind not the ambitious, but the honest ; for those that are but greedy of themselves, do in all changes of fortune only consult the conservation of their own greatness.

The government of Susa, with the castle and treasure, he committed to his own Macedonians, making Abulites, who rendered it unto him, his lieutenant, as he had done Mazeus and others, in giving them titles, but neither trust nor power ; for he left three thousand old soldiers in garrison to assure the place, and Darius's mother and her children to repose themselves.

It is said, that Charles the Fifth, having promised Charles of Bourbon the government of Marseilles, if he could have forced it, and whereof he made sure account, told some of his nearest counsellors, that he meant nothing less than the performance of that promise, because he could thereby have left the duke (revolted from his master,) very well wherewithal to have recovered his favour.

SECT. XII.

How Alexander came to Persepolis, and burnt it.

FROM Susa Alexander leadeth his army toward Persepolis ; and when he sought to pass those mountains which sunder Susiana and Persia, he was soundly beaten by Ariobarzanes, who defended against him those straits, called Pylæ Persidis, or Susæidæ ; and after the loss of many companies of his Macedonians, he was forced to save himself by retreat, caus-

ing his foot to march close together, and to cover themselves with their targets from the stones tumbled on them from the mountain-top. Yet in the end he found out another path, which a Lycian, living in that country, discovered unto him, and came thereby suddenly in view of Ariobarzanes, who being enforced to fight upon even ground, was by Alexander broken; whereupon he fled to Persepolis, but (after that they of Persepolis had refused to receive him,) he returned and gave a second charge to the Macedonians, wherein he was slain. In like manner did king Francis the First, in the year 1515, find a way over the Alps; the Switzers undertaking to defend all the passages, who, if their footmanship had not saved them, upon the king's descent on the other side, had been ill paid for their hard lodging on those hills.

Four thousand Greeks, saith Curtius, (Justin numbers them but at eight hundred,) having been taken prisoners by the Persians, presented themselves to Alexander now in sight of Persepolis. These had the barbarous Persians so maimed and defaced, by cutting off their hands, noses, ears, and other members, as they could no way have been known to their countrymen, but by their voices; to each of these Alexander gave three hundred crowns, with new garments, and such lands as they liked to live upon.

Tiridates, one of Darius's false-hearted grandees, hearing of Alexander's approach, made him know that Persepolis was ready to receive him, and prayed him to double his pace, because there was a determination in the people to spoil the king's treasure. This city was abandoned by many of her inhabitants upon Alexander's arrival, and they that stayed followed the worst counsel; for all was left to the liberty of the soldiers, to spoil and kill at their pleasure. There was no place in the world at that time, which, if it had been laid in the balance with Persepolis, would have weighed it down. Babylon, indeed, and

Susa, were very rich ; but in Persepolis lay the bulk and main store of the Persians. For after the spoil that had been made of money, curious plate, bullion, images of gold and silver, and other jewels, there remained to Alexander himself one hundred and twenty thousand talents. He left the same number of three thousand Macedonians in Persepolis which he had done in Susa, and gave the same formal honour to the traitor Tiridates that he had done to Abulites ; but he that had the trust of the place was Nicarides, a creature of his own. The body of his army he left there for thirty days, of which the commanders were Parmenio and Craterus ; and, with a thousand horse, and certain troops of chosen foot, he would needs view in the winter time those parts of Persia which the snow had covered,—a fruitless and foolish enterprise ; but, as Seneca says, ‘ Non ille ire vult, sed non potest stare :’ He hath not a will to go, but he is unable to stand still. It is said and spoken in his praise, that when his soldiers cried out against him, because they could not endure the extreme frost, and make way, but with extreme difficulty, through the snow, that Alexander forsook his horse, and led them the way. But what can be more ridiculous than to bring other men into extremity, thereby to shew how well himself can endure it ? His walking on foot did no otherwise take off their weariness that followed him, than his sometimes forbearing to drink did quench their thirst that could less endure it. For mine own little judgment, I shall rather commend that captain that makes careful provision for those that follow him, and that seeks wisely to prevent extreme necessity, than those witless arrogant fools, that make the vaunt of having endured equally with the common soldier, as if that were a matter of great glory and importance.

We find in all the wars that Cæsar made, or the best of the Roman commanders, that the provision of victuals was their first care. For it was a true say-

ing of Coligni, admiral of France, ‘ That who so will
‘ shape that beast, (meaning war,) must begin with
‘ his belly.’

But Alexander is now returned to Persepolis; where, those historians that were most amorous of his virtues complain, that the opinion of his valour, of his liberality, of his clemency towards the vanquished, and all other his kingly conditions, were drowned in drink¹; that he smothered in carousing cups all the reputation of his actions past; and that, by descending, as it were, from the reverend throne of the greatest king, into the company and familiarity of base harlots, he began to be despised both of his own and all other nations. For being persuaded, when he was inflamed with wine, by the infamous strumpet Thais, he caused the most sumptuous and goodly castle and city of Persepolis to be consumed with fire, notwithstanding all the arguments of Parmenio to the contrary, who told him, that it was a dishonour to destroy those things by the persuasions of others, which by his proper virtue and force he had obtained; and that it would be a most strong persuasion to the Asians to think hardly of him, and thereby alienate their hearts;—for they might well believe that he, which demolished the goodliest ornaments they had, meant nothing less than (after such vastation) to hold their possession. ‘ Per vinolentiam crudelitas sequitur²;’ cruelty doth commonly follow drunkenness: For so it fell out soon after, and often, in Alexander.

SECT. XIII.

The treason of Bessus against Darius. Darius's death.

ABOUT this time he received a new supply of soldiers out of Cilicia, and goes on to find Darius in Media. Darius had there compounded his fourth

and last army, which he meant to have increased in Bactria, had he not heard of Alexander's coming on, with whom (trusting to such companies as he had, which was numbered at thirty or forty thousand,) he determined once again to try his fortune. He therefore calls together his captains and commanders, and propounds unto them his resolution, who, being desperate of good success, used silence for a while. Artabazus, one of his eldest men of war, who had sometime lived with Philip of Macedon, broke the ice, and protesting that he could never be beaten by any adversity of the king's from the faith which he had ever owed him, with firm confidence that all the rest were of the same disposition, (whereof they likewise assured Darius by the like protestation,) he approved the king's resolution. Two only, and those of the greatest, to wit, Naburzanes and Bessus, whereof the latter was governor of Bactria, had conspired against their master, and therefore advised the king to lay a new foundation for the war, and to pursue it by some such person for the present, against whom neither the gods nor fortune had in all things declared themselves to be an enemy: This preamble Naburzanes used, and, in conclusion, advised the election of his fellow-traitor Bessus, with promise that, the wars ended, the empire should again be restored to Darius. The king, swollen with disdain, pressed towards Nabursanes to have slain him; but Bessus, and the Bactrians, whom he commanded, being more in number than the rest, withheld him. In the meanwhile, Naburzanes withdrew himself, and Bessus followed him, making their quarter apart from the rest of the army. Artabazus, the king's faithful servant, persuaded him to be advised, and serve the time, seeing Alexander was at hand, and that he would at least make shew of forgetting the offence made; which the king, being of a gentle disposition, willingly yielded unto. Bessus makes his submission, and attends the king, who

removes his army. Patron, who commanded a regiment of four thousand Greeks, which had in all the former battles served Darius with great fidelity, and always made the retreat in spite of the Macedonians, offered himself to guard his person, protesting against the treason of Bessus; but it was not his destiny to follow their advice, who from the beginning of the war gave him faithful counsel; but he inclined still to Bessus, who told him, that the Greeks, with Patron their captain, were corrupted by Alexander, and practised the division of his faithful servants. Bessus had drawn unto him thirty thousand of the army, promising them all those things by which the lovers of the world and themselves are wont to be allured; to wit, riches, safety, and honour.

Now the day following Darius plainly discovered the purposes of Bessus, and being overcome with passion, as thinking himself unable to make head against these ungrateful and unnatural traitors, he prayed Artabazus, his faithful servant, to depart from him, and to provide for himself. In like sort he discharged the rest of his attendants, all, save a few of his eunuchs; for his guards had voluntarily abandoned him. His Persians being most base cowards, durst not undertake his defence against the Bactrians, notwithstanding that they had four thousand Greeks to join with them, who had been able to have beaten both nations. But it is true, that him which forsakes himself no man follows. It had been far more man-like and king-like, to have died at the head of those four thousand Greeks, which offered him the disposition of their lives, (to which Artabazus persuaded him,) than to have lain bewailing himself on the ground, and suffering himself to be bound like a slave by those ambitious monsters that laid hands on him, whom neither the consideration of his former great estate, nor the honours he had given them, nor the trust reposed in them, nor the

world of benefits bestowed on them, could move to pity;—no, nor his present adversity, which above all things should have moved them, could pierce their viperous and ungrateful hearts. Vain it was indeed to hope it, for infidelity hath no compassion.

Now Darius, thus forsaken, was bound and laid in a cart, covered with hides of beasts, to the end that by any other ornament he might not be discovered; and to add despite and derision to his adversity, they fastened him with chains of gold, and so drew him on among their ordinary carriages and carts. For Bessus and Nabarzanes persuaded themselves to redeem their lives and the provinces they held, either by delivering him a prisoner to Alexander, or, if that hope failed, to make themselves kings by his slaughter, and then to defend themselves by force of arms. But they failed in both. For it was against the nature of God, who is most just, to pardon so strange villany, yea, though against a prince purely heathenish, and an idolater.

Alexander, having knowledge that Darius was retired towards Bactria, and durst not abide his coming, hasted after him with a violent speed; and because he would not force his footmen beyond their powers, he mounted on horseback certain select companies of them, and best armed, and, with six thousand other horse, rather ran than marched after Darius. Such as hated the treason of Bessus, and secretly forsook him, gave knowledge to Alexander of all that had happened, informing him of the way that Bessus took, and how near he was at hand; for many men of worth daily ran from him. Hereupon Alexander again doubled his pace, and his vanguard being discovered by Bessus's rear, Bessus brought a horse to the cart where Darius lay bound, persuading him to mount thereon, and to save himself. But the unfortunate king refusing to follow those that had betrayed him, they cast darts at him, wounded him to death, and wounded the beasts that drew

him, and slew two poor servants that attended his person. This done, they all fled that could, leaving the rest to the mercy of the Macedonian swords.

Polystratus, a Macedonian, being by pursuit of the vanquished pressed with thirst, as he was refreshing himself with some water that he had discovered, espying a cart with a team of wounded beasts breathing for life, and not able to move, searched the same, and therein found Darius bathing in his own blood ; and by a Persian captive which followed this Polystratus, he understood that it was Darius, and was informed of this barbarous tragedy. Darius also seemed greatly comforted, (if dying men, ignorant of the living God, can be comforted,) that he cast not out his last sorrows unheard ; but that by this Macedonian, Alexander might know, and take vengeance on those traitors, which had dealt no less unworthily than cruelly with him ; recommending their revenge to Alexander by this messenger, which he besought him to pursue, not because Darius had desired it, but for his own honour, and the safety of all that did or should after wear crowns. He also, having nothing else to present, rendered thanks to Alexander for the kingly grace used towards his wife, mother, and children, desiring the immortal gods to submit unto him the empire of the whole world. As he was thus speaking, impatient death, pressing out his few remaining spirits, he desired water, which Polystratus presented him ; after which he lived but to tell him, that of all the best things which the world had, which were lately in his power, he had nothing remaining but his last breath, wherewith to desire the gods to reward his compassion.

SECT. XIV.

How Alexander pursued Bessus, and took into his grace Darius's captains.

It was now hoped by the Macedonians that their travels were near an end, every man preparing for his return. When Alexander had knowledge thereof he was greatly grieved, for the bounded earth sufficed not his boundless ambition. Many arguments he therefore used to draw on his army farther into the east; but that which had most strength was, that Bessus, a most cruel traitor to his master Darius, having at his devotion the Hyrcanians and Bactrians, would, in short time (if the Macedonians should return) make himself master of the Persian empire, and enjoy the fruits of all their former travels. In conclusion, he won their consent to go on; which done, leaving Craterus with certain regiments of foot, and Amyntas with six thousand horse in Parthenia, he enters, not without some opposition, into Hyrcania; for the Mardons, and other barbarous nations, defended certain passages for a while. He passed the river of Zioberis, which taking beginning in Parthia, dissolves itself in the Caspian sea; it runneth under the ledge of mountains which bound Parthia and Hyrcania, where, hiding itself under ground for three hundred furlongs, it then riseth again, and followeth its former course. In Zadracarta, or Zeudracarta, the same city which Ptolemy writes Hyrcania, the metropolis of that region, he rested fifteen days, banqueting and feasting therein.

Phataphernes, one of Darius's greatest commanders, with other of his best followers, submit themselves to Alexander, and were restored to their places and governments; but of all others he graced Artabazus most highly, for his approved and constant faith to his master Darius. Artabazus brought with him ten thousand and five hundred Greeks, the re-

mainder of all those that had served Darius; he treats with Alexander for their pardon before they were yet arrived; but in the end they surrender themselves simply, without promise or composition. He pardons all but the Lacedæmonians, whom he imprisoned, their leader having slain himself. He was also wrought (though to his great dishonour) to receive Nabarzanes, that had joined with Bessus to murder Darius.

SECT. XV.

Of Thalestris, queen of the Amazons; where, by way of digression, it is shewed that such Amazons have been and are.

HERE it is said, that Thalestris, or Minothea, a queen of the Amazons, came to visit him, and her suit was, (which she easily obtained,) that she might accompany him till she were made with child by him; which done, (refusing to follow him into India,) she returned into her own country.

Plutarch citeth many historians, reporting this meeting of Thalestris with Alexander, and some contradicting it. But, indeed, the letters of Alexander himself to Antipater, recounting all that befel him in those parts, and yet omitting to make mention of this Amazonian business, may justly breed suspicion of the whole matter as forged. Much more justly may we suspect it as a vain tale, because an historian of the same time, reading one of his books to Lysimachus, (then king of Thrace,) who had followed Alexander in all his voyage, was laughed at by the king for inserting such news of the Amazons as Lysimachus himself had never heard of. One that accompanied Alexander, took upon him to write his acts; which to amplify, he told how the king had fought single with an elephant, and slain it. The king hearing such stuff, caught the book and threw it into the river of Indus, saying, that it

were well done to throw the writer after it, who, by inserting such fables, disparaged the truth of his great exploits. Yet, as we believe and know that there are elephants, though it were false that Alexander fought with one; so may we give credit unto writers making mention of such Amazons, whether it were true or false that they met with Alexander, as Plutarch leaves the matter undetermined. Therefore I will here take leave to make a digression, as well to shew the opinions of the ancient historians, cosmographers, and others, as also of some modern discoverers, touching these warlike women; because, not only Strabo, but many others of these our times, make doubt whether or no there were any such kind of people. Julius Solinus seats them in the north parts of Asia the Less¹. Pomp. Mela finds two regions filled with them; the one on the river Thermodoon, the other near the Caspian sea; *Quas* (saith he) *Sauromatidas appellant*², which the people call Sauromatidas. The former of these two had the Cimerians for their neighbours; *Certum est* (saith Vadianus, who hath commented upon Mela,) *illos proximios Amazonibus fuisse*; it is certain that the Cimerians were the next nations to the Amazons. Ptolemy set them farther into the land northwards, near the mountains Hippaci, not far from the Pillars of Alexander³; and that they had dominion in Asia itself toward India, Solinus and Pliny tell us, where they governed a people called the Pandæans, or Pa-deans, so called after Pandæa, the daughter of Hercules, from whom all the rest derive themselves. Claudian affirms that they commanded many nations⁴, for he speaks (largely, perhaps, as a poet,) thus:

‘ Medis levibusque Sabæis

‘ Imperat hic sexus : Reginarumque sub armis,

‘ Barbariæ pars magna jacet.’

¹ Solin. c. xxvii. and 65. ² Ther. l. i.

³ Ptol. l. vi. Asiæ Tab. ii. Plin. l. vi. c. 20.

⁴ Claud. de cap. Proz.

- ‘ Over the Medes, and light Sabeans, reigns
- ‘ This female sex ; and under arms of queen,
- ‘ Great part of the Barbarian land remains.’

Diodorus Siculus hath heard of them in Libya⁵, who were more ancient, (saith he,) than those which kept the banks of Thermodoon, a river falling into the Euxine sea near Heraclium.

Herodotus doth also make report of these Amazons, whom he tells us that the Scythians call *Æorpatas*, which is as much as *Viricidas*, or men-killers. And that they made incursion into Asia the Less, sacked Ephesus, and burnt the temple of Diana, Manethon and Aventinus report, which they performed forty years after Troy was taken. At the siege of Troy itself we read of Penthesilea, that she came to the succour of Priamus⁶.

Am. Marcellinus gives the cause of their inhabiting upon the river of Thermodoon⁷, speaking confidently of the wars they made with divers nations, and of their overthrow.

Plutarch, in the life of Theseus, out of Philochorus, Hellanicus, and other ancient historians, reports the taking of Antiopa, queen of the Amazons, by Hercules, and by him given to Theseus ; though some affirm, that Theseus himself got her by stealth when she came to visit him aboard his ship. But in substance there is little difference ; all confessing, that such Amazons there were. The same author, in the life of Pompey, speaks of certain companies of the Amazons that came to aid the Albanians against the Romans, by whom, after the battle, many targets and buskins of theirs were taken up ; and he saith farther, that these women entertain the Gælae and Lelages once a year, nations inhabiting between them and the Albanians.

But, to omit the many authors making mention of Amazons that were in the old times, Fran. Lo-

⁵ Diod. l. ii.

⁶ *Æaciad.* i. l. 3.

⁷ Mar. l. xxii. c. 7.

pez^s, who hath written the navigation of Orellana, which he made down the river of Amazons from Peru, in the year 1542, (upon which river, for the divers turnings, he is said to have sailed six thousand miles,) reports, from the relation of the said Orellana to the council of the Indies, that he both saw those women, and fought with them, where they sought to impeach his passage towards the east sea.

It is also reported by Ulricus Schmidel, that in the year 1542, when he sailed up the rivers of Paragua and Parabol, that he came to a king of that country, called Scherues, inhabiting under the tropic of Capricorn, who gave his captain Hernando Rieffere a crown of silver which he had gotten in fight from a queen of the Amazons in those parts.

Ed. Lopez, in his description of the kingdom of Congo, makes relation of such Amazons, telling us, that, (agreeable to the reports of elder times,) they burn off their right breast, and live apart from men, save at one time of the year, when they feast and accompany them for one month. These, (saith he,) possess a part of the kingdom of Monomotapa in Africa, nineteen degrees to the southward of the line; and that these women are the strongest guards of this emperor all the East Indian Portugals know.

I have produced these authorities, in part to justify mine own relation of these Amazons; because that which was delivered me for truth by an ancient Cacique of Guiana, how upon the river of Papamena, (since the Spanish discoveries called Amazons,) that these women still live and govern, was held for a vain and unprofitable report.

SECT. XVI.

How Alexander fell into the Persian luxury: and how he further pursued Bessus.

Now, as Alexander had begun to change his conditions after the taking of Persepolis; so at this time his prosperity had so much over-wrought his virtue, as he accounted clemency to be but baseness, and the temperance which he had used all his lifetime, but a poor and dejected humour, rather becoming the instructors of his youth than the condition and state of so mighty a king as the world could not equal. For he persuaded himself, that he now represented the greatness of the gods; he was pleased that those that came before him, should fall to the ground and adore him; he wore the robes and garments of the Persians, and commanded that his nobility should do the like; he entertained in his court and camp, the same shameless rabble of courtesans, and sodomitical eunuchs, that Darius had done; and imitated in all things the proud, voluptuous, and detested manners of the Persians whom he had vanquished. So licentious is felicity, as notwithstanding that he was fully persuaded that the gods, detesting the vices of the invaded, assisted him in all attempts against them, he himself, contrary to the religion he professed, (which how idolatrous soever it were, could not be but fearful unto him by neglecting it,) became by imitation, and not by ignorance or education, a more foul and fearful monster than Darius, from whose tyranny he vaunted to have delivered so many nations. Yea those that were nearest and dearest to him began to be ashamed of him, entertaining each other with this and the like scornful discourse, that Alexander of Macedon was become one of Darius's licentious courtiers; that by his example the Macedonians were in the end of so many travels more impoverished in their

virtues, than enriched by their victories ; and that it was hard to judge whether the conquerors or the conquered were the baser slaves. Neither were these opinions so reserved, but that the noise of them came to his ears. He therefore with great gifts sought to pacify the better sort, and those of whose judgments he was most jealous ; and making it known to the army that Bessus had assumed the title of a king, and called himself Artaxerxes ; and that he had compounded a great army of the Bactrians, and other nations, he had arguments enough to persuade them to go on, to the end that all already gotten might not with themselves, (so far engaged,) be cast away. And because they were pestered with the spoils of so many cities, as the whole army seemed but the guard of their carriages, (not much unlike the warfare of the French,) having commanded every man's fardels to be brought into the market-place, he, together with his own, caused all to be consumed with fire. Certainly this could not but have proved most dangerous to him, seeing the common soldiers had more interest in these things, which they had bought with their painful travels, and with their blood, than in the king's ambition ; had not, (as Seneca often observed,) his happy temerity overcome all things. As he was in his way, news came to him that Satribarzanes, whom he had established in his former government over the Arians, was revolted ; whereupon leaving the way of Bactria, he sought him out ; but the rebel hearing of his coming, fled to Bessus with two thousand horse. He then went on towards Bessus, and by setting a great pile of wood on fire with the advantage of a strong wind, won the passage over a high and inaccessible rock, which was defended against him with thirteen thousand foot ; for the extremity of the flame and smoke forced them from the place, otherwise invincible.

I saw, in the third civil war of France, certain caves in Languedoc, which had but one entrance,

and that very narrow, cut out in the midway of high rocks, which we knew not how to enter by any ladder or engine, till at last by certain bundles of straw let down by an iron chain, and a weighty stone in the midst, those that defended it were so smothered, as they rendered themselves with their plate, money, and other goods therein hidden. There were also, some three years before my arrival in Guiana, three hundred Spaniards, well mounted, smothered to death, together with their horses, by the country people, who did set the long dry grass on fire to the eastward of them, (the wind in those parts being always east,) so as, notwithstanding their flying from the smoke, there was not one that escaped. Sir John Borrowes also, with an hundred English, was in great danger of being lost at Margarita, in the West Indies, by having the grass fired behind him, but the smoke being timely discovered, he recovered the sea-shore with the loss of sixteen of his men. I remember these things but to give caution to those that shall in times to come invade any part of those countries, that they always, before they pass into the land, burn down the grass and sedge to the east of them; they may otherwise, without any other enemy than a handful of straw set on fire, die the death of honey-bees, burnt out of the hive.

SECT. XVII.

A conspiracy against Alexander. The Death of Philotas and Parmenio.

ALEXANDER was, after he parted hence, no-where resisted, till he came into Aria, to the east of Bactria, where the chief city of that province, called Artacoana, was a while defended against him by the revolt of Satribarzanes, but in the end he received the inhabitants to mercy. At this place his army was reinforced with a new supply of five thousand and five hundred foot, and near five hundred

horse, out of Greece, Thessaly, and other places. His journey out of Persia, into these parts, is very confusedly described. For having (as all historians tell us) a determination to find Bessus in Bactria, he leaves it at the very entrance, and takes the way of Hyrcania; from thence he wanders northwards towards the obscure Mardi, upon the Caspian Sea, and thence over the mountain Coronus into Aria and Drangiana.

At this time it was that the treason of Dimnus broke out, of which Philotas the son of Parmenio was accused, as accessory, if not principal. This Dimnus, having (I know not upon what ground) conspired with some others against the life of Alexander, went about to draw Nicomachus, a young man whom he loved, into the same treason. The youth, although he was first bound by oath to secrecy, when he heard so foul a matter uttered, began to protest against it so vehemently, that his friend was like to have slain him for security of his own life. So, constrained by fear, he made shew as if he had been won by persuasion, and by seeming at length to like well of the business, he was told more at large what they were, that had undertaken it.—There were nine or ten of them, all men of rank; whose names Dimnus (to countenance the enterprise) reckoned up to Nicomachus. Nicomachus had no sooner freed himself from the company of this traitor Dimnus, than he acquainted his own brother Ceballinus with the whole history; whereupon it was agreed between them, that Ceballinus (who might with least suspicion) should go to the court and utter all. Ceballinus, meeting with Philotas, told him the whole business, desiring him to acquaint the king therewith; which he promised to do, but did not. Two days passed, and Philotas never broke with the king about the matter; but still excused himself to Ceballinus by the king's want of leisure. This his coldness bred suspicion,

and caused Ceballinus to address himself to another, one Metron, keeper of the kings armoury, who forthwith brought him to Alexander's presence. Alexander, finding by examination what had passed between Ceballinus and Philotas, did fully persuade himself that his concealment of the treason, argued his hand to have been in the business. Therefore, when Dimnus was brought before him, he asked the traitor no other question than this : ' Wherein have 'I so offended thee, that thou shouldest think Philotas more worthy to be king than I?' Dimnus perceiving, when he was apprehended, how the matter went, had so wounded himself, that he lived no longer than to give his last groan in the king's presence. Then was Philotas called, and charged with the suspicion which his silence might justly breed. His answer was, that when the practice was revealed unto him by Nicomachus, he judging it to be but frivolous, did forbear to acquaint Alexander therewithal, until he might have better information. This error of his, (if it were only an error,) although Alexander, for the notorious services of his father Parmenio, of his brother Nicanor lately dead, and of Philotas himself, had freely pardoned and given him his hand for assurance; yet by the instigation of Craterus, he again swallowed his princely promise, and made his enemies his judges. Curtius gives a note of Craterus in this business, how he persuaded himself that he could never find a better occasion to oppress his private enemy, then by pretending piety and duty towards the king. Hereof a poet of our own hath given a note, as much better as it is more general, in his Philotas.

- ' See how these great men cloath their private hate,
- ' In these fair colours of the public good ;
- ' And so to effect their ends pretend the state,
- ' As if the state by their affection stood :
- ' And armed with power and princes jealousies,
- ' Will put the least conceit of discontent
- ' Into the greatest rank of treacheries,
- ' That no one action shall seem innocent :

- ‘ Yea, valour, honour, bounty, shall be made
- ‘ As accessaries unto ends unjust ;
- ‘ And even the service of the state must lade
- ‘ The needfullest undertaking with distrust :
- ‘ So that base vileness, idle luxury,
- ‘ Seems safer far than to do worthily.’ &c.

Now, although it were so that the king, following the advice of Craterus, had resolved the next day to put Philotas to torment, yet in the very evening of the same night in which he was apprehended, he called him to a banquet, and discoursed as familiarly with him as at any other time. But when, in the dead of the night, Philotas was taken in his lodging, and that they which hated him began to bind him, he cried out upon the king in these words : O Alexander, the malice of mine enemies hath surmounted thy mercy, and their hatred is far more constant than the word of a king. Many circumstances were urged against him by Alexander himself, (for the kings of Macedon did in person examine the accusations of treason,) and this was not the least, (not the least offence, indeed, against the king’s humour, who desired to be glorified as a god ;) That when Alexander wrote unto him concerning the title given him by Jupiter Ammon, he answered, ‘ that he could not but rejoice that he was admitted into that sacred fellowship of the gods, and yet he could not but withal grieve for those that should live under such a one as would exceed the nature of man.’ This was (saith Alexander,) a firm persuasion unto me, that his heart was changed, and that he held my glory in despight. See what a strange monster flattery is, that can persuade kings to kill those that do not praise, and allow those things in them which are, of all others, most to be abhorred ! Philotas was brought before the multitude to hear the king’s oration against him ; he was brought forth in vile garments, and bound like a thief ; where he heard himself, and his absent

father, the greatest captain of the world, accused ; his two other brothers, Hector and Nicanor, having been lost in the present war. He was so greatly oppressed with grief, that, for a while, he could utter nothing but tears ; and sorrow had so wasted his spirits that he sunk under those that led him. In the end, the king asked him in what language he would make his defence ; he answered, in the same wherein it had pleased the king to accuse him, which he did, to the end that the Persians, as well as the Macedonians, might understand him. But hereof the king made his advantage, persuading the assembly, that he disdained the language of his own country, and so withdrawing himself, left him to his merciless enemies.

This proceeding of the king's, Philotas greatly lamented, seeing the king, who had so sharply inveighed against him, would not vouchsafe to hear his excuse. For not his enemies only were emboldened thereby against him, but all the rest having discovered the king's disposition and resolution, contended among themselves which of them should exceed in hatred towards him. Among many other arguments which he used in his own defence, this was not the weakest, That when Nicomachus desired to know of Dimnus what men of mark and power were his partners in the conspiracy, (as seeming unwilling to adventure himself with mean and base companions,) Dimnus named unto him Demetrius of the king's chamber, Nicanor, Amyntas, and some others, but spake not a word of Philotas, who, by being commander of the horse, would greatly have valued the party, and have encouraged Nicomachus. Indeed, as Philotas said well for himself, it is likely that Dimnus, thereby the better to have heartened Nicomachus, would have named him, though he had never dealt with him in any such practice. And, for more certain proof that he knew nothing of their intents that practised against the king, there was

not any one of the conspirators, being many, enforced by torments, or otherwise, that could accuse him; and it is true, that adversity, being seldom able to bear her own burden, is, for the most part, found so malicious, that she rather desires to draw others, (not always deserving it,) into the same danger, than to spare any that it can accuse. Yet at the last, howsoever it were, to avoid the extremity of resistless and unnatural torments, devised by his professed enemies, Craterus, Cenus, Hephæstion, and others, Philotas accused his own self; being persuaded that they would have slain him forthwith. But he failed even in that miserable hope; and suffering all that could be laid upon flesh and blood, he was forced to deliver, not what he knew, but whatsoever best pleased their ears, that were far more merciless than death itself.

Of this kind of judicial proceeding St. Augustine greatly complaineth, as a matter to be bewailed, saith he, with fountains of tears. ‘ Quid cum in sua
 ‘ causa quisque torquetur; et cum quæritur utrum
 ‘ sit nocens cruciatur; et innocens luit pro incerto
 ‘ scelere certissimas pœnas; non quia illud commi-
 ‘ sisse detegitur, sed quia non commisisse nescitur:’
 What shall we say to it, when one is put to torture in his own case; and tormented, whilst yet it is in question whether he be guilty; and being innocent, suffers assured punishment for a fault of which there is no certainty, not because he is known to have committed the offence, but because others do not know that he hath not committed it?

It had been enough for Alexander’s safety, if Philotas had been put to death without torment; the rest would not much have grieved thereat, because he was greatly suspected. But Hemolaus, who afterwards conspired against him, made the king’s cruelty and delight in blood the greatest motive of his own ill intent. Therefore Seneca², speaking of A-

¹ Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 19. c. 6.

² Sen. de Clem. l. 1.

Alexander, saith thus, ‘ *Crudelitas minime humanum malum est, indignum tam miti animo; ferina ista rabies est, sanguine gaudere et vulneribus, et abjec- to homine, in silvestre animal transire:*’ Cruelty is not a human vice; it is unworthy of so mild a spirit. It is even a beastly rage to delight in blood and wounds, and casting away the nature of man, to become a savage monster.

For the conclusion of this tragedy, Curtius makes a doubt, whether the confession that Philotas made, were to give end to the torments which he could no longer endure, or that the same was true indeed; for, (saith he,) in this case, they that speak truly, or they that deny falsely, come to one and the same end. Now while the king’s hands were yet in blood, he commanded that Lyncestes, son-in-law to Antipater, who had been three years in prison, should be slain. The same dispatch had all those that Nicomachus had accused. Others there were that were suspected, because they had followed Philotas; but when they had answered for themselves, ‘ that they knew no way so direct to win the king’s favour, as by loving those whom the king favoured,’ they were dismissed. But Parmenio was yet living; Parmenio, who had served, with great fidelity, as well Philip of Macedon, the king’s father, as himself; Parmenio, that first opened the way into Asia; that had depressed Attalus the king’s enemy; that had always, and in all hazards, the leading of the king’s vanguard; that was no less prudent in counsel, than fortunate in all attempts; a man beloved of the men of war; and, to say the truth, he that had made the purchase for the king of the empire of the east, and of all the glory and fame he had: That he might not therefore revenge the death of his son, though not upon the king, (for it was unlikely that he would have dishonoured his fidelity in his eldest age, having now lived threescore and ten years,) yet upon those, that, by the witchcraft of flattery, had possessed themselves

of his affection, it was resolved that he should be dispatched. Polydamas was employed in this business; a man, whom, of all others, Parmenio trusted most, and loved best; who, (to be short,) finding him in Media, and having Cleander and other murderers with him, slew him walking in his garden, whilst he was reading the king's letters. 'Hic exitus Parmenionis fuit, militiæ domique clari viri³; multa sine rege prospere, rex sine illo nihil magnæ rei gesserat:' This was the end of Parmenio, (saith Curtius,) who had performed many notable things without the king; but the king, without him, did never effect any thing worthy of praise.

SECT. XVIII.

How Alexander subdued the Bactrians, Sogdians, and other people. How Bessus was delivered into his hands. How he fought with the Scythians.

WHEN these things had an end, Alexander went on with his army, and brought under his obedience the Arasprians, or Evergitans; he made Amenides, (sometime Darius's secretary,) their governor; then he subdued the Arachosians, and left Menon to command over them. Here the army, sometime led by Parmenio, finds him, consisting of twelve thousand Macedons and Greeks, with whom he passed through some cold regions with difficulty enough. At length he came to the foot of the mountain Taurus, towards the east, where he built a city, which he honoured with his own name, and peopled it with seven thousand of his old Macedons, worn with age and with travels of the war. The Arians, who, since he left them, were revolted, he subdued again, by the industry and valour of Caranus and Erigius; and now he resolves to find out the new king Bessus in Bactria. Bessus, hearing of his coming, prepares to pass over the great river of Oxus, which divides

Bactria from Sogdiana; Artabazus is made governor of Bactria, abandoned by Bessus; the Macedonian army suffereth for want of water, insomuch as, when they came to the river of Oxus, there died more of them by drinking inordinately, than Alexander had lost in any one battle against the Persians. And it may well be; for (as Clytus did afterwards object unto him,) he fought against women, not against men, and not against their persons but their shadows. He found on the banks of this great river no manner of timber, or other materials, to make either boats, bridges, or raft; but was forced to sew together the hides that covered his carriages, and stuff them with straw, and on them in six days to pass over his army; which Bessus might easily have distressed, if he had dared but to behold the Macedonian army afar off. He had formerly complained against Darius, for neglecting to defend the banks of Tigris, and other passages; and yet now, when this traitorous slave had stiled himself king, he durst not perform any thing worthy of a slave. And therefore those who were nearest unto him, and whom he most trusted, viz. Spitamenes, Dataphernes, Catanes, and others, the commanders of his army, moved both by the care of their own safety, and by the memory of Bessus's treason and cruelty against Darius, bound him in the like manner that he had done his master; but with this difference, that he had the chain closed about his neck like a mastiff dog, and so was dragged along to be presented to his enemy.

In the meanwhile, Alexander was arrived at a certain town inhabited with Greeks of Miletum, brought thither by Xerxes, when long before he returned out of Greece, whose issues had well near forgotten their country language. These most cruelly, (after they had received him with great joy,) he put to the sword, and destroyed their city. At this place he received Bessus, and, having rewarded Spi-

tamenēs, with the rest that delivered him, he gave the traitor into the hands of Oxatres, Darius's brother, to be tormented.

But while he now thought himself secure, some twenty thousand mountaineers assaulted his camp; in repelling whom, he received a shot in the leg, the arrow-head sticking in the flesh; so that he was carried in a horse-litter, sometimes by the horsemen, sometimes by the foot.

Soon after he came unto Maracanda, which Petrus Perondinus takes to be Samarcand, the regal city of the great Tamerlane. It had in compass threescore and ten furlongs, (Curtius saith.) Here he received the ambassadors of the Scythians, (called Avians,) who offered to serve him.

The Bactrians are shortly again, with the Sogdians, stirred to rebellion by the same Spitamenēs and Catanes, who had lately delivered into his hands the traitor Bessus. Many cities were resolvedly defended against him; all which, after victory, he defaced and razed, killing all therein. At one of these he received a blow on the neck, which struck him to the ground, and much disabled him for many days after. In the mean while, Spitamenēs had recovered Maracanda, against whom he employed Menedemus, with three thousand foot and eight hundred horse.

In the heat of these tumults, Alexander marched on, (if we may believe Curtius and others,) till he came to the river of Tanais; upon whose bank he built another Alexandria, threescore furlongs in compass, which he beautified with houses within seventeen days after the walls were built. The building of this city is said to have been the occasion of a war between him and the Scythians; the Scythian king persuading himself, that this new town was fortified on purpose to keep him under. I do not well understand why the Scythians, offering war in such terrible manner, that Alexander was judged by his

own soldiers to counterfeit sickness for very fear, should nevertheless make suit for peace: neither find I the reason why Alexander, (not intending the conquest of those northern deserts, but only the defence of his own bank,) should refuse to let them alone, with whom he could not meddle further than they should agree to suffer him. Yet hereof is made a great matter, and a victory described; in pursuit of which, the Macedonians ran beyond the bounds and monuments of Bacchus's expedition.

The truth is, that Curtius and Trogus have greatly mistaken this river, which they call Tanais; for it was the river of Iaxartes, that runs between Sogdiana and Scythia, which Alexander passed over, while Menedemus was employed in the recovery of Samarcand; but Tanais, which divides Asia from Europe, is near two thousand miles distant from any part of Bactria or Sogdiana, and the way desert and unknown. So that Alexander had, (besides Iaxartes,) the great river of Volga, and many others, to swim over, ere he could recover Tanais, which, (from the place where he was,) he could hardly have discovered with the army that followed him, if he had employed all the time he lived in Asia in that travel.

Wherefore it is enough to believe, that the Asiatic Scythians, making some offer to disturb the erection of this new city, which was like to give some hindrance to their excursions, were driven away by the Macedonians; and being naked of defensive arms, easily chased some ten or twelve miles, which is the substance of Curtius's report. As for the limits of Bacchus's journey, like enough it is, that Bacchus (if in his lifetime he were as sober a man as after his death he was held a drunken god,) went not very far into that waste country, where he could find nothing but trees and stones, nor other business than to set up a monument.

Threescore of the Macedonians are said to have been slain, and one thousand one hundred hurt in this fight, which might easily be, in passing a great river, defended against them by good archers. Of Scythian horses one thousand eight hundred were brought into the camp, and many prisoners. It is forbidden by some historians, and indeed it is hardly possible to set down the numbers of such as perished in battle; yet Cæsar commonly did it. And where the diligence of the victors hath been so inquisitive into the greatness of their own success, that writers have been able to deliver such particulars by credible report, I hold it not unlawful to set down what we find; especially when it serves to give light to the business in hand. The small number which the Macedonians lost, the omission of the number which they slew, (a thing not usual in Curtius, who forbears nothing that may set out the greatness of Alexander,) and the little booty that was gotten, do make it probable, that this war was no better than the repulsion of a few roving Tartars, (the like being yearly performed by the Muscovite without any boast;) and therefore better omitted by some historians, than so highly extolled as a great exploit by others.

While Alexander was assuring himself of those Scythians bordering upon Iaxartes, he received the ill news that Menedemus was slain by Spitamenes, the army by him led broken, and the greatest numbers slain, viz. two thousand foot, and three hundred horse. He therefore, to appease the rebellion, and to take revenge of Spitamenes, makes all the haste he can; but Spitamenes flies into Bactria. Alexander kills, burns, and lays waste all before him; not sparing the innocent children, and so departs, leaving a new governor in that province.

To repair this loss, he received a great supply of nineteen thousand soldiers out of Greece, Lycia, and Syria; with all which, and the old army, he returns towards the south, and passeth the river of Oxus;

on the south side whereof he built six towns near each other for mutual succour. But he finds a new start-up rebel, called Arimazes, (a Sogdian,) followed with thirty thousand soldiers, that defended against him a strong piece of ground on the top of a high hill; whom when Alexander had sought in vain to win by fair words, he made choice of three hundred young men, and promised ten talents to the first, nine to the second, and so in proportion to the rest, that could find a way to creep up to the top thereof. This they performed with the loss of some two and thirty of their men, and then made a sign to Alexander, that they had performed his commandment. Hereupon he sent one Cophes to persuade Arimazes to yield the place; who being shewed by Cophes that the army of Macedon was already mounted up, yielded simply to Alexander's mercy, and was (with all his kindred) scourged and crucified to death; which punishment they well deserved for neglecting to keep good watch in so dangerous a time. For the place, as seems by the description, might have been defended against all the armies of the world. But what strength cannot do, man's wit, being the most forcible engine, hath often effected; of which I will give you an example in a place of our own.

The island of Sarke, joining to Guernsey, and of that government, was in Queen Mary's time surprized by the French, and could never have been recovered again by force, having cattle and corn enough upon the place to feed so many men as will serve to defend it; and being every way so inaccessible, that it might be held against the great Turk. Yet, by a stratagem of a gentleman of the Netherlands, it was in this sort regained. He anchored in the road with one ship of small burden, and pretending the death of his merchant, besought the French, being some thirty in number, that they might bury their merchant in hallowed ground, and in the chapel of that

isle, offering a present to the French of such commodities as they had on board ; whereto (on condition that they should not come ashore with any weapon, no, not so much as with a knife,) the Frenchmen yielded. Then did the Flemings put a coffin into their boat, not filled with a dead carcase, but with swords, targets, and harquebusses. The French received them at their landing, and searching all of them so narrowly, that they could not hide a penknife, gave them leave to draw their coffin up the rocks with great difficulty ; some part of the French took the Flemish boat and rowed aboard their ship, to fetch the commodities promised, and what else they pleased ; but being entered, they were taken and bound. The Flemings on the land, when they had carried their coffin into the chapel, shut the door to them, and taking their weapons out of the coffin, set upon the French ; they run to the cliff, and cry to their company aboard the Flemings to come to their succour ; but finding the boat charged with Flemings, yielded themselves and the place. Thus a fox-tail doth sometimes help well to piece out the lion's skin, that else would be too short.

SECT. XIX.

How Alexander slew his own friends.

AFTER these Sogdian and Scythian wars, we read of Alexander's killing of a lion, and other frivolous matters, and that he committed the government of Maracanda, and the country about it, to Clytus ; and how he slew him soon after, for valuing the virtue of Philip the father before that of Alexander the son ; or rather, because he objected to the king the death of Parmenio, and derided the oracle of Ammon ; for therein he touched him to the quick, the same being delivered in public, and at a drunken banquet. Clytus, indeed, had deserved as much at the king's hands as any man living had done, and had, in particular,

saved his life, which the king well remembered when he came to himself, and when it was too late. Yet, to say the truth, Clytus's insolency was intolerable. As he, in his cups, forgat whom he offended; so the king in his, (for neither of them were themselves,) forgat whom he went about to slay; for the grief whereof, he tore his own face, and lamented so inordinately, that, but for the persuasions of Calisthenes, it is thought he would have slain himself.

Wine begat fury, fury matter of repentance; but preceding mischiefs are not amended by succeeding bewailings. *‘Omne vitium ebrietas et incendit, et detegit; obstantem malis conatibus verecundiam removet; ubi possedit animum nimia vis vini, quicquid mali latebat, emergit; non facit ebrietas vitia, sed protrahit.’* Drunkenness both kindles and lays open every vice; it removes out of the way that shame which gives impediment unto bad attempts; where wine gets the mastery, all the ill that before lay hidden breaks out; drunkenness, indeed, rather discovers vices than makes them.

Soon after this, Spitamenes, who slew Bessus, and had lately revolted from Alexander, was murdered by his wife, and his head presented to Alexander. Spitamenes being taken away, the Dahans also seized upon his fellow-conspirator Dataphernes, and delivered him up. So Alexander being now freed from all these petty rebels, disposed of the provinces which he passed over, and went on with his army into Gabaza, where it suffered so much hunger, cold, lightning, thunder, and storm, that he lost, in one tempest, a thousand of his train. From hence he invaded the Sacans, and destroyed their country. Then came he into the territory of Cohortanes, who submitted himself unto him, feasted him greatly, and presented him with thirty beautiful virgins, among whom Roxana, afterwards his wife, was one; which although all the Macedonians disdained, yet none of them durst use any freedom of speech after Clytus's

death. From hence he directed his course towards India, having so increased his numbers, that they amounted to an hundred and twenty thousand armed men.

In the meanwhile, he would needs be honoured as a god; whereto that he might allure the Macedonians, he employed two pernicious parasites, Hages and Cleo; whom Calisthenes opposed: For, among many other honest arguments used to the assembly, he told Cleo, that he thought that Alexander would disdain the gift of godhead from his vassals; that the opinion of sanctity, though it did sometimes follow the death of those who, in their life-time, had done the greatest things, yet it never accompanied any one as yet living in the world. He further told him, that neither Hercules nor Bacchus were deified at a banquet, and upon drink, (for this matter was propounded by Cleo at a carousing feast;) but that, for the more than manly acts by them performed while they lived, they were in future and succeeding ages numbered among the gods. Alexander stood behind a partition, and heard all that was spoken, waiting but an opportunity to be revenged on Calisthenes, who, being a man of free speech, honest, learned, and a lover of the king's honour, was yet soon after tormented to death; not for that he had betrayed the king to others, but because he would never condescend to betray the king to himself, as all his detestable flatterers did. For in a conspiracy against the king, made by one Hermolaus, and others, (which they confessed,) he caused Calisthenes, without confession, accusation, or trial, to be torn asunder upon the rack. This deed, unworthy of a king, Seneca thus censureth. ‘Hoc est Alexandri crimen æternum, quod nulla virtus, nulla bellorum felicitas redimet. Nam quoties quis dixerit, occidit Persarum multa millia; opponitur, et Calisthenem. Quoties dictum erit, occidit Darium; opponitur, et Calisthenem. Quoties dictum erit, omnia oceano tenui

‘vicit, ipsum quoque tentavit novis classibus, et imperium ex angulo Thraciæ usque ad orientes terminos protulit, dicetur, sed Calisthenem occidit. Omnia licet antiqua ducum regumque exempla transierit, ex his quæ fecit nihil tam magnum erit quam scelus Calisthenes.’ This is the eternal crime of Alexander, which no virtue nor felicity of his in war shall ever be able to redeem. For as often as any man shall say, he slew many thousand Persians, it shall be replied, he did so, and he slew Calisthenes. When it shall be said, he slew Darius; it shall be replied, and Calisthenes. When it shall be said, he won as far as to the very ocean, thereon also he adventured with unusual navies, and extended his empire from a corner of Thrace to the utmost bounds or the orient, it shall be said withal, but he killed Calisthenes. Let him have outgone all the ancient examples of captains and kings, none of all his acts makes so much to his glory, as Calisthenes to his reproach.

SECT. XX.

Of Alexander's journey into India. The battle between him and Porus.

WITH the army before remembered, of one hundred and twenty thousand foot and horse, Alexander did enter the borders of India, where such of the princes as submitted themselves unto him he entertained lovingly, the rest he constrained, killing man, woman, and child, where they resisted. He then came before Nisa, built by Bacchus, which, after a few days, was rendered unto him. From thence he removed to a hill at hand, which on the top had goodly gardens, filled with delicate fruits and vines, dedicated to Bacchus, to whom he made feasts for ten days together. Now, when he had drunk his fill, he went on towards Dedala, and from thence to Acadera, countries spoiled and abandoned by the in-

habitants; by reason whereof, victuals failing, he divides his army; Ptolemy led one part, Cenon another, and himself the rest. They take many towns, whereof that of greatest fame was Massaga, which had in it three hundred thousand men; but, after some resistance, it was yielded unto him by Cleophes the queen, to whom again he restored it. At the siege of this city he received a wound in the leg. After this, Nora was taken by Polysperchon, and a rock of great strength by himself: he won also a passage upon one Eryx, who was slain by his company, and his head presented to Alexander. This is the sum of Alexander's doings in those parts, before such time as he arrived at the river Indus. Coming to Indus, he found there Hephæstion, who (being sent before) had prepared boats for the transportation of his army, and, ere Alexander's arrival, had persuaded Omphis, king of that part of the country, to submit himself to this great conqueror. Therefore, soon upon Alexander's coming, Omphis presented himself with all the strength of his country, and six and fifty elephants, unto him, offering him his service and assistance. He made Alexander know that he was an enemy to the next two great kings of that part of India, named Abisares and Porus; wherewith Alexander was not a little pleased, hoping, by this disunion, to make his own victory by far the more easy. He presented Alexander with a crown of gold, so did he the rest of his commanders, and withal fourscore talents of silver coin; which Alexander not only refused, but, to shew that he was covetous of glory, not of gold, he gave Omphis a thousand talents of his own treasure, besides other Persian rarities. Abisares having heard that Alexander had received his enemy, Omphis, into his protection, resolved to make his own peace also; for, knowing that his own strength did but equal that of Omphis, and that there was no other difference between them than that which the

chance of war gave, he thought it an ill match when Alexander, who had already beaten under foot all the greatest princes of Asia, should make himself a party and head of the quarrel. So had Alexander none now to stand in his way but Porus, to whom he sent a commandment, that he should attend him at the border of his kingdom, there to do him homage. But from Porus he received this manly answer, that he would satisfy him in his first demand, which was to attend him on his borders, and that well accompanied; but, for any other acknowledgement, he was resolved to take counsel of his sword. To be short, Alexander resolves to pass over the river Hydaspes, and to find Porus at his own home. Porus attends him on the farther bank with thirty thousand foot, fourscore and ten elephants, three hundred armed chariots, and a great troop of horse. If Darius had done the like on Tigris, Alexander had surely staid somewhat longer ere he had seen India. The river was four furlongs broad, which makes half a mile, and withal deep and swift. It had in it many islands, among which there was one well shadowed with wood, and of good capacity. Alexander sent Ptolemy up the river with a great part of the army, shrouding the rest from the view of Porus, who, by this device, being drawn from his first encamping, sets himself down opposite to Ptolemy, supposing that the whole army of Macedon meant to force their passage there. In the meanwhile, Alexander recovers the farther shore without resistance. He orders his troops, and advanceth towards Porus, who at first rather believes that Abisares, his confederate, (but now the confederate of fortune,) had been come over Hydaspes to his aid than that Alexander had passed it. But he finds it otherwise, and sends his brother Hagis, with four thousand horse, and a hundred armed waggons, to entertain him. Each waggon had in it four to fight, and two to guide it; but they were at this time of

little use ; for there had fallen so much rain, and thereby the fields were so moistened, as the horses could hardly trot. The Scythians and Dahans had the vanguard, who so galled these Indians, as they broke their reins and other furniture, overturning the waggons and those in them. Perdiccas also gave up the Indian horsemen, and the one and the other were forced to recoil. Porus moves forward with the gross of his army, that those of his vanguard scattered might recover his rear. Alexander, being followed with Hephæstion, Ptolemy, and Perdiccas, took on him to charge the Indian horsemen on the left wing, commanding Cenus, or Cenon, to invade the right ; Antigonus and Leonatus he directed to break upon Porus's battle of foot, strengthened with elephants, Porus himself being carried upon one of them of the greatest stature. By these beasts the Macedonian foot were most offended ; but the archers and darters, being well guarded with the long and strong pikes of the Macedonians, so galled them, as, being enraged, they turned head, and ran over the foot that followed them. In the end, and after a long and doubtful fight, by the advantage of weapon, and by the courage and skilfulness of the Macedonian captains, the victory fell to Alexander, who also far exceeded Porus in number ; for, beside the Macedonians, and other eastern and northern nations, Porus was assailed by his own confederate and country people. Yet, for his own person, he never gave ground, otherwise than with his sword towards his enemies, till, being weakened with many wounds, and abandoned by his army, he became a prisoner to the conqueror, from whom again he received his estate with a great enlargement.

SECT. XXI.

How Alexander finished his expedition, and returned out of India.

I FORBEAR to trouble myself and others with a frivolous discourse of serpents, apes, and peacocks, which the Macedonians found in these their travels; or of those petty wars which Alexander made between the overthrow of Porus and his sailing down the river of Indus. The descriptions of places about the head and branches thereof, are better known unto us in this age, by means of our late navigations into those parts, than they were in any former times. The magnificence and riches of those kings we could in no sort be persuaded to believe, till our own experience had taught us, that there were many stranger things in the world than are to be seen between London and Stanes.

Our great traveller Mandeville, who died in the year 1372, and had seen so much of the world, and of the East Indies, we account the greatest fabler of the world; yet had he another reputation among other nations, as well able to judge as we. Witness the monument made of him in the convent of the friars Guillimius in Liege¹, where the religious of that place keep some things of his, ‘Comme pour honorable memoire de son excellence;’ for an honourable memory of his excellency, saith Guicchar-din.

The countries towards the springs of Indus, and where those many rivers of Hydaspes, Zaradris, Acesines, and the rest, fall into the main stream, are now possessed by the great Mogol, the ninth from Tamerlane, who commands all that tract between Persia and Indus towards the west, as also a great extent of country towards Ganges. In the mouth of Indus, the Ascension, a ship of London, suffered

¹ Guic. in Dis. of the Low Countries.

shipwreck in the year 1609, and some of the company travelled overland till they came to Agra, the same great city, (as I take it,) which our later cosmographers call Nagra, being named of old Dionysopolis.

Philostratus, in the life of Apollonius Tyanæus, speaking of the expedition of Bacchus and Hercules into the East Indies, tells us, that those two great captains, (whom Alexander sought by all means to outfame,) when they endeavoured to subject unto them the Oxydracæ, a people inhabiting between the rivers of Hyphasis and Ganges, they were beaten from the assault of their cities with thunder and lightnings. This may well be understood by the great ordnance that those people had then in use. For it is now certainly known, that the great kings of the uttermost east, have had the use of the cannon many hundreds of years since, and even since their first civility and greatness, which was long before Alexander's time. But Alexander pierced not so far into the east. It sufficed, that having already overwearied his army, he discovered the rest of India by fame. The Indian kings whom he had subdued, informed him, that a prince called Agramenes, who commanded many nations beyond the river of Ganges, was the powerfullest king of all those regions, and that he was able to bring into the field two hundred thousand foot, three thousand elephants, twenty thousand horse, and two thousand armed chariots. With this report, though Alexander were more inflamed than ever to proceed in this discovery and conquest, yet all the art he had could not persuade the soldiers to wander over those great deserts beyond Indus and Ganges, more terrible unto them than the greatest army that the east could gather. Yet at the last contented they were, after many persuasive orations, to follow him towards the south, to discover such part of the ocean sea as was nearer at hand; whereunto the river of Indus was

their infallible guide. Alexander, seeing that it would be no otherwise, devised a pretty trick, where-with he hoped to beguile posterity, and make himself seem greater than he was. He enlarged his camp, made greater trenches, greater cabins for the soldiers, greater horse-stalls, and higher mangers than his horses could feed in. He caused all furniture of men and horses to be made larger than would serve for use; and scattered these armours and bridles about his camp, to be kept as reliques, and wondered at by the savages. Proportionable to these, he raised up twelve great altars to be the monument of his journey's end. This was a ready way to increase the fame of his bigness; to his greatness it could add nothing, save a suspicion that it was less than is thought, seeing he strove so earnestly to make it thought more than it was.

This done, he returned again to the bank of Acesines, and there determined to set up his fleet where Acesines and Hydaspis encounter, where, to testify by a surer monument how far he had passed towards the east, he built by those rivers two cities; the one he called Nicæa, and the other Bucephalon, after the name of his beloved horse Bucephalus. Here again he received a fourth supply of six thousand Thracian horsemen, seven thousand foot; and from his lieutenant at Babylon five and twenty thousand armours, garnished with silver and gold, which he distributed amongst his soldiers. About these rivers he won many towns, and committed great slaughter on those that resisted. It is then written of him, that assaulting a city of the Oxydracæ, he leapt from the top of the wall into it, and fought, I know not how long, against all the inhabitants; tales like those of Bevis of Southampton, frivolous and incredible. Finally, he past down the river with his fleet, at which time also the news came unto him of a rebellion in Bactria, and then of the arrival of an hundred ambassadors from a king of India, who sub-

mitted himself unto him. He feasted these ambassadors upon a hundred beds of gold, with all the sumptuosity that could be devised; who soon after their dispatch returned again with a present of three hundred horse, one hundred and thirty waggons, and to each four horses, a thousand targets, with many other things rare and rich.

Their entertainments ended, he sailed towards the south, passed through many obscure nations, which did all yield unto him, either quietly, or compelled by force: Among these he built another Alexandria. Of many places which he took in this passage, Samus was one, the inhabitants whereof fought against him with poisoned swords, with one of which Ptolemy, (afterwards king of Egypt,) was wounded, and cured by an herb, which Alexander dreamed that he had seen in the mouth of a serpent.

When he came near the outlet of Indus, (being ignorant of the tides of the sea,) his gallies, as they were on a sudden shuffled one upon another by the flood, so on the ebb they were left on the dry ground and on the sandy banks of the river, wherewith the the Macedonians were much amazed; but after he had a few days observed well the course of the sea, he passed out of the river's mouth some few miles, and, after sacrifices offered to Neptune, returned; and, the better to inform himself, he sent Nearchus and Onesicritus to discover the coast towards the mouth of Euphrates. Arrianus, in the beginning of his sixth book, hath written this passage down the river Indus at length, with the manner of the vessels in which he transported his army, the commanders that were used therein, and other the marvellous provisions made.

Near the outlets of this river he spent some part of the winter, and in eighteen days march from thence recovered Gedrosia, in which passage his army suffered such misery for want of food, that of a hundred and twenty thousand foot, and twelve thousand

horse, which he carried into India, not the fourth part returned alive.

SECT. XXII.

Of Alexander's riot, cruelty, and death.

FROM Gedrosia Alexander led his army into Carmania, and so, drawing near to Persia, he gave himself wholly to feasting and drinking, imitating the triumphs of Bacchus. And though this swinish vice be hateful enough in itself, yet it always inflamed this king to cruelty. ' For (saith Curtius) the hangman followed the feast; for Aspastes, one of his provincial governors, he commanded to be slain; so as neither did the excess of voluptuousness qualify his cruelty, nor his cruelty hinder in ought his voluptuousness.'

While he refreshed his army in these parts, a new supply of five thousand foot, and a thousand horse, was brought him by Cleander and his fellows, that had been employed in the killing of Parmenio. Against these murderers great complaint was made by the deputies of the provinces in which they had commanded; and their offences were so outrageous, as Alexander was persuaded, that, had they not altogether despaired of his return out of India, they durst not have committed them. All men were glad of the occasion, remembering the virtue of him whom they had slaughtered. The end was, that Cleander and the other chiefs, with six hundred soldiers by them employed, were delivered over to the hangman; every one rejoicing that the ire of the king was at last executed on the ministers of his ire.

Nearchus and Onesicritus were now returned from the coast, and made report of an island rich in gold, and of other strange things; whereupon they were commanded to make some farther discovery; which done, that they should enter the mouth of Euphrates, and find the king at Babylon.

As he drew near to Babylon, he visited the sepulchre of Cyrus in Pasargada, now called Chelquera¹; where he was presented with many rich gifts by Orsines, one of the princes of Persia, of the race of Cyrus. But because Bagoas, an eunuch, in especial favour with the king, was neglected, he not only practised certain loose fellows to witness against Orsines, that he had robbed Cyrus's tomb, for which he was condemned to die; but he assisted the hangman with his own hands in tormenting him. At which time also Alexander caused Phradites to be slain, suspecting his greatness. 'Cœperat, (saith Curtius) 'esse præceps ad representanda supplicia, item ad 'deteriora credenda:' he began headlongly to shed blood, and to believe false reports. It is true, that he took a way to make all men weary of his government, seeing cruelty is more fearful than all the adventures that can be made against it.

At this time it is said that Calanus the philosopher burnt himself, when he had lived threescore and thirteen years. Whether herein he followed the custom of his country, being an Indian, or sought to prevent the grief and incommmodity of elder age, it is uncertain; but in this the historians agree, that foreseeing and foreshewing Alexander's death, he promised to meet him shortly after at Babylon.

From Pasargada he came to Susa, where he married Statira, Darius's eldest daughter, giving her youngest sister to his beloved Hephæstion, and fourscore other Persian ladies to his captains. There were six thousand guests invited to the feast, to each of which he gave a cup of gold. Here there came unto him three thousand young soldiers out of his conquered provinces, whereat the Macedonians greatly murmured. Harpalus, his treasurer in Babylon, having lavishly consumed the monies in his keeping, got him going with five thousand talents, and six thousand hired soldiers; but he was rejected

¹ Arrianus hath a far different description of Cyrus's tomb.

in Greece, and there slain. Alexander greatly rejoiced at the fidelity of the Greeks, whom Harpalus, with these forces and treasures, could not stir: yet he sent commandment that they should again receive their banished men; whereunto (fearful of his indignation) all submitted themselves, (except the Athenians,) though they resolved that it was a manifest preparation towards their bondage. After this there followed a marvellous discontentment in his army, because he had resolved to send into Macedon all those old soldiers which could no longer endure the travel of war, and to keep the rest in Asia. He used many orations to satisfy them, but it was in vain during the tempest of their fury. But afterwards, as whales are drawn to the land with a twine-thread, when they have tumbled a while, so are the inconsiderate multitude easily conducted when their first passions are evaporated. With such as were licensed to depart he sent Craterus, to whom he gave the lieutenantship of Macedon, Thessaly, and Thrace, which Antipater had held from his first departure out of Europe, who had beaten the rebellious Greeks in his absence, discharged the trust committed to him with great fidelity, and sent him so many strong supplies into Asia from time to time. Certainly, if Alexander had not taken counsel of his cups, he would have cast some better colour on this alteration, and given Antipater a stronger reason for his remove, than to have employed him in the conduction of a new supply to be brought him to Babylon, the war being now at an end; for Antipater saw nothing in this remove but the king's disposition to send him after Parmenio and the rest. With this Antipater, the king, notwithstanding his great courage, had no great appetite to grapple; princes, though jealous, do not stand in doubt of every man ill-affected, though valiant; but there is a kind of kingly courage, compounded of hardiness and understanding, which is many times so fearful unto

them, as they take leave both of law and religion to free themselves thereof.

After he had sent for Antipater, he made a journey into Media to settle things there; where Hephæstion, whom he favoured most of all men, dies. The king, according to the greatness of his love, laments his loss, hangs his physician, and bestows upon his monument twelve thousand talents; after which he returns to Babylon. Thither Antipater came not, but sent; and not to excuse himself, but to free himself. For, if we believe Curtius, (whom Plutarch and others gainsay,) Antipater, by his sons, Cassander, Philip, and Iolas, who waited on Alexander's cup, gave him poison, Thessalus (who was of the conspiracy) having invited him to a drinking feast of purpose; for, after he had taken a carouse in Hercules's cup, a draught of drink stronger than Hercules himself, he quitted the world within a few days.

Certainly the princes of the world have seldom found good by making their ministers over-great, and thereby suspicious to themselves; for he that doth not acknowledge fidelity to be a debt, but is persuaded that kings ought to purchase it from their vassals, will never please himself with the price given. The only restorative, indeed, that strengthens it, is the goodness and virtue of the prince; and his liberality makes it more diligent, so as proportion and distance be observed. It may be, that Antipater, having commanded two or three kingdoms ten or twelve years, knew not how to play any other part; no more than Cæsar did, after he had so long a time governed the Gauls, where he utterly forgot the art of obedience. A most cruel and ungrateful traitor Antipater was, if Curtius do not belie him; for, though he feared some ill measure upon his remove, (the tragedies of Parmenio, Clytus, and Calisthenes, having been so lately acted,) yet he knew nothing to the contrary, but that the king had re-

solved to have given him some other great government in Asia; the old soldiers thence returned, having perchance desired to be governed by Craterus, whom they had followed in all the former war.

SECT. XXIII.

Of Alexander's person and qualities.

HOWSOEVER it were, Alexander's former cruelties cannot be excused, no more than his vanity to be esteemed the son of Jupiter, with his excessive delight in drink and drunkenness, which others make the cause of his fever and death. In that he lamented his want of enterprizing, and grieved to consider what he should do when he had conquered the world, Augustus Cæsar found just cause to deride him, as if the well-governing of so many nations and kingdoms, as he had already conquered, could not have offered him matter more than abundant to busy his brains withal. That he was both learned and a lover of learning, it cannot be doubted. Sir Francis Bacon, in his first book of the *Advancement of Learning*, hath proved it sufficiently. His liberality I know not how to praise, because it exceeded proportion. It is said, that when he gave a whole city to one of his servants, he, to whom it was given, did, out of modesty, refuse it, as disproportionable to his fortune; to whom Alexander replied, That he did not inquire what became him to accept, but the king to give: of which Seneca, 'Animosa vox videtur et regia, cum sit stultissima. Nihil per se quenquam decet. Refert quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi, &c. sine quibus facti ratio non constabit. Habeatur personarum et dignitatum proportio; et cum sit ubique virtutis modus, æque peccat quod excedit, quàm quod deficit.' It seems a brave and royal speech, whereas indeed it is very foolish; for nothing, simply considered by itself, becomes a man.

1 L. ii. de Ben. c. 1.

We must regard what, to whom, when, why, where, and the like; without which considerations no act can be approved. Let honours be proportioned unto the persons; for whereas virtue is ever limited by measure, the excess is as faulty as the defect.

For his person, it is very apparent that he was as valiant as any man,—a disposition, taken by itself, not much to be admired; for I am confident that he had ten thousand in his army as daring as himself. Surely, if adventurous natures were to be commended simply, we should confound that virtue with the hardness of thieves, ruffians, and mastiff dogs; for certainly it is noways praise-worthy but in doing good things, and in the performance of those lawful enterprizes in which we are employed for the service of our kings and commonweals.

If we compare this great conqueror with other troublers of the world, who have bought their glory with so great destruction and effusion of blood, I think him far inferior to Cæsar and many others that lived after him; seeing he never undertook any war-like nation, the naked Scythians excepted; nor was ever encountered with any army of which he had not a most mastering advantage, both of weapons and of commanders, every one of his father's old captains by far exceeding the best of his enemies. But it seemeth fortune and destiny (if we may use those terms) had found out and prepared for him, without any care of his own, both heaps of men that willingly offered their necks to the yoke, and kingdoms that invited and called in their own conquerors. For conclusion, we will agree with Seneca, who, speaking of Philip the father, and Alexander the son, gives this judgment of them: 'Quod non minores fuere pestes mortalium quàm inundatio, qua planum omne perfusum est;—quàm conflagratio qua magna pars animantium exaruit': they were no less plagues to mankind, than an over-

flow of waters drowning all the level; or some burning drought, whereby a great part of living creatures is scorched up.

CHAP. III.

THE REIGN OF ARIDÆUS.

SECT. I.

Of the question about succession to Alexander.

THE death of Alexander left his army (as Demades, the Athenian, then compared it) in such case as was that monstrous giant Polyphemus, having lost his only eye; for that which is reported in the fables of that great Cyclops might be well verified of the Macedonians; their force was intolerable, but, for want of good guidance, ineffectual, and harmful chiefly to themselves. The causes whereof (under the divine ordinance) were, partly the uncertainty of title to succession in the kingdom of Macedon, partly the stubborn pride of Alexander himself, who, thinking none worthy to be his heir, did refuse to establish the right in any one, leaving every one to his own fortune; but especially the great ambition of his own followers, who all had learned of their master to suffer no equals; a lesson soon taught unto spirits reflecting upon their own worth, when the reverence of a greater object faileth.

It hath formerly been shewed, that Philip, the father of Alexander, governing in Macedon as protector, assumed unto himself the kingdom, not rendering it unto Amyntas, (the son of his elder brother Perdiccas,) when he grew to man's estate; but only bestowing upon him in marriage a daughter of his own; by which bond, and much more by his own proper strength, he assured the crown unto himself, Amyntas never attempting aught against Philip, though, (with price of his life,) he did against Alexander in the beginning of his reign. Wherefore Eurydice, the sole issue of his marriage, ought in reason to have been acknowledged queen after Alexander, as having better title thereto than either he or Philip had when they lived; unless, peradventure, some law of that nation forbade the reign of women. But the excellent virtue of these two princes had utterly defaced the right of all pretenders, not claiming from their own bodies; and so great were their conquests, that Macedon itself was, (in regard of them,) a very small appendix, and no way deserving to be laid in balance against the demand of their posterity, had they left any able to make challenge of the royal seat.

Alexander, having taken many wives, had issue by none of the principal of them. Barsine, the daughter of Artabazus, a Persian, had born unto him a young son; and Roxana, the daughter of Oxyartes, (whom he had more solemnly married,) was left by him great with child. But the baseness of the mothers, and contempt of the conquered nations, was generally alleged in bar of the plea made for them, by some that would perhaps have wrought out their own ends under the name of Alexander's children.

Cleopatra, a sister of Alexander, widow to the king of Epirus, and Aridæus's base brother, (son to Philip, by a concubine of no account,) who had married the lady Eurydice before-mentioned, were next in course. Of Cleopatra there was no speech, which

may give suspicion that either law or custom had made that sex incapable of the sovereignty. Aridæus, (besides his bastardy,) was neither for person or quality fit to rule as king, yet upon him the election fell, but slowly, and, (as happeneth often,) for lack of a better; when the counsellors having over-laboured their disagreeing wits in devising what was best, were content, for very weariness, to take what came next to hand.

Ptolemy, (soon after king of Egypt,) concurring with them who rejected all mention of the half-*Per*sian brood, king Alexander's children, was of opinion that the rule of all should be given to the captains; that going for law which by the greater part of them should be decreed: so far was he from acknowledging any one as true heir to the crown.

This Ptolemy was called the son of *Lagus*, but reputed of *Philip*, who having used the company of *Arsinoë*, Ptolemy's mother, delivered her in marriage to *Lagus*, being great with child. Therefore, whether it were so that he hoped well to work his own fortune out of those dissensions, which are incident unto the consultations of many ambitious men, equal in place, forcing them at length to redeem their quiet with subjection to one, deserving regard by his blood, and trust for his even carriage; or whether he desired only to get a share to himself, which could not have come to pass had all been given to one,—plain enough it is, that he thought not on preferring *Aridæus* before himself; and therefore gave such counsel as fitted his own and other men's purposes. Yea, this device of his took place, indeed, though not in form as he had propounded it; for it was in effect all one to have assembled at Alexander's empty chair, as Ptolemy had conceived the form of their consultations, or to set in the chair such a king as *Aridæus*, no wiser than the chair itself. Also the controversies arising were determined by

the greater part of the captains; by the greater part, if not in number, yet in puissance.

But as these counterfeit shews of dissembling aspirers, do often take check by the plain dealing of them who dare to go more directly to work; so was it like to have fared with Ptolemy and the rest, when Aristonus, another of the captains, interpreted the very words of Alexander, saying, 'that he left his kingdom to the worthiest,' as designing Perdiccas, to whom, (lying at the point of death,) he delivered his ring. It seemeth good in reason, that Alexander should be disposer of his own purchases; and those tokens of Alexander's purpose appeared plain enough, so long as no man would interpose another's construction, every one being uncertain how the secret affections of the rest might be inclined. Many, therefore, either out of their love, or because they would not be of the latest, urged Perdiccas to take upon him the estate royal. He was no stranger to the royal blood; yet his birth gave him no such reputation as the great favour of his dead king, with whom he had been very inward, and that especially since the death of Hephæstion, (a powerful minion,) into whose place he was chosen. For his own worth he might well be commended as a good man of war, and one that had given much proof of his private valour. But very surly he was; which quality, (joined with good fortune,) carried a shew of majesty; being checked with misadventure it was called by a true name Pride, and rewarded with death.

In the present business, a foolish overweening did him as great harm as it had been great happiness to have succeeded Alexander. For not content to have the acclamation of the soldiers approving the sentence of Aristonus, he would needs counterfeit modesty, thinking that every one of the princes would have entreated him to take the weighty burden of an empire, which would be the less envious the more solemnity he used in the acceptance. It is tru-

ly said, he that feigneth himself a sheep may chance to be eaten by a wolf. Meleager, (a man by nature envious, and bearing a particular hatred to Perdiccas,) took advantage of his irresolute behaviour, and very bitterly inveighed against him. In conclusion he pronounced, that whosoever was heir to the crown, the soldiers ought to be heirs to the treasure; and therefore he invited them, who were nothing slow, to share it. This disturbed all the consultation. The captains were left alone, far enough from agreeing, and not able to have brought any conclusion to good effect without consent of the soldiers, who, greedy of spoil, thronged about Meleager.

SECT. II.

The election of Aridæus, with the troubles thereabout arising. The first division of the empire.

DURING this uproar, mention was made of Aridæus by some one, and entertained with good liking of many, until at last it grew to the voice of the army. Meleager, having withdrawn himself tumultuously from the company of the lords, was glad of so fair an occasion to make himself great; therefore he produced Aridæus, commended him to the soldiers, who called him by his father's name Philip, and brought him into the palace, investing him in Alexander's robes, and proclaiming him king. Many of the nobles withstood this election, but in vain; for they could not resolve what course to follow, rejecting this. Only Python, a hot-headed man, took upon him to proclaim the son of Alexander by Roxana, according to the counsel which Perdiccas at first had given, appointing Perdiccas and Leonatus his protectors; but this child was not yet born, which made that attempt of Python vain. Finally, Perdiccas, with six hundred men, and Ptolemy, with the king's pages, took upon them to defend the place where Alexander's body lay; but the army, conducted

by Meleager, who carried the new king about whether he listed, easily broke in upon them, and enforced them to accept Aridæus for their sovereign lord. Then, by the intercession of the ancient captains, a reconciliation was propounded and admitted, but on neither side faithfully meant.

Leonatus, who was of royal blood, a goodly gentleman, and valiant, issued out of Babylon, being followed by all the horse, which consisted, for the most part, of the nobility. Perdiccas abode in the city, (but standing upon his guard,) that he might be ready to take the opportunity of any commotion that should happen among the infantry. The king (who was governed by Meleager) commanded, or gave leave to have Perdiccas made away; which attempt succeeded ill, being neither secretly carried, nor committed to sure executioners. Their coming was not unexpected, and they were by Perdiccas rebuked with such gravity, that they departed honester than they came, being sorry for their bad enterprize. Upon the news of this attempt, the camp was in an uproar, which the king seeking to pacify, wanted authority, as having newly gotten the crown by them, and holding it by their courtesy. The matter itself afforded no good excuses, and his indiscretion made them worse. He said that no harm was done, for Perdiccas was alive: but their exclamations were against the tyrannous enterprize, which he imputed to Meleager, abandoning the surest of his friends to the rage of the multitude, who were not appeased, until the king, by offering to resign his estate upon them, renewed, out of their pity, that favourable affection which had moved them to set him up at the first.

Perdiccas, having now joined himself with Leonatus, kept the fields, intending to cut off all provision of victuals from the city. But, after sundry embassies passing between the king and the nobles, (they requiring to have the authors of sedition given up into their hands, the king, that Meleager might be

joined with Leonatus and Perdiccas, as a third in government of the army,) things were compounded according to the king's desire. Meleager should have done well to consider, that such men as had one day demanded his head, were not like, the day following, to give him a principal place among them, without any new occasion offered, had not some purpose of treachery lurked under their great facility. General peace was renewed, and much love protested, where little was intended. The face of the court was the same which it had been in Alexander's time; but no longer now did the same heart give it life, and windy spirits they were which moved in the arteries. False reports were given out by the appointment of Perdiccas, tending to his own disgrace, but in such terms as might seem to have proceeded from Meleager, who, finding part of the drift, but not all, took it as an injury done to himself; and (as desirous of a true friendship) desired of Perdiccas that such authors of discord might be punished. Perdiccas (as a lover of peace) did well approve the motion; and therefore agreed, that a general muster should be made, at which time the disturbers of the common quiet should receive their punishment (as was the manner for soldiers offending) in presence of the army. The plot was mischievously laid. Had Meleager given way to seditious rumours, he must needs have incurred the general hatred of all, as a sower of dissension; and thereby, with public approbation, might have been cut off, as having often offended in that kind; his prince being too weak a patron. Now, seeking redress of these disorders, he hastened his own ruin, by a less formal but more speedy way. This kind of muster was very solemn, and practised with many ceremonies, as for cleansing of the army. The horsemen, the elephants, the Macedonian foot, the mercenaries, were each, according to their quality, set in array, apart from others, as if they had been of sundry

sorts, met at adventure ; which done, the manner was to skirmish (as by way of exercise) according to direction of their several captains. But at that time the great battle of Macedonian pikes, which they called the Phalanx, led by Meleager, was on purpose bestowed in a ground of disadvantage ; and the countenance of the horse and elephants beginning to give charge upon them, was such as discovered no jesting pastime nor good intent. Kings were always wont to fight among the horsemen ; of which custom Perdiccas made great use that day, to the utter confusion of his enemies ; for Aridæus was always governed by him, which, for the present, had him in possession. Two or three days before, he had sought the death of Perdiccas, at the instigation of Meleager ; now he rides with Perdiccas up and down about the footmen, commanding them to deliver unto death all such as Perdiccas required. Three hundred they were who were cast unto the elephants, and by them slain in the presence of the king, who should have defended them and their affrighted companions. But these three hundred were not the men whose punishment Meleager had expected ; they were such as had followed him, when he disturbed the first consultation that was held about the election of a new king, and some of them his especial friends. Having therefore kept himself quiet a while, as unwilling to give offence to them who had the advantage, when he saw their proceedings tend very manifestly to his destruction, he fled away into a temple, which he found no sanctuary ; for thither they sent, and slew him.

The army, being thus corrected, was led into the city, where a new council of the princes was held, who, finding what manner of man their king was, divided all the provinces of the empire among themselves, leaving to Aridæus the office of a visitor, and yet making Perdiccas his protector, and commander of the forces remaining with him. Then were the

funerals of Alexander thought upon, whose body having been seven days neglected, was opened and embalmed by the Egyptians; no sign of poison appearing, how great soever the suspicion might be. The charge of his burial was committed to Aridæus, one of the captains, who was two years preparing of a great and costly shew, making a stately chariot, in which the corps was laid; many corses of his friends being laid in the ground, before that of Alexander was betowed in Alexandria, a city of his own building in Egypt.

SECT. III.

The beginning of the Lamian war.

WHILST these things were doing, or presently after, Antipater and Craterus, two principal noblemen, and inferior to none of Alexander's followers, if not greater than any of the rest, were busied in Greece with a war, which the Athenians, more bravely than wisely, had begun in Alexander's life, but now did prosecute more boldly than before, upon the courage which they had taken by his death. Alexander, not long before he died, had commanded, that all the banished Greeks (few excepted) should be restored unto their former places. He knew the factious quality of the Grecian estates, and therefore thought so to provide, that in every city he would have a sure party. But it fell out otherwise; for he lost the hearts of many more than he won, by this proud injunction: his pleasure, indeed, was fulfilled; yet not without great murmuring of the whole nation, as being against all order of law, and a beginning of open tyranny. The Athenians, greatly decayed in estate, but retaining more than was needful of their ancient spirits, forbade the execution of this decree in their dominions; so did also the Ætolians, who were valiant men, and inhabited a region well fortified by nature; yet neither of them took arms, but seemed

to bear themselves, as men that had done no more than they might well justify by reason: nevertheless, to prevent the worst, the Athenians gave secret instructions to Leosthenes, a captain of theirs, willing him to levy an army, but in his own name, and to keep it in a readiness for their use. This was no hard thing for Leosthenes to do, great numbers of Greek soldiers being lately returned from the Asian war in poor estate, as defrauded of their pay by the captains. Of these he gathered up eight thousand, when the certain news were brought of Alexander's death; at which the city of Athens declared itself, and more honourably than wisely, proclaimed open war against the Macedonians, for the liberty of Greece. Hereupon Leosthenes drew in the Ætolians, and some other estates, gave battle to the Bœotians, who sided with Antipater, and overthrew them; growing so fast in reputation, and so strong in adherents, that Antipater (arming in all haste, yet suspecting his own strength,) was forced to send unto Asia to Craterus for succour.

Nothing is more vain than the fears and hopes of men, shunning or pursuing their destinies afar off, which deceive all mortal wisdom, even when they seem near at hand. One month was scarcely passed, since nothing so heavily burthened the thoughts of Antipater as the return of Craterus into Macedon, which he then feared as death, but now desired, as the most likely assurance of his life. Craterus, whom Alexander held as of all men the most assured unto him, was sent into Macedon, to convey home the old soldiers, (that was the pretence,) and to succeed Antipater in the government of Macedon and Greece. The suspicions were strong, that he had a privy charge to put Antipater to death; neither did that which was commonly published sound much better, which was, that Antipater should be sent unto the king, as captain of the young soldiers, newly to be levied in Europe. For Alexander was much incens-

ed against him by his mother Olympias; and would sometimes give out speeches, testifying his own jealousy and hatred of him; but yet he strove to smother it, which in a cruel prince betokeneth little good. Few of Alexander's lieutenants had escaped with life; most of them, indeed, were mean persons in regard of those who followed him in his Indian expedition, and were therefore (perhaps) removed, to make place for their betters. But if the king's rigour was such, as could find rebellious purposes, (for so he interpreted even lewd government,) in base persons; little might Antipater hope for, who, having sat viceroy ten years in the strongest part of the empire, was called away to the presence of so fell a master, and the envy of a court wherein they had been his inferiors, which would now repine to see him their equal. Therefore, whether his fear drew him to prevention, working first the king's death by poison, given by his son Iolaus, Alexander's cup-bearer; or whether it broke not forth until opportunity had changed it into the passion of revenge, which was cruelly performed by his son Cassander; great cause of much fear he had, which I note in this place, as the ground of effects to be produced in very few years.

At the present Craterus was sent for, and all the captains of companies lying near solicited to make haste. Not without cause; for in Macedon there could not, at that time, be raised more than thirteen thousand foot, and six hundred horse; which muster was of raw soldiers, all the force of the country being emptied into Asia. The Thessalians, indeed, who had long stood firm for Philip and Alexander, who also were the best horsemen of Greece, furnished him with very brave troops, that might have done great service, had their faith held out, which they changed for the liberty of Greece. With these forces did Antipater, in Thessaly, try the fortune of a battle with Leosthenes; rather, (as may seem,) fear-

ing the increase of his enemies power, and rebellion of the Greeks, (were they not checked at the first,) than presuming on his own strength. For Leosthenes had, of Athenians, Ætolians, and mercenaries, two and twenty thousand foot, besides the assistance of many petty seignories, and of some Illyrians, and Thracians; of horse he brought into the field about two thousand and five hundred; but over-strong he was that way also, when once the Thessalians had revolted unto him. So Antipater lost the day; and his loss was such, that he neither was able to keep the field, nor to make a safe retreat into his own country; therefore he fled into the town of Lamia, which was well fortified, and well provided of all things necessary to bear out a siege. Thither did Leosthenes follow him, present him battle again, and upon refusal close up the town with earth-works, and a wall. There will we leave him for a while, travelling in the last honourable enterprise that ever was undertaken by that great city of Athens.

SECT. IV.

How Perdiccas employed his army.

KING Aridæus living under the rule of Perdiccas, when all the princes were gone each to his own province, kept a naked court; all his greatness consisting in a bare title, supported by the strength of his protector, who cared not for him, otherwise than to make use of him. Perdiccas had no province of his own peculiar, neither was he like to be welcome to any whom he should visit in his government. A stronger army than any of the rest he had, which he might easily hope, in that unsettled condition of things, to make better worth to him than many provinces could have been. The better to accomplish his desires, he closely sought the marriage of Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander; yet about the same time, he either married Nicea, the daughter of An-

tipater, or made such love to her as blinded their eyes who did not somewhat narrowly search into his doings.

Ariarathes the Cappadocian, the second of that name, and tenth king of that country, had continued faithful to the Persian empire as long as it stood, following the example of his forefathers, even from Pharnaces I. that reigned in Cappadocia, who married Atossa; sister to the great Cyrus. Some of his ancestors had, (indeed,) been oppressed by the Persians; but what fortune took from them at one time, virtue restored at another, and their faithful princes had much increased all. But now in the fatal period of so great an empire, with much wisdom, and (Darius being slain) with sufficient honour, he might have acknowledged the Macedonian in the Persian's room. This he did not; neither did Alexander call him to account, being occupied with greater cares. But Perdiccas, who had no greater business wherein to entertain his army, found it expedient, both for the honour of the empire, to take in that inland kingdom, surrounded with provinces of the Macedonian conquest, and for his own particular to have one opportune place of sure retreat, under the government of a stedfast friend. Therefore he entered Cappadocia, fought with Ariarathes, who drew into the field thirty thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse, (a strong army, had it not encountered a stronger, and better trained,) won the victory, and thereby the whole kingdom. But with much cruelty did he use the victory; for having taken Ariarathes prisoner, with many others, he crucified him, and as many of his kindred as he could light upon; and so delivered that province to Eumenes, whom of all men living he trusted most.

Another part of his forces he had committed to Python, rather as to the most honourable of such as remained about him, than as to the most assured. Python was to subdue the Greeks, rebelling in the

high countries of Asia. About twenty thousand foot, and three thousand horse they were, (all old soldiers,) who, planted in colonies by Alexander, to bridle the barbarous nations, were soon weary of their unpleasant habitations, and the rude people among whom they lived ; and therefore took advantage of the present troubles to seek unto themselves a better fortune. Against these Python went, more desirous to make them his own than to destroy them : which intent of his Perdiccas discovering, did both give him in charge to put all those rebels to the sword, giving the spoils of them to his soldiers ; and further enjoined it unto Python's captains, (his own creatures,) that they should see this command executed. These directions for use of the victory might have proved needless, so uncertain was the victory itself. A captain of the rebels commanding over three thousand, corrupted by Python, did, in the heat of the fight, (which was very doubtful,) retire, without necessity, to a hill not far off. This dismayed the rest, and gave the day to Python, who being far enough from Perdiccas, offered composition to the vanquished, granting unto them their lives and liberty, under condition of laying down their arms ; and hereupon he gave them his faith. Being master of these companies, he might well have a good opinion of his own power ; all power being then valued by strength in followers, when as none could vaunt himself as free lord of any territory. He had thirteen thousand foot, and eight thousand eight hundred horse, besides these new companions, whom needless fear, without great loss, had caused to leave the field. But, in true estimation, all the greatness whereof Python might think himself assured, was (and soon appeared to be) inherent in Perdiccas ; for by his command were ten thousand foot and eight thousand horse, of those which followed Python, levied ; the rulers of the provinces carefully obeying the letters of Perdiccas, by which they were enjoined

ed to give assistance to that business ; and, by virtue of the precept given unto them by Perdiccas, did the Macedonians cut in pieces all those poor men who had yielded themselves, leaving Python as naked as he came forth to return unto his great master.

Now was Perdiccas mighty above the mighty, and had fair leisure to pursue his hopes of marriage with Cleopatra, and thereby to make himself lord of all : but this must be secretly carried, for fear of opposition. How it succeeded will appear when the Lamian war taketh ending.

SECT. V.

The process of the Lamian war.

WE left Antipater hardly besieged, wanting means to free himself without succours from his friends in Asia. Those helps not appearing so soon as he expected, he came to parley with Leosthenes, and would have yielded unto any terms of reason, wherewith men possessed with hope of victory do seldom limit their desires. Leosthenes willed him without further circumstance to submit himself to discretion. This was too much for him that had once commanded over them who now required of him such a dishonourable composition. Wherefore, knowing that the extremity, from which as yet he was far enough, could bring no worse with it, Antipater prepared for the defence, and the other for winning the town, which felt great want of victuals. In this lingering war, the Ætolians (whether weary of sitting still at a siege, or having business which they pretended at home) took their leave, and returned into their own country. Their departure left the trenches so thinly manned, that Antipater found means to sally out upon his enemies to their great loss ; for many were slain, and Leosthenes himself among them, ere he could be repulsed into the town. Yet hereby the

Macedonians were nothing relieved ; their victuals wasted, and they were not strong enough to deal with the Greeks in open fight. Craterus was long in coming. Lysimachus, who was nearest at hand in Thrace, had too much work of his own, leading no more than four thousand foot, and two thousand horse, against Seuthas their king, who brought into the field about four times that number ; and though Lysimachus, not without loss, had gotten one victory, yet the enemy, abounding in multitude, felt not the blow so much as might abate his courage. Therefore Leonatus was earnestly solicited by Antipater's friends, to make all haste to the rescue. He had the government of Phrygia the less, and was able to raise an army of more than twenty thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse ; whether levied out of his province, or appointed unto him out of the main army, it is uncertain. Certain it is, that he was more willing to take in hand the journey into Greece, than Antipater was to have him come. For Cleopatra had written unto him, desiring his presence at Pella, the chief city of Macedon, and very kindly offering herself to be his wife ; which letters he kept not so close as had been requisite, and therefore brought himself into great suspicion, that soon ended with his life. Antiphilus, chosen general by the Athenians, in place of Leosthenes, hearing of this, forsook the siege of Lamia, and took the ready way to those great conquerors of Asia, with purpose to give them an evil welcome home, before Antipater and they should join in one. He had (notwithstanding the departure of the Ætolians) the advantage of Leonatus in horse, by the odds of two thousand Thessalians ; in other things he was equal to him ; in cause he thought himself superior ; in the fortune of that day he proved so ; for he won a great victory (chiefly by virtue of the Thessalians) which appeared the greater by the end of Leonatus himself ; who, fighting valiantly, was driven into a piece

of marsh ground, where he found his death, which he desperately had sought among the Indians, but it waited for him at home, not far from the place of his nativity. He was the first of Alexander's captains which died in battle, but all or most of the rest shall follow him the same way. After this day, the Athenians did never any thing suitable to their ancient glory. The vanquished Macedonians were too weak to renew the fight, and too proud to fly. They betook themselves to high grounds, unfit for service on horseback, and so abode in the sight of the enemy that day; the day following, Antipater with his men came into their camp, and took the charge of all. The Athenians perceiving their strength to be at the greatest, and fearing lest that of the enemies should increase, did earnestly seek to determine the matter quickly by another battle. But still Antipater kept himself on ground of advantage, which gave more than reasonable confidence to the Greeks, many of whom departed to their homes, accounting the enemy to be vanquished. This recklessness (incorrigible in an army of volunteers) was very inexcusable; seeing that the victories by land were very much defaced by losses at sea, where the Athenians, labouring to have made themselves once again masters, were put to the worst.

But now the fatal captivity of Greece came on, of which she never could be delivered unto this day. Craterus, with a strong army, having made great marches from Cilicia, passed over into Europe, and coming into Thessaly, joined himself with Antipater. The forces of Leonatus, Antipater, and Craterus, being joined in one, contained forty thousand weightily armed, three thousand light-armed men, and five thousand horse, of which numbers the Greeks wanted a thousand and five hundred in horse, in foot eighteen thousand. Carefully, therefore, did Antipater labour to avoid the necessity of a battle, until such time as the towns confederate should return

unto the camp those bands which had straggled from it. But those companies were so slow in coming, and Antipater so urgent upon the Greeks, that compelled they were to put the matter in hazard, without further attendance. Like enough it is, that with a little more help they had carried away the victory, for the Thessalians had the upper hand, and held it, until such time as they perceived their battles (overlaid with multitude) retire into the higher ground, which caused them also to fall back. So the Macedonians became lords of the field, having little else to boast of, considering that with the loss of an hundred and thirty men, they had purchased only the death of some five hundred enemies. Yet hereof was great use made. For the Greeks, as not subject unto the full command of one general, and being every one desirous to preserve his own estate and city, concluded to make a treaty of peace with Antipater, who being a subtle artificer, and well understanding their aptness to division, refused to hearken to any general composition, but willed every city to deal apart for itself. The intent of his device was so apparent that it was rejected; the Greeks chusing rather to abide the coming of their assistants, whose unreasonable carelessness betrayed the cause. Antipater and Craterus besieging and winning some towns in Thessaly, which the army of the confederates wanted means and courage to relieve, wearied that nation from attending any longer upon other men's unlikely hopes, with their own assured and present calamity.

SECT. VI.

Of the peace granted to Athens by Antipater. Of Demosthenes's death.

THE Thessalians falling off, all the rest soon followed severally, and sued for peace; the gentle conditions given to the most forward, inviting such as

were slack. Only the Athenians and Ætolians held out. Little favour could they hope for, having been authors of this tumult; and their fear was not great, the seat of the war being far from them. But the celerity of Antipater confounded all their imaginations, who sat still at Athens, devising upon courses of prosecuting the war to come, which came to their doors before their consultation could find issue. He was ready to enter upon their frontiers; they had no ability to resist, and were as heartless as friendless. All that remained was, to send ambassadors, desiring peace upon some good terms; necessity enforcing them to have accepted even the very worst. Phocion, with Demades the orator, and Xenocrates the philosopher, were chief of this embassy; Phocion as the most honourable, Demades as a strong persuader, (both of them well respected by Antipater;) and Xenocrates as one admired for wisdom, gravity of manners, and virtue; but all these ornaments consisting in speculation, and therefore of less regard when their admiration was to cost much in real effects.

Antipater calling to mind the pride of Leosthenes, required of the Athenians that they should wholly submit themselves to his pleasure; which being (perforce) granted, he commanded them to defray the charges of the war past, to pay a fine, and entertain a garrison. Further, he abrogated the popular estate, committing the government of the city to those of most wealth, depriving of the right of suffrage all such as wanted a convenient proportion of riches.

About nine thousand they were, all men of good substance, to whom the administration of the commonwealth was given, a number sufficient to retain the name and form of a democracy. But the rascal multitude of beggarly persons, accustomed to get their livings out of the common troubles, being now debarred from bearing offices and giving their voices, cried out that this was a mere oligarchy, the violent

usurpation of a few encroaching upon the public right. These turbulent fellows (of whom king Philip had been wont to say, that war to them was peace, and peace war,) Antipater planted in Thrace, and gave them lands to manure, leaving as few of them as he could to molest the quiet of Athens.

To the same end, (yet withal for satisfying his own suspicions and hatred,) he caused Demosthenes and Hyperides, famous orators, with some others, to be slain. Had the death of these two, especially of Demosthenes, been forborne, the rest of his proceedings in this action might well have passed for very mild; whereas now, all such as are either delighted with the orations of Demosthenes, or have surrendered their judgments to authors justly admiring him as the most eloquent of all that ever did speak and write, condemn him utterly, calling him a bloody tyrant. Such grace and reputation do the learned arts find in all civil nations, that the evil done to a man, famous in one of them, is able to blemish any action, how good soever otherwise it be, or honourably carried.

Demosthenes had taken sanctuary in the temple of Neptune, in the isle of Calauria; there did Archias, (sent with soldiers by Antipater for the purpose,) find him, and gently persuade him to leave the place, but not so prevailing, he threatened violence. Then Demosthenes, entreating a little respite, as it had been to write something, secretly took poison, which he had kept for such a necessity, and so died; rather choosing to do the last execution upon himself, than to fall into the hands of such as hated him. Only this act of his, (commendable, perhaps, in a heathen man,) argued some valour in him, who was otherwise too much a coward in battle, howsoever valiant in persuading to enterprises, wherein the way to very honourable ends was to be made through passages exceedingly dangerous. He loved money well, and had great sums given him by the

Persian, to encourage him in finding work for the Macedonians at home. Neither did he ill, methinks, in taking from the Persians, which loved not his country, great rewards, for speaking such things as tended to his country's good, which he did not cease to procure, when the Persians were no longer able to give him recompence. Such as in tender contemplation of his death can endure no honourable though true mention of Antipater, may, if they can, believe Lucian, who tells us that it was Antipater's purpose to have done him great honour. Sure it is, that he was a stedfast enemy to the Macedonians; therefore discretion required that he should be cut off.

The matters of Athens being thus ordered, the chief command was left in the hand of Phocion, a virtuous man, and lover of his country, yet applying himself to the necessity of the times; by which commendations he had both at other times done the city much good, and now procured this peace, which, (though grievous to freemen, yet favourable to the vanquished,) he endeavoured carefully to preserve.

SECT. VII.

How Craterus and Antipater were drawn from their Ætolian wars into Asia. The grounds of the first civil war between the Macedonian lords.

So Antipater with Craterus returned into Macedonia, where they strengthened their friendship with a new alliance, Craterus taking Phila, the daughter of Antipater, to wife.

Shortly after they went against the Ætolians, whose poverty was not so easily daunted as the luxurious wealth of the more powerful state of Athens had been. Their country was rough and mountainous, having many places of great fastness, into which they conveyed such of their goods as they most esteemed, and of their people as were least fit for

war ; with the rest they fortified the strongest of their cities, and so abode the coming of the Macedonians, whom they manfully resisted. With great obstinacy did the Macedonians contend against the difficulties of the places, which the *Ætolians* made good as long as their victuals held out. But when Craterus had shut up all passages, and utterly debarred them of relief, then were they put to a miserable choice, either to descend from their strong holds, and fight upon equal ground with unequal numbers, or to endure the miseries of hunger and cold, against which they could make no long resistance ; or to yield themselves to the Macedonians, who, incensed by the loss of many good soldiers, were not like to leave so stubborn enemies in places which might give confidence to rebellion. In cases of extremity, much fineness of wit, apprehending all circumstances of danger, commonly doth more hurt than a blunt consideration of that only which at the present is in hand. These *Ætolians* did not as yet want meat, but their enemies daily molested them, wherefore as yet they thought upon nothing but fighting. Fortune was gracious to their courage ; for such news came out of Asia into the Macedonian camp, as made Antipater and Craterus think every hour a month, till they had rid their hands of these *Ætolians*, giving them whatsoever conditions they would ask, yet with purpose to call them to severe account ; yea, to root them out of Greece by death or by captivity, when once they should have settled the affairs of Asia, as they hoped and desired. But of men's purposes God is the disposer, in whose high counsel it was ordained, that this poor nation should continue a troublesome bar to the proceedings of Macedon and Greece, and, (when time had ripened the next monarchy,) an open gate to let the Roman conquerors into those and other provinces. Likewise concerning the matters of Asia, the reformation intended by Antipater and Craterus was so far from taking ef-

fect, that it served merely as an introduction to all the civil wars ensuing.

The grounds of the Asiatic expedition, which did set the world in an uproar, were these: Antipater and Craterus were of Alexander's captains the mightiest in reputation; the one in regard of his ancient precedency, and the present rule which he bore in the parts of Europe,—the other, as of all men the best beloved and most respected, both of Alexander and of the whole army. Next unto these had Perdiccas been, whom the advantage of his presence at the king's death did make equal, or superior to either of these, if not both together. The first intents of Perdiccas were to have consorted with these two, and to have been with them a third partner in the government of all, to which purpose he entertained the discourse of marriage with one of Antipater's daughters. But feeling in short space the strength of that gale of wind which bore him up, he began to take wing and soar quite another way. Aridæus was a very simple man, yet served well enough to wear the title of that majesty, whereof Perdiccas being administrator, and hoping to become proprietary, the practice was more severe than had been in the days of Alexander; the desire to seem terrible being very familiar with weak princes and their ambitious officers, who know no other means of preserving themselves from contempt, and of giving such a fiery lustre to their actions as may dazzle the eyes of the beholders. How cruelly the poor Greeks in the Higher Asia were all put to the sword, and how tyrannously the king and princes of Cappadocia were crucified, hath already been shewed. The Pisidians were the next who felt the wrath of these counterfeit Alexanders. One city of theirs was utterly razed, the children sold for slaves, and all the rest massacred. The Isaurians, by this example grown desperate, when after two or three days trial they found themselves unable to continue the defence, locked them-

selves into their houses, and set the town on fire, into the flames whereof the young men did throw themselves, after they had a while repelled the Macedonians from the walls.

These exploits being performed, the army had no other work than to sift the ashes of the burnt city for gold and silver; but Perdiccas had business of greater importance troubling his brains. Nothing was more contrary to his ends, than to sit still without employment, letting his soldiers grow idle about him, whilst others grew great, and took deep root in their several provinces. He purposed, therefore, to transport his forces into Europe, under pretence of bringing the king into Macedonia, the seat of his ancestors, and head of the empire. The king's presence would make the offices of his viceroys, (during the time,) actually void; Antipater with Craterus being once in case of private men, and only Perdiccas holding authority, the match with Cleopatra might easily be made: So should greatness meet with a good title, and what more could be wished? Some impediment the power of Ptolemy might give, who held Egypt well fortified with men, but much better with love of the people; yet, if the business prospered in Macedonia, like enough it was, that either Ptolemy would follow of himself, or be driven to come to reason. Antigonus likewise then governing in Phrygia, a busy-headed man, and ill-affected to the side, was to be looked into and made away, for fear of further trouble. So thought Perdiccas, and was deceived in so thinking. Antigonus was as good a man of war, of as deep a judgment, as high a spirit, and as great undertaking as any of Alexander's captain's. His employments had been less than some of theirs, which made him also the less respected; but his thoughts were as proud as theirs, for he valued himself by his own worth, not by the opinions of other men. With careful attention had he watched Perdiccas, and sounded the depth of his purposes, which it was now

high time to discover. For Perdiccas having, with a jealous eye, pryed into the demeanour of Antigonus, and finding him no way fit for his turn, caused him to be charged with such accusations as might suffice to take away his life, especially by a judge that sought his death. This device Antigonus would not seem to perceive, but prepared himself in shew to make answer, indeed to make escape, which easily he did, putting himself and his son Demetrius aboard of some Athenian gallies that carried him to Antipater, laden with such tidings as finished the Ætolian war before-mentioned.

As the coming of Antigonus made Craterus and Antipater manifestly perceive their own danger, so his flight gave Perdiccas to understand that his intentions were laid open, and must now be justified by the sword. Therefore he prepared as fast as he could, not only for defence, but (as having on his side the king's name) to meet with them at home, who were nothing slack in providing to encounter him. Ptolemy being advertised of these proceedings, and considering how nearly they concerned him, sided with Antipater. To his government of Egypt he had annexed the dominion of Cyrene, not without consent of the chief citizens; and now, in the midst of these garboils, he celebrated the funeral of Alexander with great solemnity, purchasing thereby to himself much good will and many partakers, notwithstanding the terrible report of the king's army coming against him.

SECT. VIII.

Perdiccas's Voyage into Egypt, and his death.

PERDICCAS, uncertain which way to bend his main power, at length resolved to set upon Ptolemy, leaving Eumenes, to keep to his use against Craterus and Antipater, the parts of Asia bordering upon Europe.

It may seem strange, that he did not rather make head against those who were to come out of Greece, with a great number, and of more able men, than Ptolemy could bring. Perhaps he thought to make a quick end with Ptolemy, or believed that Craterus would not be ready for him soon enough. Sure it is that he took a bad course, and made it worse with ill handling.

Ptolemy, by his sweet behaviour, allured many to his party without help of any bad arts. Perdiccas, contrariwise, was full of insolency, which never failed to be rewarded with hatred; that is, truly defined, an affection founded upon opinion of an unjust contempt. The whole story of his proceedings in Egypt is not worth relating; for he did nothing of importance, but (as a wilful man) tired his followers, and wasted them in hard enterprises without success. His most forcible attempt was upon a little town called the Camels-wall; thither he marched by night with more haste than good speed; for Ptolemy preventing him, did put himself into the place, where, behaving himself not only as a good commander, but as a stout soldier, he gave the foil to Perdiccas, causing him to retire with loss, after a vehement, but vain assault, continued one whole day. The night following, Perdiccas made another journey, (which was his last,) and came to the divisions of Nilus, over against Memphis. There with much difficulty he began to pass over his army into an island, where he meant to encamp. The current was strong, the water deep, and hardly fordable. Wherefore, he placed his elephants above the passage to break the violence of the stream, and his horsemen beneath it, to take up such as were carried away by swiftness of the water. A great part of his army being arrived on the further bank, the channel began to wax deep; so that whereas the former companies had waded up to the chin, they who should have followed could find no footing. Whether this

came by rising of the water, or flitting away of the ground, (the earth being broken with the feet of so many men, horse, and elephants,) no remedy there was, but such as had passed must repass again as well as they might; for they were too weak for the enemy, and could not be relieved by their fellows. With great confusion, therefore, they committed themselves to the river, wherein above two thousand of them perished; a thousand were devoured by crocodiles,—a miserable spectacle even to such as were out of danger; such as were strong and could swim recovered the camp; many were carried down the stream, and driven to the contrary bank, where they fell into the hands of their enemies.

This misfortune exasperated the soldiers against their general, giving liberty to their tongues, which long time had concealed the evil thoughts of their hearts. While they were thus murmuring, news came from Ptolemy, which did set them in an uproar. Ptolemy had not only shewed much compassion on those who fell into his hands, but performed all rights of funeral to the dead carcasses which the river had cast upon his side; and, finally, sent their bones and ashes to be interred by their kinsmen or friends. This did not only move the common soldiers, but made the captains fall to mutiny, thinking it unreasonable to make war upon so virtuous and honourable a person, to fulfil the pleasure of a lordly ambitious man, using them like slaves. The sedition growing strong, wanted only a head, which is quickly found. Python was there, who inwardly hated Perdiccas, for the disgrace which he had suffered by his procurement after the victory upon the rebellious Greeks. Python had lived in honourable place about Alexander; he was, in the division of the provinces, made governor of Media; he had followed Perdiccas, and being in all things (the protectorship excepted) equal to him, had nevertheless been scornfully used by him, which now he requit-

ed. Drawing together a hundred of the captains, and a good part of the horse, which consisted of the gentry, (the footmen having declared themselves before,) he entered the tent of Perdiccas, where, without further circumstance, they all ran upon him and slew him. Such end had the proud misgoverning authority of Perdiccas. He might have lived as great as any, could he have suffered any as great as himself; yea, peradventure, master of all, had he not been too masterly over those which were already his.

The next day Ptolemy came into the camp, where he was joyfully received; he excused himself of things past as not having been the author, or given cause of the war, and was easily believed; the favour of the army being such towards him that needs they would have made him protector in the room of Perdiccas. But this he refused. It was an office fit for one that would seek to increase his greatness with his trouble. Ptolemy was well enough already; wherefore, for his own quiet, he forbore to accept it; and, for their well-deserving of him, he procured that honourable charge to Python, and to Aridæus the captain, who having had some companies of soldiers to furnish with their attendance the solemnities of Alexander's funerals, did with them adhere to him against Perdiccas.

In the midst of these businesses came news of two great victories obtained by Eumenes; which news, had they arrived two or three days sooner, had been entertained with joyful acclamations, and would have given such reputation to Perdiccas, as had caused both his private maligners to continue his open flatterers, and his open enemies to have accepted any tolerable composition; but these good tidings coming in ill time, when death had stopped the ears which would have given them welcome, found bad acceptance, as shall be shewed hereafter.

SECT. IX.

Victories of Eumenes in the Lower Asia.

BEFORE we proceed in the relation of things happening about the person of the king, it is meet that we speak of those businesses in the Lower Asia, which were handled by Eumenes with notable dexterity, whilst Perdiccas was occupied in the Egyptian wars. Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, and Neoptolemus, had received command from Perdiccas to be assistant to Eumenes, and to follow his directions. But Alcetas made flat answer, that he would not, alleging the backwardness of his men to bear arms against so great a person as Antipater, and a man so much honoured as Craterus. Neoptolemus was content to make fair shew, but inwardly he repined at the precedency given to Eumenes, as thinking himself the better man. Eumenes discovering, through the counterfeited looks of Neoptolemus, the mischief lurking in his heart, wisely dissembled with him, in hope to win him by gentle behaviour and sweet language, that commonly are lost when bestowed upon arrogant creatures. Yet, the better to fortify himself, that he might stand upon his own strength, he raised out of the countries under his jurisdiction about six thousand horse, giving many privileges to such as were serviceable, and training them well up. Not without great need: for when, upon advertisement of the great preparations made by Craterus and Antipater, (who had newly passed the Hellespont,) for the invasion of his provinces, he willed Neoptolemus to come to him with all his power; Neoptolemus did indeed advance, but in hostile manner, though unprovoked, presented him battle. Neoptolemus had secretly covenanted with Antipater to lay open the way for him to the conquest of Asia, which now intending to perform, he was shamefully disappointed. For though his footmen, being all Macedonians, had much the

better, and prevailed far upon Eumenes's battles, yet were his horse driven out of the field, and himself compelled, with a few of them, to run away, leaving naked the backs of his Macedonian footmen, to be charged by Eumenes, who forced them in such wise, that casting down their pikes, they cried for mercy, and gladly took their oath to do him faithful service. Antipater and Craterus endeavoured, with many goodly promises, to draw Eumenes into their society, who contrariwise offered himself as a means of reconciliation between Perdiccas and Craterus, whom he dearly loved ; professing withal his hatred to Antipater, and constant faith to the cause which he had undertaken to maintain.

Whilst these negotiations were on foot, Neoptolemus came with his broken crew to Antipater and his associates, vilifying Eumenes, and calling him a scribe, (at which foolish railing they laughed,) but extolling the virtue of Craterus, as well he might, with high commendations ; assuring them, that if Craterus did but once appear, or that his voice were but heard by any Macedonian in Eumenes's camp, the victory was won, for they would all forthwith revolt unto him. Earnestly, therefore, he desired them to give him aid against Eumenes, and especially requested that Craterus might have the leading of the army to be sent. Their own affections did easily lead them to condescend to his motion ; and good hope there was, that the reputation of Craterus might prevail as much as the force which he drew along. For he had, in the midst of Alexander's vanities, when others, (imitating the king,) betook themselves to the Persian fashions of garments and customs, retained the ancient Macedonian form of behaviour and apparel, whereby he became very gracious with the common soldiers, who beheld these new tricks of Asia with discontented eyes, as reproachful and derogatory to the manners of their native country. So Antipater took the way towards Cilicia, to hold Per-

diccas at bay, and to join with Ptolemy. Craterus used great celerity to have taken Eumenes reveling, as he hoped, according to the common fashion of captains after a great victory. But he had a wary and well-advised enemy to encounter, who kept good espial upon him, and with much wisdom foresaw all that was to be feared, and the means of prevention, which his courage did not fail to execute.

Eumenes was not ignorant that Craterus was able to defeat him without a battle, yea, without stroke ; him therefore he feared more than the army following him, (yet the army following him was such as much exceeded his own in footmen, but was inferior in horsemen,) and thought it more uneasy to keep the Macedonians from revolting to him, than from knowing him. Hereupon he took in hand a strange piece of work, which desperation, (of all courses else,) taught him, and wise managing prosperously accomplished. He gave out reports, that Neoptolemus was returned with such company as he could gather together, and had gotten Pigres, (a captain of no great estimation, who lay not far off,) to join with him. Having animated his men against Neoptolemus, whom he knew to be despised and hated among them, (as having been vanquished by some of them, and forsaken by others in plain field, whilst they valiantly fought in his quarrel,) he took great care to keep them from receiving any intelligence of the enemy's matters. Peremptorily he commanded, that no messenger nor trumpeter should be admitted ; and not herein satisfied, he placed against Craterus no one Macedonian, nor any other that much would have regarded him had he been known ; but Thracians, Cappadocians, and Persians, under the leading of such as thought more highly of none than of Perdiccas and himself. To these also he gave in charge, that without speaking or hearkening to any word, they should run upon the enemy, and give no leisure to say or do any thing but fight. The directions which he gave to others, he did not fail to ex-

ecute in his own person ; but placing himself in the right wing of his battle, opposite to Neoptolemus, who, as he understood, conducted the left wing on the contrary side, he held the Macedonians arranged in good order, and ready to charge the enemy as soon as the distance would give leave. A rising piece of ground lay between them, which having ascended, the armies discovered each other ; but that of Eumenes every way prepared for the fight, the other wearied with long journeys, which over-hastily they had made, seeking the deceitful issue of frivolous hopes. Then it was high time for Craterus, (having failed in surprising them as enemies,) to discover himself to his old friends and fellow-soldiers, of whom he could see none. Phœnix, a Tenidian, and Artabazus, a Persian, had the leading of that side, who, mindful of their instructions, began to give up-on him with such countenance, as told him his error, which to redeem, he bade his men fight and win the day, and take the spoil to themselves. But the bear whose skin he sells is not yet caught. The ground whereon the battle was fought gave most advantage to the horse, who encountered very roughly on all parts, especially about Eumenes and Neoptolemus, who, as soon as they had discovered one another, could not contain themselves, but with great rage met body to body, and letting loose their bridles, grappled so violently together, that their horses ran from under them, leaving both of them tumbling on the ground. Neoptolemus rose up first, but Eumenes had his sword first drawn, wherewith he houghed the other, causing him to fall down and fight up-on one knee. In this conflict they received many wounds, but Neoptolomus giving slight ones, received such as were deadly, by which he died in the place, and was there, (being half-dead, half-alive,) stripped by his mortal enemy, whose revilings he requited, lying even at the last gasp, with one wound in the groin, dangerous, had it not wanted force.

The death of Neoptolemus, caused his followers to run away upon the spur, and seek shelter behind the battles of their foot. They were nothing hotly pursued, for Eumenes pained himself to carry succour to his left wing, which he suspected much to be distressed, but found accompanied with the same fortune that had assisted him when he fought in person. Craterus had gallantly borne himself a while, and sustained the impression of Artabazus and Phoenix, with more courage than force, holding it nothing agreeable with his honour to retire and protract the fight, when he was charged by men of little estimation or note. Otherwise it is not unlikely that he might have either carried the day, or preserved himself to a better adventure, by giving ground, as the rest, (when he and Neoptolemus were slain,) did. But whilst he sought to preserve his reputation, he lost his life by the fall of his horse, or his falling from his horse through the force of a wound received; upon which accident he was trampled under foot by many that knew him not, and so perished, unknown till it was too late to know it. Eumenes, coming to the place where he lay, made great lamentation, as having always loved and honoured Craterus, of whose death he was now become the instrument. The vanquished army entertained a treaty of peace with Eumenes, making shew of their willingness to become his followers; but their intent was only to refresh themselves, which, (by his permission,) having done, they stole away by night, and fled towards Antipater.

This battle, fought within ten days of the former, won to Eumenes more reputation than good will, for his own soldiers took the death of Craterus heavily, and the armies lying further off were enraged with the news. But other matters there were which incensed men against him, besides the death of Craterus, whereof it manifestly appeared that he was as sorry as any that pretended greater heaviness. His

army wanted pay. This was a great fault, which he wisely amended, by giving to them the spoil of such towns as were ill-affected to him. So he redeemed the love of his own men, who of their mere notion appointed unto him a guard for defence of his person. Others were not so easy to be reconciled: They who had been traitors to Perdiccas, hated him for his faithfulness, as greatly as they thought that he would hate them for their falsehood; neither found they any fairer way of excusing their late revolt, than by accusing and condemning the side which they had forsaken. Wherefore they proclaimed Eumenes a traitor, and condemned him to die; but it was an easier matter to give that sentence than to put it in execution.

SECT. X.

Quarrels between Eurydice the queen, and Python the protector. Python resigns his office, into which Antipater is chosen.

PYTHON and Aridæus being chosen protectors of king Aridæus and the children of Alexander, took the way to Asia the Less, conducting the army through Syria. Of these two Python was the greater in reputation, yet far too weak to sustain so important a charge. For Eurydice, wife to king Aridæus, was come to her husband, a lady of a masculine spirit, well understanding what she was or should be, and thinking herself able to support the weight which fortune had laid upon her foolish husband, being due to her own title. Her mother Cynane, sister to Alexander by her father, king Philip, was married, (as hath been shewed,) to Amyntas, who was right heir to the kingdom of Macedon, being the only son of king Perdiccas, Philip's elder brother.

This Cynane was a warlike woman; she had led armies, and, (as a true sister of Alexander,) fighting hand to hand with Ceria, queen of the Phrygians, a

virago like unto herself, had slain her. She brought up this Eurydice in the same unwomanly art of war, who now among the soldiers began to put in practice the rudiments of her education, to the small contentment of Python, that could not brook her too curious intermeddling in his charge. Whether it were so that Python had some purpose to advance the son of Alexander, by Roxana, to the kingdom, (as once he had sought to do;) or whether the queen did suspect him of some such intent; or whether only desire of rule caused her to quarrel with him,—quarrel she did, which disturbed the proceedings against Eumenes. The army having shaken off such a rank-rider as Perdiccas, would not afterwards be reined with a twined thread. Python, bearing himself upon his office, took upon him to give directions in the king's name, which the queen did oftentimes controul, using the same name with more authority, and better liking of the soldiers. Python seeing this, would needs resign his office, whether upon weariness of the contentions daily growing, or on purpose to bring the queen into envy, it is uncertain. Perhaps he thought, that now, being the far worthiest man in the camp, he should be entreated to retain the place, and have his authority confirmed, or, as might be, increased, were it but for want of a fit successor. Eurydice was nothing sorry at this course; for now she thought to manage the affairs of the empire at her own will, being freed from the troublesome assistance of a protector. But the soldiers disappointed both her and Python of their contrary expectations, choosing Antipater, the only powerful man of Alexander's captains then living, into the room of Python. Hereat the queen fretted exceedingly, and began to deal earnestly with the Macedonians, that they should acknowledge no lord save only the king their sovereign. Yet she failed of her purpose, being hindered, as may seem, by three things;—the apparent weakness of her husband, the

growth of Alexander's children, who, though born of outlandish women, were bred in the Macedonian camp, and the mightiness of Antipater, who commanding a great army near at hand, arrived in a few days at the camp, and enforced Eurydice to hold herself content. Antipater was of such power, that he needed not to work by any close devices, as Perdiccas had done; he had no concurrents, all the governors of provinces that remained alive, acknowledged him their better; yea, many of them he displaced out of hand, putting others in their room. This done, he took the king, queen, and princes along with him into Macedonia, leaving Antigonus general of the royal army; to whom for his good services done, and to be done against Eumenes, he gave the rule of Susiana, besides his former provinces, and committed into his hands the government of Asia during that war.

SECT. XI.

Antigonus, lieutenant of Asia, wins a battle of Eumenes, and besiegeth him in Nora; he vanquisheth other followers of Perdiccas.

HERE begins the greatness of Antigonus, whose power in few years over-growing the rest, wanted little of spreading itself over the whole monarchy. He was to make war upon Eumenes, Alcetas the brother, and Attalus the brother-in-law, to Perdiccas; work enough to keep his army in the public service, till such time as he might find occasion to make use of it in his own business. The first of these which he undertook was Eumenes, with whom Alcetas and Attalus refused to join, having unseasonably contended with him in time of common danger about the chief place. Eumenes had an army strong in number, courage, and all needful provisions, but obedient only at discretion. Therefore Antigonus tried all ways of corrupting his soldiers,

tempting first the whole army with letters; which practice failing by the cunning of Eumenes, (who made shew as if he himself had scattered abroad those letters to try the faith of his men;) he dealt apart with such captains as he thought most easy to be won. Of these captains one rebelled, breaking out too hastily before any help was near him, yet looking so carelessly to himself, that he and his were surprised, when he thought his enemies far off. Another follower of Eumenes, (or rather of good fortune, which he thought now to be in company with Antigonus,) kept his treachery secret, reserving it for the time of execution. Upon confidence of the treason, which this false man Apollonides had undertaken, Antigonus presented battle to Eumenes; in the heat whereof, Apollonides, general of the horse to Eumenes, fled over to the contrary side with such as he could get to follow him, but was closely followed by some, whose company he desired not. Eumenes, perceiving the irrecoverable mischief which this traiterous practice brought upon him, pursued the villain, and cut him off before he could thrust himself into the troops of Antigonus, and boast of his treachery. This was some comfort to Eumenes in the loss of that battle, which disabled him utterly to keep the field, and left it very hard for him to make a safe retreat. Yet one thing he did, which much amazed his enemies, and, (though a matter of small importance,) caused Antigonus himself to admire his high resolution. It was held no small part of the victory to get possession of the dead bodies. Eumenes, whilst Antigonus held him in chase, turned out of the way, and fetching a compass, returned to the place where the battle had been fought; there he burned, (according to the manner of the time,) the bodies of his own men, and interred the bones and ashes of the captains and common soldiers apart, raising up heaps of earth as mountains over them, and so went his way. As this bold adventure

bred in the Macedonians (returned to their camp) great admiration of his brave spirit; so the news which Menander, (who was set to look unto their carriages,) brought and published among them, enticed them to love him as their honourable friend. He had found Menander in an open plain, careless, as after an assured victory, and loaded with the spoils of many nations, the rewards of their long service, all which he might have taken; but fearing lest such a purchase should prove a heavy burden to him, whose chief hope consisted in swift expedition, he gave secret warning to Menander to fly to the mountains, whilst he detained his men, (whom authority could not have restrained,) by this slight, setting them to bait their horses. The Macedonians extolled him for this courtesy, as a noble gentleman, that had forborne when it lay in his power to strip them out of all their wealth, and make their children slaves, and to ravish their wives; but Antigonus told them, that he had not forborne to do this out of any good will to them; but out of mere subtlety had avoided those precious fetters, which would have hindered his speedy flight. He told them true; for Eumenes did not only think all carriages to be overburdensome, but the number of his men to be more troublesome than available in his intended course. Wherefore he sent them from him as fast as he could, wishing them to shift for themselves, and retaining only five hundred horse, and two hundred foot. When he had wearied Antigonus a while in following him up and down, he came to Nora; where again, keeping no more about him than necessity required to make good the place, he rovingly dismissed all the rest. Nora was a little fortress in the borders of Lycaonia and Cappadocia, so strongly situated, that it seemed impregnable, and so well victualled and stored with all necessaries, that it might hold out for many years. Thither did Antigonus follow him, with more desire to make him his friend, than to

vanquish him in war. To this purpose he entertained parley with him, but in vain. For whereas Antigonus offered him pardon and his love, Eumenes required restitution of his provinces, which could not be granted without Antipater's consent. Then was Nora closed up; where Antigonus leaving sufficient strength for continuance of the siege, took his journey into Pisidia, against Alcetas and Attalus, with whom he made short work. He came upon them unexpected, and seized on passages, which wanted not men, but such a captain as Eumenes, to have defended them. Alcetas and Attalus, as they had been too secure before his coming, so were they too adventurous in fighting at the first sight, upon all disadvantages; and their folly was attended with suitable event. Attalus, with many principal captains, was taken; Alcetas fled to the city of Termesus, where the love of the younger sort toward him was so vehement, that stopping their ears against all persuasions of the ancient men, they needs would hazard their lives and their country in his defence. Yet this availed him nothing; for the governors of the town, having secretly compounded with Antigonus, caused the young men to sally out, and using the time of advantage, they with their servants did set upon Alcetas, who unable to resist, slew himself. His dead body was conveyed to Antigonus, and by him, barbarously torn, was cast forth without burial. When Antigonus was gone, the young men interred the carcase with solemn funerals, having once been minded to set on fire their own town, in revenge of his death. Such favour had he purchased with courteous liberality; but to make an able general, one virtue, how great soever, is insufficient.

SECT. XII.

Ptolemy wins Syria and Phœnicia. The death of Antipater.

WHILST these things were in doing, the rest of the princes lay idle, rather seeking to enjoy their governments for the present, than to confirm or enlarge them. Only Ptolemy looking abroad, won all Syria and Phœnicia; an action of great importance, but not remarkable for any circumstance in the managing. He sent a lieutenant thither with an army, who quickly took Laomedon prisoner, that ruled there by appointment of Antipater, and formerly of Perdiccas; but (as may seem) without any great strength of soldiers, far from assistants, and vainly relying upon the authority which had given him that province, and was now occupied with greater cares, than with seeking to maintain him in his office.

Antipater was old and sickly, desirous of rest, and therefore contented to let Antigonus pursue the dispatch of those businesses in Asia. He had with him Polysperchon, one of the most ancient of Alexander's captain's, that had lately suppressed a dangerous insurrection of the Ætolians; which nation had stirred in the quarrel of Perdiccas, prevailing far at the first, but soon losing all that they had gained whilst Antipater was abroad in his Cilician expedition. In this Polysperchon, Antipater did repose great confidence; so far forth, that (suspecting the youth of his own son Cassander of insufficiency in so great a charge) he bequeathed unto him on his death-bed the government of Macedon and Greece, together with his office of protectorship. So Antipater died, being fourscore years old, having always travailed in the great affairs of mighty princes, with such reputation, that Alexander in all his greatness was jealous of him, and the successors of Alexander did either quietly give place unto him, or were unfortunate in

making oppositions. In his private qualities, he was a subtle man, temperate, frugal, and of a philosophical behaviour; not unlearned, as having been scholar to Aristotle, and written some histories. He had been much molested by Olympias, Alexander's mother, whom, after the death of her son he compelled to abstain from coming into Macedonia, or intermeddling in matters of state; yea, at his own death, he gave especial direction, that no woman should be permitted to deal in the administration of the empire. But this precept was soon forgotten; and yet, ere long, by sorrowful experience approved to have been sound and good.

SECT. XIII.

Of Polysperchon, who succeeded unto Antipater in the protectorship. The insurrection of Cassander against him.

POLYSPERCHON was very skilful in the art of war, having long time been apprentice in that occupation; other qualities, requisite in so high an office as he underwent, either nature had not given to him, or time had robbed him of them. He managed his business more formally than wisely, as a man of a second wit, fitter to assist than to command in chief. At the first entrance upon the stage, he called to council all his friends; wherein for weighty considerations, (as they who weighed not the contrary reasons held them,) the queen Olympias was revoked out of Epirus into Macedonia, that the presence of Alexander's mother might countenance and strengthen their proceedings. For the condition of the times requiring, that the governors of provinces abroad should keep greater armies than were needful, or easy to be retained about the person of the king in Macedonia, it seemed expedient, that the face of the court should be filled with all majesty that might give authority to the injunctions from thence pro-

ceeding, and by an awful regard contain within the bounds of duty such as could not by force have been kept in order, being strong, and lying too far off.

Such care was taken for prevention of imaginary dangers, and out of sight, whilst present mischief lay unregarded in their bosoms. Cassander, the son of Antipater, was not able to discover that sufficiency in Polysperchon, for which his father had reposed in him so much confidence : neither could he discern such odds in the quality of himself and Polysperchon as was in their fortune. He was left captain of one thousand ; which office, by practice of those times, was of more importance than the title now seems to imply. He should thereby have been as camp-master, or lieutenant-general to the other, a place no way satisfying his ambition, that thought himself the better man. Therefore he began to examine his own power, and compare it with the forces likely to oppose. All that had relied on his father were his own assured, especially such as commanded the garrisons bestowed in the principal cities of Greece. The like hope was of the magistrates, and others of principal authority in those commonweals, whose forms had been corrected by Antipater, that they would follow the side, and draw in many partakers : it concerned these men in their own particular, to adhere unto the captains by whom their faction was upheld, and by whom the rascal multitude, covetous of regaining the tyrannous power which they had formerly exercised over the principal citizens, were kept in order, obeying their betters perforce. Besides these helps, Cassander had the secret love of queen Eurydice, who had in private rendered him such courtesy as was due only to her husband. But neither the queen's favour, nor all his other possibilities, gave him confidence to break out into open rebellion ; because he saw Polysperchon much revered among the Macedonians, and strong enough to suppress him before he could have made head.

Therefore he made shew of following his pleasures in the country ; and calling many of his friends about him, under pretence of hunting, advised with them upon the safest course, and most free from all suspicion. The necessity was apparent of raising an army before the business was set on foot ; and to do this, opportunity presented him with fair means. Ptolemy had by fine force, without any commission, annexed Syria to his government of Egypt and Cyrene : this was too much, either for the king to trust him with, or for him to part with. Antigonus, upon the first news of Antipater's death, began to lay hold upon all he could get, in such sort, that he manifestly discovered his intent of making himself lord of all Asia. These two therefore stood in no need of a civil war ; which Cassander well noted, and presumed withal, that the friendship which had passed between his father and them, would avail him somewhat. Whereupon he secretly dispatched messengers to them both, and within a little while conveyed himself on a sudden over the Hellespont, that he might in person advance the business with greater speed. Much persuasion is needless in winning a man to what he desireth. Antigonus coveted nothing more than to find Polysperchon work, by raising some commotions in Greece. Yet, (as formalities must not be neglected,) Cassander did very earnestly press him, by the memory of his father, and all requisite conjurations, to assist him in this enterprise ; telling him, that Ptolemy was ready to declare for them, and urging him to a speedy dispatch. Antigonus, on the other side, repaid him with the same coin ; saying, that for his own sake, and his dead father's, whom he had very dearly loved, he would not fail to give him all manner of succour. Having thus feasted one another with words, they were nothing slack in preparing the common means leading to their several ends.

SECT. XIV.

The unworthy courses held by Polysperchon for the keeping down of Cassander.

GREAT necessity there was of timely provision; for Polysperchon needed no other instructions to inform him of Cassander's drift, than the news of his departure. He was not ignorant of the ready disposition which might be found in Antigonus and Ptolemy to the strengthening of rebellion; and well he knew that one principal hope of Cassander was reposed in the confidence of such as ruled in the Grecian estate. Therefore, (loving to work circumspectly,) he called another council, wherein it was concluded, that the popular form of government should be erected in all the cities of Greece, the garrisons withdrawn, and that all magistrates and principal men, into whose hands Antipater had committed the supreme authority, should forthwith be either slain or banished. This was a sure way to diminish the number of Cassander's friends, and to raise up many enemies to him in all quarters. Yet hereby was disclosed both an unthankful nature in Polysperchon, and a factious malice in his adherents. For how could he be excused of extreme ingratitude, that for hatred of the son went about to dishonour the father's actions, whose only bounty had enabled him to do it? or what could be said in their defence, who sought to destroy many worthy men, friends to the state, by whom the Greeks were held restrained from stirring against the Macedonians; and in opposition to their private enemy, gave the rule of things to base companions, and such as naturally maligned the empire? But as in man's body, through sinews newly issuing from one branch, a finger is more vexed by inflammation of his next neighbour, than by any distemper in the contrary hand,—so in bodies politic, the humours of men subdivided in

faction, are more enraged by the disagreeable qualities of such as curb them in their nearest purposes, than they are exasperated by the general opposition of such as are divided from them in the main trunk. Hereby it comes to pass, that contrary religions are invited to help against neighbour princes ; bordering enemies drawn in to take part in civil wars, and ancient hatred called to counsel against injurious friends. Of this fault, nature is not guilty ; she hath taught the arm to offer itself unto manifest loss in defence of the head :—they are depraved affections, which render men sensible of their own particular, and forgetful of the more general good, for which they were created.

The decree, whereby the Greeks were presented with a vain shew of liberty, ran under the king's name ; but so, as one might easily discern, that Polysperchon had guided his pen. For the main point was, that they should follow such directions as Polysperchon gave, and treat with him about all difficulties. In the rest it contained such a deal of kindness, as proceeding on a sudden from those who had kept them in hard subjection, might well appear to have some other root than the pretended good will, and was of itself too base and unfit for a king to use toward his conquered subjects, and often subdued rebels.

SECT. XV.

Of the great commotions raised in Athens by Polysperchon's decree. The death of Phocion.

NEVERTHELESS, the Athenians, with immoderate joy, entertained this happy seeming proclamation, and sought how to put it in execution without further delay ; but Nicanor, captain of the garrison, which kept one of their havens, called Munychia, in the lower part of the town, would needs take longer

time of deliberation than was pleasing to their hasty desires.

Nicanor, as a trusty follower of Cassander, was by him shifted into the place, and Menillus (that was captain there before) discharged, when Antipater was newly dead. His coming to Athens was no way grateful to the citizens, who, soon after, hearing the news of Antipater's death, cried out upon Phocion, saying, that he had sufficient intelligence of that accident, and might, by advertising them in due time, have put into their hands a fair opportunity of thrusting out the Macedonians. But these exclamations argued no more than a desire to shake off the Macedonian yoke. Far more grievously would they have been offended, had they known the instructions which Cassander had given to Nicanor, and his resolution to follow them. It was concluded that he should not only retain Munychia, any injunction to the contrary notwithstanding; but that he should find means to thrust some companies into Piræus, and fortify that also, which was the principal haven, against the high town. How to accomplish this, he rather wanted some reasonable pretence than good ability. But the Athenians were not long in giving him sufficient cause to do that which he would have done without any cause given. They desired him to come unto their council, assembled in the Piræus, there to consider of the king's proclamation; whether, upon Phocion's word and safe-conduct, he came, and earnestly pressed them to hold with Cassander in the war which was ready to break forth. Contrariwise they urged him, first of all, to make them masters of their own, which how to use they might consult afterwards. Each of them refusing to condescend unto the other's demand, the Athenians (who did always measure justice by profit, yet seldom thrived by that course) practised with Dercylus, a captain following Polysperchon, and then lying near at hand, that he should enter into the town,

and take Nicanor prisoner ; but Phocion, who then governed in Athens, a man very unlike to the rest of the citizens, being nothing pleased with such a trick of politic dishonesty, did quietly suffer him to depart and save himself.

Nicanor hereupon began to devise upon taking Piræus, not as following now the project of Cassander, but prosecuting his own just revenge. He levied as many soldiers as he could, and drew them closely into Munychia ; which done, he issued into Piræus, took it, and entrenched himself therein ; to the exceeding discomfort of the Athenians, who, lately impatient of his keeping the one haven, saw him now master of both. Alexander, the son of Polysperchon, came thither shortly after with an army. Then were the citizens in great hope of recovering all, and addressed themselves unto him ; who made fair shews, intending mere mischief, (which they perceived not,) being blinded with the vain epistles of his father, and of Olympias the old queen. Olympias, taking upon her to command, before she durst well adventure to return into Macedonia, had peremptorily charged Nicanor to restore to the Athenians the places which he held ; but he would first consider more of the matter. Polysperchon had further ordained that the isle of Samos should be rendered unto them ; a goodly offer, had it accorded with his power and meaning. He was indeed so far from purposing to let them have Samos, that as yet he did not thoroughly intend to let them have themselves. The commodity of their havens was such as he would rather get into his own hands than leave in theirs ; yet rather wished in theirs than in Cassander's. His son Alexander, not ignorant of this, made fair shew to the Athenians, and spent much labour in communing with Nicanor, but suffered not them, for whom he seemed to labour, to intermeddle with the business. Hereupon the citizens grew jealous, and the displeasure they conceived against him

they poured out upon Phocion, depriving him of his office. This was done with much tumult ; banished men and strangers thrusting themselves into the assembly of the citizens, who, distracted with sundry passions, growing out of their present misfortunes, thought every one that best could enveigh against things past, a most likely man to find some remedy for the evil threatening them. In this hurlyburly was Alexander devising how he might come to some good point of composition with Nicanor, and held much privy conference with him ; which he could not so secretly carry but that his negociation was discovered ; whereby the uproar in the town was so far increased, that Phocion, with many of his friends, were accused, and driven to seek safeguard of their lives by flight. So they came to Alexander, who entertained them gently, and gave them his letters of commendation to his father, desiring him to take them into his protection.

Polysperchon was in the country of Phocis, ready to enter with an army into Attica. Thither came Phocion with his companions, hoping well, that the letters which they brought, and their own deserts, (having always been friends to the Macedonians, as far as the good of their country gave leave,) should be enough to get patronage to their innocency. Besides all this, Dinarchus, a Corinthian, Polysperchon's familar friend, went along with them, (in an evil hour,) who promised to himself and them great favour by means of his acquaintance. But Polysperchon was an unstable man, very earnest in what he took in hand ; yet, either for want of judgment in following them, or of honesty in holding the best of them, easily changing his intended courses, and doing things by the halves, which made him commonly fail of good success. For fear of Cassander, he had offered wonderful kindness to the Athenians ; this had caused them to love him : out of their love he gathered hope of deceiving them, which made him

to change his mind, and seek how to get into his own hands those keys with which Cassander held them fast locked up: finding himself disappointed of this purpose, and suspected as a false dishonourable man, he stood wavering between the contrary allurements of profit and reputation. To keep the Athenians perforce at his devotion would indeed have done well; but the effecting of this began to grow desperate, and many towns of importance in Greece began to cast their eyes upon his proceeding in that action. Wherefore he thought it the wisest way to redeem their good opinion, by giving all contentment unto the popular faction, which was then grown to be master of that city. And in good time, for this purpose, were the Athenian ambassadors come, treading (as one may say) upon Phocion's heels, whom they were sent to accuse. These had solemn audience given to them in the king's presence, who was attended by many great lords, and, for ostentation's sake, was glorified with all exterior shews of majesty; yet all too little to change Ariæus into Alexander; for he did nothing there but either laugh or chafe, as he saw others do. For beginning of the business, Polysperchon commanded that Dinarchus should be tortured and slain: this was enough to testify his hearty affection to the commonalty of Athens, in that he spared not his old acquaintance for their sake, whose ambassadors he then bade to speak. When their errand was done, and answer to it made by the accused, who had no indifferent hearing, Phocion and the rest were pronounced guilty of treason; but to give sentence, and do the execution upon them, was (for honour's sake) referred unto the city of Athens, because they were burgesses. Then were they sent away to Athens, where the rascal multitude, not suffering them to speak for themselves, condemned them to die. So they perished, being innocent. But the death of Phocion, a man very conspicuous, made the

fortune of the rest to be of the less regard. Five and forty times had he been chosen governor of the city, never suing for the place, but sent for when he was absent ; so well was his integrity known, and so highly valued, even of such as were no pretenders to the same virtue. He was a good commander in war, wherein, though his actions were not very great, yet were they of good importance, and never unfortunate. Never did the city repent of having followed his counsel, nor any private man of having trusted his word. Philip of Macedon highly esteemed him ; so, and much more did Alexander, who (besides other signs of his love) sent him two hundred talents of silver, and offered to bestow upon him of four cities in Asia any one which he would choose. But Phocion refused these and other gifts, howsoever importunately thrust upon him, resting well contented with his honest poverty ; wherein he lived above fourscore years, and then was compelled by the unjust judgment of wicked men to drink that poison, which, by just judgment of the righteous God, so infected the city of Athens, as from that day forwards it never brought forth any worthy man resembling the virtue of their ancestors.

SECT. XVI.

Of Polysperchon's vain expedition against Cassander.

Not long after these things were done, Cassander, with such forces as Antigonus lent him, entered into Piræus ; which news drew Polysperchon headlong into Attica with a great army, but so ill victualled that he was fain to depart without any thing done ; only he had given some impediment to the enemy, who, not contented with defending what he held, began to look out and make new purchases abroad. Finding, therefore, himself unable to drive Cassander out of Athens, he left his son Alexander, with such number of men as exceeded not the proportion

of victuals, to withstand his further encroaching. The greatest part of his army he carried into Peloponnesus to make the country sure to himself, wherein Cassander had many friends.

His doings in Peloponnesus were such as they had been in other parts of Greece. First, he began to fight with edicts, restoring the democracy, or popular form of government. He commanded that the principal citizens, that had by Antipater been made rulers, should be either slain or driven into exile. This decree took immediate effect in most places; the vulgar sort being very ready to seal the charter of their freedom and authority with the blood of those who had kept them in subjection. Yet many cities there were which delighted in the rule of the chief citizens; and many which wished well to Cassander, especially they of Megalopolis, on whom Polysperchon meant to inflict an exemplary punishment of disobedience to him, which he termed rebellion. Megalopolis had in it fifteen thousand serviceable men, well furnished with necessaries, and resolved to endure the worst. And need there was of such resolution: for Polysperchon coming thither with all his power, did so much, that he overthrew, by a mine, three of their bulwarks, and all the space of wall between them; but the defendants manfully repelled the Macedonians which came up to the breach; and at the same time, with great labour, they raised up an inner wall, to bear out the next assault. The assailants having failed to carry the town at the first attempt, took much pains to clear the ground, and make fair way for their elephants, whose violence was likely to overthrow all that came in their way. But the townsmen perceiving their drift, prepared boards, driven through with long nails, which they used as gall-throps, bestowing them slightly covered, with the points upwards, in the way by which the beasts were to pass. Neither did they set any to encounter them in front; but appointed certain light-

armed men to beat upon their sides with arrows and darts, as they were instructed by some that had learned the manner of that fight in the Asian wars. Of these provisions they made happy use in the next assault; for by them were the elephants (wherein the enemy chiefly trusted) either sorely hurt, or driven back upon the Macedonians, whom they trampled under feet. Polysperchon came as ill furnished for long abode to Megalopolis as before to Athens. Therefore, being neither able to dispatch the business quickly, nor to take such leisure as was requisite, he forsook the siege, with some loss and much dishonour, leaving some part of his army to lie before the town for his credit.

After this, he sent Clitus his admiral to sea, to join with Aridæus, that was come out of Phrygia, and to cut off all succour which might come to the enemy out of Asia. Cassander also sent his whole fleet under Nicanor, who taking along with him some ships of Antigonus, came to the Propontis, where he fought with Clitus, and was beaten. But Antigonus, hearing of the overthrow, gathered together the ships that were escaped, and manning them very well, sent out Nicanor again, assuring him of the victory, as well he might; for he sent out sufficient numbers of light-armed men, whom he caused to be wafted over the straits in small vessels by night; these, before day-light, setting upon Clitus, drove his men, that lay securely on the land, headlong into their ships; in which tumult, Nicanor arriving, did assail them so lustily, that few or none escaped him.

This loss at sea, together with his bad success by land, brought Polysperchon into great contempt. He had a good facility in penning bloody decrees; but when the execution was referred to his own sword, he could find the matter more difficult. Wherefore, the Athenians perceiving that he had left them to shift for themselves, and was not able to give

them protection against the enemy which lay in their bosoms, came to agreement with Cassander, accepting a governor of his appointment, and restoring all things to the same state wherein Antipater had left them. The like inclination to the party of Cassander was found in very many cities of Greece, which daily and willingly revolted unto him, as to an industrious man, and likely to prevail in the end. Thus was the whole country set in a combustion, uneasy to be quenched; which presented unto Antigonus an opportunity that he neglected not,—of making himself lord of Asia.

SECT. XVII.

Antigonus seeks to make himself an absolute lord; and thereupon treats with Eumenes, who disappointeth him. Phrygia and Lydia won by Antigonus.

ANTIGONUS had in Antipater's lifetime a firm resolution, to make unto himself the utmost benefit that he might of the army committed to his charge. And in fair season for advancement of his purposes came the news of Antipater's death; even then, when all the business in Pisidia was dispatched, and no more employment for the army remaining, save only the continuance of the siege of Nora; a small thing of itself, but as hard as a great matter, and requiring few men, but much time, when time of all things was most precious. Eumenes lay in that fort of Nora, able to make the place good, and hoping that the mutability to which the present state was manifestly subject, would in continuance of some years (which he might abide) work more for him than his enemies in that space could work against him. His most fear was, that for want of exercise in that narrow castle, his men and horses might grow sickly and unserviceable; which made him to practise many devices of keeping them in health and lusty.

But when he had continued shut up in this manner about a year, his hopes came to good pass, and he was eased of his cares by Antigonus himself, whose forces held him besieged.

Antigonus knowing the great sufficiency of Eumenes, and considering his fidelity shewed unto Perdiccas, thought that he could not find in all the world a fitter man than him to employ in managing those high designs, wherein he doubted not that he should be withstood by the mightiest princes of the empire. He sent therefore to Eumenes by one that was friend to them both, acquainting him with some part of his intent, and promising to make him a greater lord than ever he had been, and the next man to himself, if things fell out as he desired; in regard whereof he required only his friendship, and thereupon sent him an oath to take; which done, he might at his good pleasure issue safely out of Nora, and enjoy his perfect liberty. Eumenes perusing the form of the oath, perceived the meaning of Antigonus, which was rather to make him his follower than his fellow: For whereas, in a few words, it mentioned the king and princes of the blood, rather to keep the decorum, than upon any loyal intent; the binding words and sum of all the rest were such as tied him fast only to Antigonus, omitting all reservation of duty to the king or any other. This he liked not, holding it unseemly to become a sworn man to him with whom he had fought for the mastery; and being assured that his voluntary assistance, which way soever he gave, would be more acceptable, and far more honourable than the course propounded. Yet would he not therefore break off the negociation, and wait for some better occasion of enlargement, which might perhaps be long in coming, but seeming to be well agreed with Antigonus, he prepared to give up his hold and depart. As for the oath itself, when he came to take it, he made show of dislike, in that it was not solemn enough for such per-

sonages as they were, who could not be too ceremonious in testifying their allegiance. The Macedonians which lay encamped before Nora, liked his words, and gave him leave to put in Olympias, and the children of Alexander, binding himself to them and their adherents, as well as to Antigonus, and so he departed.

Antigonus had taken upon him, as soon as he came down to the sea-side, to remove some of the governors of the provinces, behaving himself according to the authority which he had received of Antipater to exercise in the time of war. Neither did he want sufficient pretence whereby to justify his proceedings. For, if Polysperchon might lawfully hold the protectorship, which the old man doting on his death-bed bequeathed unto him as a legacy, without consent of the princes or soldiers,—why might not he himself as well retain the lieutenantship of Asia, that was granted unto him for the general good of the state, in presence of the whole army, by the king, and by Antipater, who had power to ordain what should seem convenient whilst he lived, not to dispose of things that should happen after his death? To give a fair colour to his ambition, this was enough: if any were not herewith satisfied, he had threescore thousand footmen, ten thousand horse, and thirty elephants, in a readiness to answer them.

The first that perceived his drift, and provided to resist him, was Aridæus, governor of Phrygia, who fortified the towns of his own province, and sought to have won Cyzicus, a fair haven town, and seated very conveniently for him, but was fain to go away without it. Hereupon Antigonus took occasion to command him out of the country. Aridæus was so far from obeying him, that he sent forces to relieve Eumenes. Nevertheless, finding that he was unable of himself to make long resistance, he took such companies as he could draw along with him, and so passed over into Europe, to complain at the court.

The like fortune had Clitus, who ruled in Lydia, and sought the like remedy of his fortune, with some hope at the first, (for both of them were entertained with very good words,) which quickly vanished, and grew desperate, when they were beaten at sea, as hath already been declared.

SECT. XVIII.

Antigonus pursues Eumenes. Eumenes having authority from the court, raiseth great war against Antigonus, in defence of the royal house.

ANTIGONUS having thus gotten into his hands all, or most of Asia the Less, was able to have entered Macedon, and seized upon the court; which that he forbore to do, it proceeded (as may seem) from some of these reasons. It would have bred as much jealousy in Cassander, as fear in Polysperchon, which might have brought them to terms of reconciliation; it would ask more time than he could spare; and the envy which followed the protectorship was such, as he that had power enough without the office, ought rather to shun than to pursue. Besides all this, it was manifest that Eumenes would not only refuse to take his part, but would make war upon him in defence of the royal house, to which it was found that Antigonus did not stand well affected. Against him therefore he bent his course, and with an army of twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, made great haste toward Cilicia, hoping to suppress him before he should be able to make head.

Eumenes was one of those few that continued faithful to their dead master, which being well known in the court, he had commission sent unto him from thence to raise an army, and make war upon Antigonus, taking of the king's treasure as much as he should need. Other letters also there were, directed to all the governors of provinces, requiring them to give assistance to Eumenes, and be ordered by his

direction; especially to the captains of the old soldiers, called the Argyraspides, or silver-shielded bands, commandment was given to be at his appointment. He had of his own followers gathered together two thousand foot, and five hundred horse, before his authority was given him; but now he purposed, with all the strength that he could make, to fight with Antigonus in defence of the royal blood. Olympias had written to him, desiring him to bring help to her and to her nephew the son of Alexander, and in the mean time to give her his advice in that which Polysperchon required of her; for she was desirous to return into Macedon, but suspected his ambition as not contained within lawful bounds. Eumenes, therefore, counselled her to remain in Epirus, till such time as he could bring the war to a good issue; which done, he promised that his faith and care should not be wanting to the seed of Alexander.

Strange it is to consider, that, in all the empire, scarce any one could be found among the noblemen, in whom Alexander's mother, wives, and children, might repose firm confidence, saving only this Eumenes, a stranger to the Macedonian blood, born at Cardia, a city of Thrace. His reputation was no more than his own virtue had made it; his followers obeyed at their own discretion; and compelled he was to travel as far as Persia, to gather together an army sufficient to resist the enemies that pursued his heels.

SECT. XIX.

How the princes of Macedon stood affected mutually. Olympias takes Aridæus and Eurydice, whom she cruelly puts to death.

Now, forasmuch as in this present war all the rulers of the provinces did intermeddle; and great alteration happened, not only in the parts of Asia, but

in Macedon itself, which brought a new face unto the state, by the extirpation of the royal house of Philip and Alexander ; I hold it convenient in this place, before we enter into the particulars of the war itself, to shew briefly how the great ones did mutually stand affected, and by what passions they were drawn into those courses which overthrew most of them, and out of their ruins built the greatness of a few ; as likewise to what extremity the faction broke out in Macedon itself, about the main controversy of the title to the crown, whereupon all other quarrels were or should have been depending.

Aridæus, the king, being fearful and simple, did only what he was bidden.

Polysperchon, desirous to continue long in office, had a purpose to advance the son of Alexander, by Roxana, to the kingdom, and become governor to a king of his own making.

Eurydice, the queen, discovering plainly this intent, and meaning nothing less than to let her husband serve as a stale, keeping the throne warm till another were grown old enough to sit in it, grew acquainted with Cassander, who hated the memory of Alexander, and was therefore the fitter for her turn.

Cassander held fresh in mind the danger wherein his family had been through Alexander's malice, together with the indignity offered to himself by Alexander, who knocked his head against a wall, for deriding one that adored him after the Persian manner. The displeasure hereof, and the pleasure which he took in the amorous queen, made him resolve both to suppress the lineage which he hated, and to maintain his beloved mistress, either by supporting her weak husband, or by taking her to be his own wife.

The rest of the lords held it a thing indifferent who reigned over all, so as they might reign in their several countries, and establish their authority in such wise that it might not be taken from them.

Among these, Ptolemy and Antigonus were well enough already, if their ambition would have suffered them to see it.

Pytho and Seleucus lying far off, and being strong, had some good hope to encroach upon their neighbours. Against these, Peucestes and some others, with much ado, hardly made resistance, until such time as Eumenes came to them, who propounded to himself great matters, which he lived not to accomplish.

Olympias, the old queen, (as it is common with step-dames,) hated the children of her husband by his other wives. It was thought that she had given poison to Aridæus, which, failing to take away his life, had much impaired both his body and wits. Now she, considering that Eumenes was too full of business to come home so soon as she wished that he should, and that Cassander daily prevailed in Greece, thought it the best way to join with Polysperchon, and set up as king her nephew Alexander, the son of Roxana, removing Aridæus before Cassander were able to defend him. To this intent she procured men among her kindred in Epirus, and so took her way towards Polysperchon, who, joining with her, entered into Macedon.

Eurydice hearing this news, wrote very earnestly to Cassander, praying him to set aside all other business, and come to succour her. She herself, by entreaty, gifts, and promises, drew to her party as many of the Macedonians as she could, until she thought her own side strong enough; and then, taking her husband with her, went boldly forth against Olympias and the traitor Polysperchon.

These two queens met armed, as if the matter should have been determined by their own hands, which ended without any stroke stricken by the revolt of those who followed Eurydice. For as soon as the Macedonians beheld Olympias, calling to mind her former estate, and the victorious reigns of her

husband and son, they refused to lift any weapon against her. Eurydice finding herself thus forsaken, fled towards Amphipolis, but was intercepted and made prisoner with her husband.

Olympias having obtained this victory without blood, thought that all things would succeed as easily, and that upon the same considerations for which they had refused to bear arms against her, the Macedonians would not stick to maintain her, whatsoever her proceedings were. Having therefore shut up Aridæus and his wife in a close room, where they could scarce turn round, she fed them through a little hole, till, after a while, it came in her head, (for fear lest the people should have commiseration of him who had reigned almost six years and a half,) to put them to death. So she delivered Aridæus to some barbarous Thracians, who took away his life by cruel torments; to Eurydice she sent a sword, a halter, and a cup of poison, willing her to choose the instrument of her own death, who, praying that the like presents might one day be sent to Olympias, yielded her neck to the halter, having spent her last curses not in vain. Nicanor, the brother of Cassander, and a hundred the chief of his friends, did Olympias then choose out, all whom she commanded to be slain. His brother Iolaus, that was already dead and buried, she accused of poison given to Alexander, and thereupon caused his tomb to be thrown down, and his bones to be scattered abroad. The Macedonians, wondering at this fury, began to condemn themselves, and the folly of Polysperchon, who had, quite contrary to Antipater's charge given on his death-bed, called this outrageous woman to the government of the empire.

SECT. XX.

How Cassander was revenged upon Olympias.

(1.) *The great expedition of Cassander. Olympias shuts herself into Pydna, where Cassander besieged her. Æacidas, king of Epirus, coming to succour Olympias, is forsaken, and banished by his own subjects.*

CASSANDER, at that time, lay before Tegea, in Peloponnesus; whither when all these ill tidings were brought to him, he never staid to take the city, nor to give order for the state of things in that country, though Alexander, the son of Polysperchon, were there with an army; but compounding with them of Tegea, he willed his associates to look to themselves as well as they could, till his return; and so in all haste he took his journey towards Macedon, carried headlong with the greedy desire of just revenge. The Ætolians had taken the streights of Thermopylæ, in favour of the queen and Polysperchon, to hinder his passage; but he, not willing to mispend any time in dealing with them, got together as many ships as he could, great and small, with which he transported his army into Thessaly. There he divided his companies, appointing some under Callas, a subtle captain, to hold Polysperchon busied, who then lay encamped near to Perbebia; with the rest he marched directly against Olympias. She, having once prevailed by the respect given to her dignity, took more care now to appear majestical, to make herself strong. To this end, she made a solemn progress to Pydna, a sea town, and well fenced, having in her company all the flower of the court, especially the great ladies, among whom was Roxana, and her young son Alexander, heir to the great Alexander, by his grandmother's designment; who during his minority, kept the sovereign power in her own hands. But all

this pomp served to little use against the violence of the enemy, that soon presented himself before the walls ; only it fed the besieged with a vain hope of succour, that would from all parts arrive, to rescue persons of their quality. And hereof there soon appeared fair likelihood, which as soon vanished, and went away in smoke.

For Æacidas, king of Epirus, made great haste to bring succour to Olympias, his cousin, with whom Deodamia, his daughter, was also shut up. Nevertheless, his subjects were nothing forward in this expedition ; but finding certain passages taken in the way by Cassander's men, they called upon him to retire and quit the enterprise. The king's importunity, urging them to proceed, and the obstinate refusal of the army, broke out at length into such terms, that when he had raged in vain against the multitude, his authority, with which he thought to have prevailed upon them, was, by them, taken from him, and he compelled to forsake his kingdom, and to wander up and down in foreign countries, a banished man ; his people joining with the enemy against whom he had led them forth to war.

Pydna, in the mean time, was closed up straitly both by sea and land ; so that neither any could issue out of the city, nor any relief be conveyed into it ; but it held out as long as any food was left, no memorable service being done there, whilst great actions were managed abroad.

(2.) *A continuation of Olympias's story. Polysperchon defeated. Extreme famine in Pydna. Olympias yields to Cassander.*

Now, though order of time require it, that we should rehearse the doings of Eumenes and Antigonus in this place, leaving Olympias yet a while to the hour of her destiny, which grows the faster upon her because she may discern it coming ; yet that we

may not be compelled to interrupt the course of our narration, by inserting her tragedy in the midst of things not manifestly coherent with it, we will here (as elsewhere we have done, and elsewhere must) continue to end one history, that we may not be therewith distracted, when we shall come to the relation of another. All the hope of the besieged remaining in Polysperchon, was in like manner disappointed, as their former trust had been, which was reposed in the succours of the Epirot. For Callas, who was sent against him, found the means to corrupt the greatest part of his army with money, leaving him within a little while so slenderly accompanied, that he was fit for no other business of war, than a swift retreat. When famine had so far prevailed in the city that the horses were killed as a precious food, many men feeding on the dead carcasses of their fellows, and saw-dust being given to the elephants for provender; some of the soldiers obtaining the queen's leave (who could not deny it,) others, without asking leave, yielded themselves to the enemy, and were by him gently relieved, and sent abroad into the country. The news of the queen's affairs, dispersed by these men, did so affright her well-willers, that such as had reserved themselves to the event, came in apace, and submitted themselves to Cassander. At length when the mortality was so great in the town, that the living were even poisoned by the noisome scent of the dead, Olympias bethought herself of stealing away by sea in a galley that she had, wherein her success was as bad as in the rest. For God had appointed this town, by her chosen as a place of refuge, to be unto her as a house of torment, and a gaol, out of which she should not be delivered, but unto an evil death. Being therefore utterly broken with miseries, which daily afflicted her, and the other ladies, unaccustomed to so wretched a kind of life, she offered composition; and, with much labour, hardly

obtained of Cassander (who, having fetched her galley out of the haven, accounted himself as good as master of her body) a grant of her own life. Immediately, upon her apprehension, Pella, the chief city of the kingdom, was yielded to Cassander. Amphipolis did stand out; for Aristonus, to whom Olympias had given charge of such forces as were left abroad in the country, taking courage from the success of some petty services wherein he had prevailed, began to promise himself great unlikelihoods. But Olympias, to win Cassander's favour, very earnestly required him, upon his faith to her, that he should give it up. He did so, and presently after was killed by his private enemies, that were set on by Cassander, who partly hated him upon old respects, partly doubted him as a man likely to seek innovation.

(3.) *The death of Olympias, and her conditions.*

WHEN Olympias had now heard sorrowful tidings of all her friends, she herself was called into question, and accused in an assembly of the Macedonians, for the murders, (they were so stiled in her affliction, which in time of prosperity she called justice,) by her committed. There was she, (being not heard, nor called to speak) condemned to die. The suit was commenced and prosecuted, against her, by the kindred of those whom she had slain; but it was at Cassander's instigation, who (to hasten the execution) sent her word, that he would furnish her with a ship, and other necessaries, to save herself by flight; which when she refused, saying, that she would plead for herself, and tell her own tale, he dissembled no longer, but sent unto her such men as hated her most, who took away her miserable life. She was daughter and sister unto two kings of Epirus, wife and mother unto two the mightiest kings of that or many other ages, a stout lady, and of unreprieveable chastity; but her ambition was boundless,

her hatred unappeasable, and her fury, in revenge, most unwomanly. Her perverse conditions, made her husband seek other wives and concubines, which caused her to hate both him and them. She was thought privy to her husband's death; after which, very cruelly, she slew his late wife Cleopatra, having first murdered one of her two children in her arms, and, with a beastly fury, broiled the other alive in fire, in a copper bason. For these things, her son Alexander, (otherwise loving her well,) forbade her to meddle in the government of Macedon. But God, more severe unto cruel tyrants, than only to hinder them of their wills, permitted her to live and fulfil the rest of her wickedness, (which was his justice upon the adulteries of Philip, and the oppression done by him and others;) after all which, he rewarded her malice, by returning it upon her own head.

(4.) *Cassander celebrates the funeral of Aridæus and Eurydice; and seeks to make himself king of Macedon.*

AFTER her death, Cassander gave honourable burial to Aridæus and Eurydice, among their progenitors, kings of Macedon. And looking further into his own possibilities of greatness, he married the lady Thessalonica, whom he had taken at Pydna, being the daughter of king Philip, by another of his wives, that by her he might have some title to the crown. For the same end, he committed Roxana and her young son to close prison, removing thereby some part of his impediment. And the better to increase his fame, and purchase love, he built a city, called by his own name, Cassandria, that soon grew to be very great and powerful. He re-edified likewise Thebes in Greece, and restored it unto the old inhabitants, after it had lain twenty years waste, being utterly razed by Alexander. By these means, especially by the restoration of Thebes, whereunto all Greece voluntarily contributed, he grew so strong,

that few remained enemies unto him; and they, with much labour, hardly could resist him. Leaving him therefore daily prevailing in Greece, we will return to them who contended in Asia for less titles, but larger provinces, with greater forces.

CHAP. IV.

OF THE GREAT LORDSHIP WHICH ANTIGONUS GOT IN
ASIA.

SECT. I.

The journey of Eumenes into Persia. His wise dealing with those that joined with him.

EUMENES, having joined unto his company the Argyraspides, made haste into the eastern parts, to take possession of those countries, according to his commission, and strengthen himself against Antigonus. He took his journey through Cœlosyria and Phœnicia, hoping to reclaim those provinces, usurped with the rest of Syria, (as hath been shewed) by Ptolemy, to the king's obedience. But to effect this, his haste of passing forward was too great, his army too little, and the readiness of the people to return to their due obedience none at all. Besides all which impediments, one inconvenience troubled him in all his proceedings, making them the less effectual. The captains of the Argyraspides were so forward, that they scorned to repair to him, and take his direc-

tions; and their fidelity was so unsteady, that he might have more easily dealt with open traitors. It was not expedient, that he, being general, should weaken his authority, by courting them; neither lay it in his power to keep them in order by compulsion. Therefore he feigned, that Alexander had appointed unto him, in a dream, a place for their meeting; namely, in a rich pavilion, wherein an empty throne was placed, as if Alexander himself had been present at their consultations. Thus he freed himself from their vain pride, but of their faith he could have no assurance. Yet when Ptolemy requested them, and Antigonus bribed them to forsake him, they continued, (though not without considering of the matter,) to take his part. So he marched on, sending before him the king's warrant, which Pytho and Seleucus refused to obey, not as rejecting the king's authority, but excepting against the person of Eumenes, as a man condemned to die by the Macedonian army, for the death of Craterus. Eumenes, knowing well that he was not to rely upon their assistance, who stood otherwise affected than his affairs required, and were not to be dealt with by persuasion, sought passage by strong hand through the country of Babylon, in such wise, that Seleucus, having in vain assayed to hinder him, by opening the sluices of Euphrates, was glad at length to grant him friendly way, as desirous to be rid of him. Thus he came to Peucestes, and the rest of the eastern lords, who were glad of his company, because of the differences between Pytho, Seleucus, and themselves. Yet the contention about superiority grew very hot among them, every one finding matter enough to feed his own humour of self-worthiness. But the former device of assembling in one pavilion, made all quiet; the conclusion ever being sure to follow that which Eumenes propounded, who was both wisest in giving advice, and best able to reward, by means of the authority given him, to take what he pleased of the king's trea-

tures. By these means he won to himself many of those who had most power to do good or hurt.

SECT. II.

How Antigonus, coming to set upon Eumenes, was driven off with loss.

ANTIGONUS, hearing that Eumenes lay in the province of Susa, had an earnest desire to follow him, and drive him further from the king's treasures, which were kept there. To which end, as soon as he had made himself strong enough, he removed out of Mesopotamia, where he had wintered; and taking to him Pytho and Seleucus, with their men, he marched directly against the enemies, with intent to give them battle. Eumenes had fortified the castle of Susa, and was retired back toward Persia, keeping the river of Tigris between him and his pursuers. The passages of the river were well guarded, and good espial kept upon Antigonus, to observe which way he took. Before he came to Tigris itself, he was to pass over Coprates, a great river, and not fordable, which he sought to do by small vessels, whereof he had no great store. A great part of his army had gotten over, when Eumenes, who kept a bridge upon Tigris, came with a thousand horse, and four thousand foot, to see their demeanour; and finding them out of order, charged them, broke them, and drove them headlong back into Coprates, wherein most of them were drowned; very few escaping with life, except four thousand that yielded themselves prisoners, in sight of Antigonus, that was not able to relieve them. This loss made Antigonus glad to fall off; and the heat of that country in the dog-days breeding diseases in the army, by which many perished, caused him to remove as far as into Media. So he took Python with him, (leaving Seleucus to besiege the castle of Susa,) and seek,

ing to go the nearest way, passed through savage nations, that continually vexing him with skirmishes, slew great numbers of his men before he could arrive in Media with his troops, that were quite heart-broken.

SECT. III.

Of Eumenes's cunning. A battle between him and Antigonus.

AFTER his departure, Eumenes with his associates fell into consultation about the remainder of their business. Fain he would have had them to enter upon those provinces which Antigonus had left behind him; to which also the captains of the Argyraspides, or *Silvershields*, were very inclinable, as desiring to draw nearer to Greece. But Peucestes and the rest, whose dominions lay in the high countries, had more care of their own particular estates, and would needs march eastward. These carried it, for the army was not strong enough to divide itself into parts.

When they came into Persia, Peucestes ruling there, feasted them royally, and sought by all means to win the soldiers' love to himself. Eumenes, perceiving whereunto those doings tended, suffered him a while to keep good cheer, till the time of war drew near. Then did he feign an epistle, directed as from Orontes, governor of Armenia, to Peucestes himself; the purport whereof was, that Olympias had vanquished Cassander, and sent over a great army under Polysperchon, to join with Eumenes. These news, as they filled the camp with vain joy, so they wrought in all men's minds a great willingness to obey Eumenes, by whom was the likeliest appearance of their preferment; wherein they dealt wisely, he being far the most sufficient commander, as they found soon after. For when Antigonus, coming out of Media, drew near unto them, Eumenes by some mischance was fallen sick, and fain to be carried in a litter; the army marched in very bad array, and was likely to

have been forced to take battle in that disorder. But Eumenes, when the rest of the captains were amazed, was carried about the army in a litter, and upon the sudden did cast his men into so good form, that Antigonus, perceiving him afar off, could not refrain from giving him deserved commendations. Yet he did not cease to promise great rewards to the captains, and all sorts of men, if they would forsake Eumenes; which hopes deceiving him, he came to the trial of a battle. Eumenes had more elephants than Antigonus, otherwise, he was inferior in number both of horse and foot by a third part. The battle was fought with variable success, and great loss on both sides, continuing a part of the day, and of the night following, yet the victory was uncertain. For Eumenes could not force his men to lie far from their carriages, by which means Antigonus, (who had a more absolute command over his,) encamping on the ground whereon they fought, had in his power the dead bodies, which was accounted the sign of victory; for he buried his own, and gave leave to his enemies, craving it, to do the like; but a greater sign of victory had Eumenes, for he abode still in the same place, and not only buried his men very honourably at great leisure, but held the country round about; whereas Antigonus was glad (having tarried but one day) to steal away by night, and return into Media, from whence he came.

SECT. IV.

Of divers stratagems practised by Antigonus and Eumenes, one against the other.

THUS did the war continue doubtful, and was protracted to a greater length, each part having stout soldiers, and skilful generals; but the side which had hitherto prevailed, being hindered by the equal authority of many, from pursuing all advantages to the best. Antigonus grew daily weaker in men and reputation; so that to repair himself, he

could find no way safer, than to put all to adventure. He knew that his enemies lay in their wintering-places, quartered far asunder; so that if he could suddenly come among them, he was likely to put them in great distress. Between him and them the way was not long, being only nine days journey; but very bad, through a rough, dry wilderness, hardly passable. Another way fairer, and leading through a country well peopled, but requiring twenty-five days journey, he forsook, partly for the length, partly and chiefly because he would come undiscovered. So therefore taking his journey in the dead of winter, he forbade his men the use of fire by night, because he would not have them descried afar off. This commandment had been well observed four or five days, when continuance of time (as commonly) breeding negligence, and the cold weather pinching them, they were bold to cherish themselves, being near to their way's end. The light of these fires gave notice of their coming, which being reported to Peucestes, and other captains, they were so astonished with the sudden danger, that in all haste they betook themselves to flight. But Eumenes, meeting with the news, began to hearten his affrighted companions, promising to make Antigonus march leisurely, and willing them to abide and draw up their men together. They could scarce believe him, yet they were content to be ruled, and did as he appointed, who failed not in making his word good. He took with him some companies of the readiest men, wherewith he occupied certain tops of mountains, looking toward the camp of Antigonus; there he chose a convenient ground to encamp upon, and made great store of fires in sundry places, as if the whole army had been present. This was a sorrowful spectacle to Antigonus, who thought himself prevented of his purpose, and began to fear lest he should be compelled to fight, whilst his men were tired with a long and painful journey. Therefore he resolved to turn aside,

and take the way to such places as might better serve to refresh his army. This he did with great care and circumspection at the first, as knowing how ready Eumenes would be upon all advantages. But after a while, considering that no enemy stirred about him, he began to pause and think in himself, that somewhat or other was not fallen out according to his opinion. To be the better informed in the matter, he caused some inhabitants of that desert to be taken, and brought before him; of whom he learned, that they had seen no other army than his thereabouts, but only a few men that kept fires on the hill-tops. It vexed him exceedingly to find that he had been so deluded; therefore he went against these troops with great fury, meaning to take sharp vengeance on them for having so deceived him. But by this time sufficient strength was arrived there, which could not be forced without much business and long time. All the army was come, save only Eudamus, captain of the elephants, who, besides those beasts, had no more than four hundred horsemen in his company. Antigonus, hearing of this supply coming to his enemies, sent above two thousand horse, and all his light-armed footmen, to cut it off by the way. Eudamus being fallen into this danger, was fain to place his elephants round about his carriages, and so to defend himself as well as he could; for his horsemen, overlaid with multitudes, were quickly broken, and driven away upon the spur. Neither knew they who sat upon the elephants which way to turn them; for on all sides they received wounds, and were not able to requite them with the like. In this extremity there appeared brave troops of horse and foot, that came unexpected to the rescue, and charging the assailants upon the back, drove them to seek their own safety by speedy flight. These were sent by Eumenes, who, though he knew not what his adversary meant to do, yet he knew very well what was fittest

for him to do ; and therefore playing both games himself, provided the remedy.

SECT. V.

The conspiracy of Peucestes and others against Eumenes's life.

By these means Eumenes won great honour, and was by the whole army acknowledged a most expert general, and well worthy of the chief command. But Peucestes and the other captains, conscious of their own insufficiency, were so transported with envy, that they could no longer contain their vile thoughts, but held communication, as upon a necessary point, how they might find means to murder him.

Surely it is great injustice to impute the mischief contrived against worthy men to their own proud carriage, or some other ill deserving ; for, though it often happen, that small vices do serve to counterpoise great virtues, (the sense of evil being more quick and lasting than of good,) yet he shall bewray a very foolish malice, that, wanting other testimony, will think it a part of wisdom to find good reason of the evils done to virtuous men, which oftentimes have no other cause than virtue itself. Eumenes, among many excellent qualities, was noted to be of singular courtesy, of a very sweet conversation among his friends, and careful by all gentle means to win their love that seemed to bear him any secret ill affection. It was his mere virtue that overthrew him, which even they that sought his life acknowledged. For they concluded that he should not be slain before the battle were fought with Antigonus, wherein they confessed that it stood best with their safety to be governed by his direction. Of this treason he was quickly advertised by Eudamus, to whom he had done many pleasures, and by some others of whom he used to borrow money when he needed not, to the end that they should be careful of his good for fear

of losing their own. Considering, therefore, and discoursing with himself of the villainy intended against him, he made his last will, and burnt all his writings that contained any matter of secret ; which done, he revolved many things in his mind, being doubtful what course were best to follow. All the nobles of the empire stood ill-affected to the royal blood, excepting those which were with him, that were more in number than in worth. How things at that time stood in Macedon and Greece, either he knew not, or knowing the truth, knew nothing that might encourage him to seek their help that needed his. To make his own peace with Antigonus had been against his faith to Olympias and the princes that had committed this great power into his hands. For which cause also it may be thought, that he forbore either to lose the battle willingly, or to fly into Cappadocia, and make shift for himself among his old friends. At length he resolved to do his best against the common enemy, and afterwards to look to himself as well as he might.

SECT. VI.

The last battle between Antigonus and Eumenes.

THE soldiers, especially those old bands of the *Silver-shields*, finding Eumenes perplexed, and not knowing the cause, entreated him not to doubt of the victory, but only to bring them into the field, and set them in array ; for the rest, they alone would take sufficient order. The like alacrity was generally found in the common soldier's faces ; but the chief commanders were so mischievously bent against him, that they could not endure to think of being beholden to him for the victory ; yet he ordered the battle so well, that, without their own great fault, they could hardly fail of getting the upperhand.

Before the armies came to joining, a horseman from the side of Eumenes, proclaimed with a loud

voice to the followers of Antigonus, that their wickedness in fighting against their own fathers would now be punished, as it well deserved. This was not spoken in vain; for the *Silver-shields* were men of threescore or seventy years old, and strengthened more by continual exercise than decayed by age, and excelling in courage, as having passed through greater dangers than any like to be presented in that fight. Therefore Antigonus's men (who had often been beaten by them, and were now to try their last hope with these resolute warriors, the most ancient and best regarded of all Alexander's soldiers) grew very pensive, and advanced heavily, suspecting their own cause, and fearing that the threatenings uttered would prove true.

Antigonus was now again far the stronger in horse, which gave him cause of great hope, the ground on which they were to fight being a plain levelled field. Placing therefore himself and his son Demetrius in the right wing, and committing the left wing to Python, he did set forward courageously against the enemies, that were ready to give him a sharp entertainment.

Eumenes took unto him Peucestes, with the rest of the lords, and stood in the left wing of his battle, in the face of Antigonus, meaning both to prevent the traitors, his companions, of all means to make head against him on the sudden, and (withal) to give proof of his own valour, which perhaps he should no more do, in the face of all his enemies. In the right wing, opposite unto Python, he bestowed the weakest of his horse and elephants, under one Philip, an honest man, and (which was enough at such a time) obedient; commanding him to protract the fight, and make a reasonable retreat, expecting the event of the other side.

So they joined very fiercely; Antigonus labouring to make himself master of all; Eumenes to die an honourable death, or to win such a victory upon his

open enemies as might give him leisure and opportunity to deal with his false friends.

The footmen of Antigonus being, even in their own opinions, far inferior to those whom they must encounter, were, at the first brunt, presently defeated by the *Silver-shields*, who slew above five thousand of them, losing of their own not one man. But in horse, Eumenes was so over-matched that he could not repel Antigonus, who pressed him very hard, but was fain to stand wholly upon defence. Yet his courage wrought so well by example among his followers, that the enemy could not win one foot of ground upon him, until such time as Peucestes, with one thousand five hundred horse, withdrew himself out of the battle, leaving his companions fighting to defend his back. Then did Eumenes desperately rush amongst his enemies, labouring to break open the way unto Antigonus himself; and though he failed of his purpose, yet, with great slaughter, he did so beat upon them which came in his way, that the victory hung a long time in suspense, uncertain which way to incline.

The ground whereon they fought being of a slight sandy mould, through the trampling of horses, men, and elephants, did cast up such a cloud of dust as hindered the prospect, so that no man could see what was done a little from him. Antigonus, finding this advantage, dispatched away some companies of horse, that passed, undiscovered, beyond Eumenes's battles, and came to his carriages, which lay about half a mile from the place of fight, slenderly guarded, (for that the whole body of the army lay between them and danger,) and therefore easily taken. Had Peucestes retired himself no further than unto the carriages, he might not only have defended them, but, peradventure, have surprised those which came to surprise them, and so have done as good a piece of service as a better man; but he was gotten somewhat further, to a place where, out of

danger, he might expect the event; and Eumenes was so over-laboured both in body and mind, that he could not possibly give an eye to every place, being not well able to continue where he was.

It happened so, that the elephants, meeting together, those of Antigonus had the better hand; whereupon Eumenes, finding himself every way overcharged, began to give back, and withdrew himself and his companies, in good order, to the other side of the battle, where Philip (as he was directed) had, by fighting and retiring together, kept that wing from loss. The Antigonians had felt so much of Eumenes that day, that they were well contented to let him depart quietly, and wished not to see him come again, as fain he would have done.

The loss of the carriages was reported unto him as soon as he had any leisure to hear how things went; whereupon he presently ordered his men for a fresh charge, and sent for Peucestes, that was not far off, requesting him to bring in his men, and renew the fight; whereby he trusted, not only to recover their own goods, but to enrich themselves with the spoils of their enemies. Peucestes not only refused to join with him, but immediately withdrew himself into a safer place, where he might be further from such dangerous temptations.

By this the night grew on, and both armies, wearied with fighting, were desirous to return into their camps. Yet Antigonus conceived hope of doing somewhat more; and therefore, taking half his horsemen, he waited upon Eumenes a part of his way homewards, but found no opportunity to offend him; the other half he committed to Python, willing him to set upon the *Silver-shields* in their retreat, which yet he forbore to do, because it appeared too full of danger. So the battle ended, wherein Antigonus had not so much the better in horse as the worse in foot; but the spoil which he got by surprising his

enemy's carriages, made amends for all his other losses.

SECT. VII.

How Eumenes was betrayed to Antigonus, and slain.

EUMENES coming into his camp, and finding the *Silver-shields* extremely discontented with their misfortune, began to cheer them up, and put them in hope of recovering all with advantage; for their brave demeanour that day had so crushed the enemy, that he had no power left wherewith to abide them in open field, and was much less able to draw their carts after him through that great wilderness over the high mountains.

But these persuasions availed nothing. Peucestes was gone; the other captains would needs return into the high countries, and the soldiers had no desire either to fly or fight, but only to recover their goods. Wherefore, Teutamus, one of the two captains of the *Silver-shields*, (who had in former times readily consented unto traitorous motions in hope of gain, but was letted by his partner Antigenes,) finding, as he thought, a fit occasion of making himself great, and winning the love of those bands, dealt secretly with Antigonus, requesting him to restore unto those old soldiers their goods which he had taken, being the only reward of their services in the wars of Philip and Alexander.

Antigonus, as a subtle man, knew very well that they which requested more than they had reason to expect; would also, with a little entreaty, perform a great deal more than they promised; and therefore he lovingly entertained the messengers, filling them with hopes of greater matters than they desired, if they would put Eumenes into his hands, by whom they were seduced to make war against him. This answer pleased them so well, that they forthwith devised how to deliver him alive. Wherefore, coming

about him as at other times to do their duty, and pretending more joy of their victory than sorrow of their loss, which they said they would redeem by another fight; in the midst of this goodly talk they leaped upon him, caught hold of his sword, and bound him fast. So they hauled him away, and, stopping their ears against all persuasions, would not yield so far as to loosen one of his hands, and let him kill himself; but brought him alive, (that was their own general, under whom they had obtained many victories,) as it had been in triumph, into the camp of their enemies.

The press of men running out of the camp to see him was so great, that Antigonus was forced to send a guard of horsemen and elephants to keep him from being smothered, whom he could not suddenly resolve either to kill or save. Very few they were that sued for his life; but of these, Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, was one; the rest were desirous to be rid of him quickly; thinking, belike, that if he were saved, he would soon be the chief in reputation for his great ability. So, after long deliberation, Antigonus concluded that it was the safest way to put him to death; which intending to have done by famine, (perhaps, because he would keep it a while in his own power to reverse this sentence, as desiring, if it might be, to have him live his friend,) haste of other business made him do it by the sword.

To this end came all the travels of that worthy general, Eumenes, who had, with great wisdom, fidelity, and patience, laboured in vain to uphold the family which God had purposed to cast down. He is reckoned among the notable examples of fortune's mutability; but more notable was his government of himself in all her changes. Adversity never lessened his courage, nor prosperity his circumspection. But all his virtue, industry, and wit, were cast away in leading an army, without full power to keep it in due obedience: Therefore, it was not ill answered

by Gaspar de Colligny, admiral of France, in our days, to one that foretold his death, which ensued soon after, in the massacre of Paris, ‘That rather than to lead an army of volunteers, he would die a thousand times.’

Antigonus himself gave to the body of Eumenes honourable funeral, and rewarded the treason wrought against him with deserved vengeance. One chief captain of the *Silver-shields* he burnt alive; many of the other captains he slew; and to the whole multitude of the *Silver-shields*, that had betrayed so worthy a commander, he appointed a leader, that should carry them into far countries, under pretence of wars; but with a privy charge to consume them all, as perjured wretches, letting none of them return alive unto his friends and kindred, or so much as once behold the seas that beat upon the shores of Greece and Macedon.

SECT. VIII.

How Antigonus slew Python, and occupied Media. How he removed governors of provinces, and made himself lord of Persia, carrying away Peucestes.

THE two armies being joined thus in one, were carried into Media, where they spent the rest of the winter; the common soldier idly, the principal men intently bent unto the business ensuing. Python began to consider his own deservings; for that the whole war had been chiefly maintained by the strength and riches of his provinces. Besides, he thought himself as good a man as Antigonus, unless it were in the soldiers opinion, which he judged easy to be purchased with gifts, and therefore spared not to assay them with great liberality. But, in following this course, he was driven by necessity to trust many, of whom he stumbled upon some that were unsecret, and others bearing him no sincere affection. Thus was his purpose discovered to Antigo-

nus, who (nothing like to Python) dissembled his indignation, and rebuked the informers, as breeders of dissension between him and his honourable friend, unto whom he meant to commit the government of all those countries, his own business calling him into the Lower Asia. These reports coming daily to his ears, did finally delude Python. By his greatness with Alexander, his authority in that province where he lay, whereof he was governor, and the love of the soldiers, which he had bought with money, he was strong enough to maintain even an offensive war. But what need had he to use the sword, when he was likely, without contention, to obtain more than his own asking? Therefore he came, as soon as he was sent for, to take his farewell of Antigonus, and to divide the provinces with him, that meant nothing less than to yield to any such division. As soon as he came, he was taken, and accused, condemned to die, and slain out of hand: for Antigonus, having begun with Eumenes, his ancient friend, was not afterwards restrained by any consideration of old acquaintance, from cutting down indifferently all that stood in the way, but swam carelessly through the blood wherein at first he doubtfully waded.

When this business was ended, he appointed a new governor in Media to order the province, and a captain to suppress all commotions; thinking, belike, that the power and authority so divided would hardly agree in one against him from whom both were derived.

After this he marched into Persia, where he was entertained as absolute lord of Asia. There began he to shew how well he understood his own mightiness; for he placed and displaced, at his pleasure, governors in all provinces; leaving none in office that were not his own creatures, except such as lay too far off to be dislodged easily.

Peucestes, who ruled in Persia, thought with good cheer to redeem old offences, but was deceiv-

ed ; having to do with one that could not be taken with such baits. He was carried away, and feasted with goodly words of promise that never took effect. Thus he that envied the virtue of his friend, was driven to flatter (in vain) the fortune of his enemy ; after which he lived a most contemptible life, till he died obscurely, a man forgotten.

SECT. IX.

How Seleucus was chased out of Babylon by Antigonus. The great riches of Antigonus.

SELEUCUS was the next in this visitation : one that had, from time to time, continued in the same tenor of good-will to Antigonus, and now gave proof of his hearty affection towards him, by making the captain of the castle of Susa to meet him on the way, rendering unto him that strong place, and all the treasures therein bestowed. This offer was so great, that Antigonus (though having in his hands the keeper of the place) could hardly believe it, but used him with excessive kindness, for fear so good a mood should change. In that castle he found all the treasures of Alexander, with the jewels of the Persian kings, which, added to his former store of money, made up twenty-five thousand talents. Having all this, he might well account himself a happy man, if riches were sufficient to happiness. But large dominion was the mark at which he aimed ; therefore, he proceeded, with intent to leave no country behind his back that should not acknowledge him for sovereign lord. Coming to Babylon, he was entertained by Seleucus with all possible demonstration of love, and honoured with presents befitting the majesty of a king. All this he accepted with great gravity, as being due to him, and began to require an account of the revenues of that province. This demand Seleucus held unreasonable, saying, that it was not needful for him to render unto any man an

account of that province, which was given unto him in respect of his many good services to the state. But whether he spake reason or no, it sufficed that Antigonus was powerful; who urged him daily to come to a reckoning. Manifest it was, that neither want of money, nor any other necessity, moved Antigonus to press him thus; but only the desire to pick matter of quarrel against him, whereof it was likely that he should find such issue as Python and Peucestes had done. Therefore, taking with him only fifty horse, he conveyed himself away, and fled into Ptolemy's dominions, desiring him to protect him from the violence of such a man, as went about to oppress all that, in former times, had been his betters, or at least his equals. Antigonus was glad of his flight; for now all those countries were yielded unto him without battle; whereas to fight with Seleucus for them he wanted all pretence, and to kill him it was not his desire, having received many benefits of him, and those not intermixed, as commonly it happens, with any injuries. Yet it is reported, that the Chaldæans brought a strange prophecy to Antigonus, bidding him to look well to himself, and know, that if Seleucus did escape his hands, he should recover Babylon, yea, win all Asia, and kill Antigonus in battle. Easy believers may give credit to this tale. Had it been true, methinks, Antigonus rather should have hanged those Chaldæans for giving him no warning till it was too late, than sent pursuers (as they say that he did) after him, whom the destinies preserved for so great purposes. When he had settled things at Babylon, he took his journey into Cilicia, where he wintered. There he took up ten thousand talents more of the king's treasures, and, casting his accounts, found his yearly income to amount unto eleven thousand talents.

CHAP. V.

OF THE GREAT CIVIL WAR BETWEEN ALEXANDER'S
CAPTAINS, AND HOW THEY ASSUMED THE NAME AND
STATE OF KINGS.

SECT. I.

*The combination of Ptolemy, Cassander, and others,
against Antigonus. Their demands, and his answer.*

THESE great riches, and the rest of his power, made Antigonus dreaded, envied, and suspected, whereby he quickly was embarked in a new war. Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus, had privily combined themselves together, intending to hinder his further growth, and to bring him to more reason than of his own accord he seemed like to yield unto. Of their practices he had some notice; the good entertainment given unto Seleucus giving him sufficient cause of mistrust. Therefore he sent ambassadors to them severally, entreating them to continue firm in their love towards him that would be ready to requite them with the like. The cold answers which they made, occasioned his hasty preparation against the most forward of them, which was Ptolemy, it being likely that a good army should prevail more than a fair message. Therefore, as soon as the season of the year would permit, he took the way towards Syria, and was encountered by embassy from them all. These told him, that their lords did much rejoice at his victory obtained against Eu-

menes, their common enemy, and the honour that he had thereby gotten : In which war, forasmuch as they, being his confederates, must have endured great loss, with hazard of their whole estates, if the contrary faction had prevailed, they held it very just that all should be partakers in the fruits of that voyage, wherein they had been all adventurers. Wherefore they desired him, that making between them all an equal division of the treasures that were in his hands, (a thing easy to be done,) he would also take some convenient order for enlarging their dominions, according to the rate of his new purchases. This might best be to every one's liking, if he would make over Cappadocia, with Lycia, to Cassander ; and Phrygia, bordering upon the Hellespont, to Lysimachus ; for whereas his own dominions were so much extended eastward by his late victory, he might well spare some of those western provinces, to those that were seated in the west. As for Ptolemy, he would not crave any new addition, but rest contented within his own territories. Provided always, that Seleucus, their common friend, and partner in the late war, might be restored to his own, out of which he had been driven so injuriously, that all of them were forced to take it deeply to heart ; requiring amends, with his friendly consent unto their demands, which otherwise they must labour to obtain with armed hands.

Antigonus knew, that after many losses received, he should yet be able to redeem peace whensoever he listed, with these, or perhaps with easier conditions. Neither was he so weak, to give away quietly any part of his strength into the hands of such bad friends, for fear only lest it should be taken from him perforce. Rather he hoped that he should be able to find them work, more than enough, to defend their own. Therefore, he roundly answered the ambassadors, that it was no part of his meaning to communicate with other men, the profit of that victory

which he alone, without other men's help, had obtained. Though indeed they had already sufficiently gained by him, if they could see it, having by his means kept their governments, whereof they were like to be dispossessed by Polysperchon, and the council of state in Macedon. But what marvel was it, if they considered not how he had saved them, seeing one of them had forgotten the time, when coming to him as a fugitive, and begging succour, he was by his mere bounty relieved, and enabled to get all that he now held? Cassander did not, (said he,) in those days command me to surrender provinces, and give him his equal share of my treasures; but, for his father's sake, desired me to pity him, and help him against his enemies; which I did, by lending him an army and fleet, on confidence whereof he now presumes to threaten me. As for Seleucus, how can he complain of wrong, that durst not stay to plead his right? I did use him well, but his conscience told him that he had deserved ill, else he would not have fled. Let them that so curiously search into my doings, consider well their own, which some of them can hardly justify. I am now in the way to Syria, meaning to examine Ptolemy's proceedings, and, after him, to deal with others, if they continue to provoke me.

SECT. II.

The preparation and beginnings of the war.

WHEN the ambassadors were dismissed with this answer, nothing was thought upon but war. Antigonus, perceiving that he should be invaded from Europe, as soon as he were entered into Syria, left his nephew Ptolemy to guard the sea-coasts, and hinder Cassander from landing in Asia; giving him also in charge, to drive out of Cappadocia some that were already sent over to molest him. Likewise he dispatched messengers into Greece and Cyprus, not

unfurnished of money, to draw friends to his side, and raise up troubles to his enemies. Especially he laboured to make himself the strongest by sea; to which purpose he rather hastened than foreslowed his journey into Syria, that he might get possession of mount Libanus, which afforded many excellent commodities for building of a navy. Therefore, having erected beacons, and laid out post-horses throughout all Asia, to give swift advertisement of all occurrences, he invaded Syria, that was not held against him by any power sufficient to maintain the field.

Ptolemy lay in Egypt, the strength and heart of his dominion, where he was beloved and honoured of all the people as their natural lord; his other provinces he kept with a few garrisons, better serving to contain the people within obedience, than to confront a foreign enemy. So Antigonus took many cities and places of that country, and began to set great numbers of artificers on work in making ships, which was one of his most earnest cares. In these businesses he consumed a year and three months, not idly, for he took Joppa and Gaza, which were yielded unto his discretion, and well used. The strong city of Tyrus held out long, but was compelled in the end, by famine, to render itself, upon composition that Ptolemy's soldiers might depart with their arms, which was permitted.

Ptolemy was not asleep while these things were in doing, though he kept himself within the bounds of Egypt, as indeed it behoved him to do. His forces were not able to stand against Antigonus in plain field, but likely they were to increase, which made him willing to protract the time. Nevertheless by sea, (where his enemy was as yet unready,) he sent his fleet into all quarters, whereof Seleucus had the chief command.

Seleucus passed with a hundred sail along the coast of Syria, in the full view of Antigonus and his army, to their no little discomfort. He landed in

Cyprus, which was then governed by many petty lords, of whom the greatest adhered to Ptolemy; the rest were, by the factors of Antigonus, bought for him with gold, but now redeemed by the Egyptian with sharp steel.

The same commodity of aid by sea, encouraged the president of Caria, (called also Cassander, but not the son of Antipater, howsoever by the painful and learned writer Reinerus Reineccius, he is by some oversight counted for the same,) to declare for Ptolemy and his confederates, and busily employ in their quarrel all his forces, which he had hitherto kept in good neutrality, and thereby enjoyed rest; but now he threw himself into dangerous war, choosing rather to undergo trouble at hand, than to fall under certain ruin, though somewhat further distant, which would have overwhelmed him, if Antigonus had beaten all the rest.

SECT. III.

How each party sought to win the assistance of Greece.

Antigonus's declaration against Cassander. Alexander, the son of Polysperchon, revolteth from Antigonus who had set him up.

IN the mean season all possible care was taken on both sides, to assure unto them the people of Greece, whose aid which way soever it inclined, was of great importance. Herein, at the first, Antigonus sped so well by large effusion of his treasure, that he drew to him the Lacedæmonians, and other Peloponnesians, of whom he waged eight thousand; and caused Polysperchon, (who had a good while made hard shifts,) to rouse himself again, and taking upon him the title of captain of Peloponnesus, to make head against Cassander.

These hopeful beginnings encouraged him to proceed further in the same kind. Wherefore, to make Cassander the more odious, he called together both

his own soldiers, and all the Greeks and Macedonians that were to be found thereabouts. To these he declared, that Cassander had very cruelly slain Olympias, mother to the great Alexander; and not herewith contented, had shut up in close prison the poor lady Roxana, Alexander's wife, and his son begotten on her body: That all this proceeded from a desire to make himself king over the Macedonians; which well appeared, by his enforcing the lady Thessalonica, daughter to king Philip, a match unfit for a man of no greater parentage than he, to join with him in marriage: That in mere despite of those dead princes, Philip and Alexander, he had planted the Olynthians, rooted out by Philip, in a new city by him built, and called by his own name Cassandria; and had re-edified the city of Thebes, which, for the great treason of the inhabitants, was levelled with the ground by the victorious hand of Alexander. For these reasons he required them to make a decree, that Cassander should restore to absolute liberty the lady Roxana and her son, and should yield obedience to the lord lieutenant-general of the empire, (by which name Antigonus himself was understood,) or else should be reputed a traitor and open enemy to the state. Furthermore, he propounded, that all the cities of Greece should be restored unto freedom. This he did, not because he was careful of their good, but for the need which he had of their assistance.

These things being decreed, Antigonus was persuaded that not only the Greeks would adhere unto him, as to their loving patron, and fall off from Cassander; but that the rulers of provinces, who had hitherto suspected him as a man regardful of nothing but his own benefit, would correct their opinion, and think him the most faithful of all others to the royal blood. But concerning his loyalty to the young prince, the world was too wise to be deceived with vain shews. His undertaking for the liberty

of the Greeks was more effectual, and got easy belief, in regard of his present hatred to Cassander. Yet herein also Ptolemy strove to be as earnest as he, making the like decree, in hope to win himself that valiant nation, which afforded men far more serviceable in war than were to be found in any province of the empire.

And this indeed was the point at which both sides aimed. Wherein Antigonus, thinking to make all sure, deceived himself, not without great cost. For he gave to Alexander, the son of Polysperchon, five hundred talents, willing him to set the war on foot in Peloponnesus, whereby it might appear, that on his side was meant nothing else than what was openly pretended.

In Peloponnesus, Cassander's men had, with much bloodshed, grievously afflicted the contrary faction; and he himself, perceiving that they were more easily spoiled as enemies, than retained as friends, thought it the best way to make what use he could of them that were not long like to continue his. Finally, perceiving that Alexander came furnished with plenty of gold, wherewith he was able, not only to win the doubtful, but to corrupt such as might seem best assured; he thought it a good part of wisdom to surrender upon fair conditions that which he could not assure himself to hold any long time by force. Therefore he sent one to deal with Alexander, about the matters in controversy; letting him know, that Antigonus was very skilful in setting men together by the ears, not caring who prevailed, but only desiring to have them weary themselves whilst he was busy elsewhere, that so at length he might find opportunity to set upon the stronger. If therefore Alexander were so wise as to keep in his purse the five hundred talents which he had, and, without stroke stricken, to receive the whole lordship of Peloponnesus, it should be freely put into his hands by Cassander; provided that he

should from thenceforth renounce all confederacy made with Antigonus, and enter into a sure and faithful league with Ptolemy, Cassander, and the rest of the confederates; otherwise he might well persuade himself, that the country which his father could not keep, when he was indeed the lieutenant of the empire, should not in haste be won by him, that was only the factor of a proud injurious man, so stiling himself, but not acknowledged by others.

Alexander had lived a while with Antigonus since the beginning of these wars, among whose followers it was not hard to discover the intent, (which he did not carry very secret,) of making himself absolute lord of all. Therefore he was soon entreated to accept so good an offer, and did not stick to enter into that league, whereby he was to become a free lord, and subject unto no man's controul.

Howbeit, this his honour continued not long, ere he lost both it and his life together, by treason of the Sicyonians; who thinking thereby to have made themselves free, were soon after vanquished in battle by Cratesipolis, Alexander's wife, a discreet and valiant lady. She, in revenge of her husband's death, crucified thirty of the citizens taken in flight; and having by severity taught them obedience, did afterwards continue her army in good order, and governed those places that she held with the love and commendation of her subjects and neighbours.

SECT. IV.

The Ætolians rise against Cassander in favour of Antigonus, and are beaten. A fleet and land-army of Antigonus utterly defeated by Ptolemy's lieutenant. In what terms the war stood at this time. Antigonus draws near to Greece.

ANTIGONUS, when he found that with so much money he had only bought an enemy, began to raise troubles to Cassander and his other adversaries in

Greece, by stirring up the Ætolians against them likewise he laboured to win to his party the islands in the Greek seas, by whose assistance he might be the better able to deal with Ptolemy, that greatly prevailed by reason of his strong fleet. But neither of these attempts had the success which he expected. The Ætolians, a factious nation, and always envying the greatness of their neighbours, were often in commotion, but so, that commonly their gains equalled not their losses. Cassander won some of their own country, fortified the Acarnanians against them, and compelled Glaucias, king of the Illyrians, whom he vanquished in battle, to forsake their side, and bind himself to bear no arms against Cassander's friends.

On the other side, as many petty islands were drawn to join with Antigonus; so the fleet of the Rhodians under Theodatus, who was admiral to Antigonus, passing along the coast of Asia toward Cyprus, with an army under conduct of Perilaus, marching on the shore for mutual assistance, was quite overthrown by Ptolemy's navy. Polyclytus, who in Ptolemy's behalf had been sent into Peloponnesus against Alexander, finding no need of his service in that country, because Alexander was come over to their side, returned homewards, and, by the way, heard of the course which these Antigonians held, whom he very cunningly surprised. He rode with his fleet behind a cape, which the enemies were to double; his land forces he placed in ambush, whereinto Perilaus falling, was taken prisoner with many of his men, and many were slain, making little resistance. Theodatus, the admiral, perceiving this, made all haste to help his fellows that were on land; but whilst he, with all his fleet, were intentive only to that business, Polyclytus appeared at their backs, who, as soon as he perceived their disorder, hastened about the cape, and charging them behind, suffered not one of them to escape him. These ill tidings caus-

ed Antigonus to deal with Ptolemy about some composition. First, he sent ambassadors, afterwards they met in person. But Antigonus would not yield unto the demands of Ptolemy, so the parley was vain.

Hitherto each party seemed to have indifferently sped in the war, and thereby to have equal cause of hope and fear. This late victory, with the good success of his affairs in Cyprus, did seem to make amends to Ptolemy for his losses in Syria. Likewise the revolt of Alexander from Antigonus did equal the confederacy made between the Ætolians and him; as also those petty skirmishes that had been in Asia the Less, to Antigonus's advantage, were sufficiently recompensed by others of like regard, but adverse to him, and by the troubles brought upon his estates in those parts by the two Cassanders.

Contrariwise, Antigonus valued the loss of his men, money, and ships, no otherwise than as the paring of his nails that were left long enough, and would easily grow again; but the enlargement of his territory, by addition of Syria, he prized at a higher rate, as if thereby he had fed upon a limb of Ptolemy his enemy, and strengthened the body of his own empire. Concerning other accidents, whereof the good were hitherto sufficient to counterpoise the bad, he meant to proceed as occasion should direct, which commonly is not long wanting to them that want no money.

That which most molested him was the attempts of his enemies upon Asia the Less, wherein though as yet they had gotten little, yet had he cause to fear, lest the people, being tied to him by no bond of allegiance, might upon small occasion revolt from him, to men of as honourable reputation as he himself. To prevent this, and to be nearer to Greece, he held it expedient for him to be there in person, where his affairs did seem to prosper the worse, by reason of his absence. Therefore he left part of his army in Syria, under his son Demetrius, to whom, being then but

two and twenty years old, he appointed many ancient captains as assistants, or rather as directors ; the rest he carried with him into Phrygia, where he meant to winter.

SECT. V.

How Lysimachus and Cassander vanquished some enemies raised against them by Antigonus. The good success of Antigonus in Asia and Greece ; with the rebellion of many cities against Cassander.

THE coming of Antigonus into those parts, wrought a great alteration in the process of his business thereabouts. For his enemies had not leisure to think upon molesting him in Asia ; they themselves were held over hardly to their own work on Europe side. Seuthes, a king of the Thracians, joining with some towns that rebelled against Lysimachus, brought also the bordering Scythians into the quarrel. All these relied upon Antigonus, who was to help them with money and other aid. The Ætolians likewise took courage and rose against Cassander, having Æacidas, lately restored to the kingdom of Epirus, their assistant. But Lysimachus gave unto his rebels no time to confirm themselves. He suddenly presented himself before two of the cities that had rebelled, and compelled them, by fear, to return to their former duty. He fought a battle with the Scythians and wild Thracians, and drove them out of the country. Finally, he overcame Seuthes ; and following the heat of his victory, slew Pausanias in battle, whom Antigonus had sent over with an army ; and all his men he did either put to ransom, or fill up with them his own bands. The like success had Philip, Cassander's lieutenant, against the Ætolians. For he wasted their country, fought with the Epirots that came to help them ; and, after the victory, fought again with their forces joined in one, overthrowing them, and killing Æacidas, that unfortunate king,

Finally, he drove the Ætolians out of most of their country, and forced them to seek their safety among the wild mountains. Of the Epirots he sent as prisoners to Cassander the principal authors of the king's restitution, and of the present war.

Yet these actions required some time, and wearied Antigonus's adversaries with painful travel; after which they remained only savers. Antigonus himself, at fair leisure, won all Caria the whilst, and sent armies into Peloponnesus and other parts of Greece, bestowing liberty upon all the cities he took out of Cassander's hands. The whole country of Peloponnesus, (excepting Sicyon and Corinth,) with the isle of Eubœa, and many places of the firm land, were by those means won to be his in true and vehement affection, ready to do or suffer any thing for him that had made so evident a demonstration of his readiness to give them the liberty in deed, which others had promised in idle words. Many states, desirous of the same benefit, would fain have shewed their good will, but they were kept in by Cassander's garrisons, who was too wise to trust them loose. Therefore Antigonus made shew as if he would pass over into Macedon; by which terror, he forced Cassander to repair thither in all haste, with the best of his strength, leaving many good towns of Greece so weakly guarded, that well they might take courage to help themselves, if any foreign succour appeared. The aid which they desired was not long wanting. The lieutenants of Antigonus, taking the advantage of Cassander's departure, entered the country, drove his garrisons out of divers cities, forced the governor of Athens to enter into league with their lord, won the citadel of Thebes, and set the people at liberty. This last action was somewhat remarkable; for Thebes had not long before been raised out of her old ruins by the mere power of Cassander, of which act he was accused by Antigonus, as if it had been some heinous crime. Yet now the same Antigonus winneth

the city and the love of the inhabitants, only by expelling him that was their founder. So much are men readier to thank the increaser than the author of their good ; and rather to look forward upon those hopes, which vainly they extend beyond all measure, than backward upon their miserable nullity, that held them incapable of being any thing.

SECT. VI.

Victories of Ptolemy by sea. A great battle at Gaza, which Ptolemy and Seleucus won against Demetrius, the son of Antigonus.

As the presence or nearness of Antigonus gave life to his affairs in the lower Asia and Greece ; so the designs of his enemies, taking the advantage of his absence, ruined the very foundations of those great works in the eastern parts, wherewith in the year preceding he had overtopped them. The isle of Cyprus, whose princes wavered between contrary affections, inclining one while to Antigonus, another while faintly regarding their covenant with Ptolemy, was visited by an Egyptian fleet, wherewith Ptolemy, in his own person, easily reduced them to a more settled order ; putting some to death, carrying others away prisoners, and leaving a lieutenant of his own appointment, governor of the whole country. With the same fleet he ran along the sea-coasts, wasting a great part of Caria and Cilicia, with the spoils of which he enriched his followers, and returned loaden to Cyprus. Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, hearing frequent reports of the miseries wherewith his father's subjects were oppressed, made all haste out of Syria to the rescue, taking only his horse and light-armed foot with him, because the business required expedition. But in vain did he tire himself and his followers, in hasty seeking of one, that, by launching out into the deep, could, in a few minutes, delude the labour of so many days, if need had so

required. Answerable to the vanity of this expedition was the success. For Ptolemy was gone, before Demetrius came into Cilicia. Neither was it certain, whether, having lightened his ships of their burthen in Cyprus, he would return upon those maritime countries, or make towards Syria, where his coming was expected. He was indeed gone into Egypt, and there, with Seleucus, was describing a royal army, which he levied with all convenient speed, for the recovery of Syria. This was more than Demetrius knew. Therefore he was fain to chuse, out of uncertainties, the most likelihood, and return the way that he came, with all his companies, which were fitter for service in the open field, than to be bestowed in garrisons among the Cilicians. He had scarce refreshed his men and horses in Syria, when the news arrived of Ptolemy's coming with a puissant army to give him battle. Hereupon, he called to council his principal friends, who advised him to give way to the time, and expect some better opportunity in future; being a young man, and weakly furnished with means to resist such ancient and famous generals as Ptolemy and Seleucus. This counsel seemed rather to proceed from the cold temper of those aged men that gave it, than from any necessity growing out of the present business. For Demetrius, considering himself to be the son of Antigonus, and now general of his father's army, thought his own title weighty enough to be laid in balance against the bare names of those two great commanders. Neither found he much reason that should move him to distrust his forces as insufficient. His men were better exercised than the enemy's, and promised as much as could be required. Therefore, persuading himself, that such odds of number, and of great fame, would rather serve to adorn his victory, than hinder him in obtaining it, he resolved to put the matter to trial, without expecting the advantage of more help. So, animating his soldiers with hope of spoil and re-

wards, he abode the coming of the enemies at Gaza, with purpose to encounter them as soon as they had finished their wearisome journey over the deserts of Arabia.

Ptolemy and Seleucus, issuing out of so rich a province as Egypt, came so well provided of all necessities, that their army felt not any great grievance of the evil way when battle was presented them, which confidently they undertook. In all things else they had the odds of Demetrius; of elephants they were utterly unprovided: but how to deal with those beasts they were not ignorant. They had prepared a kind of pallisado, fastened strongly together with chains, and sharpened in such a manner, that the elephants could not seek to break upon it without receiving much hurt. The rest of their forces, which (besides that they had the advantage in multitude) were heartened with many fortunate services by them performed that year, whilst the enemies had wearied themselves, either with vain journies, or long and dulling expectation, they disposed in such order as best answered to the form wherein Demetrius was embattled. The fight began, and was maintained with equal courage for a long time, each party striving more to win honour than to satisfy any other passion, as having little cause of hatred or revenge. But after some continuance, the greater number holding better out, the error of Demetrius, who, upon no necessity, would needs fight a battle at disadvantage, began to appear by his losses. He had committed himself to fortune, having more to lose by her than he could get: but in this fight she was idle, and left all to be decided by strong hands; unless it may be said, that the terror brought upon his men, by the loss of his elephants, was bad luck. Those beasts were in that kind of war hardly to be resisted on plain ground; and therefore, at the first, they made great spoil amongst Ptolemy's men. Afterwards, seeking to break through the pallisado, they

were sorely hurt, and every one of them taken. This disaster caused the horsemen of Demetrius to faint; they had laboured hard, and prevailed little; till now, perceiving that all must lie upon their hands, who were ill able to make their own places good, they began to shrink, and many of them to provide for their safety by timely flight; which example the rest quickly followed. When Demetrius had stroven so long in vain to make his men to abide, that he himself was likely to be lost, he was fain to give place to the stronger, making a violent retreat as far as to Azotus, which was about thirty miles from the place of battle. A great part of his carriages was in Gaza, whither some of his company turned aside, hoping to save such goods as in haste they could pack up. This foolish covetousness was their destruction, and the loss of the town; for whilst they, forgetful of the danger, had filled the streets with sumpter-horses, and stopped up the gates, thronging, some to get in and fetch, others to carry out what they had already loaden, Ptolemy's army broke in without resistance, taking them with their goods and the city altogether.

This victory restored unto Ptolemy the best part of Syria, a province more easy in those times to get than to keep; and opened the way to all the greatness of Seleucus; for between Gaza and Phœnicia no place offered resistance. In Coelosyria and Phœnicia, some towns held out a while, but were soon taken in by Ptolemy. Among these were the great cities of Tyre and Sidon; of which Sidon was given up by the inhabitants; Tyre by the garrison falling to mutiny against their captain, who, trusting to the strength of it, had made great vaunts, but was pardoned by Ptolemy, and honourably entertained, in respect of his fidelity.

SECT. VII.

How Seleucus recovered Babylon, and made himself lord of many countries in the Higher Asia. The era of the kingdom of the Greeks, which began with the dominion of Seleucus.

WHILE Ptolemy followed his business with such prosperity, Seleucus took leave of him, and went up to Babylon, to try his own fortune ; which he found so favourable, that, recovering first his own province, he became at length master of the better part of Alexander's purchases.

This expedition of Seleucus was very strange, and full of unlikelihoods. His train consisted of no more than eight hundred foot, and two hundred horse ; a number too small to have been placed as garrison in some one of those main great cities, against which he carried it into the Higher Asia. But little force is needful to make way into strong places, for him that already stands possessed of their hearts which dwell within the walls. The name of Seleucus was enough, whom the Babylonians had found so good a governor, that none of them would find courage to resist him, but left that work to Antigonus's own men, wishing them ill to speed. Some of the Macedonians that were in those countries had the like affection ; others made a countenance of war, which, by easy compulsion, they left off, and followed new ensigns. This added courage to the people, who came in apace, and submitted themselves joyfully to Seleucus. In a defection so general, it was not a safe course for the Antigonians to thrust themselves into the towns of most importance ; for every man of them should have been troubled with daily enemies in his own lodging. It remained, that they should issue forth into the field, and try the matter by fight ; but the treason of one principal man, who revolted to the enemy with more than a thousand soldiers following

him, so dismayed the rest, that they did no more than seek to make good one strong place, wherein were kept the hostages and prisoners that Antigonus held for his security in those quarters. This castle, belike, they had not fortified in times of leisure against dangers that were not then apparent. Seleucus quickly took it, and so got the entire possession of Mesopotamia and Babylon.

Antigonus had bestowed in Media and Persia forces convenient for the defence of those provinces, that were the utmost of his dominion. In the countries about Euphrates he had not done the like, for his own great army lay between them and all enemies. Therefore, when the victory at Gaza had opened unto Seleucus the way into those parts, he found little impediment in the rest of his business. Having now gotten what he sought, it behoved him to seek how he might keep his gettings; for his own forces were too small, and his friends were ill able to lend him any more. That which his friends could not do for him his enemies did. Nicanor, to whom Antigonus had committed his army in Media, joining unto himself, out of Persia and other countries, all needful help, came with ten thousand foot and seven thousand horse, either to save all from being lost, or to drive Seleucus out of that which he had won.

Against this power, Seleucus had only four hundred horse, and somewhat above three thousand foot, wherewith to oppose himself; his large conquest of unwarlike nations having yielded him many loving subjects, but few soldiers. Therefore, when his enemies were near to the river of Tigris, he withdrew himself from the place where his resistance was expected, into certain marshes not far off, where he lay secretly, waiting for some advantage. Nicanor thought that he had been fled, and was the less careful in fortifying his camp. In recompence of this vain security, his camp was taken by surprise the

first night of his arrival. The satrapa, or lieutenant of Persia, together with sundry of the captains, were slain; he himself was driven to flee for his life into the deserts, and the whole army yielded unto Seleucus; whose gentle demeanour, after the victory, drew all Media, Susiana, and the neighbouring provinces, to acknowledge him their lord, without any further stroke stricken.

This victory of Seleucus gave beginning unto the new stile of *The kingdom of the Greeks*; an account much used by the Jews, Chaldæans, Syrians, and other nations in those parts. I will not make any long disputation about the first year of this era. The authority of that great astrologer Ptolemy¹, from which there is no appeal, makes it plain, that the five hundred and nineteenth year of Nabonassar was the eighty-second year of this account. Other inference hereupon is needless than that note of the learned Gauricus², that the first of these years was reckoned complete at Babylon, together with the end of four hundred and thirty-eight years after Nabonassar. With the observation of Saturn, recorded by Ptolemy, agrees (as it ought) the calculation of Bunting; finding the same planet to have been so placed in the sign of Virgo, as the Chaldæans had observed it in the same year, which was from Nabonassar the five hundred and nineteenth; from Seleucus the eighty-second year; and the last of the hundred and thirty and seventh Olympiad. These observations of the celestial bodies are the surest marks of time, from which he that wilfully varies is inexcusable. As for such occurrences in history, and the years of succeeding princes, (that are not seldom ambiguous, by reason of unremembered fractions,) if they seem to be hereagainst, it is not greatly material: yet thus much is worthy of note, that these years of the Greeks were not reckoned in all countries from one beginning; as plainly appears in

¹ Ptol. Almag. l. ix. c. 7, 8.

² L. Gauric. in annotat. ad locum citatum.

the difference of one year that is found between actions related by the several authors of the two books of the Maccabees, who follow divers accounts. He that shall adhere to the time defined by Ptolemy, may apply the other supputations thereunto, as being no farther from it than a year's distance.

SECT. VIII.

How Ptolenny lost all that he had won in Syria. What the causes were of the quiet obedience performed unto the Macedonians by those that had been subject unto the Persian empire. Of divers petty enterprises taken in hand by Antigonus and Demetrius with ill success.

IN a happy hour did Seleucus adventure to go up to Babylon with so few men as his friend could then well spare; for had he staid longer, upon hope of getting more soldiers, Ptolemy could have spared him none at all. Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, having lost the battle at Gaza, received from Ptolemy all his own goods, his pages and servants, in free gift; and therewithal a courteous message, to this effect,—That no personal hatred was the ground of this war, which he and his confederates held with Antigonus, but only terms of honour, wherein they would seek to right themselves after such manner, that other friendly offices, without reference to the quarrel, should not be forgotten.

This noble dealing of Ptolemy did kindle in Demetrius an earnest desire of requiting him with some as brave liberality: which to effect, he gathered together the remainder of his broken troops, drew as many as could be spared out of the garrisons in Cilicia, or other provinces thereabouts, and, advertising his father of his misfortune, besought him to send a new supply, wherewith he might redeem his honour lost. Antigonus, upon the first news of this overthrow, had said, that the victory which Ptolemy

won upon a beardless boy, should be taken from him by bearded men ; yet, upon desire that his son, whom he tenderly loved, should amend his own reputation, he was content to make a stand in Phrygia. Ptolemy hearing of Demetrius's preparations, did nevertheless follow his own business in Coelosyria ; thinking it enough to send part of his army under Cilles, his lieutenant, against the remnant of those that had been already vanquished when their forces were entire. This, peradventure, would have been sufficient, had not Cilles too much undervalued the power of such an enemy. He thought this young gallant, having lately saved his life by flight, would now be more careful of having a fair way at his back, than adventurous in setting further forward than urgent reason should provoke him. In this confidence he passed on without all fear, as one that were already master of the field, and should meet with none that would issue out of their places of strength to make resistance. When Demetrius was informed of this careless march, he took the lightest of his army, and made his journey with such diligence one whole night, that, early in the morning, he came upon Cilles unexpected, and was on a sudden, without any battle, master of his camp, taking him alive, with his soldiers and their carriages all at once.

This exploit served not only to repair the credit of Demetrius, which his loss at Gaza had almost ruined, but, further, it enabled him to recompense the bounty of Ptolemy with equal favour, in restoring to him Cilles, with many other of his friends, accompanied with rich presents. But neither was Ptolemy so weakened by this loss, nor Demetrius so emboldened by his victory, that any matter of consequence thereupon ensued ; for Demetrius feared the coming of Ptolemy, and therefore he fortified himself in places of advantage. Ptolemy, on the other side, was loth to engage himself in any enterprise ; wherein he might perceive, that if the coming of

Antigonus found him entangled, he should either be driven to make a shameful retreat, or a dangerous adventure of his whole estate, in hope of not much more than already he possessed.

Antigonus, indeed, was nothing slow in his way towards Syria, whither he made all haste, not so much to relieve his son as to embrace him ; for he rejoiced exceedingly that the young man had so well acquitted himself, and being left to his own advice performed the office of a good commander. Wherefore, to increase the reputation of this late victory, he brought such forces as might serve to recover all Syria ; meaning that the honour of all should be referred unto the good foundation laid by his son, whom, from this time forwards, he employed in matters of greatest importance.

Ptolemy had now less reason to encounter with Antigonus, than before his coming to have assailed the camp of Demetrius ; yet he made it a matter of consultation, as if he had dared more than he meant. But all his captains advised him to retire into Egypt, alleging many good arguments to that purpose, which they might well perceive to be agreeable to his own intent, by his propounding that course, not without remembrance of the good success against Perdiccas in the like defensive war. So he departed out of Syria, preserving his honour ; as being rather led by mature deliberation than any sudden passion of fear : and he departed at fair leisure, not only carrying his treasures along with him, but staying to dismantle some principal cities, that he thought most likely to trouble him for the future. All the country that he left at his back fell presently to Antigonus, without putting him to the trouble of winning it by pieces. So easy was it in those times for the captain of a strong army to make himself lord of a great province.

We may justly wonder, that these kingdoms of Syria, Media, Babylon, and many other nations,

(which the victories of Alexander had over-run with so hasty a course as gave him not leisure to take any good view of them,) were so easily held, not only by himself, but by the captains of his army after him. The hot contentions for superiority between the kings of Israel and those of Damascus, between Egypt and Babylon, Babylon and Nineveh, the Persians, and many countries, argue a more manly temper to have been once in those people, which are now so patient of a foreign yoke, that, like sheep or oxen, they suffer themselves to be distributed, fought for, won, lost, and again recovered, by contentious masters, as if they had no title to their own heads, but were born to follow the fortune of the Macedonians. This will appear the more strange, if we shall consider how the several states of Greece (many of which had never possessed so large dominion as might cause their spirits to swell beyond their ability) did greedily embrace all occasions of liberty; and how these proud conquerors were glad to offer it, desiring to have them rather friends than servants, for fear of further inconvenience.

It must therefore be noted, that most of these countries had always been subject unto the rule of kings, or petty lords, whom the Babylonians and Persians long since had rooted out, and held them in such bondage, that few of them knew any other law than the command of foreign masters. This had utterly taken from them all remembrance of home-born princes, and incorporated them into the great body of the Persian empire; so that wanting within themselves all sovereign power, or high authority, (the life and spirit of every state,) they lay as dead, and were bereaved of motion, when that kingdom fell, whereof they lately had been members.

Why the Persian satrapæ, or princes of that empire, did not, when Darius was taken from them, as the Macedonian captains, after the death of Alexander, strive to lay hold upon these provinces, which

had been many ages subject unto them, and scarce four years in quiet possession of their enemies; or why, at least, they contended not (when the terrible name of that great conqueror did cease to affright them) to get their shares among his followers, if not wholly to dispossess them of their new purchases,—it is a question wherein who is not satisfied may find no less reason to suspect the history than authority to confirm it. For we seldom read, that any small kingdom, prevailing against a far greater, hath made so entire a conquest in the compass of ten years, as left unto the vanquished no hope of recovery, nor means to rebel, especially when such disorders, or rather utter confusion, hath ensued, by the fury of civil war among the victors.

The cause why the Macedonians held so quietly the Persian empire is well set down by Machiavel, and concerns all other kingdoms that are subject unto the like form of government; the sum whereof is this: Wheresoever the prince doth hold all his subjects under the condition of slaves, there is the conquest easy and soon assured. Where ancient nobility is had in due regard, there is it hard to win all, and harder to keep that which is won. Examples of this are, the Turkish empire, and the kingdom of France. If any invader should prevail so far upon Turkey, that the great sultan and his children (for brethren he useth not to suffer alive) were taken, or slain, the whole empire would quickly be won and easily kept, without any danger of rebellion; for the bashaws, how great soever they may seem, are mere slaves; neither is there, in all that large dominion, any one man whose personal regard could get the people to follow him in such an attempt, wherein hope of private gain should not countervail all apparent matter of fear. Contrariwise, in France, it were not enough for him that would make a conquest, to get into his hands the king and his children, though he further got the better part of the country, and

were by far the strongest in the field. For, besides the princes of the royal blood, there are in that kingdom store of great men, who are mighty in their several countries, and having certain royalties and principalities of their own, are able to raise war in all quarters of the realm ; whereunto the remembrance of their own ancient families, and long-continued nobility, will always stir up and inflame them ; so that until every one piece were won, and every one (an endless work) of the chief nobility brought under or destroyed, the victory were not complete nor well assured. It is true, that such power of the nobility doth oftentimes make way for an invader, to whom the discontentments of a few can easily make a fair entrance. But such assistants are not so easily kept as they are gotten, for they look to be satisfied at full in all their demands ; and having what they would, they soon return to their old allegiance, upon condition to keep what they have, unless they be daily hired with new rewards ; wherein it is hard to please one man, without offending another as good as himself. The Turk, on the other side, needs not to fear any peril that might arise from the discontented spirits of his principal men. The greatest mischief that any of them could work against him, were the betraying of some frontier town, or the wilful loss of a battle ; which done, the traitor hath spent his sting, and must either fly to the enemy, whereby he loseth all that he formerly did hold ; or else, in hopes of doing some further harm, he must adventure to excuse himself unto his master, who seldom forgives the captain that hath not striven by desperate valour against misfortune. As for making head, or arming their followers against the great sultan, and so joining themselves unto any invader, it is a matter not to be doubted ; for none of them have any followers or dependants at all, other than such as are subject unto them by virtue of their offices and commissions. Now, as this base condition of the

principal men doth leave unto them no means whereby to oppose themselves against the flourishing estate of their prince, so would it weaken both their power and their courage in giving him assistance, if adversity should make him stand in need of them. For there is scarce any one among the Turkish bashaws, or provincial governors, that knows either from whence he was brought, or from whom descended; nor any one among them, that, by the loss and utter ruin of the Turkish empire, can lose any foot of his proper inheritance; and it is the proper inheritance of the subject, which is also a kingdom unto him, which makes him fight with an armed heart against the conqueror, who hath no other device painted on his ensign than the picture of slavery.

As is the Turkish empire, so was the Persian; void of liberty in the subjects, and utterly destitute of other nobility than such as depended upon the mere favour of the prince. Some, indeed, there were of the royal blood, and others descended from the princes that joined with Darius, the son of Hystaspes, in oppressing the magi. These were men of reputation in Persia; but their reputation consisted only in their pedigree, and their safety in not meddling with affairs of state, which made them little esteemed. In what small account these Persian princes were held, it may appear from this, that the king's uncles, cousin-germans, and brethren, were called by the kings their slaves; and so did stile themselves in speaking unto these great monarchs. That upon every light occasion of displeasure they were handled as slaves, it is easy to be discerned in that example of cruelty practised by Xerxes upon his own brother Masistes, which hath been formerly noted in a place more convenient. As for the satrapæ, or governors of the provinces, it is needless to cite examples proving them to have been mere slaves: it may suffice, that their heads were taken from them at the king's will; that is, at the will of

those women and eunuchs by whom the king was governed.

To this want of nobility in Persia, may be added the general want of liberty convenient among the people; a matter no less available in making easy and sure the conquest of a nation, than is the cause assigned by Machiavel. For as *Æsop's* ass did not care to run from the enemies, because it was not possible that they should load him with heavier burthens than his master caused him daily to bear; so the nations that endure the worst under their own princes, are not greatly fearful of a foreign yoke; nor will be hasty to shake it off, if by experience they find it more light than was that whereunto they had been long accustomed. This was it that made the Gascoigns bear such faithful affection to the kings of England, for that they governed more mildly than the French. This enlarged the Venetian jurisdiction in Lombardy; for the towns that they won, they won out of the hands of tyrannous oppressors; and this did cause the Macedonians, with other nations that had been subject unto the posterity of Alexander's followers, to serve the Romans patiently, if not willingly; for that by them they were eased of many burthens which had been imposed upon them by their own kings.

So that of this tameness, which we find in those that had been subjects of the Persian kings, the reasons are apparent. Yet some of these there were that could not so easily be contained in good order by the Macedonians; for they had not indeed been absolutely conquered by the Persians. Such were the Sogdians, Bactrians, and other nations about the Caspian sea. Such also were the Arabians bordering upon Syria; against whom Antigonius sent part of his army, thinking therewith to bring them under, or rather to get a rich booty. The captains that he sent fell upon the Nabathæans at such time as they were busied in a great mart, wherein they traded with more re-

mote Arabians, for myrrh, frankincense, and other such commodities. All, or most of these rich wares, together with five hundred talents of silver, and many prisoners, the Macedonians laid hold upon; for their coming was sudden and unexpected. But, ere they could recover Syria, the Nabathæans overtook them, and finding them weary with long marches, made such a slaughter, that of four thousand foot and six hundred horse only fifty horse escaped. To revenge this loss, Demetrius was set out with a greater power; yet all in vain; for he was not resisted by any army, but by the natural defence of a vast wilderness, lack of water, and of all things necessary. Therefore he was glad to make peace with them; wherein he lost not much honour, for they craved it, and gave him presents. Returning from the Nabathæans, he viewed the lake Asphaltites, whence he conceived hope of great profit that might be raised by gathering the sulphur. With this good husbandry of his son, Antigonus was well pleased, and appointed men to the work; but they were slain by the Arabians, and so that hope vanished.

These petty enterprises, with the ill success accompanying them, had much impaired the good advantage against Ptolemy, when the news of Seleucus's victories in the high countries marred all together; for neither was the loss of those great and wealthy provinces a matter to be neglected; neither was it safe to transport the war into the parts beyond Euphrates, whereby Syria and the Lower Asia should have been exposed to the danger of ill-affected neighbours. A middle course was thought the best, and Demetrius, with fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, was sent against Seleucus. These forces being sent away, Antigonus did nothing, and his son did less. For Seleucus was then in Media; his lieutenants about Babylon withdrew themselves from necessity of fight; some places they fortified and kept. Demetrius could hold nothing that he got,

without setting in garrison more men than he could spare; neither did he get much, and therefore was fain to set out the bravery of his expedition, by burning and spoiling the country; which he did thereby the more alienate, and as it were acknowledge to belong unto his enemy, who thenceforth held it as his own assured.

Antigonus had laid upon his son a peremptory commandment to return unto him at a time prefixed; reasonably thinking, (as may seem,) that in such an unsettled state of things, either the war might be ended, by the fury of the first brunt, or else it would be vain to strive against all difficulties likely to arise, where want of necessaries should frustrate the valour, that, by length of time, was like to become less terrible to the enemy. Demetrius, therefore, leaving behind him five thousand foot and a thousand horse, rather to make shew of continuing the war than to effect much, where himself, with greater forces, could do little more than nothing, forsook the enterprise, and went back to his father,

SECT. IX.

A general peace made and broken. How all the house of Alexander was destroyed.

THESE ambitious heads, having thus wearied themselves with ineffectual travel, in seeking to get more than any one of them could hold, were contented at length to come to an agreement; wherein it was concluded, that each of them should hold quietly that which at the present he had in possession. As no private hatred, but mere desire of empire had moved them to enter into the war, so was it no friendly reconciliation, but only a dulness growing upon the slow advancement of their several hopes that made them willing to breathe a while, till occasion might better serve to fight again.

Besides that main point,—of retaining the provin-

ces which every man held,—there were two articles of the peace, that gave a fair but false colour to the business : ‘ That the son of Alexander, by Roxana, ‘ should be made king, when he came to full age ;’ and ‘ That all the estates of Greece should be set at ‘ liberty.’ The advancement of young Alexander to his father’s kingdom, seems to have been a matter forcibly extorted from Antigonus, in whom was discovered a purpose to make himself lord of all. But this, indeed, more nearly touched Cassander ; for in his custody was the young prince and his mother : neither did he keep them in sort answerable to their degree, but as close prisoners, taken in that war wherein they had seen the old queen Olympias taken and murdered, that sought to have put them in possession of the empire. The mutual hatred and fear between them, rooted in these grounds of injuries done and revenge expected, upon this conclusion of peace grew up faster than any time before in the heart of Cassander, who saw the Macedonians turn their favourable expectations towards the son of their late renowned king.

All this either little concerned Antigonus, or tended greatly to his good. The young prince must first have possession of Macedon, whereby Cassander should be reduced to his poor office of captain over a thousand men, if not left in worse case. As for them that held provinces abroad, they might either do as they had done under Aridæus, or better, as being better acquainted with their own strength. He, in the meantime, by his readiness to acknowledge the true heir, had freed himself from that ill-favoured imputation of seeking to make himself lord of all that Alexander had gotten.

The like advantage had he in that article, of restoring the Greeks to their liberty. This liberty had hitherto been the subject of much idle discourse, but it never took effect. Antigonus held scarce any town of theirs ;—Cassander occupied most of the country,

which, if he should set free, he must be a poor prince ; if not, there was matter enough of quarrel against him, as against a disturber of the common peace.

In the mean season, the countries lying between Euphrates and the Greek seas, together with a great army, and money enough to entertain a greater, might serve to hold up the credit of Antigonus, and to raise his hopes as high as ever they had been.

With much disadvantage do many men contend against one that is equal to them all in puissance. Cassander's friends had left him in an ill case ; but he could not do withal ; for where every one man's help is necessary to the war, there may any one make his own peace, but no one can stand out alone when all the rest are weary. The best was, that he knew all their affections, which tended to no such end as the becoming subjects unto any man, much less to the son of an Asiatic woman, of whom they had long since refused to hear mention. Therefore he took a short course, and caused both the child and his mother to be slain, freeing thereby himself in a trice from the dangerous necessity of yielding up his government, which he must have done when the child had come to age. Roxana was a lady of singular beauty, which was perhaps the cause why Perdiccas desired to have her son, being as yet unborn, proclaimed heir to the great Alexander. Immediately upon the death of Alexander, she had used the favour, (if it were not love,) of Perdiccas, to the satisfying of her own bloody malice upon Statira, the daughter of king Darius, whom Alexander had likewise married, according to the custom of those countries, wherein plurality of wives is held no crime. For having, by a counterfeit letter in Alexander's name, gotten this poor lady into her hands, she did, by assistance of Perdiccas, murder her and her sister, and threw their bodies into a well, causing it to be filled up with earth. But now, by God's just vengeance, were she and her son made away in the like

secret fashion ; even at such a time, as the near approaching hope of a great empire had made her life, after a wearisome imprisonment, grow dearer unto her than it was before.

The fact of Cassander was not so much detested in outward shew as inwardly it was pleasing unto all the rest of the princes. For now they held themselves free lords of all that they had under them, fearing none other change of their estates than such as might arise from war, wherein every one persuaded himself of success, rather better than worse. Hereupon all of them, (except Lysimachus and Seleucus, that had work enough at home,) began to rouse themselves, as if the time was now come for each man to improve his own stock. Antigonus's lieutenants were busy in Peloponnesus and about Hellespont, while their master was careful in following other and some greater matters, that were more secretly to be handled. He pretended the liberty of Greece ; yet did the same argument minister unto Ptolemy matter of quarrel against both him and Cassander ; Ptolemy complaining, (as if he had taken the matter deeply to heart,) that Antigonus had put garrisons into some towns which ought in fair dealing to be set at liberty. Under colour of redressing this enormity, he sent an army into Cilicia, where he won four towns, and soon after lost them, without much labour of his own or his enemies.

After this, putting to sea with a strong fleet, he ran along the coast of Asia, winning many places, and in that voyage allured unto him a nephew of Antigonus, (a good commander, but discontented with the ill requital of his services,) whom finding shortly as false to himself as he had been to his own uncle, he was fain to put to death. But in doing these things, his desire to set the Greeks at liberty, appeared not so plain as he wished that it should, for their case was no way bettered by his molesting Antigonus in Asia. Therefore, to get the love of that

valiant nation, he made at the last an expedition into Greece itself; where, having set free some little islands, and landed in Peloponnesus, he raised so great an expectation of finishing the long desired work, that Cratesipolis, the widow of Alexander, Polysperchon's son, gave up into his hands the towns of Sicyon and Corinth.

Ptolemy had conceived a vain belief, that the Greeks, emboldened by his countenance and assistance, would all of them take heart, and rise up in arms, whereby, with little labour, their liberty might be gotten, and he be acknowledged as author of this immortal benefit. But long servitude had well-near extinguished the ancient valour of that nation; and their ill fortune, in many likely attempts to recover freedom, had so tired their spirits, that they would no more stir in pursuit thereof, but sat idly still, as wishing it to fall into their mouths.

The Lacedæmonians, about these times, began to fortify their town with walls, trusting no longer in their virtue, (for both it and the discipline that upheld it were too much impaired,) that had been a wall to their town and territory.

The Athenians were become as humble servants, as they had been, in times past, insolent masters; erecting as many statues in honour of Demetrius Phalereus, as there were days in the year. This Demetrius was now their governor, and he governed them with much moderation, but in spite of their hearts, as being set over them by Cassander. By this base temper of the principal cities, it is easy to gather how the rest of the country stood affected. Ptolemy could not get them to set their helping hands to their own good, and to furnish him with the promised supplies of money and victuals. Credible it is, that he had a true meaning to deliver them from thralldom; as judging the commodity that would arise, by annexing them to his party, a matter of more weight than the loss that Cassander should re-

ceive thereby, who could hardly retain them, if once Antigonus took the work in hand. But when he found such difficulty in the business, he changed his purpose, and renewing his former friendship with Cassander, he retained Sicyon and Corinth in his own possession.

Before the coming of Ptolemy into Greece, Cassander had been held occupied with very much work. For, (besides his pains taken in wars among barbarous princes,) he found means to allure unto himself the lieutenants of Antigonus that were in Peloponnesus and about Hellespont, making his own advantage of their discontentments. By the like skilful practice, he freed himself from a greater danger, and made those murders which he had committed seem the less odious, by teaching his enemies to do the like.

Old Polysperchon, that had made so great a stir in the reign of Aridæus, did, after the death of Roxana and her child, enter again upon the stage, leading in his hand another son of the great Alexander, and meaning to place him in his father's throne. The name of this young prince was Hercules: he was begotten on Barsine, the daughter of Artabazus, a Persian, but had been less esteemed than the son of Roxana, either for that his mother was held no better than a concubine, or else, perhaps, in regard of the favour which Perdiccas, and after him Olympias, did bear unto Roxana. At this time, the death of his brother had moved such compassion, and regard of his being Alexander's only living child had procured unto him such good will, that the demand which Polysperchon made in his behalf was deemed very just and honourable. There were indeed, more hearts than hands that joined with this young prince; yet wanted he not sufficient strength of hands, if the heart of him, that least ought, had not been most false. Cassander had raised an army to withstand his entry into Macedon; but little trust could he repose

in that army, whose wishes he perceived to be with Hercules. Therefore he assailed Polysperchon himself with gifts and promises, wherewith at length he prevailed so far, that the old villain was contented to murder his pupil; choosing rather, with many curses and foul dishonour, to take the offered lordship of Peloponnesus, and commander of an army, than to purchase a noble fame with dangerous travel, in maintaining his faith unto both his dead and living sovereigns.

Antigonus had not all this while been asleep, though his losses were hitherto the chief witnesses of his having been a stirrer in these commotions. He thought it enough for him at the present to retain his own; and therefore took order for the recovery of those places which Ptolemy had taken pains to win. As for the rest, it no way grieved him to see Cassander incur the general hatred of men, by committing those murders of which the profit was like to redound unto him that was the most powerful; or to see Polysperchon and Ptolemy sweat in a busy war against Cassander. If they would have continued their quarrels, he could well have afforded them leisure, and have thought the time well spent in beholding their contentions. For he was thoroughly persuaded, that when the rest had wearied themselves in vain with long strife, his armies and treasures, wherein he exceeded them all, would bring all under. According to these haughty conceits he demeaned himself among his followers, looking big upon them, and like a king before his time. This was it that caused so many to revolt from him; but it was no great loss to be forsaken by those who looked with envious eyes upon that fortune whereon their own should have depended. Against this envy of his own men, and the malice of others, Antigonus busily sought a remedy, such as was likely to give him a goodly title to the whole empire.

Cleopatra, sister unto the great Alexander, lay for

the most part in Sardis, whom he had a great desire to take to wife. This his desire was not without good hope; for howsoever she discovered much unwillingness thereto, yet was she in his power, and might therefore be entreated, were it only for fear of being enforced. But it was not his purpose to get her by compulsive means; either because his fancy, being an old man, was not over-violent; or rather because his ambition, whereunto all his affections had reference, could have made small use of her by doing such apparent wrong. She had been married to Alexander, king of Epirus, after whose death she came to her brother in Asia; hoping, belike, to find a new husband in his camp. But neither any of those brave captains that were, in times following, so hot in love with her, durst then aspire unto her marriage; nor did her brother, full of other cares, trouble himself with providing her of an husband. She therefore, being a lusty widow, suffered her blood so far to prevail against her honour, that she supplied the want of a husband by entertainment of paramours. Alexander hearing of this, turned it to a jest; saying, that she was his sister, and must be allowed this liberty, as her portion of the empire. When, by his death, the empire lay in a manner void, and the portion due to her therein, grew, in men's opinion, greater than it had been, then did many seek to obtain her, while she herself desired only a proper man, with whom she might lead a merry life. To this purpose she did invite Leonatus unto her, who made great haste, but was cut off by death, ere he came to her presence. Now at the last, after long tarrying, she had her choice of all the great commanders; Antigonus, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander, being all her earnest wooers. All these (Antigonus excepted) had wives already; Ptolemy had many wives, and many concubines whom he respected as much as his wives, being noted of too much dotage of that kind. This hindered not his

suit, peradventure it advanced it, by giving to Cleopatra some hope of mutual toleration. To him, therefore she bequeathed herself, and was taking her journey from Sardis towards him, when Antigonus's deputy in that city made her to stay until his master's further pleasure should be known. Antigonus had now a wolf by the ears; he neither could well hold her, nor durst let her go. She would not be his wife; he had none honest pretence to force her; and to keep her prisoner had been the way by which he might have incurred a general hatred, lasting perhaps beyond her life; as the course taken by Cassander against Roxana (a lady less respected than Alexander's own sister,) did well testify. Therefore he thought it the wisest way to procure her death; for to let any other enjoy the commodity of so fair a title to the kingdom, it was no part of his meaning. To this purpose he sent instructions to the governor of Sardis, willing him in any case to do it secretly. So the fact was committed, and certain women about her put in trust with the murder; which women afterwards were put to death, as mischievous conspirers against the life of that good lady. So was Antigonus freed from blame, at least in his own opinion; but the world was less foolish than to be so deluded. How the murder was detected we need not ask; for seldom is that bloody crime unrevealed, and never so ill smothered as when great persons are the authors.

Thus was the whole race of Philip and Alexander the Great extinguished; and it was extinguished by the hands of such as thought upon nothing less than the execution of God's justice due unto the cruelty of these powerful but merciless princes. Wherefore the ambitious frames, erected by these tyrants, upon so wicked foundations of innocent blood, were soon after cast down, overwhelming themselves or their children with the ruins, as the sequel will declare.

SECT. X.

How Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, gave liberty to Athens, expelling the garrisons of Cassander out of those parts. The immoderate honours decreed by the Athenians to Antigonus and Demetrius.

NONE being left alive that had any title to the kingdom, it stood with good reason, that they which were lords of the provinces, acknowledging no superior, should freely profess themselves kings in name, as they were already in substance. Yet had this name ill beseeemed the weaker, while the strongest of all did forbear it; neither seemed it convenient, in the judgment of Antigonus, to crown his last action with such a title, as if he had attained unto greatness by that foul murder, the infamy whereof he was careful how to discharge from his own head. He purposed, therefore, to undertake a plausible enterprise, even the liberty of Greece; whereby it was apparent, that he might get such honour as would not only drown all bad reports, but make him be thought equal to any name of royalty, whereof in seeming modesty he was not covetous. To this purpose he delivered a strong army, with a navy of two hundred and fifty sail, and five thousand talents of silver, unto Demetrius his son, willing him to begin at Athens, and thence to proceed in setting all the country free.

Demetrius came to Athens before he was expected, so that without resistance he entered the haven, it being thought that a fleet of Ptolemy, Cassander's good friend, had been arrived. But when it was known, both who he was, and what was the cause of his coming, the joy of the citizens broke out into loud acclamations. Demetrius Phalereus forsook the town, and withdrew himself to Thebes, under safe-conduct; only the garrison in Munychia strove to make good that piece, which after a while was won upon

them by force. During the siege of Munychia, Demetrius went to Megara, whence he expelled the garrison of Cassander, and so restored the city to liberty.

I think it not impertinent sometimes to relate such accidents as may seem no better than mere trifles; for even by trifles are the qualities of great persons as well disclosed, as by their great actions; because, in matters of importance, they commonly strain themselves to the observance of general commended rules; in lesser things they follow the current of their own natures. The lady Cratesipolis lay in Patras, and had a great desire to see Demetrius; hoping belike, that she might by his means better her estate, and recover her towns in Sicyon and Corinth, detained by Ptolemy; (to whose lieutenant, in those places, Demetrius, before his departure out of Greece, offered money for the surrender of them;) yet the only business pretended was love. He being advertised hereof, left his forces in the country of Megara, and taking a company of his lightest armed for guard of his person, made a long journey to meet with her. This troop also he caused to lodge a great way from his tent, that none might see her when she came. As closely as the business was carried, some of his enemies had gotten knowledge of it, whereby they conceived good hope, that the diligence of a very few men might overthrow all the great preparations of Antigonus, and bring him to any terms of reason, by taking his dear son prisoner. Their project fell but a little short of the effect; for they came so suddenly upon him, that he had no better shift than to muffle himself in an old cloak, and creep away disguised, leaving them to ransack his tent. There was in this prince a strange medley of conditions, especially an extreme dissoluteness in wanton pleasures, and a painful industry in matter of war. He was of a most amiable countenance, a gentle nature, and a good wit; excellent in devising engines of

war, and curious in working them with his own hands. He knew better how to reform his bad fortune, than how to rule his good. For adversity made his valour more active, prosperity puffed him with an overweening, wherein he thought that he might do what he listed. His fortune was as changeable as were his qualities, turning often round, like the picture of her wheel, till she had wound up the thread of his life, in such a manner as followeth to be shewed.

Returning to his camp, and finishing his business at Megara, he resolved no longer to attend the issue of a siege, but to assail Munychia by force, that so he might accomplish the liberty of Athens; which, until it was fully wrought out, he refused to enter into the city. Munychia was strongly fortified, yet by the continuance of the assault, the multitude without, through help of their engines that scoured the walls, prevailed upon the resolution of those that lay within it, and won the place in two days. The walls and all the defences of that piece against the city, were levelled with the ground; and so was it freely put into the citizens hands, to whom, withal, was given their liberty, with promise to aid them in maintaining it.

The fame of this action was louder than of any other victory gotten by Demetrius with greater skill and industry. For the Athenians having forgotten how to employ their hands, laboured to make up that defect with their tongues; converting to base flattery that eloquence of theirs, which the virtues of their ancestors had suited unto more manly arguments. They decreed unto Antigonus and Demetrius the name of kings;—they consecrated the place in which Demetrius leaped from his chariot when he entered their city, and built there an altar, calling it by the name of Demetrius the *Alighter*;—they called them by the names of the *gods their Saviours*, ordaining

that every year there should be chosen a priest of these gods ; and further, that such as were employed by their state in dealing with either of these two princes, should not be called ambassadors, but *Theori*, or consulters with the gods, like as were they whom they sent unto the oracle of Jupiter or Apollo.

It were a frivolous diligence to rehearse all their flatteries, these being so gross. Hereby they not only corrupted the young prince, but made that acclamation, which best would have pleased the old man, to be of no use. For he could not handsomely take upon him the name of king, as imposed by the Athenians, unless he would seem to approve their vanity, in loading him with more than human honours. Yet was he so tickled with this their fine handling, that when their *Theori*, or consulters, came shortly after, desiring him to relieve them with corn, and timber to build ships, he gave them almost a hundred thousand quarters of wheat, and matter sufficient to make a hundred gallies. So gracious was his first oracle, or rather, so weak is great power in resisting the assaults of flattery.

SECT. XI.

The great victory of Demetrius against Ptolemy in Cyprus. How Antigonus and Demetrius took upon them the stile of kings, wherein others followed their example.

FROM this glorious work, Antigonus called away Demetrius unto a business of greater difficulty, meaning to employ his service against Ptolemy in Cyprus. Before his departure out of Greece, he was willed to establish a general council, that should treat of matters concerning the common good of the country. About the same time Antigonus withdrew his own garrison out of Imbros, committing their liberty entire into the people's hands ; whereby it might appear, that as he would not permit any other to oppress

the Greeks, so would he be far from doing it himself. This was enough to hold his reputation high among these new purchased friends: it followed, that he should convert his forces to the winning of ground upon his enemies:

A pitiful tragedy had lately happened in Cyprus, through the indiscretion of Menelaus, Ptolemy's brother, and his lieutenant in that isle. Nicocles, king of Paphos, was entered into some practice with Antigonus; yet not so far that he thought himself past excuse; by which confidence he was, perhaps, the more easily detected. To cut off this negotiation, and the false hearted king of Paphos, at one blow, Menelaus was sent thither, who, surrounding Nicocles's house with soldiers, required, in Ptolemy's name, to have him yielded to the death. Nicocles offered to clear himself; but Menelaus told him, that die he must, and bade him come forth quietly. This desperate necessity caused the unhappy king to rid himself of life; and his death struck such an impression into his wife, that she not only slew herself, but persuaded the wives of her husband's brethren to do the like: also those brethren of Nicocles, unto whom Ptolemy had pretended no ill, being amazed with the suddenness of this calamity, did shut up the palace; and, setting it on fire, consumed it, with all that was in it, and themselves, together.

Whatsoever the crime objected was, Nicocles perished as a man innocent, because he was not suffered to make his answer. Of this sad accident, though Menelaus deserved the blame for his rigorous proceeding, yet it is to be thought that much dislike fell also upon Ptolemy,—as men that are grieved cast an ill affection even upon those that gave the farthest removed occasion.

Not long after this, Demetrius came into Cyprus, with a power sufficient against any opposition that Ptolemy was like to make. The Cypriots did little

or nothing against him; either because they had small strength, or for that they held it a matter indifferent whom they acknowledged as their lord, being sure that they should not themselves have the rule of their own country. Menelaus, therefore, out of his garrisons drew forth an army, and fought with Demetrius. But he was beaten, and driven to save himself within the walls of Salamis, where he was so hardly besieged, that, without strong succour, he had no likelihood to make good the place, much less to retain possession of the whole island. His greatest help at the present was the fidelity of his soldiers, whom no rewards could win from him, nor good usage (when any of them were taken prisoners, and enrolled in the enemy's bands,) keep from returning to him with the first opportunity. Most of them were mercenaries, but all their goods were in Egypt, which was enough to keep them faithful. Yet could not this their resolution have stood long against the odds of number which Demetrius had of men as resolute, and against his terrible engines of battery, if Ptolemy had not hasted to his rescue.

Ptolemy brought with him a hundred and forty gallies, besides two hundred ships of burden for transporting his army and carriages. This fleet made a terrible shew, when it was descried afar, though more than half of it was unfit for service in fight at sea. Wherefore, to make the opinion of his forces the more dreadful, Ptolemy sent unto Demetrius a threatening message, willing him to be gone, unless he would be overwhelmed with multitudes, and trampled to death in a throng. But this young gallant repaid him with words of as much bravery, promising to let him escape, upon condition that he should withdraw his garrisons out of Sicyon and Corinth.

Demetrius had no more than one hundred and eighteen gallies; but they were, for the most part,

greater than those of Ptolemy ; better stored with weapons fit for that service, and very well furnished with engines in the prows to beat upon the enemy. Nevertheless, he stood in great doubt of threescore gallies that lay in the haven of Salamis, lest Menelaus with them should set upon his back ; in which case it was very likely that all should go very ill with him. Against this mischief he bestowed ten of his own gallies in the mouth of that haven to keep Menelaus from issuing forth, and, setting his horsemen on the shore to give what assistance they could, he, with the rest of his fleet, puts to sea against Ptolemy.

The fight began early in the morning, and continued long with doubtful success. The generals were not ranged opposite one to the other, but held each of them the left wing of his own fleet. Each of them prevailed against the squadron wherewith he encountered ; but the success of Demetrius was to better purpose ; for his victory in one part was such as caused others to fall out of order ; and, finally, drove all to betake themselves unto speedy flight. As for Ptolemy, he was fain to leave his advantage upon the enemy in one part of the fight, that he might relieve and animate those of his own which needed him in another ; wherein he found his loss over-great to be repaired by contending any longer against the fortune of that day ; and therefore he laboured only to save himself, in hopes of better event that might follow some other time.

There fell out in this battle no unusual accident ; yet was the victory greater than could have been expected. The occasions whereof, were, partly the great skill in sea-services which the Greeks and Phœnicians, that were with Demetrius, had above those which followed Ptolemy ; partly the good furniture of the ships ; wherein consisted no less, than in the quality of those with whom they were manned. Further, we may reasonably judge, that the

two hundred ships of burthen, carrying the strength of Ptolemy's army, did not more encourage his own men, and terrify his enemies in the day before the fight, than breed in each part the contrary affections, when, in the beginning of the fight, they fell off and stood aloof. For though it were fitting that they should do so, yet a multitude, prepossessed with vain conceits, will commonly apprehend very slight occasions to think themselves abandoned. Besides all this, the expectation that Menelaus, issuing with his fleet out of Salamis, should charge the enemies in stern, was utterly frustrate. He was kept in perforce by the ten ships appointed to bar up the mouth of the haven, which they manfully performed, as great necessity required.

Such disappointment of expectation doth much abate the courage of men in fight, especially of the assailants ; whereas, on the contrary, they that find some part of their fears vain, do easily gather hopeful spirits, and conceive an opinion of their own ability to do more than they had thought upon, out of their not suffering the harm that they had imagined.

Whatsoever the causes of this victory were, the fruit was very great ; for Ptolemy had no more than eight gallies that accompanied him in his flight ; all the rest of his fleet was either taken or sunk. Neither did Menelaus any longer strive against the violence of fortune ; but yielded up all that he held in Cyprus, together with his army, consisting of twelve thousand foot, and a thousand and two hundred horse, and those gallies in the haven of Salamis. The same dejection of spirit was found in the common soldier, as well that was taken at sea as that had served the Egyptian by land ; none of them reposing any more confidence in Ptolemy, but willingly becoming followers of a new lord, whose army they now increased.

It was generally believed, that much more depend-

ed on the event of this fight than the isle of Cyprus, for which they contended; wherefore the common expectation was great; especially Antigonus, whom it most concerned, was deeply perplexed with cares, thinking every day a year till he were advertised of the issue. In this mood Aristodemus found him, a notable flatterer, whom Demetrius had honoured with the message of these good news. Aristodemus had bethought himself of a trick, whereby to double the welcome of his joyful errand; he caused his ships to ride at anchor a good distance from the shore; he himself landed in a cock-boat, which he sent immediately back to the ship; and so all alone he went forward, looking very sadly, that no part of his tidings might appear in his countenance. Report of his arrival (for it was not known where he had been) came presently to Antigonus, who sent messenger after messenger to meet him on the way, and bring speedy word how all went; but neither any answer, nor so much of a look as might intimate the purport of his errand, could be won from this demure gentleman. Thus marched he fair and softly forward, with a great throng at his heels, (that served well to set out his pageant,) until he came in sight of Antigonus, who could not contain himself, but went down to meet him at the gate, and hear the news. Then did Aristodemus, upon the sudden, with a high voice, salute Antigonus by the name of king; uttering the greatness of the victory (with as much pomp as before he had covered it with silence) in the hearing of all the people, who, with loud acclamations, gave that name of king both to Antigonus and to his son Demetrius. Antigonus, in requital of the long suspense wherein Aristodemus had held him, said, that it should also be long ere he received his reward; but the title of king, together with the diadem, which his friends did set on his head, he could not wish a fairer occasion to assume; wherefore he readily accepted them, and sent the like to his son.

When it was once noised abroad that Antigonus and Demetrius called themselves kings, it was not long ere their fellows were ready to follow the good example. Ptolemy's friends would by no means endure that their lord should be thought a man dejected for the loss of a fleet, therefore they saluted him also king. Lysimachus, in Thrace, had boldness enough to put the diadem about his own head. Seleucus had, before this time, among the barbarous people, taken upon him as king; but now he used the stile indifferently, as well among the Greeks and Macedonians as in dealing with others. Only Cassander held himself contented with his own name; whereby, howsoever he might shadow his pride, he no way lessened the fame of his cruelty against his master's house. But the name which he forbore, his sons after him were bold to usurp, though with ill success, as will appear when they shall enter upon the stage; whereon these old tragedians, under new habits, as no longer now the same persons, begin to play their parts, with bigger looks, and more boisterous actions, not with greater grace and judgment, than in the scenes already past.

CHAP. VI.

OF THE WARS BETWEEN THE KINGS OF EGYPT, ASIA,
MACEDON, THRACE, AND OTHERS, UNTIL ALL ALEX-
ANDER'S PRINCES WERE CONSUMED.

SECT. I.

*The expedition of Antigonus against Egypt, with ill
success.*

ALL the rest of these kings had taken that name upon them, in imitation of Antigonus himself, as befitting his greatness, which was such as gave him hope to swallow them up, together with their new titles. Being not ignorant of his own strength, he resolved to single out Ptolemy, and make him an example to others, who should hardly be able to stand when the greatest of them was fallen. To this purpose he prepared an army of eighteen thousand foot and eight thousand horse, with fourscore and three elephants; as likewise a fleet of a hundred and fifty gallies, and a hundred ships of burden: the land forces he commanded in person; of the navy Demetrius was admiral.

When all was ready for the journey, the seamen advised him to stay yet again eight days longer, and expect the setting of the Pleiades. But his hasty desire to prevent all preparations for resistance that Ptolemy should make, rejected this counsel, imputing it rather to their fear than skill. Wherefore he departed from Antigonia, (a town which he had

built in Syria, and called after his own name, that was soon changed into Seleucia by his mortal enemy,) and came to Gaza, where he met with his fleet. The nearer that he drew to Egypt, the more haste he made, thinking by celerity to prevail, more than by his great power. He caused his soldiers to carry ten days provision of victuals, and had many camels loaden with all necessaries for passing the deserts, over which he marched with no small toil, though he met with no resistance. At mount Casius, which is near adjoining to Nilus, he saw his fleet riding at anchor, not far from the shore, in ill case, and many ships wanting. It had been sorely beaten with foul weather, wherein some were lost, others driven back to Gaza, or scattered elsewhere into such creeks as they could recover; Demetrius himself, with the best and strongest vessels, did so long beat it up against the wind, that all his fresh water was spent; in which extremity he and all his must have perished, had not the tempest ceased when it did, and Antigonus appeared in sight, from whom these over-wearied, thirsty, and sea-beaten soldiers received relief. After these painful travels, there followed a war, no less painful than to little purpose; for Ptolemy had so fortified all the passages upon the river of Nilus, as he assured himself either to end the war there, or, if his guards should happen to be forced, yet could it not be done, but so much to the weakening of the assailants, as he should afterwards with a second army, (which he held entire,) entertain the invader upon advantage enough. All that Antigonus sought was to come to blows speedily: Ptolemy, on the contrary, to beat Antigonus by the belly. It is true that Nilus gave him water enough, but wood he had none to warm it; and while Antigonus assaulted the ramparts, raised upon the river, in vain, Ptolemy assayed the faith of his soldiers with good success; for with great gifts and greater promises he ferried them over so fast, as, had not Antigonus thrust some

assured regiments upon the passages next the enemy, and in the meanwhile taken a resolution to return, Ptolemy had turned him out of Egypt ill attended.

Some of them, indeed, he laid hands on, in the way of their escape, and those he put to death with extreme torments; but, in all likelihood, with the same ill success that Perdiccas had formerly done, when he invaded Egypt; had he not readily removed his army further off from the noise of their entertainment that had already been won from him.

To prevent, therefore, as well the present danger of his stay, as the shame following a forced retreat, he secretly practised the advice of his council, upon whom the burden must be laid of his entrance and leaving Egypt.

It is, indeed, less prejudicial in such like cases, that errors, dishonours, and losses, be laid on counsellors and captains, than on kings,—on the directed than on the director; for the honour and reputation of a prince is far more precious than that of a vassal. Charles V., as many other princes have done, laid the loss and dishonour he received in the invasion of France, by the way of Provence, to Antony de Leva, whether justly or no, I know not; but, howsoever, all the historians of that time agree, that the sorrow thereof cost that brave captain his life. Certainly, to give any violent advice in doubtful enterprises, is rather a testimony of love, than of wisdom in the giver; for the ill success is always cast upon the counsel; the good never wants a father, though a false one, to acknowledge it. Yet I have sometimes known it, that great commanders, who are for the present in place of kings, have not only been dissuaded, but held in a kind, by a strong hand, from hazarding their own persons; and yet have those kind of mutineers never been called to a marshal's court.

SECT. II.

How the city of Rhodes was besieged by Dèmetrius.

THIS departure of Antigonius left behind it many dead carcasses, and a great deal of joy in Egypt. Ptolemy held a solemn feast, and sent messengers abroad, laden with glad news, to Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Cassander, his confederates ; strongly encouraging all that side with the report of this his late felicity, though it appeared but in a defensive war. Antigonius, on the contrary, flattered himself with another interpretation, calling the joys of his enemies for witnesses of his own greatness, seeing they arose but from so little things ; his enemies being but bare saviors by the last bargain, and himself, as he supposed, having lost but a little time, and no part of his honour, in the late retreat. Howsoever it were, yet he meant to follow his affairs henceforth in another fashion ; for that which he could not cleave asunder by great blows, he purposed by little and little to pare off ;—by cutting off the branches first, to fell the tree itself with the more facility. To effect which, he resolved, (leaving the great ones to grow a while,) to root up the dependants of his enemies,—dependants, whom the forenamed confederates should be forced either to relieve or to lose ; and hereby he doubted not to draw them into the field, where the advantage of power, and of all other warlike provisions, promised him victory.

At this time the city of Rhodes was very mighty ; being well governed, and having long held itself in good neutrality, it drew the better part of all the trade of those parts, and thereby a great deal of riches to itself ; to maintain which, and to increase it, it furnished and kept on the seas a fleet of well-armed ships, by which it not only beat off all pirates and petty thieves, but the reputation of their strength

was thereby so much increased, as all their neighbour princes sought their alliance and confederacy.

In this so dangerous a time, (in which they must either refuse all that sought them, and so stand friendless and apart, or join themselves to some one, and thereby forego the peace, by which their greatness had grown,) their affections carried them to the Egyptian; both because the greatest part of their trade lay that way, as also for that Antigonus's disposition, greatness, and neighbourhood was fearful unto them. This affection of theirs, with some other passages more apparent, gave argument of quarrel to Antigonus, who began to declare himself against them by petty injuries, of taking some of their ships, with such other grievances, while he made a more weighty preparation to pursue the war against them openly and strongly. All things soon after ordered according to the greatness of the enterprise, he employed his son Demetrius against them in their own island, who brought such terror upon the citizens, that laying aside all respect of friendship and honour, they offered him their assistance and service against whomsoever. Demetrius, who knew from whence this change came, and that the alteration was persuaded by fear, and not by love, raised his demands to an intolerable height; requiring an hundred hostages to be delivered unto him, and liberty to lodge in their port as many ships of war as himself pleased. These conditions more properly to be imposed upon a state already conquered, than on those who as yet had heard of nothing but a constrained assistance, restored unto the Rhodians their lost courage, and made them resolve to defend their liberty to the last man: this taught them to infranchise all their able bond-men, and wisely rather to make them their fellow-citizens, than to make themselves fellow-slaves with them.

Demetrius, having refused the fair conditions offered, as the Rhodians the fearful ones propounded

to them, makes preparation for a long siege; and finding no appearance to carry the place in fury, he set in hand with his engines of battery; in the invention and use of which, he never shewed himself a greater artisan than in this war. But in conclusion, after the citizens had sustained all the assaults given them for a whole year,—after many brave sallies out of the town, and the famine which they endured within the town, which had proved far more extreme if Ptolemy had not with many hazards relieved them,—Demetrius, by mediation of the Grecian ambassadors, gave over the siege: a hundred hostages they gave him for performance of the peace made, but with exception of all the magistrates and officers of the city.

Hereunto Demetrius was brought by the usual policy of war and state; for while, with the flower of all his father's forces, he lay before Rhodes, Cassander recovered many of those places in Greece which Demetrius had formerly taken from him; neither did Cassander make the war as in former times, by practice and surprise, but by a strong and well compounded army, which he himself led as far as into Attica, and therewith greatly distressed and endangered Athens itself. On the other side (though with less success) did Polysperchon invade Peloponnesus. These dangerous undertakings upon Greece advised the Athenians and Ætolians to dispatch their ambassadors towards Demetrius; and advised Demetrius rather to abandon the enterprise of Rhodes, than to abandon the great honour which he had formerly gotten by setting all Greece at liberty.

Demetrius was no sooner out of the island, than that the Rhodians erected statues in honour of Lysimachus and Cassander; but for Ptolemy, whom they most affected, and from whom they received their most relief, they consulted the oracle of Jupiter, whether it were not lawful to call him a god. The priests which attended in the temple of Ammon, gave the

same fair answer for Ptolemy which they had formerly done for Alexander his master ; for as Alexander consulted the oracle with an army at his heels, so was Ptolemy at this time lord of the soil : and yet was this a far more cleanly creation than that done by the Athenians, who deified Antigonus and Demetrius by decree of the people. A mad age it was, when so many of Alexander's captains could not content themselves with the stile of kings, but that they would needs be called gods.

SECT. III.

How Demetrius prevailed in Greece. Cassander desires peace of Antigonus, and cannot obtain it. Great preparations of war against Antigonus.

DEMETRIUS coming with a strong fleet and army into Greece, quickly drove Cassander out of Attica ; and, pursuing his fortune, chased him beyond the straits of Thermopylæ. Herein his reputation did much avail him, which was so great, that six thousand of his enemy's soldiers revolted unto him. So, partly by the greatness of his name, partly by force, he recovered in short space, all that Cassander held in those straits, and giving liberty unto the people, he bestowed upon the Athenians those pieces which had been fortified to block them up. Then went he into Peloponnesus ; where he found the like, or more easy success ; for he suddenly took Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, and the most of the country, bestowing liberty upon such as needed it. The town of Sicyon he translated, by consent of the citizens, from the old seat into another place ; and called it, after his own name, Demetrius. This done, he betook himself to his pleasure. At the Isthmian games he caused himself to be proclaimed captain-general of Greece, as Philip and Alexander had been in former times ; whereupon, (as if he were now become as great as Alexander,) he despised all others, making it a mat-

ter of jest, that any save himself or his father, should usurp the name of king. But in his behaviour he was so far unlike to a king, that in all the time of his leisure, he deserved none other name than of a drunken palliard. Yet were the Athenians as ready as ever to devise new honours for him ; among which they made one decree, That whatsoever king Demetrius should command, ought to be held sacred with the gods and just with men.

All Greece being now at the disposition of Antigonus, Cassander stood in great fear, lest the wars should fall heavily upon him in Macedon ; which, to avoid, he knew no better way than to make peace with his enemies betimes. And to that purpose he sent ambassadors, but had no better answer from Antigonus, than that he should submit his whole estate to his discretion. This proud demand made him look about him, and labour hard in soliciting his friends, both to assist him, and take heed to themselves: neither found he them slow in apprehending the common danger ; for Lysimachus knew, that if once Cassander lost Macedon, Demetrius would soon be master of Thrace. Neither were Ptolemy nor Seleucus ignorant of that which was like to befall them, if Antigonus were suffered to put himself in quiet possession of those provinces in Europe. Wherefore it was agreed, that with joint forces they should all together set upon the common enemy.

Hereof Antigonus had notice, but scorned all their preparations, saying, that he would as easily scatter them, as a flock of birds are driven away with a stone. With these conceits he pleased himself, and no way hindered the proceedings of his enemies. He lay at that time in his town of Antigonia, (a name that it must shortly lose,) where he was carefully providing to set out some stately game and pageants, in ostentation of his glory. But thither was brought unto him the tumultuous news of Lysimachus's victories about Hellespont. For Cassander

had committed unto Lysimachus part of his forces, wherewith to pass over into Asia, while he himself with the rest should oppose Demetrius on Europe side. So Lysimachus passing the Hellespont, began to make hot war upon the subjects of Antigonus, getting some of the cities in those parts to join with him by fair means, winning others by force, and wasting the country round about.

To repress this unexpected boldness, Antigonus made hasty journies, and came soon enough to recover his losses, but not strong enough to drive Lysimachus home, or compel him to come to battle. Lysimachus waited for the coming of Seleucus, keeping himself the whilst from necessity of fighting. But Babylon was far off, and Seleucus's preparations were too great to be soon in readiness. The winter also did hinder his journey, which enforced them on both sides to rest in some quiet, without performing any matter of importance. This delay of debating the quarrel in open field, held all those nations in a great suspense, and bred much expectation. Yet might all have come to nothing, had not Antigonus been so froward, that he refused to yield unto any peaceable conditions. At length Seleucus drew near with a mighty army of his own, (for he had gathered strength in that long time of leisure which Antigonus had given him;) and with great aid from Ptolemy, that was joined with his forces.

To help in this needful case, Demetrius was called over into Asia, by his father's letters, which he readily obeyed. Before his departure out of Greece, he made peace with Cassander upon reasonable terms, to the end he might not be driven to leave any part of his army for defence of the country; and that his journey might be without any such blemish of reputation, as if he had abandoned his dependants; for one article of the peace was, that all the cities of Greece should be at liberty. Cassander was glad to be so rid of an enemy, that was too strong

for him. Yet would this league have done him little good, if things had fallen out contrariwise than they did in Asia, seeing the ratification thereof was referred unto Antigonus. It sufficed that, for the present, every one found means to clear himself of all incumbrances elsewhere, to the end that each of them might freely apply himself to the trial of the main controversy in Asia.

SECT. IV.

How Antigonus was slain in a great battle at Ipsus, near unto Ephesus, wherein his whole estate was lost.

SELEUCUS, with his son Antiochus, joining with Lysimachus, compounded a great army, which was, all considered, not inferior to that of the enemy. In greatness of name, (that helpeth much in all wars, but especially in the civil,) they were rather unanswerable, than unequal to their adversaries; for Antigonus had of long time kept them under with a mastering spirit, and had been reputed a king indeed, when the rest were held but usurpers of the title. Likewise Demetrius was generally acknowledged a brave commander, having given proof of his worth in many great services of all kinds, and enriched the art of war with many inventions, which even his enemies, and particularly Lysimachus, did much admire. Seleucus, who had sometimes flattered Antigonus, and fearfully stolen away from him to save his life, with young Antiochus, a prince not heard of before this journey; and Lysimachus, that had lived long in a corner, hardly keeping his own from the wild Thracians, wanted much in reputation of that which was yielded to their opposites; yet so, that as ancient captains under Alexander, two of them were held worthy enough to receive any benefit that fortune might give; and the third a prince of great hope, whereof he now came to make experience.

The soldiers on both sides were for the most part hardy and well exercised, many of them having served under Alexander; though of those old companies, the long space of two and twenty years had consumed the greatest number. But concerning their affections: the followers of Seleucus were easily persuaded, that in this battle they must either get the upper hand, or put in extreme danger all that belonged to the confederate princes; whereas Antigonus's men could discern no other necessity of fighting, than the obstinate quality of their lord, that needs would be master of all. Antigonus had about threescore and ten thousand foot, ten thousand horse, and seventy-five elephants. His enemies were six thousand short of him in number of their foot; in horse they had the odds of five hundred; of elephants they had four hundred, and a hundred and twenty armed chariots of war; which helps, though they little had availed the Persians, yet were they not to be despised, in the hands of a good captain.

Antigonus himself, either troubled with the unexpected greatness of his enemies forces, or presaging little good like to ensue, grew very pensive, communing much in private with his son, whom he commended to the army as his successor; whereas, in former times he had never been so jocund as towards the hour of battle, nor had been accustomed to make his son, or any other, privy to his counsel, before it required execution. Other tokens of bad luck, either foregoing the fight, or afterwards devised, I hold it needless to recount. Diana of Ephesus dwelt near to the place of battle, a busy goddess in many great fights, and therefore likely to have been thrust into the fable, if any matter nearly resembling a miracle had chanced.

It is easy to believe, that these two so gallant armies, containing well near all the strength of Alexander's whole empire, performed a notable fight, being led by such worthy commanders, and whom the

issue thereof did highly concern. Yet are few of the particulars recorded ; an easy loss in regard of the much variety wherewith every story aboundeth in this kind. The most memorable things in the battle were these : Demetrius, with his best force of horse, charged valiantly upon young Antiochus, whom, when he had broken and put to flight, he was so transported with the heat of his good success, that he never gave over his pursuit, but left his father naked, and lost thereby both him and the victory. For when Seleucus perceived this advantage, he interposed his elephants between Demetrius and the phalanx of Antigonus ; and with many troops of horse offering to break upon the enemies battle, wheresoever it lay most open, he did so terrify the Antigonians, that a great part of them rather chose to revolt from their lord, whilst they were fairly invited, than to sustain the fury of so dangerous an impression. This cowardice, or rather treason, of some, discouraged others, and finally cast them all into flight, exposing their general to the last end of his destinies. Antigonus was then fourscore years old, very fat and unwieldy, so that he was unapt for flight, if his high spirit could have entertained any thought thereof. He had about him some of his most trusty followers, and as many others as he could hold together. When one, that perceived a great troop making towards him, told him,—‘ Sir king, ‘ yonder company means to charge you ;’ he answered,—‘ Well may they, for who defends me ? but anon ‘ Demetrius will relieve us.’ Thus expecting, to the very last, that his son should come to the rescue, he received so many darts into his body, as took away his lately ambitious, but then fearful hopes, together with his troublesome life.

His great ability in matter of arms, together with his insatiable desire of empire, have sufficiently appeared in the whole volume of his actions. He was more feared by his enemies, than loved by his

friends ; as one that could not moderate his fortune, but used insolence towards all alike, as if it had been some virtue nearest representing a kingly majesty. This was the cause that so many of his followers revolted to his enemies ; and finally, that a great part of his army forsook him in his last necessity. For those kings and princes that call all the careful endeavours of their vassals only duty and debt, and are more apt to punish the least offences, than to reward the greatest services, shall find themselves, upon the first change of fortune, (seeing it is love only that stays by adversity,) not only the most friendless, but even the most contemptible and despised of all others. This Antigonus found true in part, while he lived ; in part he left it to be verified upon his son.

SECT. V.

How Demetrius, forsaken by the Athenians, after his overthrow, was reconciled to Seleucus and Ptolemy, beginning a new fortune, and shortly entering into quarrels.

For Demetrius, at his return from the idle pursuit of young Antiochus, finding all quite lost, was glad to save himself, with four thousand horse and five thousand foot, by a speedy retreat unto Ephesus ; whence he made great haste unto Athens, as to the place that for his sake would suffer any extremity. But whilst he was in the midst of his course thither, the Athenian ambassadors met him with a decree of the people ; which was, that none of the kings should be admitted into their city. These were ambassadors, not *theori*, or consulters with the oracle. It was a shameless ingratitude in the Athenians, to reward their benefactor, in his misery, with such a decree ; neither did any part of his calamity more afflict the unfortunate prince, than to see his adversity despised by those whom he had thought his surest friends. Yet he was fain to give good words ; for he had left ma-

ny of his ships in their haven, of which he now stood in great need, and therefore was fain to speak them fair that sometimes had grossly flattered him : but he shall live to teach them their old language, and speak unto them in another tune. When he had gotten his ships, he sailed to the Isthmus, where he found nothing but matter of discomfort. His garrisons were everywhere broken up, the soldiers having betaken themselves to his enemies pay ; so that he was king only of a small army and fleet, without money or means wherewith to sustain him and his followers any long time. All the rest, or the greatest part of his father's large dominion, was now dividing among the conquerors ; and those few places, which as yet held for him, (having not, perchance, heard the worst of what had happened,) he no way knew how to relieve. For to put himself into the field, on the side of Asia, he had no power ; and to inclose himself in any town, how strong soever, were but to imprison his fortune and his hopes, or therein, indeed, to bury himself and his estate. He, therefore, creeping through those bushes that had fewest briars, fell upon a corner of Lysimachus's kingdom, whereof he gave all the spoil that was gotten to his soldiers ; his own losses having been too great to be repaid again by small prizes.

In the meanwhile the confederate princes had wherewithal to busy themselves in the partition of those provinces of which their late victory had made them lords ; wherein Seleucus had a notable advantage, by being present, and master of the field. For neither Ptolemy nor Cassander were at the overthrow given, having only sent certain troops to reinforce the army which Seleucus led, who took hold of a part of Asia the Less, and all Syria, being no otherwise divided from his own territory than by the river of Euphrates. For there had not any order been taken by the confederates for the division of all those lands, because they did not expect so prosper-

ous an issue of that war, which they made only in their common defence. It was therefore lawful for Seleucus to make the best benefit that he could of the victory ; at which, nevertheless, others did re-pine : and though they neither could, nor durst, accuse him of ill dealing for the present, yet seeing the over-greatness of Seleucus brought no less danger to the rest of the new kings, than that of Antigonus had done, they consulted, upon the same reason of state as before, how to oppose it in time. Neither was Seleucus ignorant of what they had determined ; for he read it in the law universal of kingdoms and states, needing no other intelligence. Hereupon they forget friendship on all sides, and cure themselves of all unprofitable passion : the hatred of each other, and their loves, being laid on the one side, against their profits on the other, were found so far too light, as Seleucus, who had to-day slain Antigonus, the father, and driven Demetrius, the son, out of Asia, sought to-morrow how to match himself with Stratonice, Demetrius's daughter ; and so by Demetrius, to serve his turn against Lysimachus.

The story of this Stratonice, with whom young Antiochus, the son of Seleucus, fell so passionately in love, and so distempered, as Seleucus, his father, to save his son's life, gave her (though she were his wife) unto him ; and how his passion was discovered by his pulse, is generally noted by all writers. But neither did this alliance between Seleucus and Demetrius, between Ptolemy and Lysimachus, between Demetrius and Cassander, between Demetrius and Ptolemy, though for the present it brought him again into the rank of kings, otherwise tie any of them to each other, than the marriages between Christian kings have done in latter times, namely, between the Austrians, the Arragonians, the French, and other princes ; neither have the leagues of those elder times been found more faithful than those of the same later times have been ; as in the stories of

Charles VIII. of France, and of Charles the emperor, of Francis I., and of the kings of Naples, dukes of Milan, and others, the reader may observe; between whom, from the year of our Lord one thousand four hundred ninety and five, when Charles VIII. undertook the conquest of Naples, to the year one thousand five hundred fifty and eight, when Henry II. died, the histories of those times tell us, that all the bonds, either by the bed or by the book, either by weddings or sacramental oaths, had neither faithful purpose nor performance. Yet did Demetrius reap this profit, by giving his daughter to his enemy Seleucus, that he recovered Cilicia from Plistarchus, the brother of Cassander, who had gotten it as his share in the division of Antigonus's possessions; for the intruder was not strong enough to hold it by his proper forces from him that entered upon it as a lawful heir; neither would Seleucus lend him any help, as by the rule of confederacy he should have done against the common enemy. So Plistarchus, with very angry complaint, as well against Seleucus as Demetrius, went unto Cassander; whither Phila, their sister, followed him shortly, to pacify them both, and keep all quiet; being sent for that purpose by Demetrius her husband, that was not strong enough to deal with Cassander, and therefore glad to make use of that bond of alliance betwixt them, whereof in his own prosperity he never took notice to the other's good. About the same time he took to wife a daughter of Ptolemy's, (plurality of wives being familiar with these Macedonians, that had learned it in their eastern conquests,) and so was he by two marriages rather freed from two enemies than strengthened with two friends; for neither of them wished him any good, otherwise than might seem to advance their own ambitious desires.

Seleucus and Ptolemy could both of them have been contented better, that Demetrius, with help of their countenance, should seek his fortune somewhat

farther off, than settle his estate under their noses ; particularly Seleucus thought that Cilicia lay very fitly for himself, and Ptolemy had a great appetite (which yet he concealed a while) to the isle of Cyprus. Now, whether it were so that Seleucus would fain have set his new father-in-law upon the neck of Lysimachus, or whether he were indeed greedy of the bargain, he offered to buy of Demetrius, for ready money, his late purchase of Cilicia. Hereunto Demetrius would not hearken, but meant to keep as much land as he could, having already found in Cilicia twelve thousand talents of his father's treasure, that would serve him to make sport a while. This refusal so displeased Seleucus, that, in angry terms, he demanded the cities of Tyre and Sidon to be surrendered to him, which were the only places in Syria that had not followed the fortune of the late great battle. Instead of giving them up, Demetrius took present order to have them better manned, and spake it stoutly, that were he overcome a thousand times, yet would he not hire Seleucus to become his son-in-law. In this quarrel Seleucus was generally reprehended as one of a malignant disposition, that would break friendship with his father-in-law for two towns, from whom he had already taken more than well he knew how to govern. But the fire consumed itself in words, which, had it fastened upon arms, like it is that the weaker would have found friends out of envy to the stronger.

SECT. VI.

How Demetrius won the city of Athens, and prevailed in Greece, but lost in Asia. Of troubles in Macedon following the death of Cassander.

IN the meanwhile, the Athenians not knowing how to use the liberty which Demetrius had bestowed on them, were fallen by sedition under the tyranny of Lachares ; through which alteration their dis-

tempered city was so weakened, that it seemed ill able to keep off the punishment due to their late ingratitude. This advantage hastened him, whom they had once called their god and saviour, to present himself unto them in the habit of a revenging fury. He brought against them all the forces that he could well spare from other employments, which were at that time perhaps the more, because his doubtful eastern friends were unwilling to give impediment to any business that might entangle him in Greece. His first enterprise in Athens had ill success; a great part of his fleet perishing in a tempest. But he soon repaired the loss; and, (after some victories in Peloponnesus, where he won divers towns that had fallen from him,) returning to the enterprise, wasted the country of Attica, and cut off all relief from the city both by land and sea.

Athens was not able to feed the great multitude within it any long time, for it stood in a barren soil, and wanted now the command of those islands and places abroad from whence it was wont to be stored with victuals; being also destitute of means to keep such a navy as might bring in supply, or dare to do any thing at sea against that of Demetrius. Yet was there some hope of succour from Ptolemy, who (trusting thereby to win the love of Greece) had laden a hundred and fifty ships with corn, and sent them to relieve the hungry city. But these hundred and fifty were unable to deal with three hundred good fightingships which Demetrius had; rather they feared to become a prey to him, and therefore hasted away betimes, as having done enough in adventuring to come so near that they might be descried. This broke the heart of the people, among whom the famine was so extreme, that a father and his son did fight for a dead mouse, which dropped down between them from the house top. Wherefore they sent ambassadors to yield up the town and crave pardon; having so far offended, that, out of desperation, they made it a capital

offence to propose any motion of peace. Yet were they fain to abolish this decree, rather because they knew not what else to do than because they hoped to be forgiven.

Demetrius, contented with the honour of the victory, did not only forbear to take away the lives of these unthankful men, which they had submitted unto his mercy, but, out of his liberality, gave them food, and placed in office amongst them such as were most acceptable to the people. Nevertheless, he was grown wiser than to trust them so far as he had done in times past. And therefore, when (among other flattering acclamations) they bade him take their havens, and dispose of them at his pleasure, he was ready to lay hold upon the word, and leave a sure garrison within their walls to keep them honest perforce. After this he went into Peloponnesus, vanquished the Lacedæmonians in two battles, and was in very fair possibility to take their city, when the dangerous news called him in all haste, of Lysimachus and Ptolemy, that prevailed faster upon him elsewhere than himself did upon his enemies in Greece. Lysimachus had won many towns in Asia; Ptolemy had gotten all the isle of Cyprus, except the city of Salamis, wherein Demetrius had left his children and mother, that were straitly besieged. Whilst he was bethinking himself which way to turn his face, a notable piece of business offered itself, which thrust all other cares out of his head.

Cassander was lately dead in Macedon, and soon after him, Philip, his eldest son, whose two younger brethren, Antipater and Alexander, fought for the kingdom. In this quarrel, Thessalonica, the daughter of king Philip, whom Cassander had married, seemed better affected to Alexander than to her elder son; who thereupon grew so enraged, that most barbarously he slew his own mother. The odiousness of this fact gave a fair lustre to Alexander's cause, drawing the generality of the Macedonians to take his

part, as in revenge of the queen's death upon that wicked parricide Antipater. But Antipater was so strongly backed by Lysimachus, whose daughter he had married, that Alexander could not hope to make his party good without some foreign aid. For which cause he called in both Pyrrhus and Demetrius, who, how they dealt with him it will soon appear in the following tragedy of him and his brother. Their father, Cassander, had been one that shifted well for himself, at such time as every man sought how to get somewhat in the ill-ordered division of the empire. He was cunning in practice, and a good soldier; one of more open dealing than were his companions, but withal more impudent, rudely killing those whom others would more wisely have made away. He deeply hated the memory of Alexander, that had knocked his head against a wall upon some opinion of contempt. With Olympias he had an hereditary quarrel, derived from his father, whom she could not abide. Her feminine malice did so exasperate him, by cruelty that she used against his friends both alive and dead, as it made him adventure upon shedding the royal blood; wherewith, when once he had stained his hands, he did not care how far he proceeded in that course of murder. His carefulness to destroy those women and children whose lives hindered his purpose, argues him to have been rather skilful in matters of arms than a valiant man; such cruelty being a true mark of cowardice, which fears afar off the dangers that may quietly pass away, and seeks to avoid them by base and wicked means, as never thinking itself safe enough until there be nothing left that carries likelihood of danger. Of Olympias and Roxana it may be said, that they had well deserved the bloody end which overtook them; yet it ill beseemed Cassander to do the office of a hangman. But Alexander's children had by no law of men deserved to die for the tyranny of their father: wherefore, though Cassander died in his

bed, yet the divine justice brought swords upon his wife and children, that well revenged the cruelty of this bloody man, by destroying his whole house as he had done his master's.

SECT. VII.

Of Pyrrhus, and his doings in Macedon. The death of Cassander's children. Demetrius gets the kingdom of Macedon; prevails in war against the Greeks; loseth reputation in his war against Pyrrhus, and in his civil government, and prepares to win Asia. How all conspire against Demetrius. Pyrrhus and Lysimachus invade him; his army yields to Pyrrhus, who shares the kingdom of Macedon with Lysimachus.

PYRRHUS, the son of that unfortunate prince Æacidas, which perished in war against Cassander, was hardly preserved, being a suckling infant, from the fury of his father's enemies. When his fosterers had conveyed him to Glaucias, king of Illyria, the deadly hatred of Cassander would have bought his life with the price of two hundred talents. But no man can kill him that shall be his heir. Glaucias was so far from betraying Pyrrhus, that he restored him by force to his father's kingdom, when he was but twelve years of age. Within the compass of six years, either the indiscretions of his youth, or the rebellious temper of his subjects, drove him out of his kingdom, and left him to try the world anew. Then went he to Demetrius, (who married his sister,) became his page, followed him a while in his wars, was with him in the great battle of Ipsus, whence he fled with him to Ephesus, and was content to be hostage for him in his reconciliation with Ptolemy. In Egypt he so behaved himself, that he got the favour of Berenice, Ptolemy's principal wife; so that he married her daughter, and was thereupon sent home with men and money into Epirus; more beholden now to

Ptolemy than to Demetrius. When he had fully recovered the kingdom of Epirus, and was settled in it, then fell out that business between the children of Cassander, which drew both him and Demetrius into Macedon.

Antipater, the elder of Cassander's sons, was so far too weak for Pyrrhus, that he had no desire to attend the coming of Demetrius, but made an hasty agreement, and divided the kingdom with his younger brother Alexander; who likewise felt the aid of Pyrrhus so troublesome, that he was more willing to send him away than to call in such another helper; for Pyrrhus had the audacity to request, or take as granted, by strong hand, Ambracia, Acarnania, and much more of the country, as the reward of his pains; leaving the two brethren to agree as well as they could about the rest. Necessity enforced the brethren to composition; but their composition would not satisfy Demetrius, who took the matter heinously that he was sent for, and made a fool, to come so far with an army and find no work for it. This was a frivolous complaint; whereby it appeared that Demetrius had a purpose to do as Pyrrhus had done, and so much more, by how much he was stronger. Hereupon it seemed to Alexander a wise course to remove this over-diligent friend, by murdering him upon some advantage. Thus Demetrius reported the story; and it might be true, though the greatest part, and perhaps the wisest, believed it not: but the issue was, that Alexander himself was feasted and slain by Demetrius, who took his part of the kingdom as a reward of the murder; excusing the fact so well, by telling his own danger, and what a naughty man Cassander had been, that all the Macedonians grew glad enough to acknowledge him their king. It fell out, happily, that about the same time Lysimachus was busied in war with a king of the wild Thracians; for thereby he was compelled to seek peace of Demetrius; which to obtain, he

caused the remainder of Macedon to be given up; that is, the part belonging to Antipater his son-in-law. At this ill bargain Antipater grievously stormed, though he knew not how to amend it; yet still he stormed, until his father-in-law, to save the labour of making many excuses, took away his troublesome life. Thus in haste, with a kind of neglect, and as it were to avoid molestation, were slain the children of Cassander,—of Cassander that had slain his own master's children in a wise course of policy, with careful meditation, (so much the more wicked as the more long,) studying how to erect his own house, that fell down upon his grave, ere the earth on it was thoroughly settled.

It might be thought that such an access of dominion added much to the greatness of Demetrius; but indeed it shewed his infirmity, and thereby made him neglected by many, and at length hated by all. For he had no art of civil government, but thought (or shewed by his actions that he thought) the use and fruit of a kingdom to be none other than to do what a king listed. He gave himself over to women and wine, laughing openly at those that offered to trouble him with supplications, and the tedious discourse of doing justice. He had more skill in getting a kingdom than in ruling it; war being his recreation, and luxury his nature. By long rest, (as six years reign is long to him that knows not how to reign one year,) he discovered so much of his worst conditions, as made both the people weary of his idleness, and the soldiers of his vanity. He was freed from care of matters in Asia, by hearing that all was lost; though more especially by hearing that Ptolemy had, with great honour, entertained and dismissed his mother and children. This afforded him the better leisure of making war in Greece, where he vanquished the Thebans, and won their city twice in short space, but used his victory with mercy. Against Lysimachus he would fain have done somewhat, (the peace

between them notwithstanding,) at such time as he was taken by the Thracians; but Lysimachus was freely dismissed, and in good case to make resistance ere Demetrius came, so as this journey purchased nothing but enmity. Another expedition he took in hand against Pyrrhus, with no better, or rather with worse event. Pyrrhus held somewhat belonging to Macedon, which he had indeed as honestly gotten as Demetrius the whole kingdom. He had also made excursions into Thessaly. But there needed not any handsome pretence of quarrel, seeing Demetrius thought himself strong enough to overrun his enemy's country with two great armies. It is a common fault in men to despise the virtue of those whom they have known raw novices in that faculty wherein themselves are noted as extraordinary. Pyrrhus was a captain, whom later ages, and particularly the great Hannibal, placed higher in the rank of generals, than either Demetrius or any of Alexander's followers. At this time he missed that part of the army which Demetrius led, and fell upon the other half, which he overthrew; not with more commendations of his good conduct than of his private valour, shewed in single combat against Pantauchus, Demetrius's lieutenant, who, being a strong man of body, challenged this young prince to fight hand to hand, and was utterly beaten. The loss of this battle did not so much offend the Macedonians as the gallant behaviour of Pyrrhus delighted them; for in him they seemed to behold the lively figure of Alexander in his best quality. Other kings did imitate, in a counterfeit manner, some of Alexander's graces, and had good skill in wearing princely vestures, but (said they) none, save Pyrrhus, is like him in deed in performing the office of a captain.

These rumours were not more nourished by the virtue of the Epirot than by dislike of their own king, whom they began to disesteem, not so much in regard of his unprofitable journey into Epirus,

(for he had wasted much of the country, and brought home his army in good case,) as of his insolence, that grew daily more and more intolerable. His apparel seemed, in the eyes of the Macedonians, not only too sumptuous and new-fangled, but very unmanly, and serving chiefly to be a daily witness how much he contemned them and their good opinion. Of his soldiers lives he was reckless, and suffered unwisely this unprincely sentence to escape out of his mouth,—that ‘the more of them died, the fewer he was to pay.’ He made a mockery of justice; and (as it were to publish unto all his subjects how little he esteemed it or them) having, by a shew of popularity, invited petitioners, and with a gracious countenance entertained their supplications, he led the poor suitors after him in great hope, till coming to a bridge, he threw all their writings into the river; pleasing himself in that he could so easily and so boldly delude the cares of other men. By these courses he grew so odious, that Pyrrhus gathered audacity, and invading Macedon, had almost won it all with little resistance. Demetrius then lay sick in his bed, who recovering health, and taking the field, had such great odds of strength, as made Pyrrhus glad to forsake his winnings and be gone.

At length he began to have some feeling of the general hate, which to redress he did not (for he could not) alter his own conditions; but purposed to alter their idle discourses of him, by setting them on work in such an action, wherein his best qualities might appear, that is, in a great war. His intent was to invade Asia with a royal army, wherein the fortune of one battle might give him as much as the fortune of another had taken from him. To this end he first made peace with Pyrrhus, that so he might leave all safe and quiet at home. Then did he compose a mighty army, of almost a hundred thousand foot, and twelve thousand horse, with a navy of five hundred sail, wherein were many ships far exceed-

ing the greatness of any that had been seen before ; yet so swift and useful withal, that the greatness was least part of their commendation.

The terrible fame of these preparations made Seleucus and Ptolemy suspect their own forces, and labour hard with Lysimachus and Pyrrhus to join against this ambitious son of Antigonos, that was like to prove more dangerous to them all than ever was his father. It was easily discerned, that if Demetrius once prevailed in Asia, there could be no security for his friends in Europe, what league soever were of old concluded. Therefore they resolved to begin with him betimes, and each to invade that quarter of Macedon that lay next to his own kingdom. Lysimachus came first, and against him went Demetrius with a great part of his army ; but whilst he was yet on the way, news were brought into his camp that Pyrrhus had won Berrhœa. The matter was not over great, were it not that minds prepared with long discontent are ready to lay hold upon small occasions of dislike. All the camp was in uproar ; some wept, others raged, few or none did forbear to utter seditious words, and many desired leave of Demetrius to go to their own houses ; meaning indeed to have gone to Lysimachus.

When Demetrius perceived the bad affection of his army, he thought it the wisest way to lead the Macedonians further off from Lysimachus, their own countryman, against Pyrrhus, that was a stranger ; hoping by victory against the Epirot to recover the love of his followers in such sort that he might afterwards at leisure deal with the other. But herein his wisdom beguiled him ; for the soldiers were as hasty as he to meet with Pyrrhus ; not intending to hurt him, but longing to see that noble prince, of whom they daily heard the honourable fame. Some spake of his valour, some inquired, others answered, of his person, his armour, and other tokens whereby he might be known ; as particularly by a pair of

goat's horns that he wore on his crest. It was not likely that these men should hurt him. Divers of them stole away and ran over into Pyrrhus's camp, where the news that they brought were better welcome than their persons; for they said, and it was true, that if the Macedonians might once get sight of Pyrrhus, they would all salute him king. To try this, Pyrrhus rode forth, and presented himself bare-headed in view of the camp, whither some were sent before to prepare his welcome. The news of his arrival found a general applause, and every one began to look out with desire to set eye on him. His face was not so well known as his helmet, therefore he was admonished to put it on; which done all came about him and proffered their service; neither were there any that spake for Demetrius, only some (and they the most moderate of tongue) bade him begone betimes and shift for himself. So Demetrius threw aside his masker's habit, and attiring himself poorly, did fearfully steal away out of his own camp: deserving well this calamity, whether it were so that he would not hearken to the good counsel of his friends; or whether his behaviour deprived him of such friends as would dare to let him hear the unpleasant sound of necessary truth.

Whilst Pyrrhus was making this triumphant entry into the kingdom of Macedon, Lysimachus came upon him very unseasonably, and would needs have half, saying, that he had done as much as Pyrrhus in the war, and therefore had reason to challenge his part of the gains. The bargain was quickly made, and the division agreed upon; each of them being rather desirous to take his part quietly than to fight for the whole, as hoping each of them to work his fellow quite out of all upon better opportunity.

SECT. VIII.

How Demetrius, gathering forces, enterprized many things with ill success in Greece and Asia. How he was driven upon Seleucus, and compelled to yield himself. His imprisonment and death.

THE Athenians were as unthankful to Demetrius in this his adversity, as they had been in former times; for they presently forsook his friendship, and called Pyrrhus out of Macedon to be their patron. Demetrius, when he went against Lysimachus, had left a great part of his forces in Greece, under his son Antigonus; therefore it is like that he had soon gotten an army, though Phila his wife (who is highly commended for a wife and virtuous lady,) did poison herself, upon desperate grief for his misfortune. The first upon whom he attempted to shew his anger were the Athenians, that had well deserved it. He began to lay siege to their town, but was pacified by Crates the philosopher, whom they had made their spokesman; and taking fair words instead of satisfaction, passed over into Asia with eleven thousand soldiers, meaning to try his fortune against Lysimachus, for the provinces of Lydia and Caria.

At his first coming into those parts, fortune seemed to smile upon him. For many good towns, willingly, or by compulsion, yielded to his obedience. There were also some captains that fell from Lysimachus to him with their companies and treasures. But it was not long ere Agathocles, the son of Lysimachus, came upon him with an army so strong, that it was not for Demetrius's good to hazard his last stock against it. Wherefore he resolved to pass through Phrygia and Armenia, into Media, and the provinces of the Higher Asia, trusting to find a kingdom somewhere in those remote quarters. The execution of this counsel was grievously impeached by Agathocles, who pursued him close, and cut off all

his provisions, driving him to take which ways he could, without following his intended course. In many skirmishes, Demetrius vanquished this troublesome enemy ; nevertheless, he could not be shaken off, but continued afflicting the poor titular king with extreme famine. At length, in passing the river Lycus, so many of Demetrius's men were lost, that the rest could no longer make resistance, but were driven to travel with such speed, as might well be called a plain flight : so that with famine, pestilent diseases following famine, and other accidents of war, eight thousand of them were consumed ; the rest, with their captain, escaped into Cilicia. Seleucus had gotten possession of Cilicia, whilst Demetrius was occupied in Greece ; yet was it no part of Demetrius's errand to lay claim to the country ; but with vehement and humble letters he besought his son-in-law to call to mind their alliance, and to pity him in his great misery. These letters, at the first, wrought well with Seleucus, and he condescended to the request ; yet considering further how Demetrius had carried himself, when he recovered strength after the battle at Ipsus, he changed his purpose, and went against him with an army.

Many treaties were held between them, of which none took effect, through the jealousy of Seleucus. Therefore, mere desperation forced Demetrius to fight like a madman ; and his fury got him some victories, though of small importance. At length, sickness took and held him forty days, in which time a great number of his few men ran to the enemy. This notwithstanding, he still held out, and once had like to have taken Seleucus in his bed, had not his coming been discovered by fugitives that gave the alarm. Finally, when all his army had forsaken him, and left him, with a few of his friends, to shift for himself, he was compelled, by the last of those adherents (for even some of those few forsook him,) to yield unto Seleucus.

Seleucus, hearing this, was exceeding glad, and sent him very comfortable messages. But the approbation of his own humanity by his followers, was such as to renew his jealous thoughts, and hindered him from admitting Demetrius to his presence; though otherwise he used him with as much favour as any prisoner could wish. He was kept under sure guard in a demi-island, wherein were goodly walks, orchards, and parks for hunting. He had all that he asked royally, and friends allowed to visit him at his and their pleasure; only his liberty was reserved unto the coming of young Antiochus and Stratonica out of the high countries. In this sort he spent three years, living merrily all the while, (as one that now enjoyed the happiness which, with so much travel and blood-shed, he had sought in vain,) and then died, leaving to his son Antigonus the same which his father had left unto himself, that is, friends and hope. His ashes were honourably buried in Corinth; his qualities have appeared in his actions, and the fortune of his house will shew itself hereafter, in times and places convenient.

SECT. IX.

The death of Ptolemy, of Lysimachus, and of Seleucus, that was last of Alexander's captains; with other occurrences.

ABOUT the same time that Demetrius died, did also Ptolemy king of Egypt; a virtuous prince, warlike, gentle, bountiful, and (which in those times was a rare commendation,) regardful of his word. He had, by many wives and concubines, many children; out of whom he selected Ptolemy Philadelphus, and caused him to reign, together with himself, two or three years before he died, so that he might confirm him in the inheritance of the kingdom. At this, Ptolemy Ceraunus (for all of that house assumed the name of Ptolemy) was grievously incensed; but no

man cared for his anger. Therefore he went to Seleucus, who gave him loving entertainment. There were now only two of Alexander's captains left, Seleucus and Lysimachus. These two needs would fight for it, who should be the longest liver of that brave company. The true ground of their quarrel was their near equality of strength, and want of one to part them. The pretence was, the murders which Lysimachus had committed upon many of his nobles, together with his poisoning Agathocles, his eldest son, whose wife and children fled unto Seleucus for aid.

The Macedonians, after seven months pause, having spent their first heat of admiration, began to hearken so well to Lysimachus, their natural countryman, that they forsook Pyrrhus upon none other ground than because he was an alien. This they had known well enough before; but they did him no great wrong in taking lightly from him what they lightly gave him. Lysimachus had reigned about five years alone, when the city of Lysimachia (built by him, and called after his name) falling by an earthquake, appeared, by events, to have foreshowed the fall of his house. His own jealousy, and the instigation of a mother-in-law, caused him to poison his son Agathocles, which drew upon him that war, wherein (after the loss of all his fifteen children, that were taken away by divers accidents,) he perished himself.

Seleucus was encountered by Lysimachus on Asia side, where one battle concluded the war with Lysimachus's death. It pleased Seleucus more than the victory, that he was the last of all the great heroes which had followed Alexander; for now he seemed to himself as lord and heir of all the conquered world. So he passed over into Macedon, to take possession of Europe, where there was none to withstand him. But there he ended his days, and within seven months followed Lysimachus, and others of his fel-

lows, by a bloody death; being treacherously slain by Ptolemy Ceraunus, whose friend and patron he had been. Seventy-seven years old he was, when he fought with Lysimachus, and Lysimachus was seventy-four. With them ended the generation of old captains, that had seen the days, as it were, of another world under the Persian; yet was there left one equal to any of them in the art of war, even Pyrrhus the Epirot, of whom we spake before, that is now ready to enter into a war with the Romans, a more warlike people than Alexander himself did ever encounter. Of which war, and of which people, it is needful that we here make mention, as of a story more important than any likely to ensue in Greece, or in the great kingdoms that were held by Alexander's successors, with less (and still decreasing) virtue than was that by which they were first purchased.

CHAP. VII.

THE GROWTH OF ROME, AND SETTLING OF THE EASTERN KINGDOMS.

SECT. I.

How the Romans enlarged their dominion in Italy, from the death of Tullus Hostilius, unto such time as they were assailed by Pyrrhus.

How Rome was founded by Romulus, settled in good order by Numa Pompilius, and by many, though small victories, gathered strength, until such

time as it became the head of Latium, by the conquest of Alba, in the reign of Tullus Hostilius, it hath been already noted in due order of time. But whereas now the Roman greatness beginneth to encounter the power of Greece, and, extending itself out of Italy, to overwhelm the dominions of other states and princes, I hold it convenient (as in like cases I have done) briefly to set down the growth of this mighty city, in a compendious relation of these many actions, which could not have been delivered in the ages wherein they were severally performed, without much interruption of the history that was then occupied in matter more important.

After the death of Tullus Hostilius, (who, when he had reigned two and thirty years, was burnt together with his house by lightning,) Ancus Martius, grand-child to Numa Pompilius, by his daughter, and not much unlike him in disposition, succeeded in the kingdom of Rome. He walled the city about, enlarged it with the hill Aventine, which he inclosed, built a bridge over Tybris, and the city of Ostia, upon the sea, sixteen miles distant from Rome. Finally, having reigned twenty-four years, he died; and by his last will he left his children in charge with one Lucumon, the son of Damaratus, a Corinthian, who, avoiding Cypselus king of Corinth's tyranny, had fled into Etruria, and dwelt in Tarquinii, by the name of which town he was afterwards called Tarquinius. From that city in Etruria coming to Rome, and encouraged by some ominous occurrents, together with his wife Tanaquil's prophecy, he grew a favourite of Ancus Martius, by his Grecian wit, humouring the factions of the Roman court; inso-much that after his decease he became not only protector to the children, but governor to the city. He doubled the number of senators, and enlarged the centurions of horsemen: neither was he less eminent in war than in peace; for he prevailed often against the Tuscans, and from his victories the chiefest or-

naments of triumph took their original. When this Lucius Tarquinius had reigned eight and thirty years, he was slain by the sons of Ancus Martius, to whom he had been left guardian. But Tanaquil, his wife, perceiving what was done, informed the people from out of an high turret, that her husband was wounded, and sick, but not dangerously ; and withal signified unto them, that in the interim of his sickness, one Servius Tullius, (whom from his birth she always prophesied to be born to great hopes, the son of P. Corniculani and Ocrisia, a well descended but captive woman,) brought up in her house, and husband unto her daughter, should supply her husband's place in governing the state until his recovery ; which government being thus at first obtained by cunning, he afterwards usurped as his right. He first ordained ratements, subsidies, and valuations of the people's wealth ; among whom, at that time, fourscore thousand were mustered, of which number consisted their whole corporation ; and by distinction of dignities, ages, trades, and offices, he managed the kingdom in as good sort as if it had been a private household. At length, having two daughters of different natures, the one mild and gentle, the other fierce and outrageous, and finding, also, that the two sons of Tarquinius Priscus, Sextus and Aruns, which had been committed to his tuition, were of different dispositions, proportionably answering to his daughters, he (willing to add water, not oil, to fire,) gave the mild daughter to Sextus, the hot-headed son, and the violent to Aruns, the gentle, in marriage. But whether by intended courses, or by accident, it happened, the two mild ones being made away, the furious natures were readily joined in marriage ; who soon after concurring and calling the senate together, began to lay claim to the kingdom. Upon this tumult, Servius Tullius hastening to the senate (where he thought by authority to have bridled insolency) was thrown down the stairs ; and going

home sore bruised, was slain by the way, when he had reigned forty and four years. Then Tullia his daughter, first proclaiming her husband Tarquinius Superbus king, returning home, enforced her coachman to drive her chariot over her father's corps, whereupon the street had the denomination of *Wicked-street*. This Tarquin, exercising cruelty without justice, and tyranny without mercy, upon the people and senators, having tired himself and them at home, used the same rage and treachery upon his borders. He took Oriculum, Suessa, Pometia, and the Gabii. The issue of besieging Ardea, a town eighteen miles distant from Rome, was of bad success. In the heat of which war, his son Sextus Tarquinius violently ravished that chaste lady Lucretia, his kinsman Collatinus's wife; who, in way of expiation for so unchaste a deed, thought good to wash out those spots of infamy with her own blood: so (having first bequeathed the revenge to her father Sp. Lucretius Tricipitinus, her husband Collatinus, and Junius Brutus) she killed herself; whereupon (chiefly by Junius Brutus's resolution) Tarquinius Superbus, with his wife and children, was deposed and banished, and fled to Porsenna king of Etruria for succour, in the five and twentieth year of his reign, and the two hundred forty and fourth from the building of their city; in which space Rome had scarce gotten full possession of fifteen miles round about her.

Junius Brutus, by the help of Collatinus, having expelled Tarquin, and freed his country from that heavy yoke of bondage, enforced the people by solemn oath, never to admit any government by kings amongst them; whereupon they ransacked their king's goods, consecrated their fields to Mars, and conferred the government of the state upon Brutus and Collatinus. But because the name of king was odious in their ears, they changed the manner of their government from perpetual to annual, and

from a single governor to a double, lest perpetual or sole dominion might be some motive to usurpation ; and instead of kings they called them consuls, signifying, as it may be interpreted, *Providers*, that their titles might remember them of their place, which was to be always mindful of their citizens welfare. And yet was it so hard settling of troubled waters, that the people, after this innovation of state, scarce daring to assure themselves of their own security, enforced Tarquinius Collatinus to resign up his authority ; fearing that tyranny would be hereditary, and supposing that the very name and affinity with the house of Tarquin savoured already of their condition. In his room was substituted Valerius Publicola, who, that he might (as his name importeth) be gracious in the people's eyes, gave liberty, in matters of controversy, to appeal from the consuls to the people ; and that he might, as well in goods as in person, avoid occasion of suspicion, caused his own house to be pulled down, because it was built in a place defensible, as if it had been a citadel. Neither was Brutus any ways deficient in matter of greater moment, which concerned as well the people's safety as their favour ; for having got intelligence that some greener wits, and in the first rank his own sons, were itching after innovations, hoping to restore the banished kings, he caused them publicly in the market-place to be whipt, and then to be brought all impartially to the block.

Hitherto the Romans having, by the unblemished integrity of Brutus, well appeased all ill-bred quarrels at home, now hereafter employ their military designs against foreigners ; first, for their liberty ; secondly, for enlarging their possessions ; and lastly, for defending their confederate provinces, and extending their empire. For Rome, situated as it were in the mid-way between Latium and the Tuscans, having as yet but narrow bounds, being in her minority, could not but give occasion of offence to her

neighbours; until by main opposition, having prevailed against her borderers, she used them as instruments whereby to obtain the rest.

Their first war, in the first year of consuls, was against Porsenna king of Etruria; who being overpersuaded by Tarquin's lamentation, came to Rome, together with the banished king, and with great forces, to seat him again in his kingdom.

In the first conflict, Horatius Cocles, having long time borne the main brunt of his enemies, on the bridge over Tybris, at length, finding himself too faint to stand against so many, caused the bridge behind him to be broken down, and, with his armour, leaping into the river like a hunted stag, refreshed his hot spirits, and returned safe to his fellows, with the like resolution to sustain a new charge. Porsenna, although by this he had well-nigh won the hill Janiculus, which is the very entrance into the city, and found the victory, in a manner, assuredly his own; yet admiring their valour, and terrified by the constant resolution of Mutius Scævola, (who having by error slain Porsenna, his secretary, instead of the king himself, did, in scorn of torments threatened, burn off his own hand,) he thought it not a whit prejudicial, either to his safety or credit, to enter league with them at the worst hand. And yet the edge of Tarquinius's spleen was not quite abated, though Aruns his son, and Brutus his enemy, in single combat, had slain each other. And here the Romans, although they lost Brutus, got the field; and their ladies, whose champion he was, for their chastity, not for beauty, mourned the loss of him one whole year. Into his place, for the residue of his year, was subrogated Sp. Lucretius Tricipitinus, father to Lucretia; and in his room, (deceasing naturally before the year expired,) Horatius Pulvillus.

Tarquin, upon his overthrow, feeling the fates disastrous, thought it no boot to strive against the stream, and spent the residue of his time, which was

about fourteen years, privately at Tusculum. Yet his son-in-law, Mamilius Tusculanus, stomaching afresh at those old repulses, because Porsenna had made peace with the Romans, and denied further succour unto the Tarquins, mustered up his Latins, and gave battle to the Romans at the lake Regillum ; where, the conflict was fierce, and the issue uncertain, until Aulus Posthumus, the Roman dictator, (for they had created this magistracy greater than consuls, purposely for this war, when first it was expected,) to exasperate his soldiers' courage, threw their own ensigns amidst the enemies ; and Cossus, or Spurius Cassius, (master of the horse, an assistant officer to the dictator,) commanded to take off their bridles, that they might run with free violence, to recover again their ensigns. This fight was so well performed, that a report went current, of Castor and Pollux, two gods, who came on milk-white steeds to be eye-witnesses of their valour, and fellow-helpers of their victory ; for the general consecrated a temple to them, as a stipend for their pains. After this, the Romans fierce spirits, having no object of valour abroad, reflected upon themselves at home ; and the sixteenth year after the king's expulsion, upon instigation of some desperate bankrupts, thinking themselves wrongfully oppressed by the senate and consuls, they made an uproar in the holy mount ; until by Menenius Agrippa, his discreet allusion of the inconvenience in the head and belly's discord to that present occasion, they were reconciled to the senate ; with condition, that they might have some new magistrates created, to whom they might appeal in cases of variance, and make them solicitors in all their controversies, the consuls authority notwithstanding. This was enacted, and they were called the tribunes of the people. After this atonement amongst themselves, they had continual war with the Latins, concerning their bounds and limits, and with other neighbouring states. A-

mongst these the Volsci and Æqui held them longest, who made war of themselves upon the Romans; whereby they lost the best city in their whole jurisdiction, Corioli.

In this conquest, T. Martius got the sirname of Coriolanus, a name honourable then, as derived from a great victory; although, by reason of the poverty of the town, a Roman general in aftertimes would have been ashamed of that title. But yet these graces had been no occasion of disparagement, had he not afterwards, in a great time of dearth, advised to sell corn, which they procured from Sicily, at too high a rate to the people; whereupon Decius Mus, their tribune, in their behalf, accused him, and, after judgment, banished him. Coriolanus flying to the Volsci, whom lately before he had vanquished, incensed them to renew their forces again; which being committed to him and to Attius Tullus, he prevailed in field so far forth that he was come within four or five miles of the city. Encamping there, he made so sharp war, and was at such defiance with his country, that he would not relent by any supplication of ambassadors, until his mother Veturia, and Volumnia his wife, with a pitiful tune of deprecation, shewing themselves better subjects to their country than friends to their son and husband, were more available to Rome than was any force of arms. Hereupon Coriolanus dismissing his army, was after put to death among the Volsci as a traitor, for neglecting such an opportunity; or, (as others surmise,) living with them until old age, he died naturally.

Not long after this, the Veii in Etruria provoked the Romans; against whom the Fabii, three hundred and six in number, all of one family, entreated and obtained, that they only might be employed, as it had been in a private quarrel. These Fabii, after some good services, lying encamped at Cremera, were circumvented and all slain: one only of that whole house had been left, by reason of infancy, at

home; from whom afterwards sprang Fabius Maximus, who vanquished Hannibal.

In process of time, the Romans were also troubled with the Volsci, at the hill of Algidum, two miles from Rome; where Lucius Minucius, their consul, with his whole army, had been discomfited, had not L. Quintius Cincinnatus, chosen dictator, and taken from the plough to the highest honour in Rome, with success, answerable to his expedition, dispersed his enemies, and freed his country in the space of sixteen days. In the continuance of this Volscian war it was, that Appius Claudius, one of the ten men whom they had two years before chosen governors of the state, and enactor's of Solon's laws amongst them, procured from Athens, (abrogating, in the meanwhile, the consuls and all other magistrates,) would have ravished Virginia, the daughter of T. Virginius, captain of a company, and lying then at camp at Algidum. Hereupon the people in an uproar, took the hill Aventine, and, after much variance, enforced the ten men to resign up their authority again to new consuls.

After this, either new quarrels, or desire to revenge old losses, drew the Romans into a new war against the Veientes and their adherents; upon whom having tried their forces, with diversity of captains, and variety of event, they vanquished the Falisci and the Fidenates, and utterly subdued the Veientes. In conquering the Falisci, Furius Camillus shewed no less integrity than fortitude. For when a schoolmaster, by training forth into the Roman camp many children of the principal citizens, thought to betray the town, yielding them all up as hostages; Camillus delivered this traitor bound unto his scholars, willing them to whip him back into the city, which forthwith yielded unto him in reverence of his justice. The siege of Veii was ten years, and so troublesome, that the Romans were there enforced to winter abroad under beasts skins, (to which they

were the more easily induced, because then first they received pay,) and to make vows never to return without victory.

At length, winning the city by a mine, they got so large spoils, that they consecrated their tents to Apollo Pythius; and the whole people in general were called to the ransacking of the city. But they were no less unthankful to Camillus for his service, than before they had been to Coriolanus; for they banished him the city, upon some occasion of inequality in dividing the spoils. Yet he requited their unkindness with a new piece of service against the fury of the Gauls; who having a populous country, and very healthful, the fathers, (as sometimes now,) lived so long, that the sons, destitute of means, were enforced to rove abroad, seeking some place where to set up their rest; and withal, being a nation vast in body, rude by nature, and barbarous in conditions, wandered as rovers over many countries. Some of them lighting on Italy, set upon Clusium, a town in Etruria; whereof Rome having information, (and being careful of her confederate towns,) sent ambassadors, warning them to desist from such injurious enterprises. But the barbarous people, not regarding the message, upon some injury offered by the Roman ambassadors, converted their forces from Clusium towards Rome; and giving a great overthrow unto the Romans by the river Allia, upon the sixteenth day before the Calends of August, (which day was after branded for unlucky, and called *Alliensis* in the Roman calendar,) they hastened towards the city. Then was Rome the true map of misery and desolation. For some leaving the city, some creeping into holes,—priests hiding their reliques, and every one shifting for himself; ere the enemy came, Rome was abandoned as indefensible. The vestal virgins, in this tumult, were safely conveyed away: the ancients of the city, gathering boldness out of desperate fear, did put on their robes, and taking their leave of the

world, did seat themselves in thrones in their several houses, hourly expecting the messengers of death, and meaning to die as they had lived, in state. The younger sort, with M. Manlius their captain, took upon them to make good the capitol.

By this the Gauls were entered the city, who seeing all quiet, at first suspected some ambush ; after finding all secure, they fell to the spoil, committing all to the fire and sword. As for the old senators, they sat in their majesty with a grave resolution ; having first revered them as gods, anon they tried whether they would die like men. When the city was thoroughly rifled, they attempted the capitol, which held them work for the space of seven months. Once they were like to have surprised it by night, but being descried by the gaggling of geese, M. Manlius did awaken, and kept them from entrance. At length a composition was agreed upon : the Gauls being weary, and the Romans hungry. The bargain was, that the Gauls should take a thousand pound weight in gold, to desist from their siege. Whilst the gold was in weighing, the Gauls, with open insolency, made their weights too heavy ; Brennus, their captain, casting his sword into the balance, and, with a proud exprobaton, saying, that the vanquished must be patient per force. But in the midst of this cavilling, came Furius Camillus with an army from Ardea, (where he had lived in his banishment,) and fell upon the Gauls with such violence, that he dispersed their troops, quenched the fire of the city with their blood, forcing them to restore the spoils with advantage, and forbear the gold, in accepting which they had lately been so nice. Further, having rid the city of them, he so hotly pursued them through a great part of Italy, that the remainder of their army which escaped from him was very small. Other armies of the Gauls, which followed this first, had the like ill success. They were often beaten by the Romans ; especially the victories of M. Torqua-

tus, and of M. Valerius Corvinus, (each of which in single fight slew a champion of the Gauls,) abated their presumption, and restored courage to the Romans. Camillus, for his notable service, was afterwards accounted a second Romulus.

The people, after this destruction of their city, were earnestly bent to go to the Veii to inhabit; but Camillus dissuaded them.

About the same time, somewhat before the siege of Veii, they changed their government from consuls to military tribunes. The government of these also, after some years, was, by civil dissension, interrupted: so that one while consuls ruled, another while there was an anarchy. Then the tribunes were restored, and ruled again; till, after many years expired, the consular authority was established, it being enacted, that one of the consuls should always be a plebeian. This was after the building of the city three hundred sixty-five years. And now Rome, by suppression of her neighbour countries, creeping well forward out of her minority, dares set forth against the warlike Samnites, who dwelt almost one hundred and thirty miles off, situated between Campania and Apulia. These did so strongly invade the Campanians their neighbours, that they forced them to yield themselves subjects to Rome, and undergo any conditions of tribute, or whatsoever else, to obtain protection; which the Romans, although both countries had been their confederates, yet not willing that the greater, like fish, should devour the less, easily allowed of; aiming, themselves, at the good situation of Campania, the abundance of corn and wine, pleasant cities and towns, but especially Capua itself, the fairest city then in all Italy.

The families of the Papyrii and Fabii were most employed in the managing of this war, which endured the space of fifty years. And in this season were the Romans oftentimes dangerously encountered by the Samnites; as when T. Veturius and Sp.

Posthumius were consuls, and discomfited by Pontius at Caudium, with no small ignominy; and when Q. Fabius Gurges lost the field with three thousand men. But for these losses, many great victories made large amends; the greatest whereof were gotten by L. Papyrius, and by Quintus Fabius Maximus.

The Samnites drew the Etrurians into their quarrel. But the force of the Samnites was well broken, ere the Etrurians, (the greater and richer, but less warlike nation,) began to stir. So the one and the other of these two countries became at length tributary to Rome.

In the continuance of this long war it was, (though in time of truce between the Romans and the Samnites,) that the Latins began to challenge equal freedom in the corporation of Rome, and right in bearing office, so that they required to have one of the consuls yearly chosen out of them. This demand of the Latins was not unreasonable. For the Romans themselves were a Latin colony; besides all which, they made offer to change their name, and to be called Romans. But the Romans were too proud to admit any such capitulation. So a great battle was fought between them, wherein the fortune of Rome prevailed, by the virtue of the consuls.

Manlius Torquatus, and the elder Decius, were then consuls, whom the soothsayers advertised, that the side should be victorious which lost the general in fight. Hereupon Decius, the consul, exposed his life to the enemy, and purchased victory, (as was believed,) by his death. In which kind of devoting himself for his army, the son of this Decius, being after consul, did imitate his father, in the Etrurian war. But, (as Tully well notes,) it was rather the desperate resolution of these Decii, that purchased victory, by rushing into the midst of the enemies, wherein their soldiers followed them, than any great commendation of such a religion as required the

lives of so worthy citizens to be sacrificed for their country. The discipline of Manlius was no less resolute than the valour of Decius. He forbade any one to forsake his place, and fight single with an enemy. For breach of which order, he caused his son to be put to death, who had slain a captain of the Latins, being challenged in single fight.

When the Latins, the Æqui, Volsci, Hernici, Campani, Samnites, and Etrurians, with some other people, were brought under obedience, it was a vain labour for any people of Italy to contend against the Romans. Yet the Sabines adventured to try their fortune, and found it bad ; for Curius Dentatus, the Roman consul, wasting all their country with fire and sword, from the river Nar and Velia, to the Adriatic sea, brought them into quiet subjection.

The last of the Italians that made trial of the Roman arms, were the Tarentines and their adherents. These had interposed themselves as mediators between the Romans and Samnites ; with a peremptory denunciation of war unto that party which should dare to refuse the peace by them tendered. These threats, which discovered their bad affection unto Rome, ended in words ; but when the Samnites were utterly subdued, matter enough of quarrel was found to examine their ability of performance.

The Romans complained that certain ships of theirs were robbed, and sent ambassadors unto Tarentum, to require amends. Upon some wrong done to these ambassadors, was laid the foundation of that war, wherein the Lucanians, Messapians, Brutians, and Appulians, joining with the Tarentines, procured the Samnites, and other subjects of Rome, to rebel and take their part. But some experience of the Roman strength taught all these people to know their own weakness. Wherefore they agreed to send for Pyrrhus, by whose aid, (being a Grecian, as the Tarentines also were,) great hope was conceived, that the

dominion of Rome should be confined unto more narrow bounds than all Italy, which already, in a manner, it did overspread.

SECT. II.

How Pyrrhus warred upon the Romans, and vanquished them in two battles.

PYRRHUS, forsaken by the Macedonians, and unable to deal with Lysimachus, was compelled awhile to live in rest ; which he abhorred no less than a wiser prince would have desired. He had a strong army and a good fleet, which, in that unsettled state of things, was enough to purchase a kingdom ; but the fall of Demetrius had so increased the power of Lysimachus, that it was no point of wisdom to make an offensive war upon him, without far greater forces. Antigonus, the son of Demetrius, held Corinth at the same time, and some other towns, with the remainder of his father's army and treasures left in his hand. Upon him it is like that Pyrrhus might have won ; but it was better to let him alone, that he might serve to give some hindrance to Lysimachus.

In this want of employment, and covetous desire of finding it, the Tarentine ambassadors came very fitly to Pyrrhus ; and they came with brave offers, as needing none other aid than his good conduct, which to obtain, they would cast themselves under his protection. They had in their company some of the Samnites, Lucanians, Messapians, and others ; which promised in behalf of their several nations as much as could be desired. This encouraged Pyrrhus, and filled him with hopes of goodly conquests, that he might enlarge his empire to the west, as far as Alexander had gotten eastward ; and still, by one victory, open the gate unto another. To which effect, it is said, that once he answered Cyneas, his chief counsellor, asking what he meant to do after eve-

ry one of the victories which he hoped to get,—That, having won Rome, he would soon be master of all Italy; that, after Italy, he would quickly get the isle of Sicily; that out of Sicily he would pass over into Africa, and win Carthage, with all the rest of the country; and, being strengthened with the force of all these provinces, he would be too hard for any of those that were now so proud and troublesome. But Cyneas enquired yet further what they should do when they were lords of all; whereunto Pyrrhus, (finding his drift,) answered pleasantly, That they would live merrily; a thing, (as Cyneas then told him,) that they presently might do without any trouble, if he could be contented with his own.

Nevertheless, this Italian expedition seemed unto Pyrrhus a matter of such consequence as was not to be omitted in regard of any scholastical disputation. Wherefore he prepared his army, of almost thirty thousand men, well sorted and well trained soldiers; part of which he sent over before him under Cyneas, with the rest he followed in person. At his coming, he found the Tarentines very prompt of tongue; but in matter of execution utterly careless to provide for the war. Wherefore he was fain to shut up their theatre, and other places of pleasure and resort; enforcing them to take arms, and making such a strict muster, as was to them very displeasing, though greatly behoving to their estate.

Whilst he was occupied with these cares, Levinus, the Roman consul drew near, and began to waste Lucania, a province confederate with the Tarentines in this war.

The Lucanians were not ready to defend their own country; the Samnites were careless of the harm that fell not (as yet) upon themselves; the Tarentines were better prepared than they would have been, but their valour was little: all of these had been accustomed to shrink, for fear of the Roman fortitude; and therefore it fell out happily, that

Pyrrhus relied more upon his own forces, than the issue of their vaunting promises. He was now driven either to set forward with those that himself had brought into Italy, and the assistance of the Tarentines, wherein little was to be reposed; or else to weaken the reputation of his own sufficiency, which by all means he was careful to uphold. In good time, a great part of his forces that had been scattered by foul weather at sea, were safely come to him; with which he resolved to assay the valour of the Romans, against whom he proudly marched.

Levinus, the consul, was not affrighted with the terrible name of a great king, but came on confidently to meet him and give him battle, ere all his adherents should be ready to join with him. This boldness of the Roman, and the slackness of the Messapians, Lucanians, Samnites, and others, whom the danger most concerned, caused Pyrrhus to offer a treaty of peace; requiring to have the quarrel between the Romans and his Italian friends, referred to his arbitrement. Whether he did this to win time, that the Samnites and their fellows might arrive at his camp; or whether, considering better at near distance, the weight of the business which he had taken in hand, he were desirous to quit it with his honour; the short answer that was returned to his proposition, gave him no means of either the one or the other; for the Romans sent him this word, that 'they had neither chosen him their judge, nor feared him their enemy.'

Hereupon both armies hastened their march unto the river of Siris; Levinus intending to fight before the arrival of the Samnites; Pyrrhus to hinder him from passing that river, until his own army were full. Upon the first view of the Roman camp, it was readily conceived by Pyrrhus that he had not now to do with a barbarous people, but with men well trained in a brave discipline of war; which caused him to set a strong *corps de garde* upon the passage of the

river, that he might not be compelled to fight until he saw his best advantage. But he quickly found, that this new enemy was not only skilful in the art of war, but courageous in execution; for the Roman army entered the ford in the face of his *corps de garde*, and their horse at the same time began to pass the river in sundry places; which caused the Greeks to forsake the defence of their bank, and speedily retire unto their camp.

This audacity forced Pyrrhus to battle, wherewith he thought it best to present them ere their whole army had recovered firm footing, and were in order. So directing his captains how to marshal his battles, himself with the horse charged upon the Romans, who stoutly received him as men well exercised in sustaining furious impressions. In this fight neither did his courage transport him beyond the duty of a careful general, nor his providence in directing others hinder the manifestation of his personal valour. It behoved him indeed to do his best, for he never met with better opposers. Once, and shortly after the fight began, his horse was slain under him; afterwards he changed armour with a friend; but that friend paid his life for the use of his king's armour, which was torn from his back. This accident had almost lost him the battle; but he perceiving it, discovered his face, and thereby restored courage to his men, and took from the Romans their vain joy. The fight was obstinate; and with the greater loss (at least of more eminent men) on Pyrrhus's side, as long as only spear and sword were used. But when the elephants were brought into the wings, whose unusual form and terrible aspect the horses of the Romans (unaccustomed to the like) were not able to sustain, then was the victory quickly gotten; for the Roman battles perceiving their horse put to rout, and driven out of the field, finding also themselves both charged in flank, and overborne by the force and huge bulk of those strange beasts, gave way to

necessity, and saved themselves as well as they could by hasty flight ; in which consternation they were so forgetful of their discipline, that they tarried not to defend their camp, but ran quite beyond it, leaving both it, and the honour of the day, entirely to Pyrrhus.

The fame of this victory was soon spread over Italy, and the reputation was no less than the fame ; for it was a matter very rarely to be heard, that a Roman consul, with a select army, should lose in plain battle, not only the field, but the camp itself, being so notably fortified as they always were. And this honour was the more bravely won by Pyrrhus, for that he had with him none of his Italian friends, save the unwarlike Tarentines. Neither could he well dissemble his content that he took in having the glory of this action peculiarly his own, at such time as he blamed the Lucanians and Samnites for coming (as we say) a day after the fair. Nevertheless, he wisely considered the strength of the Romans, which was such as would better endure many such losses than he could endure many such victories. Therefore he thought it good to compound with them whilst with his honour he might ; and to that purpose he sent unto them Cyneas, his ambassador, demanding only to have the Tarentines permitted to live at rest, and himself accepted as their special friend. This did Cyneas, with all his cunning, and with liberal gifts, labour to effect ; but neither man nor woman could be found in Rome that would take any bribe of him ; neither did their desire of recovering their captives, or their danger by the rising of many states in Italy against them, so incline them to peace, as the vehement exhortation of Appius Claudius, an old and blind senator, did stir them up to make good their honour by war. So they returned answer, that whilst Pyrrhus abode in Italy, they would come to no agreement with him.

Such was the report that Cyneas made at his re-

turn of the Roman puissance and virtue, as kindled in Pyrrhus a great desire of confederacy with that gallant city. Hereupon many kind offices passed between them ; but still, when he urged his motion of peace, the answer was, he must first depart out of Italy, and then treat of peace.

In the mean season each part made provision for war ; the Romans levying a more mighty army than the former, and Pyrrhus being strengthened with access unto his forces of all the east parts of Italy. So they came to trial of a second battle ; wherein (though after long and cruel fight) the boisterous violence of the elephants gave to Pyrrhus a second victory. But this was not so joyful as the former had been ; rather it gave him cause to say, that such another victory would be his utter undoing : for he had lost the flower of his army in this battle ; and though he drove the Romans into their camp, yet he could not force them out of it ; nor saw any likelihood of prevailing against them that were like to be relieved with daily supplies, whilst he should be driven to spend upon his old stock. Neither could he expect that his elephants should always stand him in stead. A little knowledge of their manner in fight would soon teach the Romans, that were apt scholars in such learning, how to make them unserviceable. Wherefore he desired nothing more than how to carry his honour safe out of Italy ; which to do (seeing the Romans would not help him, by offering or accepting any fair conditions of peace or of truce) he took a slight occasion, presented by fortune, that followeth to be related.

SECT. III.

The great troubles in Macedon and Sicily. How Pyrrhus, being invited into Sicily, forsook Italy; won the most of the isle, and lost it in short space. Pyrrhus returns into Italy, where he is beaten by the Romans, and so goes back to his own kingdom.

WHEN Ptolemy Ceraunus had traitorously murdered his benefactor and patron, Seleucus, he presently seized upon all the dominions of Lysimachus in Europe, as if they had been the due reward unto him that had slain the conqueror. The houses of Cassander and Lysimachus were then fallen to the ground; neither was there in Macedon any man of strength and reputation enough to advance himself against Ceraunus. The friends of Lysimachus were rather pleased to have him their king, that had (as he professed) revenged their lord's death, than any way offended with the odiousness of his fact, by which they were freed from subjection to one against whom they had stood in opposition. Many there were, that, upon remembrance of his father's great virtue, gathered hope of finding the like in Ceraunus; persuading themselves that his reign might prove good, though his entrance had been wicked. These affections of the Macedonians did serve to defeat Antigonus the son of Demetrius, that made an attempt upon the kingdom. As for Antigonus, the son of Seleucus, he was far off, and might be questioned about some part of Asia, ere he should be able to bring an army near unto Europe. Yet he made great shew of meaning to revenge his father's death; but being stronger in money than in arms, he was content, after a while, to take fair words, and make peace with the murderer. While these three strove about the kingdom, Pyrrhus, who thought his claim as good as any of theirs, made use of their dissension; threatening war, or promising his assistance

to every one of them. By these means he strengthened himself, and greatly advanced his Italian voyage, which he had then in hand; requesting money of Antiochus, ships of Antigonus, and soldiers of Ptolemy, who gave him his daughter in marriage, and lent him a strong power of Macedonian soldiers and of elephants, (covenanting to have them restored at two years end,) more for fear than for love, that so he might free himself from trouble, and quietly enjoy his kingdom. Thus Ptolemy grew mighty on the sudden; and the power that by wicked means he had gotten, by means as wicked he increased.

All Macedon and Thrace being his, the strong city of Cassandria was held by Arsinoe, his sister, the widow of Lysimachus, who lay therein with her young children. Her he circumvented by making love to her, and (according to the fashion of those times, wherein princes regarded no degree of consanguinity) taking her to wife, with promise to adopt her children:—a promise that he meant not to perform; for it was not long ere he slew them and drove her into exile.

In the pride of this good success which his villainy found, vengeance came upon him from afar, by the fury of a nation that he never heard of. Belgius, a captain of the Gauls, having forced his passage through many countries unto the confines of Macedon, sent a proud message to Ceraunus, commanding him to buy peace with money, or otherwise to look for all the miseries of war. These Gauls were of the race of those that issued out of their country to seek new seats in that expedition wherein Brennus took and burnt the city of Rome. They had divided themselves, at their setting forth, into two companies; of which the one fell upon Italy; the other, passing through the countries that lie on the northern side of the Adriatic sea, made long abode in Pannonia and the regions adjoining, where

they forced all the neighbour princes to redeem peace with tribute; as now they would have compelled Ceraunus to do; upon whose borders they came, about an hundred and eight years after such time as their fellows had taken Rome.

When their ambassadors came to Ptolemy, asking what he would give, his answer was, that he would be contented to give them peace; but it must be with condition, that they should put into his hands their princes as hostages, and yield up their arms; for otherwise he would neither pardon their boldness, nor give any credit to their words. At this answer, when it was returned, the Gauls did laugh; saying, that they would soon confute with deeds the vanity of such proud words. It may seem strange, that he, who had given away part of his army unto Pyrrhus for very fear, should be so confident in undertaking more mighty enemies. The king of the Dardanians offered to lend him twenty thousand men against the Gauls; but he scorned the offer, saying, that he had the children of those who, under the conduct of Alexander, had subdued all the east. Thus he issued forth against the barbarous people with his famous Macedonians, as if the victory must needs have followed the reputation of a great name. But he soon found his great error when it was too late; for the enemies were not only equal in strength of body and fierceness of courage, but so far superior to the Macedonians in numbers, that few or none escaped their fury. Ptolemy himself, grievously wounded, fell into their hands whilst the battle continued; and they presently struck off his head, which they shewed to his men on the top of a lance, to their utter astonishment.

The report of this great overthrow filled all Macedon with such desperation, that the people fled into walled towns, and abandoned the whole country as lost. Only Sosthenes, a valiant captain, animating as many as he could, gathered a small army, with which he many times got the upper hand, and hindered Belgius from using the victory at his whole pleasure. In regard of this his virtue, the soldiers would have made him king, which title he refused, and was content with the name of a general. But (as mischiefs do seldom come alone) the good success of Belgius drew into Macedon, Brennus, another captain of the Gauls, with an hundred and fifty thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse; against which mighty army, when Sosthenes with his weak troops made opposition, he was easily beaten, and the Macedonians again compelled to hide themselves within their walls, leaving all their country to the spoil of the barbarians.

Thus were the Macedonians destitute of a king, and trodden down by a nation that they had not heard of in less than fifty years after the death of Alexander, who sought to discover and subdue unknown countries, as if all Greece, and the empire of Persia had been too little for a king of Macedon.

Very seasonably had these news been carried to Pyrrhus in Italy, who sought a fair pretext of relinquishing his war with the Romans; had not other tidings out of Sicily distracted him, and carried him away in pursuit of nearer hopes. For, after the death of Agathocles, who reigned over the whole island, the Carthaginians sent an army to conquer Sicily, out of which, by him, they had been expelled. This army did so fast prevail, that the Sicilians had no other hope to avoid slavery, than in submitting themselves to the rule of Pyrrhus; whom, being a Grecian and a noble prince, they thought it more for their good to obey, than to live under the well known heavy yoke of Carthage. To him, therefore,

the Syracusans, Leontines, and Agragentines, principal estates of the isle, sent ambassadors, earnestly desiring him to take them into his protection.

It grieved Pyrrhus exceedingly, that two such notable occasions of enlarging his dominions should fall out so unluckily both at one time. Yet whether he thought the business of Sicily more important, or more full of likelihood, or whether, perhaps, he believed, (as came after to pass,) that his advantage upon Macedon would not so hastily pass away, but that he might find some occasion to lay hold on it at better leisure, over into Sicily he transported his army, leaving the Tarentines to shift for themselves; yet not leaving them free as he found them, but with a garrison in their town, to hold them in subjection.

As his departure out of Italy was rather grounded on headlong passion, than mature advice, so were his actions following, until his return unto Epirus, rather many and tumultuous, than well ordered or note-worthy. The army which he carried into that isle, consisted of thirty thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse; with which, soon after his descent in Sicily, he forced the Carthaginians out of all, in effect, that they held therein. He also won the strong city of Eryx; and having beaten the Mamertines in battle, he began to change condition, and turn tyrant. For he drove Sostratus (to whom his cruelty was suspected) out of the island, and put Thenon of Syracuse to death, being jealous of his greatness; which two persons had faithfully served him, and delivered the great and rich city of Syracuse into his hands. After this, his fortunes declined so fast, as he served himself, and salved the reputation of his leaving Sicily, by an embassy sent from the Tarentines and Samnites, imploring his present help against the Romans, who, since his leaving Italy, had well near dispossessed them of all that they had.

Taking this fair occasion, he embarked for Italy;

but was first beaten by the Carthaginian gallies in his passage; and secondly assailed in Italy itself, by eighteen hundred Mamertines, that attended him in the straits of the country. Lastly, after he had recovered Tarentum, he fought a third battle with the Romans, led by M. Curius, who was victorious over him, and forced him out of Italy into his own Epirus.

A prince he was far more valiant than constant; and had he been but a general of an army for some other great king or state, and had been directed to have conquered any one country or kingdom, it is to be thought that he would have purchased no less honour than any man of war, either preceding or succeeding him; for a greater captain or a valianter man, hath been no where found. But he never staid upon any enterprise, which was indeed the disease he had, whereof not long after he died in Argos.

SECT. IV.

How Antigonus, the son of Demetrius, delivered Macedon from the Gauls. How Pyrrhus won the kingdom of Macedon from Antigonus.

THE virtue of Sosthenes being too weak to defend the kingdom of Macedon, and the fortune which had accompanied him against Belgius, failing him in his attempts against Brennus, the Macedonians were no less glad to submit themselves unto the government of Antigonus, than they had formerly been desirous to free themselves from the impotent rule of his father Demetrius. His coming into the country with an army, navy, and treasure beseeeming a king, did rather breed good hope in the people, than fill them with much confidence; for he was driven to use against the barbarians only those forces which he brought with him, having none other than good wishes of the Macedonians to take his part. Brennus, with the main strength of his army, was gone to spoil the temple of Apollo at Delphos, having left

no more behind him than he thought necessary to guard the borders of Macedon and Pannonia, which were about fifteen thousand foot, and three thousand horse. These could not be idle, but thought to get somewhat for themselves in the absence of their fellows, and therefore sent unto Antigonus, offering to sell him peace, if he would pay well for it; which, by the example of Ceraunus, he had learnt (as they thought) not to refuse. Antigonus was unwilling to weaken his reputation by condescending to their proud demands; yet he judged it unfit to exasperate their furious choler by uncourteous words or usage, as Ceraunus had over-fondly done. Wherefore he entertained their ambassadors in very loving and sumptuous manner with a royal feast; wherein he exposed to their view such abundance of massy gold and silver, that they were not so much delighted with the meat as with sight of the vessels wherein it was served. He thought hereby to make them understand how great a prince he was, and how able, if need required, to wage a mighty army.

To which end, he likewise did shew unto them his camp and navy, but especially his elephants. But all his bravery served only to kindle their greedy appetites, who, seeing his ships heavy laden, his camp full of wealth and ill-fortified, himself (as it seemed) secure, and his men, both in strength and courage, inferior unto the Gauls, thought all time lost wherein they suffered the present possessors to spend the riches which they accounted assuredly their own. They returned, therefore, to their companions, with none other news in their mouths than of spoil and purchase; which tale carried the Gauls heedless to Antigonus's camp, where they expected a greater booty than the victory over Ceraunus had given to Belgius. Their coming was terrible and sudden; yet not so sudden, but that Antigonus had notice of it, who, distrusting the courage of his own men, dislodged somewhat before their arrival, and con-

veyed himself, with his whole army and carriage into certain woods adjoining, where he lay close.

The Gauls, finding his camp forsaken, were not hasty to pursue him, but fell to ransacking the empty cabbins of the soldiers, in hopes of finding all that was either lost or hidden. At length, when they had searched every place in vain, angry at their lost labour, they marched with all speed towards the seaside, that they might fall upon him, whilst he was busy in getting his men and carriages a-ship-board. But the success was no way answerable to their expectation; for being proud of the terror which they had brought upon Antigonus, they were so careless of the seamen, that, without all order, they fell to the spoil of what they found on the shore, and in such ships as lay on ground.

Part of the army had left Antigonus, where he lay in covert, and had saved itself by getting aboard the fleet; in which number were some well experienced men of war, who, discovering the much advantage offered unto them, by the desperate presumption of their enemies, took courage, and encouraged others, to lay manly hold upon the opportunity. So the whole number, both of soldiers and marines, landing together with great resolution, gave so brave a charge upon the disordered Gauls, that their contemptuous boldness was thereby changed into sudden fear; and they, after a great slaughter, driven to cast themselves into the service of Antigonus.

The fame of this victory caused all the barbarous nations in those quarters to re-entertain their ancient belief of the Macedonian valour, by which the terrible and resistless oppressors of so many countries were overthrown.

To speak more of the Gauls in this place, and to shew how, about these times, three tribes of them passed over into Asia the Less, with their wars and conquests there, I hold it needless; the victorious arms

of the Romans, taming them hereafter in the countries which now they won, shall give better occasion to rehearse those matters briefly.

Howsoever the good success of Antigonus got him reputation among the barbarous people, yet his own soldiers, that without his leading had won this victory, could not thereupon be persuaded to think him a good man of war; knowing that he had no interest in the honour of the service, wherein his conduct was no better than creeping into a wood.

This (as presently will appear) was greatly helpful unto Pyrrhus, though, as yet, he knew not so much. For Pyrrhus, when his affairs in Italy stood upon hard terms, had sent unto Antigonus for help, not without threats, in case it were denied. So was he sure to get either a supply, wherewith to continue his war against the Romans, or some seeming honourable pretence to forsake Italy, under colour of making his word good, in seeking revenge. The threats which he had used in bravery, mere necessity forced him, at his return into Epirus, to put in practice.

He brought home with him eight thousand foot and five hundred horse; an army too little to be employed, by his restless nature, in any action of importance; yet greater than he had means to keep in pay. Therefore he fell upon Macedon, intending to take what spoil he could get, and make Antigonus compound with him, to be freed from trouble. At his first entrance into this business, two thousand of Antigonus's soldiers revolted unto Pyrrhus; and many cities, either willingly or perforce, received him. Such fair beginnings easily persuaded the courage of this daring prince to set upon Antigonus himself, and to hazard his fortune in trial of a battle for the whole kingdom of Macedon.

It appears that Antigonus had no desire to fight with this hot warrior; but thought it the wisest way, by protracting of time, to weary him out of the country. For Pyrrhus overtook him in a strait passage,

and charged him in the rear, wherein were the Gauls and the elephants, which were thought the best of his strength, a manifest proof that he was in retreat. The Gauls very bravely sustained Pyrrhus's impression, yet were broken at length, (when most of them were slain) after a sharp fight; wherein, it seems, that Antigonus, keeping his Macedonian phalanx within the strait, and not advancing to their succour, took away their courage, by deceiving their expectation. The captains of the elephants were taken soon after, who, finding themselves exposed to the same violence that had consumed so many of the Gauls, yielded themselves and the beasts. All this was done in full view of Antigonus and his Macedonians, to their great discomfort; which emboldened Pyrrhus to charge them where they lay in their strength. Where the phalanx could be charged only in a front, it was a matter of extreme difficulty (if not impossible) to force it. But the Macedonians had seen so much, that they had no desire to fight against Pyrrhus; who discovered so well their affections, that he adventured to draw near in person, and exhort them to yield. Neither the common soldier, nor any leader, refused to become his follower. All forsook Antigonus, a few horsemen excepted, that fled along with him to Thessalonica, where he had some small forces left, and money enough to entertain a greater power, had he known where to levy it. But whilst he was thinking how to allure a sufficient number of the Gauls into his service, whereby he might repair his loss, Ptolemy, the son of Pyrrhus, came upon him; and easily defeating his weak forces, drove him to fly from the parts about Macedon, to those towns far off in Peloponnesus in which he had formerly lurked, before such time as he had looked abroad into the world, and made himself a king.

This good success revived the spirits of the Epirot, and caused him to forget all sorrow of his late

misfortunes in the Roman war; so that he sent for his son Helenus (whom he had left with a garrison in the castle of Tarentum) willing him to come over into Greece, where was more matter of conquest, and let the Italians shift for themselves.

SECT. V.

How Pyrrhus assailed Sparta, without success. His enterprise upon Argos, and his death.

PYRRHUS had now conceived a great hope that nothing should be able to withstand him; seeing that in open fight he had vanquished the Gauls, beaten Antigonus, and won the kingdom of Macedon. There was not in all Greece, nor indeed in all the lands that Alexander had won, any leader of such name and worth as deserved to be set up against him; which filled him with the opinion that he might do what he pleased. He raised therefore an army, consisting of twenty-five thousand foot, two thousand horse, and twenty-four elephants, pretending war against Antigonus, and the giving liberty to those towns in Peloponnesus which the same Antigonus held in subjection; though it was easily discovered that such great preparations were made for accomplishment of some design more important than war against a prince already vanquished, and almost utterly dejected; especially the Lacedæmonians feared this expedition as made against their state; for Cleonymus, one of their kings, being expelled out of his country, had betaken himself to Pyrrhus, who readily entertained him, and promised to restore him to his kingdom. This promise was made in secret; neither would Pyrrhus make shew of any displeasure that he bore unto Sparta; but contrariwise professed that it was his intent to have two of his younger sons trained up in that city as in a place of noble discipline. With such colours he deluded men, even till he entered upon Laconia, where presently he de-

meant himself as an open enemy ; excusing himself and his former dissembling words with a jest, that he followed herein the Lacedæmonian custom, of concealing what was truly purposed. It had been indeed the manner of the Lacedæmonians to deal in like sort with others, whom, in the time of their greatness, they sought to oppress ; but now they complained of that as falsehood in Pyrrhus which they always practised as wisdom, till it made them distrusted, forsaken, and almost contemptible. Nevertheless, they were not wanting to themselves in this dangerous extremity ; for the old men and women laboured in fortifying the town, causing such as could bear arms to reserve themselves fresh against the assault, which Pyrrhus had unwisely deferred upon assurance of prevailing.

Sparta was never fortified before this time otherwise than with armed citizens. Soon after this, (it being built upon uneven ground, and for the most part hard to approach,) the lower and more accessible places were fenced with walls ; at the present only trenches were cast, and barricadoes made with carts, where the entrance seemed most easy. Three days together it was assailed by Pyrrhus, exceeding fiercely, and no less stoutly defended. The desperate courage of the citizens preserved the town the first day ; whereinto the violence of Pyrrhus had forced entrance the second day, but that his wounded horse threw him to the ground, which made his soldiers more mindful of saving the person of their king, than of breaking into the city, though already they had torn in sunder the barricadoes. Presently after this, one of Antigonus's captains got into Sparta with a good strength of men ; and Areus the king returned out of Crete (where he had been helping his friends in war) with two thousand men, little knowing the danger in which his own country stood, until he was almost at home. These succours did not more animate the Spartans than kindle in Pyrrhus a

desire to prevail against all impediments. But the third day's work shewed how great his error had been in forbearing to assault the town at his first coming; for he was so manfully repelled, that he saw no likelihood of getting the place, otherwise than by a long siege, in which tedious course he had no desire to spend his time.

Antigonus had now raised an army, though not strong enough to meet the enemy in plain field, yet able to hinder all his purposes. This made Pyrrhus doubtful what way to take, being diversly affected by the difficulty of his enterprise in hand, and the shame of taking a repulse in his first attempt. Whilst he was thus perplexed, letters came from Argos, inviting him thither, with promise to deliver that city into his hands.

Civil dissension raging then hotly in Argos, caused the heads of several factions to call in Pyrrhus and Antigonus; but the coming of these two princes taught the citizens wit, and made them desirous to rid their hands of such powerful assistants, as each of the two kings pretended himself to be. Antigonus told the Argives that he came to save them from the tyranny of Pyrrhus; and that he would be gone if they needed not his help. On the other side, Pyrrhus would needs persuade them, that he had none other errand than to make them safe from Antigonus; offering, in like manner, to depart, if they so desired.

The Argives took small pleasure in hearing the fox and kite at strife which of them should keep the chickens from the enemy, and therefore prayed them both to divert their powers some other way. Hereunto Antigonus readily condescended, and gave hostages to assure his word,—for he was the weaker, and stood in need of good will. But Pyrrhus thought it enough to promise; hostages he would give none to his inferiors, especially meaning deceit. This made them suspect his purpose to be such, as indeed

it was. Yet he less regarded their opinions than to hold them worthy of assurance, by giving them such a bond as he intended to break ere the next morning.

It was concluded, that a gate of the city should be opened by night unto Pyrrhus by his complices within Argos, which was accordingly performed. So his army, without any tumult, entered the city, till the elephants, with towers on their backs, cloyed the way, being too high to pass the gate. The taking off and setting on again of those towers, with the trouble thereto belonging, did both give alarm to the city, and some leisure to take order for defence, before so many were entered as could fully master it. Argos was full of ditches, which greatly hindered the Gauls, (that had the vanguard,) being ignorant of the ways in the dark night. The citizens, on the other side, had much advantage, by their knowledge of every by-passage; and setting upon the enemies on all sides, did put them to great loss and more trouble.

Pyrrhus, therefore, understanding by the confused noise and unequal shoutings of his own men, that they were in distress, entered the city in person, to take order for their relief, and assurance of the place. But the darkness, the throng, and many other impediments, kept him from doing any thing of moment, until break of day. Then began he to make his passage by force, and so far prevailed, that he got into the market-place. It is said, that seeing in that place the image of a wolf and a bull, in such posture as if they had been combatant, he called to mind an oracle, which threatened him with death, when he should behold a bull fighting with a wolf; and that hereupon he made retreat.

Indeed, the coming of Antigonus to the rescue, the disorder and confusion of his own men, with divers ill accidents, gave him reasonable cause to have retired out of the city, though the wolf and bull had

been away. The tumult was such, that no directions could be heard; but as some gave back, so did others thrust forward, and the Argives pressing hard upon him, forced Pyrrhus to make good his retreat with his own sword. The tops of the houses were covered with women, that stood looking on the fight. Among these was one, that saw her own son in dangerous case, fighting with Pyrrhus. Wherefore she took a tile-stone or slate, and threw it so violently down on the head of Pyrrhus, that he fell to the ground astonished with the blow, and lying in that case, had his head cut off.

Thus ended the restless ambition of Pyrrhus, together with his life; and thus returned the kingdom of Macedon to Antigonus, who forthwith possessed the army, the body, and the children of his enemy. The body of Pyrrhus had honourable funeral, and was given by Antigonus unto Helenus his son, which young prince he graciously sent home into his father's kingdom of Epirus. From this time forwards the race of Antigonus held the kingdom of Macedon; the posterity of Seleucus reigned over Asia and Syria; and the house of Ptolemy had quiet possession of Egypt, until such time as the city of Rome, swallowing all up, digested these, among other countries, into the body of her own empire.

THE
HISTORY
OF
THE WORLD,
IN FIVE BOOKS.

THE FIFTH BOOK.

ENTREATING OF THE TIMES FROM THE SETTLED RULE
OF ALEXANDER'S SUCCESSORS IN THE EAST, UNTIL
THE ROMANS, PREVAILING OVER ALL, MADE CON-
QUEST OF ASIA AND MACEDON.

CHAP. I.

OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.

SECT. I.

*A discussion of that problem of Livy,—Whether the
Romans could have resisted the great Alexander?
That neither the Macedonian nor the Roman soldier
was of equal valour to the English.*

THAT question handled by Livy,—‘Whether
‘the great Alexander could have prevailed a-
‘gainst the Romans, if, after his eastern conquest, he
‘had bent all his forces against them?’—hath been,
and is the subject of much dispute; which, (as it
seems to me,) the arguments on both sides do not

so well explain, as doth the experience that Pyrrhus hath given of the Roman power in his days. For if he, a commander (in Hannibal's judgment) inferior to Alexander, though to none else, could, with small strength of men, and little store of money, or of other needful helps in war, vanquish them in two battles, and endanger their estate when it was well settled, and held the best part of Italy under a confirmed obedience,—what would Alexander have done, that was abundantly provided of all which is needful to a conqueror, wanting only matter of employment, coming upon them before their dominion was half so well settled? It is easy to say, that Alexander had no more than thirty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, (as indeed at his first passage into Asia, he carried over not many more,) and that the rest of his followers were no better than base effeminate Asiatics. But he that considers the armies of Perdiccas, Antipater, Craterus, Eumenes, Ptolemy, Antigonus, and Lysimachus, with the actions by them performed, every one of which, (to omit others,) commanded only some fragment of this dead emperor's power, shall easily find, that such a reckoning is far short of the truth.

It were needless to speak of treasure, horses, elephants, engines of battery, and the like, of all which the Macedonian had abundance; the Romans having nought save men and arms. As for sea-forces, he that shall consider after what sort the Romans, in their first Punic war, were trained in the rudiments of navigation, sitting upon the shore, and beating the sand with poles, to practise the stroke of the oar, as not daring to launch their ill-built vessels into the sea, will easily conceive how far too weak they would have proved in such services.

Now for helpers in war: I do not see why all Greece and Macedon, being absolutely commanded by Alexander, might not well deserve to be laid in balance against those parts of Italy which the Ro-

mans held in ill-assured subjection. To omit, therefore, all benefit that the eastern world, more wealthy indeed than valiant, could have afforded unto the Macedonian, let us only conjecture how the states of Sicily and Carthage, nearest neighbours to such a quarrel, (had it happened,) would have stood affected. The Sicilians were for the most part Grecians; neither is it to be doubted, that they would readily have submitted themselves unto him that ruled all Greece besides them. In what terms they commonly stood, and how ill they were able to defend themselves, it shall appear anon. Sure it is, that Alexander's coming into those parts would have brought excessive joy to them that were fain to get the help of Pyrrhus, by offering to become his subjects. As for the Carthaginians: if Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse, hated of his people, and ill able to defend his own besieged city, could, by adventuring to sail into Africa, put their dominion, yea, and Carthage itself, in extreme hazard; shall we think that they would have been able to withstand Alexander? But why do I question their ability, seeing that they sent ambassadors, with their submission, as far as Babylon, ere the war drew near them? Wherefore it is manifest, that the Romans must, without other succour than perhaps of some few Italian friends, (of which yet there were none that forsook them not, at some time, both before and after this,) have opposed their valour, and good military discipline, against the power of all countries to them known, if they would have made resistance. How they could have sped well, in undertaking such a match, it is uneasy to find in discourse of human reason. It is true, that virtue and fortune work wonders; but it is against cowardly fools and the unfortunate: for whosoever contends with one too mighty for him, either must excel in these, as much as his enemy goes beyond him in power, or else must look both to be overcome, and

to be cast down so much the lower, by how much the opinion of his fortune and virtue renders him suspected, as likely to make head another time against the vanquisher. Whether the Roman or the Macedonian were in those days the better soldier, I will not take upon me to determine; though I might, without partiality, deliver mine own opinion, and prefer that army, which followed not only Philip and Alexander, but also Alexander's princes after him, in the greatest dangers of all sorts of war, before any that Rome either had, or in long time after did send forth. Concerning fortune, who can give a rule that shall always hold? Alexander was victorious in every battle that he fought, and the Romans in the issue of every war. But forasmuch as Livy hath judged this a matter worthy of consideration, I think it a great part of Rome's good fortune that Alexander came not into Italy, where, in three years after his death, the two Roman consuls, together with all the power of that state, were surprised by the Samnites, and enforced to yield up their arms. We may therefore permit Livy to admire his own Romans, and to compare with Alexander those captains of theirs which were honoured sufficiently in being thought equal to his followers:—that the same conceit should blind our judgment, we cannot permit without much vanity.

Now, in deciding such a controversy, methinks it were not amiss for an Englishman to give such a sentence between the Macedonians and Romans, as the Romans once did, (being chosen arbitrators,) between the Ardeates and Aricini¹, that strove about a piece of land; saying, that it belonged unto neither of them, but unto the Romans themselves.

If therefore it be demanded,—Whether the Macedonian or the Roman were the best warrior? I will answer, the Englishman. For it will soon appear, to any that shall examine the noble acts of our

¹ Liv. Dec. i. l. 3.

nation in war, that they were performed by no advantage of weapon ; against no savage or unmanly people ; the enemy being far superior unto us in numbers, and all needful provisions ; yea, as well trained as we, or commonly better, in the exercise of war.

In what sort Philip won his dominion in Greece, what manner of men the Persians and Indians were, whom Alexander vanquished ; as likewise of what force the Macedonian phalanx was, and how well appointed against such arms as it commonly encountered, any man that hath taken pains to read the foregoing story of them doth sufficiently understand. Yet was this phalanx never, or very seldom, able to stand against the Roman armies ; which were embattled in so excellent a form, as I know not whether any nation beside them have used, either before or since. The Roman weapons, likewise, both offensive and defensive, were of greater use than those with which any other nation hath served, before the fiery instruments of gunpowder were known. As for the enemies with which Rome had to do, we find that they which did over-match her in numbers, were as far over-matched by her in weapons ; and that they, of whom she had little advantage in arms, had as little advantage of her in multitude. This also, (as Plutarch well observeth,) was a part of her happiness, that she was never overlaid with two great wars at once.

Hereby it came to pass, that having at first increased her strength, by accession of the Sabines ; having won the state of Alba, against which she adventured her own self, as it were in wager, upon the heads of three champions, and having thereby made herself princess of Latium,—she did afterwards, by long war, in many ages, extend her dominion over all Italy. The Carthaginians had well-near oppressed her ; but their soldiers were mercenary, so that, for want of proper strength, they were easily beaten

at their own doors. The Ætolians, and with them all, or the most part of Greece, assisted her against Philip the Macedonian: he being beaten, did lend his help to beat the same Ætolians. The wars against Antiochus and other Asiatics, were such as gave to Rome small cause of boast, though much of joy; for those opposites were as base of courage, as the lands which they held were abundant of riches. Sicily, Spain, and all Greece, fell into her hands, by using her aid to protect them against the Carthaginians and Macedonians.

I shall not need to speak of her other conquests; it was easy to get more when she had gotten all this. It is not my purpose to disgrace the Roman valour, (which was very noble,) or to blemish the reputation of so many famous victories; I am not so idle. This I say; that among all their wars, I find not any wherein their valour hath appeared comparable to the English. If my judgment seem over-partial, our wars in France may help to make it good.

First, therefore, it is well known, that Rome (or perhaps all the world besides) had never any so brave a commander in war as Julius Cæsar, and that no Roman army was comparable unto that which served under the same Cæsar. Likewise it is apparent, that this gallant army, which had given fair proof of the Roman courage, in good performance of the Helvetian war when it first entered into Gaul, was nevertheless utterly disheartened when Cæsar led it against the Germans. So that we may justly impute all that was extraordinary in the valour of Cæsar's men, to their long exercise under so good a leader, in so great a war. Now let us in general compare with the deeds done by these best of Roman soldiers in their principal service, the things performed in the same country by our common English soldiers, levied in haste from following the cart, or sitting on the shop-stall; so shall we see the difference. Herein will we deal fairly; and believe

Cæsar, in relating the acts of the Romans ; but will call the French historians to witness what actions were performed by the English. In Cæsar's time France was inhabited by the Gauls, a stout people, but inferior to the French, by whom they were subdued, even when the Romans gave them assistance. The country of Gaul was rent in sunder (as Cæsar witnesseth) into many lordships, some of which were governed by petty kings, others by the multitude ; none ordered in such sort as might make it appliable to the nearest neighbour. The factions were many and violent, not only in general through the whole country, but between the petty states, yea, in every city, and almost in every house. What greater advantage could a conqueror desire ? Yet there was a greater. Ariovistus, with his Germans, had overrun the country, and held much part of it in a subjection little different from mere slavery ; yea, so often had the Germans prevailed in war upon the Gauls, that the Gauls (who had sometimes been the better soldiers) did hold themselves no way equal to those daily invaders. Had France been so prepared unto our English kings, Rome itself by this time, and long ere this time, would have been ours. But when king Edward III. began his war upon France, he found the whole country settled in obedience to one mighty king ; a king, whose reputation abroad was no less than his puissance at home ; under whose ensign the king of Bohemia did serve in person ; at whose call the Genoese and other neighbour states were ready to take arms ; finally, a king, unto whom one prince¹ gave away his dominion for love, another² sold away a goodly city and territory for money. The country lying so open to the Roman, and being so well fenced against the English, it is noteworthy, not who prevailed most therein, (for it were mere vanity to match the English purchases with the Roman conquest,) but whether of the two gave the

1 The Dauphin of Viennois.

2 The king of Majorca.

greater proof of military virtue therein. Cæsar himself doth witness, that the Gauls complained of their own ignorance in the art of war, and that their own hardiness was over-mastered by the skill of their enemies. Poor men, they admired the Roman towers and engines of battery, raised and planted against their walls, as more than human works! What greater wonder is it that such a people was beaten by the Romans, than that the Caribees, a naked people, but valiant as any under the sky, are commonly put to the worse by small numbers of Spaniards? Besides all this, we are to have regard of the great difficulty that was found in drawing all the Gauls, or any great part of them, to one head, that with joint forces they might oppose their assailants; as also the much more difficulty of holding them long together. For hereby it came to pass, that they were never able to make use of opportunity, but sometimes compelled to stay for their fellows, and sometimes driven to give or take battle upon extreme disadvantages, for fear lest their companies should fall asunder; as, indeed, upon any little disaster, they were ready to break, and return every one to the defence of his own. All this, and (which was little less than all this) great odds in weapon, gave to the Romans the honour of many gallant victories. What such help, or what other worldly help, than the golden metal of their soldiers had our English kings against the French? Were not the French as well experienced in feats of war? yea, did they not think themselves therein our superiors? were they not in arms, in horse, and in all provision, exceedingly beyond us?—Let us hear what a French writer³ saith of the inequality that was between the French and English, when their king John was ready to give the onset upon the Black Prince at the battle of Poictiers. ‘John had all the advantages over Edward, both of number, force, shew, country, and conceit, (the which is commonly a consideration of

3 John de Serres.

‘ no small importance in worldly affairs;) and, withal, the choice of all his horsemen (esteemed then the best in Europe) with the greatest and wisest captains of his whole realm ‘. And what could he wish more ?

I think it would trouble a Roman antiquary to find the like example in their histories ; the example, I say, of a king brought prisoner to Rome by an army of eight thousand, which he had surrounded with forty thousand, better appointed, and no less expert warriors. This I am sure of, that neither Syphax the Numidian, followed by a rabble of half-scurillions, as Livy rightly terms them, nor those cowardly kings, Perseus and Gentius, are worthy patterns. All that have read of Cressy and Agincourt will bear me witness, that I do not allege the battle of Poitiers for lack of other as good examples of the English virtue ; the proofs whereof have left many a hundred better marks in all quarters of France than ever did the valour of the Romans. If any man impute these victories of ours to the long-bow, as carrying farther, piercing more strongly, and quicker of discharge than the French cross-bow, my answer is ready, That, in all these respects, it is also (being drawn with a strong arm) superior to the musket; yet is the musket a weapon of more use. The gun and cross-bow are of like force, when discharged by a boy or a woman, as when by a strong man ; weakness, or sickness, or a sore finger, makes the long-bow unserviceable. More particularly, I say, that it was the custom of our ancestors to shoot, for the most part, *point-blank* ; and so shall he perceive, that will note the circumstances of almost any one battle. This takes away all objection ; for when two armies are within the distance of a butt’s length, one flight of arrows, or two at the most, can be delivered before

4 Jean avoit tout l’avantage par dessus Edouard, le nombre, la force, le lustre, le pays, le prejugé (qui n’est pas communément une consideration de peu d’importance aux affaires du monde) et avec soi l’élite de sa Cavallerie, lors estimée la meillieur de tout son royaume.

they close. Neither is it in general true, that the long-bow reacheth farther, or that it pierceth more strongly than the cross-bow; this is the rare effect of an extraordinary arm, whereupon can be grounded no common rule. If any man shall ask, How then came it to pass that the English won so many great battles, having no advantage to help him? I may, with best commendation of modesty, refer him to the French historian⁵, who, relating the victory of our men at Crevant, where they passed a bridge in the face of the enemy, useth these words: ‘The English comes with a conquering bravery, as he that was accustomed to gain everywhere, without any stay; he forceth our guard placed upon the bridge to keep the passage.’ Or I may cite another place of the same author, where he tells how the Britons, being invaded by Charles VIII. king of France, thought it good policy to apparel twelve hundred of their own men in English cassocks; hoping that the very sight of the English red cross would be enough to terrify the French. But I will not stand to borrow of the French historians (all which, excepting De Serres, and Paulus Æmilius, report wonders of our nation,) the proposition which first I undertook to maintain,—That the military virtue of the English prevailing against all manner of difficulties, ought to be preferred before that of the Romans, which was assisted with all advantages that could be desired. If it be demanded,—Why then did not our kings finish the conquest, as Cæsar had done? My answer may be, (I hope without offence,) that our kings were like the race of the Æacidæ, of whom the old poet Ennius gave this note, ‘Bellipotentes sunt magè quam sapientipotentes:’ They were more warlike than politic. Whoso notes their proceedings, may find, that none of them went to work like a conqueror, save only king Henry V., the course of whose victories it pleased God to interrupt

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by his death. But this question may easily be answered, if another be first made,—Why did not the Romans attempt the conquest of Gaul before the time of Cæsar? Why not after the Macedonian war? Why not after the Punic, or after the Numantian? At all these times they had good leisure, and then especially, they had both leisure and fit opportunity, when, under the conduct of Marius, they had newly vanquished the Cimbri and Teutones, by whom the country of Gaul had been piteously wasted. Surely the words of Tully were true,—That with other nations the Romans fought for dominion; with the Gauls, for preservation of their own safety.

Therefore they attempted not the conquest of Gaul, until they were lords of all other countries to them known. We, on the other side, held only the one-half of our own island, the other half being inhabited by a nation (unless perhaps in wealth and numbers of men somewhat inferior) every way equal to ourselves; a nation anciently and strongly allied to our enemies the French, and, in that regard, enemies to us. So that our danger lay both before and behind us; and the greater danger at our backs; where commonly we felt, always we feared, a stronger invasion by land than we could make upon France transporting our forces over sea.

It is usual with men that have pleased themselves in admiring the matters which they find in ancient histories, to hold it a great injury done to their judgment, if any take upon him, by way of comparison, to extol the things of later ages. But I am well persuaded, that as the divided virtue of this our island hath given more noble proof of itself, than under so worthy a leader that Roman army could do, which afterwards could win Rome, and all her empire, making Cæsar a monarch; so hereafter, by God's blessing, who hath converted our greatest hindrance into our greatest help, the enemy that shall dare try our forces, will find cause to wish that, avoiding us,

he had rather encountered as great puissance as was that of the Roman empire. But it is now high time that, laying aside comparisons, we return to the rehearsal of deeds done ; wherein we shall find how Rome began, after Pyrrhus had left Italy, to strive with Carthage for dominion, in the first Punic war.

SECT. II.

The estate of Carthage before it entered into war with Rome.

THE city of Carthage had stood above six hundred years, when first it began to contend with Rome for the mastery of Sicily. It forewent Rome one hundred and fifty years in antiquity of foundation ; but in the honour of great atchievements, it excelled far beyond this advantage of time. For Carthage had extended her dominion in Africa itself, from the west part of Cyrene, to the straits of Hercules, about fifteen hundred miles in length, wherein stood three hundred cities. It had subjected all Spain, even to the Pyrenean mountains, together with all the islands of the Mediterranean sea, to the west of Sicily, and of Sicily the better part. It flourished about seven hundred and thirty years before the destruction thereof by Scipio ; who, besides other spoils, and all that the soldiers reserved, carried thence four hundred and seventy thousand weight of silver, which make of our money (if our pounds differ not,) fourteen hundred and ten thousand pounds sterling. So as this glorious city ran the same fortune which many other great ones have done both before and since. The ruin of the goodliest pieces of the world foreshews the dissolution of the whole.

About one hundred years after such time as it was cast down, the senate of Rome caused it to be rebuilt ; and by Gracchus it was called Junonia. It was again and again abandoned and re-peopled, taken and re-taken ; by Gensericus the Vandal ; by

Belisarius, under Justinian; by the Persians; by the Egyptians, and by the Mahometans. It is now nothing. The seat thereof was exceeding strong, and, while the Carthaginians commanded the sea, invincible. For the sea compassed it about, saving that it was tied to the main by a neck of land; which passage had two miles and more of breadth, (Appian saith three miles and one furlong,) by which we may be induced to believe the common report, that the city itself was above twenty miles in compass; if not that of Strabo, affirming the circuit to have been twice as great.

It had three walls without the wall of the city, and between each of those three or four streets, with vaults under ground of thirty feet deep, in which they had place for three hundred elephants and all their food. Over these they had stables for four thousand horse, and granaries for all their provender. They had also lodgings in these streets between these out-walls for four thousand horsemen and twenty thousand footmen; which (according to the discipline used now by those of China) never pestered the city. It had, towards the south part, the castle of Byrsa, to which Servius gives twenty-two furlongs in compass, that make two miles and a half. This was the same piece of ground which Dido obtained of the Libyans, when she got leave to buy only so much land of them as she could compass with an ox-hide. On the west side it had also the salt sea, but in the nature of a standing pool; for a certain arm of land, fastened to the ground on which the city stood, stretched itself toward the west continent, and left but seventy feet open for the sea to enter. Over this standing sea was built a most sumptuous arsenal, having their ships and gallies riding under it.

The form of their commonwealth resembled that of Sparta; for they had titular kings, and the aristocratical power of senators. But (as Regius well observeth) the people in latter times usurped too

great authority in their councils. This confusion in government, together with the trust that they reposed in hired soldiers, were helping causes of their destruction in the end. Two other more forcible causes of their ruin, were their avarice and their cruelty. Their avarice was shewed, both in exacting from their vassals¹ (besides ordinary tributes,) the one-half of the fruits of the earth;² and in conferring of great offices, not upon gentle and merciful persons, but upon those who could best tyrannize over the people, to augment their treasures. Their cruelty appeared in putting them to death without mercy that had offended through ignorance. The one of these rendered them odious to their vassals, whom it made ready, upon all occasions, to revolt from them; the other did break the spirits of their generals, by presenting, in the heat of their actions abroad, the fear of a cruel death at home. Hereby it came to pass, that many good commanders of the Carthaginian forces, after some great loss received, have desperately cast themselves, with all that remained under their charge, into the throat of destruction; holding it necessary, either to repair their losses quickly, or to ruin all together; and few of them have dared to manage their own best projects after that good form wherein they first conceived

¹ In Pol. Arist. l. 2. c. 9.

² The Turks at this day do also take the one half of the poor man's corn that labours the earth; yea, they take tribute both of the bodies and of the souls of the Christians their vassals, by bereaving them of their ablest children, and bringing them up in the Mahometan religion. The Irish take the fourth sheaf, and were wont to eat up with their horsemen, footmen, and dogs, what they pleased of the other three parts remaining. The husbandman and the yeoman of England are the freest of all the world; and reason good; for of them have the bodies of our victorious armies been compounded. And it is the freeman, and not the slave, that hath courage, and the sense of shame deserved by cowardice. How free the English yeomen have been in times not long since past, Fortescue hath shewed in his praise of our country's laws. But I may say, that they are more free now than ever, and our nobility and gentry more servile; for since the excessive bravery, and vain expence of our grandees, hath taught them to raise their rents; since by inclosures, and dismembering of manors, the court-baron, and the court-leet, the principalities of the gentry of England have been dissolved; the tenants having paid unto their lords their rack-rent, owe them now no service at all, and (perchance) as little love.

them, for fear lest the manner of their proceeding should be misinterpreted ; it being the Carthaginian rule to crucify not only the unhappy captain, but even him whose bad counsel had prosperous event. The faults wherewith in general they of Carthage are taxed by Roman historians, I find to be these : lust, cruelty, avarice, craft, unfaithfulness, and perjury. Whether the Romans themselves were free from the same crimes, let the trial be referred unto their actions. The first league between Carthage and Rome was very ancient, having been made the year following the expulsion of Tarquin. In that league the Carthaginians had the superiority, as imposing upon the Romans the more strict conditions. For it was agreed, that the Romans should not so much as have trade in some part of Africa, nor suffer any ship of theirs to pass beyond the head-land, or cape, then called the Fair Promontory, unless it were by force of tempest ; whereas, on the other side, no haven in Italy was forbidden to the Carthaginians. A second league was made long after, which (howsoever it hath pleased Livy to say ³, that the Romans granted it at the Carthaginians intreaty) was more strict than the former ; prohibiting the Romans to have trade in any part of Africa, or in the island of Sardinia.

By these two treaties, it may appear, that the Carthaginians had an intent, not only to keep the Romans (as perhaps they did other people) from getting any knowledge of the state of Africa, but to countenance and uphold them in their troubling all Italy, whereby they themselves might have the better means to occupy all Sicily, whilst that island should be destitute of Italian succours. Hereupon we find good cause of the joy that was in Carthage, and of the crown of gold weighing twenty-five pounds, sent from thence to Rome, when the Samnites were overthrown. But the little state of Rome

³ Liv. Dec. 1. l. 7.

prevailed faster in Italy than the great power of Carthage did in Sicily : for that mighty army of three hundred thousand men, which Hannibal conducted out of Africa into Sicily, was consumed by pestilence⁴; many great fleets were devoured by tempests; and howsoever the Carthaginians prevailed at one time, the Sicilians, either by their own valour, or by assistance of their good friends out of Greece, did, at some other time, repair their own losses, and take revenge upon these invaders. But never were the people of Carthage in better hope of getting all Sicily, than when the death of Agathocles the tyrant had left the whole island in combustion; the estate of Greece being such at that time, that it seemed impossible for any succour to be sent from thence. But whilst the Carthaginians were busy in making their advantage of this good opportunity, Pyrrhus, invited by the Tarentines and their fellows, came into Italy, where he made sharp war upon the Romans. These news were unpleasing to the Carthaginians, who, being a subtle nation, easily foresaw, that the same busy disposition which had brought this prince out of Greece into Italy, would as easily transport him over into Sicily, as soon as he could finish his Roman war. To prevent this danger, they sent Mago ambassador to Rome, who declared in their name that they were sorry to hear what misadventure had befallen the Romans, their good friends, in this war with Pyrrhus; and that the people of Carthage were very willing to assist the state of Rome by sending an army into Italy, if their help were thought needful against the Epirots.

It was indeed the main desire of the Carthaginians to hold Pyrrhus so hardly to his work in Italy, that they might, at good leisure, pursue their business in Sicily, which caused them to make such a goodly offer. But the Romans were too high-minded; and refused to accept any such aid of their

1 Xenoph. Græc. Hist. l. 2.

friends, lest it should blemish their reputation, and make them seem unable to stand by their own strength. Yet the message was taken lovingly, as it ought; and the former league between Rome and Carthage renewed, with covenants added concerning the present business,—that if either of the two cities made peace with Pyrrhus, it should be with reservation of liberty to assist the other, in case that Pyrrhus should invade either of their dominions. All this notwithstanding, and notwithstanding that the same Mago went and treated with Pyrrhus, using all means to sound his intentions, (a matter very difficult, where one upon every new occasion changeth his own purposes,) yet Pyrrhus found leisure to make a step into Sicily; where, though in fine he was neither getter nor saver, yet he clean defeated the purposes of Carthage, leaving them, at his departure from thence, as far from any end as when they first began.

So many disasters in an enterprize, that, from the first undertaking, had been so strongly pursued through the length of many generations, might well have induced the Carthaginians to believe that an higher providence resisted their intendment. But their desire of winning that fruitful island was so inveterate, that, with unwearied patience, they still continued in hope of so much the greater harvest, by how much their cost and pains therein buried had been the more; wherefore they re-continued their former courses, and, by force or practice, recovered in a few years all their old possessions; making peace with Syracuse, the chief city of the island, that so they might the better enable themselves to deal with the rest.

Somewhat before this time, a troop of Campanian soldiers, that had served under Agathocles, being entertained within Messina as friends, and finding themselves too strong for the citizens, took advantage of the power that they had to do wrong, and,

with perfidious cruelty, slew those that trusted them; which done, they occupied the city, lands, goods, and wives of those whom they had murdered. These mercenaries called themselves Mamertines. Good soldiers they were; and like enough it is, that mere desperation of finding any that would approve their barbarous treachery, added rage unto their stoutness. Having therefore none other colour of their proceedings than the law of the stronger, they over-ran all the country round about them.

In this course at first they sped so well, that they did not only defend Messina against the cities of Sicily confederated, to wit, against the Syracusans and others, but they rather won upon them, yea, and upon the Carthaginians, exacting tribute from many neighbouring places. But it was not long ere fortune, turning her back to these Mamertines, the Syracusans won fast upon them; and, finally, confining them within the walls of Messina, they also, with a powerful army, besieged the city. It happened ill, that about the same time a contention began between the Syracusan soldiers, then lying at Megara, and the citizens of Syracuse, and governors of the commonwealth; which proceeded so far, that the army elected two governors among themselves; to wit, Artemidorus, and Hieron, that was afterwards king. Hieron being, for his years, excellently adorned with many virtues, although it was contrary to the policy of that state to approve any election made by the soldiers, yet, for the great clemency he used at his first entrance, was, by general consent, established and made governor. This office he rather used as a scale, thereby to climb to some higher degree, than rested content with his present preferment.

In brief, there was somewhat wanting whereby to strengthen himself within the city, and somewhat without it that gave impediment to his obtaining and safe keeping of the place he sought; to wit, a powerful party within the town, and certain muti-

nous troops of soldiers without, often and easily moved to sedition and tumult. For the first, whereby to strengthen himself, he took to wife the daughter of Leptines, a man of the greatest estimation and authority among the Syracusans. For the second, leading out the army to besiege Messina, he quartered all those companies which he had suspected on the one side of the city, and leading the rest of his horse and foot unto the other side, as if he would have assaulted it in two several parts, he marched away, under covert of the town-walls, and left the mutineers to be cut in pieces by the besieged. So returning home, and levying an army of his own citizens, well trained and obedient, he hasted again towards Messina, and was by the Mamertines (grown proud by their former victory over the mutineers) encountered in the plains of Myleum, where he obtained a most signal victory; and leading with him their commander captive into Syracuse, himself, by common consent, was elected and saluted king. Hereupon the Mamertines, finding themselves utterly enfeebled, some of them resolved to give themselves to the Carthaginians, others to crave assistance of the Romans; to each of whom the several factions dispatched ambassadors for the very same purpose.

The Carthaginians were soon ready to lay hold upon the good offer; so that a captain of theirs got into the castle of Messina, whereof they that had sent for him gave him possession. But, within a little while, they that were more inclinable to the Romans, had brought their companions to so good agreement, that this captain, either by force or by cunning, was turned out of doors, and the town reserved for other masters.

These news did much offend the people of Carthage, who crucified their captain, as both a traitor and coward; and sent a fleet and army to besiege Messina, as a town that rebelled, having once been

theirs. Hieron, the new-made king of Syracuse, (to gratify his people, incensed with the smart of injuries lately received,) added his forces to the Carthaginians, with whom he entered into league for exterminating the Mamertines out of Sicily. So the Mamertines, on all sides, were closed up within Messina; the Carthaginians lying with a navy at sea, and with an army on the one side of the town, whilst Hieron, with his Syracusans, lay before it on the other side.

In this their great danger came Appius Claudius, the Roman consul, with an army to the straits of Sicily; which passing by night, with notable audacity, he put himself into the town, and sending messengers to the Carthaginians and to Hieron, required them to depart; signifying unto them, that the Mamertines were now become confederates with the people of Rome, and that therefore he was come to give them protection, even by force of war, if reason would not prevail.

This message was utterly neglected, and so began the war between Rome and Carthage; wherein it will then be time to shew on which part was the justice of the quarrel, when some actions of the Romans, lately foregoing this, have been first considered.

SECT. III.

The beginning of the first Punic war. That it was unjustly undertaken by the Romans.

WHEN Pyrrhus began his wars in Italy, the city of Rhegium being well affected to Rome, and not only fearing to be taken by the Epirot, but much more distrusting the Carthaginians, as likely to seize upon it in that busy time, sought aid from the Romans, and obtained from them a legion, consisting of four thousand soldiers, under the conduct of Decius Campanus, a Roman præfect, by whom they

were defended and assured for the present. But after a while, this Roman garrison, considering at good leisure the fact of the Mamertines, committed in Messina, (a city in Sicily, situate almost opposite to Rhegium, and no otherwise divided than by a narrow sea, which severeth it from Italy,) and rather weighing the greatness of the booty, than the odiousness of the villainy by which it was gotten, resolved finally to make the like purchase, by taking the like wicked course. Confederating, therefore, themselves with the Mamertines, they entertained their hosts of Rhegium after the same manner, dividing the spoil, and all which that state had, among themselves.

When complaint was made to the senate and people of Rome of this outrage, they finding their honour thereby greatly stained, (for no nation in the world made a more severe profession of justice than they did, during all the time of their growing greatness,) resolved, after a while, to take revenge upon the offenders; and this they performed shortly after, when they had quenched the fires kindled in Italy by Pyrrhus. For, notwithstanding that those Romans in Rhegium, (as men, for the foulness of the fact, hopeless of pardon,) defended themselves with an absolute resolution, yet in the end the assailants forced them, and those which escaped the present fury, were brought bound to Rome; where, after the usual torments by whipping inflicted, according to the custom of the country, they had their heads stricken from their shoulders, and the people of Rhegium were again restored to their former liberties and estates.

This execution of justice being newly performed, and the fame thereof sounding honourably through all quarters of Italy, messengers came to Rome from Messina, desiring help against the Carthaginians and Syracusans, that were in a readiness to inflict the like punishment upon the Mamertines, for the like offence. A very impudent request it was which they

made, who, having both given example of that villainy to the Roman soldiers, and helped them with joint forces to make it good, entreat the judges to give them that assistance which they were wont to receive from their fellow thieves.

The Romans could not suddenly resolve whether the way of honesty or of profit were to be followed ; they evermore pretended the one, but they many times walked in the other. They considered how contrary the course of succouring the Mamertines was to their former counsels and actions, seeing for the same offences they had lately put to the torment and to the sword their own soldiers, and restored the oppressed to their liberty. Yet, when they beheld the description of the Carthaginian dominion, and that they were already lords of the best parts of Africa, of the Mediterranean islands, of a great part of Spain, and some part of Sicily itself, whilst also they feared that Syracuse, therein seated, (a city in beauty and riches little at that time inferior to Carthage, and far superior to Rome itself,) might become theirs; the safety of their own estate spake for these Mamertines, who, if they (driven to despair by the Romans) should deliver Messina, with those other holds that they had, into the hands of the Carthaginians, then would nothing stand between Carthage and the lordship of all Sicily : for Syracuse itself could not, for want of succour, any long time subsist, if once the Carthaginians, that were masters of the sea, did fasten upon that passage from the main land. It was further considered, that the opportunity of Messina was such as would not only debar all succours out of the continent from arrival in Sicily, but would serve as a bridge, whereby the Carthaginians might have entrance into Italy at their own pleasure.

These considerations of profit at hand, and of preventing dangers that threatened from afar, did so prevail above all regard of honesty, that the Mamer-

tines were admitted into confederacy with the Romans, and Ap. Claudius, the consul, presently dispatched away for Messina, into which he entered, and undertook the protection of it, as is shewed before. The besiegers were little troubled with his arrival, and less moved with his requiring them to desist from their attempt. For they did far exceed him in number of men: the whole island was ready to relieve them in their wants, and they were strong enough at sea to hinder any supply from getting into the town. All this Appius himself well understood, and against all this he thought the stiff metal of his Roman soldiers a sufficient remedy. Therefore he resolved to issue out into the field, and to let the enemies know, that his coming was to send them away from the town, not to be besieged by them within it.

In executing this determination, it was very beneficial to him, that the enemy lay encamped in such sort as one quarter was not well able to relieve another in distress. Hiero was now exposed to the same danger whereinto he had wilfully cast his own mutinous followers not long before; only he was strong enough, (or thought so,) to make good his own quarter without the help of others. Against him Appius Claudius issued forth, and, (not attempting by unexpected sally to surprise his trenches,) arranged his men in order of battle, wherewith he presented him. The Syracusan wanted not courage to fight, but surely he wanted good advice; else would he not have hazarded all his power against an enemy of whom he had made no trial, when it had been easy, and as much as was required, to defend his own camp. It may be, that he sought to get honour wherewith to adorn the beginning of his reign; but he was well beaten, and driven to save himself within his trenches, by which loss he learned a point of wisdom, that stood him and his kingdom in good stead all the days of his life. It was a foolish desire of re-

venge that had made the Syracusans so busy in helping those of Carthage against the Mamertines.

Had Messina been taken by the Carthaginians, Syracuse itself must have sought help from Rome, against those friends whom it now so diligently assisted. Hiero had (in respect of those two mighty cities) but a small stock, which it behoved him to govern well; such another loss would have made him almost bankrupt; therefore he quietly broke up his camp, and retired home, intending to let them stand to their adventures that had hope to be gainers by the bargain. The next day, Claudius perceiving the Sicilian army gone, did with great courage, and with much alacrity of his soldiers, give charge upon the Carthaginians; wherein he sped so well, that the enemy forsook both field and camp, leaving all the country open to the Romans; who, having spoiled all round without resistance, intended to lay siege unto the great city of Syracuse.

These prosperous beginnings, howsoever they animated the Romans, and filled them with hopes of attaining to greater matters than at first they had expected, yet did they not imprint any form of terror into the city of Carthage, that had well enough repaired greater losses than this; in which no more was lost than what had been prepared against the Mamertines alone, without any suspicion of war from Rome.

Now in this place I hold it seasonable to consider of those grounds whereupon the Romans entered into this war,—not how profitable they were, nor how agreeable to rules of honesty, (for questionless the enterprise was much to their benefit, though as much to their shame,) but how allowable in strict terms of lawfulness, whereupon they built all their allegations in maintenance thereof. That the Mamertines did yield themselves and all that they had into the Romans hands, (as the Campanes, distressed by the Samnites, had done,) I cannot find; neither can I

find how the messengers of those folks, whereof one part had already admitted the Carthaginians, could be enabled to make any such surrendry in the public name of all.

If therefore the Mamertines, by no lawful surrendry of themselves and their possessions, were become subject unto Rome, by what better title could the Romans assist the Mamertines against their most ancient friends, the Carthaginians, than they might have aided the Campanes against the Samnites, without the same condition? which was, (as they themselves confessed,) by none at all. But let it be supposed, that some point serving to clear this doubt is lost in all histories. Doubtless it is, that no company of pirates, thieves, outlaws, murtherers, or such other malefactors, can, by any good success of their villainy, obtain the privilege of civil societies, to make league or truce, yea, or to require fair war; but are, by all means, as most pernicious vermin, to be rooted out of the world. [I will not take upon me to maintain that opinion of some civilians, that a prince is not bound to hold his faith with one of these;—it were a position of ill consequence. This I hold, that no one prince or state can give protection to such as these, as long as any other is using the sword of vengeance against them, without becoming accessary to their crimes.] Wherefore we must esteem this action of the Romans, so far from being justifiable by any pretence of confederacy made with them, as that contrariwise, by admitting this nest of murtherers and thieves into their protection, they justly deserved to be warred upon themselves by the people of Sicily; yea, although Messina had been taken, and the Mamertines all slain, ere the news of this confederacy had been brought unto the besiegers. The great Alexander was so far persuaded herein, that he did put to the sword all the Branchiadæ, (a people in Sogdiana,) and razed their city, notwithstanding that they joyfully entertained him as their

king; because they were descended from a company of Milesians, who, to gratify king Xerxes, had robbed a temple, and were by him rewarded with the town and country which these of their posterity enjoyed. Nevertheless, in course of human justice, long and peaceable possession gives *jus acquisitum*, a kind of right by prescription, unto that which was at first obtained by wicked means, and doth free the descendants from the crime of their ancestors, whose villainies they do not exercise. But that the same generation of thieves, which, by a detestable fact, hath purchased a rich town, should be acknowledged a lawful company of citizens, there is no shew of right. For even the conqueror, that by open war obtaineth a kingdom, doth not confirm his title by those victories which gave him first possession, but length of time is requisite to establish him; unless by some alliance with the ancient inheritors, he can better the violence of his claim; as did our king Henry I. by his marriage with Maud, that was daughter of Malcolm, king of the Scots, by Margaret, the niece of Edmund Ironside. Wherefore I conclude, that the Romans had no better ground (if they had so good) or justice in this quarrel, than had the Goths, Huns, Vandals, and other nations, of the wars that they made upon the Roman empire, wherein Rome herself, in the time of her visitation, was burnt to the ground.

SECT. IV.

Of the island of Sicily.

- (1.) *The quality of the island, and the first inhabitants thereof.*

THE defence of the Mamertines, or the possession of Messina, being now no longer, since the first victories of Appius Claudius, the objects of the Roman

hopes; but the dominion of all Sicily being the prize for which Rome and Carthage are about to contend; it will be agreeable unto the order which, in the like cases, we have observed, to make a brief collection of things concerning that noble island, which hath been the stage of many great acts, performed as well before and after, as in this present war.

That Sicily was sometime a peninsula, or demi-isle adjoining to Italy, as a part of Brutium in Calabria near unto Rhegium, and afterwards by violence of tempests severed from the same, it is a general opinion of all antiquity; but at what certain time this division happened, there is no memorial remaining in any ancient writer. Strabo, Pliny¹, and Dionysius affirm, that it was caused by an earthquake; Silius² and Cassiodorus, do think it to have been done by the rage and violence of the tide and surges of the sea. Either of these opinions may be true; for so was Eubœa severed from Bœotia, Atalantus and Macris from Eubœa, Scilly here in England from the cape of Cornwall, and Britain itself, (as may seem by Verstegan's arguments,) from the opposite continent of Gaul. But for Sicily, they which lend their ears to fables, do attribute the cause of it to Neptune, (as Eustathius witnesseth,) who, with his three forked mace, in favour of Jocastus, the son of Æolus, divided it from the main land, and so made it an island, which before was but a demi-isle, that by that means he might the more safely inhabit and possess the same. Diodorus Siculus³, moved by the authority of Hesiodus, ascribeth the labour of sundering it from Italy to Orion; who, that he might be compared to Hercules, (cutting through the rocks and mountains,) first opened the Sicilian straits, as Hercules did those of Gibraltar.

They which value the islands of the midland sea according to their quantity and content, do make

1 Plin. l. ii. c. xci.
Ovid. de Fast. iv.

2 Sil. l. v.

3 Orion. l. iv. c. xiv. Diod. l. vi.

this the greatest ; as Eustathius and Strabo ; who affirm this, not only to excel the rest for bigness, but also for goodness of soil. As concerning the form of this island, Pomponius Mela saith, it is like that capital letter of the Greeks, which they call *Delta*, namely, that it hath the figure of a triangle, which is generally known to be true. That the whole island was consecrated to Ceres and Proserpina, all old writers with one consent affirm. To Ceres it was dedicated, because it first taught the rules of setting and sowing of corn ; to Proserpina, not so much for that she was from hence violently taken by Pluto, as because (which Plato and Diodorus do report for truth) that Pluto, as soon as she, uncovering herself, first shewed herself to be seen of him, gave her the dominion thereof.

Of the fertility and riches of this country, there is a famous testimony writ by Cicero, in his second oration against Verres, where he saith that Marcus Cato did call it ‘ the granary and storehouse of the ‘ commonwealth, and the nurse of the vulgar sort.’ The same Cicero doth add in that place, that it was not only the storehouse of the people of Rome, but also that it was accounted for a well furnished treasury. For without any cost or charge of ours, (saith he,) it hath usually cloathed, maintained, and furnished our greatest armies with leather, apparel, and corn. Strabo⁵ reporteth almost the same thing of it. Whatsoever Sicily doth yield, (saith Solinus,) whether by the sun and temperature of the air, or by the industry and labour of man, it is accounted next unto those things that are of best estimation ; were it not that such things as the earth first putteth forth are extremely overgrown with saffron. Diodorus Siculus saith, that in the fields near unto Leontium, and in divers other places of this island, wheat doth grow of itself, without any labour or looking to of the husbandman. Martianus sheweth, that there were

⁵ Strabo, l. vi.

in it sixty colonies, and sixty cities; there are that reckon more, whereof the names are found scatteringly in many good authors.

Now, besides many famous acts done by the people of this island, as well in peace as war, there be many other things which have made it very renowned; as the birth of Ceres, the ravishing of Proserpina, the giant Enceladus, the mount *Ætna*, *Scylla* and *Charybdis*, with other antiquities and rarities; besides those learned men, the noble mathematician *Archimedes*, the famous geometrician *Euclides*, the painful historian *Diodorus*, and *Empedocles* the deep philosopher.

That *Sicily* was at first possessed and inhabited by giants, *Læstrygones* and *Cyclopes*, barbarous people and uncivil, all histories and fables do jointly with one consent aver. Yet *Thucydides* saith, that these savage people dwelt only in one part of the island. Afterwards the *Sicani*, a people of *Spain*, possessed it. That these *Sicani* were not bred in the isle, (although some do so think,) *Thucydides* and *Diodorus* do constantly avouch.

Of these it was named *Sicania*. These *Sicani* were invaded by the *Siculi*; who, inhabiting that part of *Latium* whereon *Rome* was afterwards built, were driven by the *Pelasgi* from their own seats, and finding no place upon the continent which they were able to master and inhabit, passed over into this island three hundred years before the *Greeks* sent any colonies thither; and (saith *Philistus*) eighty years before the fall of *Troy*. These *Siculi* gave the name of *Sicilia* to the island, and making war upon the *Sicani*, drove them from the east and northern part thereof, into the west and south. At their landing they first built the city *Zancle*, afterwards called *Messina*; and after that *Catana*, *Leontium*, and *Syracuse* itself, beating from thence the *Ætolians*, who long before had set up a town in that place. As for the name of *Syracuse*, it was not known till such

time as Archias of Corinth (long after) won that part of the island from the Siculi ; neither did the Siculi, at their first arrival, dispossess the Ætolians thereof ; but some hundred years after their descent, and after such time as they had founded the cities before-named, with Neæ, Hybla, Trinacia, and divers others.

After these Siculi came another nation out of Italy, called Morgetes, who were thence driven by the Ænotrians. These sat down in that part of Sicily where they afterwards raised the cities of Morgantium and Leontium. For at this time the Siculi were divided, and by a civil war greatly enfeebled. Among these ancient stories, we find the last voyage and the death of Minos, king of Crete. Thucydides, an historian of unquestionable sincerity, reports of Minos, that he made conquest of many islands ; and some such business, perhaps, drew him into Sicily. But the common report is, that he came thither in pursuit of Dædalus. The tale goes thus : Dædalus, flying the revenge of Minos, came into Sicily to Cocalus, king of the Sicani ; and during his abode there, he built a place of great strength near unto Megara, for Cocalus to lay up his treasure in, together with many notable works, for which he was greatly admired and honoured.

Among the rest he cast a ram in gold, that was set up in the temple of Venus Erycina ; which he did with so great art, as those that beheld it thought it rather to be living than counterfeit.

Now Minos, hearing that Cocalus had entertained Dædalus, prepares to invade the territory of Cocalus ; but when he was arrived, Cocalus, doubting his own strength, promiseth to deliver Dædalus. This he performs not ; but in the meanwhile kills Minos by treason, and persuades the Cretans, Minos's followers, to inhabit a part of Sicily ; the better (as it seems) to strengthen himself against the Siculi. Hereunto the Cretans (their king being dead) gave

their consent, and built for themselves the city of Minoa, after the name of their king, Minos. After, they likewise built the town of Engium, now called Gange; and these were the first cities built by the Greeks in Sicily, about two ages before the war of Troy; for the grandchildren of Minos served with the Greeks at the siege thereof.

But, after such time as the Cretans understood that their king had by treason been made away, they gathered together a great army to invade Cocalus; and landing near unto Camicus, they besieged the same five years, but in vain. In the end (being forced to return without any revenge taken) they were wrecked on the coast of Italy; and having no means to repair their ships, nor the honour they had lost, they make good the place whereon they fell, and built Hyria, or Hyrium, between the two famous ports of Brundusium and Tarentum. Of these Cretans came those nations afterwards called Iapyges and Messapii.

After the taking of Troy, Egestus and Elymus brought with them certain troops into Sicily, and seated themselves among the Sicani, where they built the cities of Egesta and Elyma.

It is said that Æneas visited these places in his passage into Italy, and that some of the Trojans, his followers, were left behind him in these towns of Sicily; whereof there want not good authors that make Æneas himself the founder.

About the same time the Phœnicians seized upon the promontories of Pachinus and Lilybæum, and upon certain small isles adjoining to the main island, which they fortified, to secure the trades that they had with the Sicilians; like as the Portugals have done in the East Indies, at Goa, Ormus, Mosambique, and other places. But the Phœnicians staid not there; for, after they had once assured their descents, they built the goodly city of Panormus, now called Palermo.

These we find were the nations that inhabited the isle of Sicily before the war of Troy, and ere the Greeks, in any numbers, began to straggle in those parts.

It may perchance seem strange to the reader, that in all ancient story he finds one and the same beginning of nations after the flood; and that the first planters of all parts of the world were said to be mighty and giant-like men; and that as Phœnicia, Egypt, Libya, and Greece, had Hercules, Orestes, Antæus, Typhon, and the like; as Denmark had Starchaterus, remembered by Saxo Grammaticus¹; as Scythia, Britanny, and other regions, had giants for their first inhabitants; so this isle of Sicily had her Læstrygones and Cyclopes. This discourse I could also reject for feigned and fabulous, did not Moses make us know that the Zamzummim, Emim, Anakim, and Og of Bashan, and others, which sometime inhabited the mountains and deserts of Moab, Ammon, and mount Seir, were men of exceeding strength and stature, and of the races of giants; and were it not that Tertullian², St Augustine, Nicephorus, Procopius, Isidorus, Pliny, Diodorus, Herodotus, Solinus, Plutarch, and many other authors, have confirmed the opinion. Yea, Vesputius, in his second navigation into America, hath reported that himself hath seen the like men in those parts. Again, whereas the self-same is written of all nations that is written of any one; as, touching their simplicity of life, their mean fare, their feeding on acorns and roots, their poor cottages, the covering of their bodies with the skins of beasts, their hunting, their arms and weapons, and their warfare; their first passages over great rivers and arms of the sea upon rafts of trees tied together, and afterwards their making boats, first of twigs and leather, then of wood; first with

¹ Saxo G. in præfat. hist.

² Tertul. de Resurr. Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. xv. c. 9. Et quæst. in Gen. Niceph. l. ii. c. 87. Procop. l. ii. de Bello Goth. Plin. l. vii. c. 2.

oars, and then with sail ; that they esteemed as gods the first finders out of arts ; as of husbandry, of laws, and of policy ;—it is a matter that makes me neither to wonder at nor to doubt of it ; for they all lived in the same newness of time, which we call old time, and had all the same want of his instruction, which (after the Creator of all things) hath by degrees taught all mankind. For other teaching had they none, that were removed far off from the Hebrews, who inherited the knowledge of the first patriarchs, than that from variable effects they began by time and degrees to find out the causes ; from whence came philosophy natural, as the moral did from disorder and confusion, and the law from cruelty and oppression.

But it is certain, that the age of time hath brought forth stranger and more incredible things than the infancy ; for we have now greater giants for vice and injustice, than the world had in those days for bodily strength ; for cottages and houses of clay and timber, we have raised palaces of stone ; we carve them, we paint them, and adorn them with gold ; in-somuch, as men are rather known by their houses, than their houses by them ; we are fallen from two dishes to two hundred ; from water, to wine and drunkenness ; from the covering of our bodies with the skins of beasts, not only to silk and gold, but to the very skins of men. But, to conclude this digression, time will also take revenge of the excess which it hath brought forth : ‘ *Quam longa dies peperit, longiorque auxit, longissima subruet :*’ long time brought forth, longer time increased, and a time longer than the rest shall overthrow.

(2.) *The plantation of the Greeks in Sicily.*

WHEN the first inhabitants had contended long enough about the dominion of all Sicily, it happened that one Theocles, a Greek, being driven upon

that coast by an easterly wind, and finding true the commendations thereof which had been thought fabulous, being delivered only by poets, gave information to the Athenians of this his discovery, and proposed unto them the benefit of this easy conquest, offering to become their guide. But Theocles was as little regarded by the Athenians, as Columbus, in our grandfather's times, was by the English. Wherefore he took the same course that Columbus afterwards did. He over-laboured not himself in persuading the noble Athenians, (who thought themselves to be well enough already,) to their own profit, but went to the Chalcidians, that were needy and industrious, by whom his project was gladly entertained. By these was built the city of Naxus, and a colony planted of Eubœans.

But the rest of the Greeks were wiser than our western princes of Europe; for they had no pope that should forbid them to occupy the void places of the world. Archias of Corinth followed the Eubœans, and landed in Sicily, near unto that city called afterward Syracuse³; of which that part only was then encompassed with a wall, which the Ætolians called Homothermon, the Greeks Nasos, the Latins Insula. He, with his Corinthians, having overcome the Siculi, drove them up into the country; and, after a few years, their multitudes increasing, they

³ Syracuse, as Cicero relates, was the greatest and most goodly city of all that the Greeks possessed. For the situation is both strong and of an excellent prospect, from every entrance by land or sea. The port was (for the most part) environed with beautiful buildings; and that part which was without the city, was on both sides banked up, and sustained with beautiful walls of marble. The city itself was one of the greatest in the world: For it had in compass (as Strabo reporteth) without the treble wall thereof, 180 furlongs, which made of our miles about 18. It was compounded of four cities (Strabo saith of five) viz. Insula, Acradina, Tycha, and Neapolis; of which greatness the ruins and foundations of the walls do yet witness. After such times as the Doræ of Peloponnesus had driven out the Sicilians, this goodly city, for a long time became the seat of tyrants. The first whereof was Gelon; the second, Hiero the elder; the third, Thrasybulus; the fourth and fifth, Dionysius the elder and younger; the sixth, Dion; the seventh, Agathocles; the eighth, Pyrrhus; the ninth, Hiero the younger; the tenth and last, Hieronymus: who, being slain at Leontium, at length the Romans conquered it under the conduct of Marcellus.

added unto the city of the island that of Acradina, Tyche, and Neapolis. So, as well by the commodity of the double port, capable of as many ships as any haven of that part of Europe, as by the fertility of the soil, Syracuse grew up in great haste to be one of the godliest towns of the world. In short time the Greeks did possess the better part of all the sea-coast, forcing the Sicilians to withdraw themselves into the fast and mountainous parts of the island, making their royal residence in Trinacia.

Some seven years after the arrival of Archias, the Chalcidians, encouraged by the success of the Corinthians, did assail and obtain the city of Leontium, built and possessed by the Siculi. In brief, the Greeks won from the Siculi and their associates the cities of Catana and Hybla, which, in honour of the Megarians that forced it, they called Megara.

About five and forty years after Archias had taken Syracuse, Antiphemus and Entimus, the one from Rhodes, the other from Crete, brought an army into Sicily, and built Gela; whose citizens, one hundred and eight years after, did erect that magnificent and renowned city of Agrigentum, governed according to the laws of the Dorians.

The Syracusans also, in the seventieth year after their plantation, did set up the city of Acra, in the mountains; and in the ninetieth year, Casmena, in the plains adjoining; and again, in the hundred and thirtieth year of their dwelling in Syracuse, they built Camerina; and soon after that, Enna, in the very centre of the island. So did the Cumani, about the same time, recover from the Siculi the city of Zancle, which they had founded in the strait between Sicily and Italy. They of Zancle had been the founders of Himera.

Not long after this, Doriæus the Lacedæmonian built Heraclia; which the Phœnicians and Carthaginians, fearing the neighbourhood of the Spartans,

soon after invaded and ruined ; though the same were again ere long re-edified.

Selinus also was built by a colony of Megara, and Zancle was taken by the Messenians ; who, having lost their own country, gave the name thereof unto this their new purchase. Such were the beginnings of the greatest cities in this island.

(3.) *Of the government and affairs of Sicily before Dionysius's tyranny.*

THE most part of the cities in Sicily were governed by the rule of the people, till such time as Phalaris began to usurp the state of Agrigentum, and to exercise all manner of tyranny therein.

This was that Phalaris, to whom Perillus, the cunning artificer of a detestable engine, gave an hollow bull of brass, wherein to inclose men, and scorch them to death ; praising the device with this commendation, that the noise of one tormented therein should be like the bellowing of a bull. The tyrant gave a due reward to the inventor, by causing the first trial to be made upon himself. He reigned one and thirty years, saith Eusebius ; others give him but sixteen. Howsoever it were, one Telemachus, in the end, fell upon him with the whole multitude of Agrigentum, and stoned him to death ; being thereto animated by Zeno, even whilst the tyrant was tormenting the same Zeno to make him confess some matter of conspiracy.

After the death of Phalaris, the citizens recovered their liberty and enjoyed it long, till Thero usurped the government of the commonwealth. At which time also, Panetius made himself lord of Leontium, and Cleander of Gela ; but Cleander, having ruled seven years, was slain by one of the citizens. Cleander being dead, his brother Hippocrates succeeded in his room, and greatly afflicted the people of Naxos, of Zancle or Messina, and of Leontium ; whom, with divers others of the ancient inhabitants, he

forced to acknowledge him their lord. He also made war with the Syracusans ; and in the end got from them, by composition, the city of Camerina. But when he had reigned seven years, he was slain in a battle against the Siculi, before Hybla.

At this time did the Syracusans change their form of government, from popular to aristocratical ; a preparation towards a principality, whereinto it was soon after changed. After the death of Hippocrates, Gelon (descended from the Rhodians, which, together with the Cretans, had long before, among other of the Greeks, seated themselves in Sicily,) that had commanded the forces of Hippocrates in the former war, with notable success, became lord of Gela. He, after his master's death, breaking the trust committed unto him by Hippocrates over his children, and being in possession of Gela, took the occasion and advantage of a contention in Syracuse, between the magistrates and the people. For coming with a strong army to the succour of the governors, driven out by the multitude, they elected him their prince ; being the first, and (indeed) the most famous that ever governed the Syracusans. This change happened the second year of the threescore and twelfth Olympiad¹, wherein the better to establish himself, he took to wife the daughter of Thero, who had also usurped the estate of Agrigentum.

Now this Gelon, the son of Dinomenes, had three brethren, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus ; to the first of which he gave up the city of Gela, when he had obtained the principality of Syracuse. For, after that time, all his thoughts travelled in the strengthening, beautifying, and amplifying of Syracuse. He defaced Camerina, that a little before was fallen from the obedience of the Syracusans who built it, and brought the citizens to Syracuse. The Megarians, that had moved a war against him, he overcame ; the richer sort he brought to Syracuse, and the people

he sold for slaves. In like manner dealt he with other places upon the like occasion. Not long after this, Thero, a prince of the Agrigentines, having dispossessed Terillus of his city Himera, the Carthaginians were drawn into the quarrel by Anaxilus, lord of Messina, father-in-law to Terillus; and Gelon also was solicited by his father-in-law, Thero. Gelon was content; and, in fine, after divers conflicts, the Carthaginians, and other Africans, led by Hamilcar, were overthrown by Gelon²; and an hundred and fifty thousand of them left their bodies in Sicily.

This Gelon it was to whom the Athenians and Lacedæmonians sent for succour, when Xerxes with his huge army passed the Hellespont. He, for their relief, having armed thirty thousand soldiers, and two hundred ships, refused nevertheless to send them into Greece, because they refused him the commandment of one of their armies, either by sea or by land. So he used to their ambassadors only this saying, ‘That their spring was withered;’ accounting the army by him prepared to be the very flower of the Greek nation.

The Carthaginians, after this great loss received, fearing the invasion of their own country, sent to Gelon by their ambassadors to desire peace, who grants it them on these conditions: That from thenceforth they should not sacrifice their children to Saturn; That they should pay him two thousand talents of silver, and present him with two armed ships, in sign of amity. These conditions the Carthaginians not only willingly accepted, but with two thousand talents, and the ships for war, they sent unto Demarata, Gelon’s wife, a crown, valued at an hundred talents of gold, with other presents. Whereby we see that some nations and some natures are much the better for being well beaten. The wars ended, and Sicily in peace, Gelon beautified the temples of the gods, and erected others in honour of

² Herod. & Diod.

them. So being exceedingly beloved and honoured of his subjects, he left the world, and left for his successor his brother Hiero. Philistus and Pliny report, that when his body was burnt, according to the custom of that age, a dog of his, which always waited on him, ran into the fire, and suffered himself to be burnt with him.

To Gelon, Hiero his brother succeeded; a man rude, cruel, covetous, and so suspicious of his brethren, Polyzelus and Thrasybulus, as he sought by all means to destroy them. Notwithstanding all this, by the conversation which he had with Simonides, he became of better condition, and greatly delighted with the study of good arts. Divers quarrels he had, as well with Theron of Agrigentum, as with other cities; all which he shortly after compounded, and gave a notable overthrow to the Carthaginians, whom Xerxes had incited to invade Sicily, fearing the succours which Gelon had prepared to aid the Grecians against him. He also overthrew in battle Thrasydæus the son of Theron, and thereby restored the Agrigentines to their former liberty. But in the end he lost the love of the Syracusans; and after he had reigned eleven years, he left the kingdom to his brother Thrasybulus, who became a most unjust and bloody tyrant. Thrasybulus enjoyed his principality no longer than ten months. For notwithstanding the force of mercenary soldiers, which he entertained for his guards, he was beaten out of Syracuse by the citizens, to whom, being besieged in Acradina, he restored the government, and was banished the island. From thence he sailed into Greece, where he died a private man among the Locrians.

And now had the Syracusans recovered again their former liberty, as all the rest of the cities did, after which they had never sought had the successors of Gelon inherited his virtue, as they did the principality of Syracuse. For in all changes of estates, the preservation ought to answer the acquisi-

tion. Where a liberal, valiant, and advised prince hath obtained any new seigniory, and added it to that of his own, or exalted himself from being a private man to the dignity of a prince, it behoveth the successor to maintain it by the same way and art by which it was gotten.

To conclude, Syracuse (though not without blows, ere she could cleanse herself of the creatures and lovers of Gelon,) was now again become mistress of herself, and held herself free well near threescore years, to the time of Dionysius; though she were, in the meanwhile, greatly endangered by a citizen of her own, called Tindario.

Now, to prevent the greatness of any one among them for the future, they devised a kind of banishment of such among them as were suspected, taking pattern from the Athenian *Ostracism*. They called this their new-devised judgment of exile *Petalismus*, wherein every one wrote upon an olive leaf (as at Athens they wrote upon shells) the name of him whom he would have expelled the city. He that had most suffrages against him was banished for five years. Hereby in a short time it came to pass, that those of judgment, and best able to govern the commonwealth, were, by the worst able, either suppressed or thrust out of the city. Yea, such as feared this law, though they had not yet felt it, withdrew themselves as secretly as they could, seeking some place of more security, wherein to maintain themselves. And good reason they had so to do, seeing there is nothing so terrible in any state, as a powerful and authorised ignorance. But this law lasted not long. For their necessity taught them to abolish it, and restore again the wiser sort to the government; from which the nobility, having practised to banish one another, the state became altogether popular. But, after a while, being invaded by Ducetius, king of the Sicilians, that inhabited the inner part of the island, (who had already taken Enna, and some other of the

Grecian cities, and overthrown the army of the Agrigentines,) the Syracusans sent forces against him, commanded by an unworthy citizen of theirs, called Bolcon. This their captain made nothing so much haste to find Ducetius, against whom he was employed, as he did to fly from the army he led, as soon as Ducetius presented him battle. So, for want of conduct, the greatest number of the Syracusans perished.

But making better choice among those whom they had banished, they levy other troops; by whom, in conclusion, Ducetius being beaten, submitteth himself, and is constrained to leave the island for a time. Yet it was not long ere he returned again, and built the city Collatina on the sea-side.

Ducetius being dead, all the Greek cities did in a sort acknowledge Syracuse, Trinacia excepted; which also, by force of arms, in the fourscore and fifth Olympiad, they brought to reason.

But they do not long enjoy this their superintendency. For the citizens of Leontium, being oppressed by them, seek aid from the Athenians, about the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war. In this suit they prevailed by the eloquence of Gorgias their orator, and got an hundred Athenian gallies to succour them, under the leading of Laches and Charades. To this fleet the Leontines and their partners added one hundred more; with which forces, and with some supplies brought by Sophocles, Pythodorus, Eurymedon, and other Athenian captains, they invaded the territories of the Syracusans, and their partizans; won and lost divers places, took Messina, and in the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war lost it again. They also, at the same time, attempted Himera, but in vain. The fire of this quarrel took hold upon many cities, which invaded each other's territory with great violence. But when they had wearied themselves on all hands, and yet could see no issue of the war, the Leontines, without the ad-

vice of the Athenians, came to an accord with the Syracusans, and were admitted into their society with equal freedom. So the Athenians, who hoped to have greatened themselves in Sicily by the division and civil war, were disappointed of their expectation by the good agreement of the Sicilians, and fain to be gone with the broken remainder of their fleet. This they knew not how to amend, but (according to the custom of popular estates,) by taking revenge upon their own commanders. So they banished Pythadorus and Sophocles, and laid a heavy fine upon Eurymedon. Shortly after this followed the most memorable war that ever was made by the Greeks in Sicily, which was that of the Athenians against the Selinuntines and Syracusans, in favour of the cities of Egesta, Leontium, and Catana. They of Selinus had oppressed the Egestans, and they of Syracuse the Leontines and the Catanians, which was the ground of the war. For the Athenians undertook the protection of their old friends; and, in hatred of the Athenians, aid from Lacedæmon was sent to the Syracusans. The Lacedæmonians dealt plainly, having none other end than that which they pretended, namely, to help a people of their own tribe that craved their succour, being in distress. The Athenians scarce knew what to pretend, for their preparations were so great as discovered their intent to be none other than the conquest of the whole island; yet they which had called them in were so blinded with their own passions, that they would not believe their own eyes, which presented unto them a fleet and army far greater than the terrible report of fame had made it.

In this expedition the city of Athens had engaged all her power, as regarding not only the greatness of the enterprize, but the necessity of finishing it in a short space of time. For the Lacedæmonians (as hath already been shewed in due place) stood at that

time in such broken terms of peace with Athens, as differed not much from open war. Wherefore it was thought necessary either to spare no cost in this great expedition, or altogether to forbear it, which was likely to be hindered by wars at home, if their proceedings were slack abroad. And surely, had not the desire of the Athenians been over-passionate, the arguments of Nicias had caused them to abstain from so chargeable a business, and to reserve their forces for a more needful use. But young counsels prevailed against the authority of ancient men, that were more regardful of safety than of honour.

Of this business mention hath been already made, in that which we have written of the Peloponnesian war. But what was there delivered in general terms, as not concerning the affairs of Greece otherwise than by consequence, doth in this place require a more perfect relation, as a matter wherein the whole state of Sicily was like to have felt a great conversion.

Though Alcibiades had prevailed against Nicias, in exhorting the people to this great voyage, yet Nicias, together with Alcibiades and Lamachus, was appointed to be one of the chief commanders therein.

These had commission and direction, as well to succour the Segestans, and to re-establish the Leontines, cast out of their places by the Syracusans, as also by force of arms to subject the Syracusans, and all their adherents in Sicily, and compel them by tribute to acknowledge the Athenians for their supreme lords. To effect which, the fore-named captains were sent off with an hundred and thirty gallies, and five thousand one hundred soldiers, besides the thirty ships of burden which transported their victuals, engines, and other munitions for the war; and these were Athenians, Mantineans, Rhodians, and Candi-ans: there were, besides these, six thousand Megarians light-armed, with thirty horsemen³,

³ Thucyd. l. 6. c. ix.

With these troops and fleets they arrive at Rhegium, where the Rhegians refuse to give them entry, but sell them victuals for their money. From thence they sent to the Egestans, to know what treasure they would contribute towards the war, seeing, for their sakes, they had entered thereinto. But they found, by their answers, that these Egestans were poor, and that they had abused the Athenian ambassadors with false shews of gold, having in all but thirty talents. The Athenians further were discouraged, when they found that the Rhegians, their ancient friends, and allied unto the Leontines, refused to trust them within their walls. Hereupon Nicias adviseth to depart towards the Selinuntines, and to force them, or persuade them to an agreement with the Egestans; as likewise to see what disbursements the Egestans could make, and so return again into Greece, and not to waste Athens in a needless war. Alcibiades, on the other side, would solicit the cities of Sicily to confederacy against the Syracusans and Selinuntines, whereby to force them unto restitution of all that they had taken from the Leontines. Lamachus, he persuades them to assail Syracuse itself, before it were prepared against them. But, in the end, (being excluded out of divers cities,) they surprise Catana; and there they take new counsel how to proceed. Thence they employed Nicias to those of Egesta, who received from them thirty talents towards his charges, and one hundred and twenty talents more there were of the spoils they had gotten in the island. Thus, the summer being spent in idle consultations and vain attempts, the Athenians prepare to assail Syracuse. But Alcibiades, having been accused at home in his absence, was sent for back by the Athenians, to make his answer, and the army was left to the conduct of Nicias and Lamachus. These commanders obtain a landing-place very near unto Syracuse, by this device.

They employ to Syracuse an inhabitant of Catana,

whom they trust, and instruct him to promise unto the Syracusans that he would deliver into their hands all the Athenians within Catana. Hereupon the Syracusans draw thitherward with their best forces. But, in the meanwhile, the Athenians setting sail from Catana, arrive at Syracuse, where they land at fair ease, and fortify themselves against the town. Shortly after this they fight, and the Syracusans had the loss; but the Athenians wanting horse, could not pursue their victory to any great effect. They then retire themselves, with a resolution to refresh their army at Catana for the winter season. From thence they made an attempt upon Messina, hoping to have taken it by an intelligence, but in vain; for Alcibiades had discovered such as were traitors within the city to the Messinians. This he now did, in despite of his own citizens the Athenians, because they had recalled him from his command, with a purpose either to have him put to death, or to have banished him; whereof being assured by his friends, he took his way towards the Lacedæmonians, and to them he gave mischievous counsel against his country. While this winter yet lasted, the Syracusans sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon and Corinth for aid; as likewise the Athenian captains in Sicily send to Athens for supplies; which both the one and the other obtained.

In the spring following, (which was the beginning of the eighteenth year of the Peloponnesian war,) the Athenians in Sicily sail from the port of Catana to Megara, forsaken of the inhabitants; from whence foraging the country, they obtain some small victories over the straggling Syracusans; and, at their return to Catana, they receive a supply of two hundred men at arms, but without horse, which they hoped to furnish in the island, from the Segestans and other their adherents: they were also strengthened with a company of archers, and with three hundred talents in money.

Hereupon they take courage, and encamp near Syracuse, upon the banks of the great port, repelling the Syracusans that sallied to impeach their intrenchments. They also received from their confederates four hundred horsemen, with two hundred other horse, to mount their men at arms. Syracuse was now in effect blocked up, so as hardly any succours could enter but such as were able to force their passage; yet the Athenians receive divers losses, among which it was not the least, that Lamachus, one of their best commanders, was slain.

In the meanwhile, Gylippus and Python, with the Lacedæmonian and Corinthian forces, arrive, and take land at Himera. The citizens of Himera and of Gela, together with the Selinuntines, join with them; so that with these, and his own troops, Gylippus ventured to march over-land towards Syracuse. The Syracusans send a part of their forces to meet him and conduct him. The Athenians prepare to encounter them, expecting his arrival near unto the city, upon a place of advantage. At the first encounter they had the better of their enemies, by reason that the Syracusan horsemen could not come to fight in those straits; but, soon after, Gylippus charging them again, brake them, and constrained Nicias to fortify himself within his camp. Whereupon Nicias made the state of his affairs known by his letters to the Athenians; shewing, that without great supplies by sea and land, the enterprise would be lost, together with the small army remaining. These letters received, the Athenians appoint two other generals, Eurymedon and Demosthenes, to join with Nicias; the one they dispatch presently with some supply, the other they send after him in the spring following.

In the meanwhile, Gylippus, at Syracuse, fights with the Athenians both by sea and land; sometimes with ill, sometimes with good success; but, in conclusion, he took from them their fort near unto Sy-

racuse, at the promontory called Plymmyrium, wherein the Athenians lost their treasure, and a great part of all their provisions. Notwithstanding which loss, and that the Athenians themselves in Greece were (in effect) besieged within Athens by the Lacedæmonians; yet were they most obstinate in prosecuting the war in Sicily, and dispatched away Demosthenes with new succours. Demosthenes, in his way towards Sicily, encountered with Polyanthes, the Corinthian, with his fleet, both the captains being bound for Sicily; the one to succour Nicias, the other Gylippus. The loss between them was in effect equal; and neither so broken, but that each of them prosecuted the enterprize they had in hand. But, before the succours arrive to either, Gylippus and Ariston had assailed the Athenians in the great port of Syracuse, and in a sea-fight put them to the worst, to the great discouragement of the Athenians. On the neck of this, Demosthenes arrived with seventy-three gallies, charged with footmen; and (blaming the sloth of Nicias) he invaded the Syracusans the same day that he arrived. But he made more haste than he had good speed, being shamefully beaten and repulsed with great loss. Hereupon Demosthenes and Eurymedon determine to rise up from before Syracuse, and return to the succour of Athens; but Nicias disputed to the contrary, pretending that he had good intelligence within Syracuse, whereby he learned that the town could not long hold out.

Whatsoever Nicias's intelligence was, upon the arrival of a new supply into the town, the Athenians had all consented to depart, and to lodge at Catana, had not an eclipse of the moon, boding, (as was thought,) ill success, caused them to defer their departure. But this superstition cost them dear; for the Syracusans, Lacedæmonians, and Corinthians, with seventy-seven sail of gallies, entered the great port of Syracuse, wherein the Athenians kept their fleet, and whereon they had fortified themselves. The Athe-

nians, in the same port, encountered them with eighty-six gallies, commanded by Eurymedon, in which the Athenian fleet was beaten by the lesser number, and Eurymedon slain. Now, though it were so that the Syracusans received the more loss by land, (for the fight was general,) yet when the Athenians were beaten by sea, in which kind they thought themselves invincible, they were wonderfully cast down. For it was well said of Gylippus to the Syracusans : ‘ When any people do find themselves vanquished in that manner of fight, and with those weapons in which they persuade themselves they exceed all others, they not only lose their reputation, but their courage.’ The Athenians, besides the gallies sunk and wrecked, had seventeen taken and possessed by the enemy ; and, with great labour and loss, they defended the rest from being fired, having drawn them within a pallisado, in one corner of the port, unadvisedly ; for it is as contrary to a sea-war, to thrust ships into a strait room and corner, as it is to scatter foot in a plain field against horse ; the one subsisting by being at large, the other by close embattling.

The Syracusans having now weakened the Athenian fleet, resolve to imprison them within the port. And to that purpose they range all their gallies in the mouth of the haven, being about a mile over, and there they came to anchor, filling the out-let with all manner of vessels, which they man most strongly, because the Athenians, being now made desperate, should not with double ranks of gallies break through the Syracusian fleet, which lay but single, because they were forced to range themselves over all the out-let of the port. They therefore not only moored themselves strongly by their anchors, but chained the sides of their gallies together, and laid behind them again certain ships, which served in the former war for victuallers ; to the end, that if any of their gallies were sunk, or the chain which joined them to

their fellows broken, the Athenians might yet find themselves a second time entangled and arrested. To disorder also those Athenian gallies which came on in form of a wedge, to break through and force a passage, the Syracusans had left within these gallies and ships inchained together a certain number of loose ones, to stop their course and fury ; for where the way of any vessel using oar or sails is broken, and their speed fore-slowed, they cannot force with any weight and violence the resistance opposing. .

On the other side, the Athenians knew that they were utterly lost, except, with an invincible resolution, they could make their way, and break down this great bridge of boats ; or, at least, force a passage through them in some part or other ; which they resolve to hazard with all their shipping, to the number of one hundred and ten of all sorts, and with all the strength of their land-army, in them embarked. But the gallies which were within the bridge of boats, did so disorder the Athenian fleet, ere they came to force the bridge, as, albeit, some few of them had broken through the chains ; yet being stopped by the ships without, and assailed by other loose gallies of the Syracusans, which were purposely left at large in the sea, they were either taken or sunk. Three great disadvantages the Athenians had : the first, that fighting within a haven, and, as it were, in a strait, they had no room to turn themselves, nor to free themselves one from another, being entangled ; the second, that having over-pestered their gallies with soldiers, who used offensive arms of darts and slings, they had not place upon the decks to stretch their arms ; the third was, the uncomfortable end for which they fought, namely, to force a passage, by which they might save themselves by running away. To be short, the fight was no less terrible than the confusion, the slaughter great on all sides, and the noise and the cries so loud and lamentable, as

that no directions could be heard. But in the end, the Athenians, as many as survived, were beaten back to the land, with the loss of sixty of their gallies, broken, sunk, or abandoned. The Syracusans did also lose twenty of theirs, with Python, the commander of the Corinthians. The rest of the Athenian gallies running themselves into the bottom of the port, saved themselves by the help and countenance of the land-army there fortified. In this desperate estate the Athenian commanders go to counsel. Demosthenes persuades them to furnish with fresh soldiers those few gallies which remained; and, while the Syracusans were triumphing, and made secure by their present victory, to set upon them, and forcing their way out of the port, to return to Athens. This was no ill counsel; for, as we have heard of many great captains, (yea, the greatest number of all that have been victorious,) that have neglected the speedy prosecution of a beaten enemy; so might we produce many examples of those, who, having slept securely in the bosom of good success, have been suddenly awakened by the rallied companies of a broken army, and have thereby lost again all the honour and advantage formerly gotten. But Nicias opposeth the advice of Demosthenes; others say that the seamen were against it. Whereupon abandoning their gallies, they all resolve to march over-land to the cities of their confederates, till some more favourable fortune should call them thence. On the other side, Gylippus, and other the Lacedæmonian and Corinthian captains, with Hermocrates, exhort the Syracusans to put themselves presently into the field, and to stop all the passages leading to those cities of their enemies, to which the Athenians might make their retreat. But many were weary, and many were wounded, and many of them thought that they had done enough for the present. Which humour in some of our commanders at Cadiz, lost us both the Indian fleet, and the spoils of many other

neighbouring places. Hermocrates, the Syracusan, finding it a lost labour to persuade his countrymen to any hasty prosecution, devised this good stratagem, thereby to gain time; not doubting but that, after a day or two, he should draw them willingly out. He sent two or three horsemen out of Syracuse by night, willing them to find Nicias, and, (after they had assured him that they were of the Athenians faction,) to give him advice not to march away overhastily from the place wherein he was fortified, alleging, that the Syracusans had lodged their army, which could not long stay there upon the passages and places of advantage, leading towards the cities of their allies. These tidings Nicias easily believed, and put off his journey to the third day; for men newly beaten, are (for the most part) more fearful than wise, and to them every thistle in the field appears, by night, a man at arms.

The third day, (leaving all their gallies and all their baggage,) they remove; being pierced and pursued with the lamentable outcries of those that were sick and hurt, whom they abandon to the cure of their enemies swords. The rest march away, to the number of forty thousand, and make their first passage by force over the river of Anapus, notwithstanding the opposition of their enemies. But being every day charged in their marches, and by the Syracusan horsemen beaten in from foraging and provision of food, they grow weak and heartless. The Syracusans also possess the mountain Lepas, by which they were to pass towards Camerina, and thereby force them to fall back again towards the sea-coast, and to take what way they could, being unable to proceed in their journey intended. Many hard shifts they made in difficult passages, and blind marches by night, which they were fain to endure, as having none other means to escape from the enemy that pursued them, and held them waking with continual skirmishing. To keep all in order, Nicias undertook

the leading of the vanguard, and Demosthenes conducted the rear. At the river Erinæus, Nicias takes the start of a whole night's march, leaving Demosthenes to make the retreat, who being encompassed, and overpressed with numbers, surrenders himself. The conditions he obtained were far better than he could have hoped for; and the faith of his enemies far worse than he suspected, for he was afterwards, with Nicias, murdered in prison. The army of Demosthenes being dissolved, they pursue Nicias with the greater courage, who being utterly broken upon the passage of the river Assinarus, surrendered himself to Gylippus upon honest conditions. Gylippus sought to preserve him, and to have had the honour to have brought these two to Sparta; Nicias, as a noble enemy to the Lacedæmonians, and who, at the overthrow which they received at Pylus by the Athenians, had saved the lives of the vanquished; Demosthenes, as one that had done to Lacedæmon the greatest hurt. Hermocrates also, the commander of the Syracusan army, dissuaded the rest, by all the art he had, from using any barbarous violence after so noble a victory. But the cruel and cowardly sort, (cowardice and cruelty being inseparable passions,) prevailed, and caused these brave captains to be miserably murdered; one part of their soldiers to be starved in loathsome prisons, and the rest sold for slaves. This was the success of the Sicilian war, which took end at the river Assinarus, the twenty-second day of May, in the ninety-first Olympiad.

The Athenians being beaten out of Sicily, the Egestans, (for whose defence against the Selinuntines, this late war had been taken in hand,) fearing the victorious Syracusans, sought help from the Carthaginians, to whom they offered themselves and their city as their vassals. The Carthaginians, though ambitious enough of enlarging their dominion in Sicily, yet considering the prosperity of the Syracusans, and

their late victories over the Athenians, they staid a while to dispute of the matter, whether they should refuse or accept the offer made unto them; for the Selinuntines were straitly allied to the Syracusans, as may appear by what is past. In the end, the senators of Carthage resolve upon the enterprize; and, (by a trick of their Punic wit,) to separate the Syracusans from the Selinuntines, they sent ambassadors to Syracuse, praying that city, as in the behalf of the Egestans, to compel the Selinuntines to take reason, and to rest content with so much of the lands in question, as they of Syracuse should think meet to allow them. The Syracusans approved the motion, for it tended to their own honour. But the Selinuntines would make no such appointment: rather they took it ill, that the Syracusans, with whom they had run one course of fortune in the Athenian war, should offer to trouble them by interposing as arbitrators, in a business that themselves could end by force. This was right as the Carthaginians would have it. For now could they of Selinus with an ill grace crave aid of Syracuse, and the Syracusans as ill grant it unto those that had refused to stand to the arbitrement, which the Carthaginians would have put into their hands. Hereupon an army of three hundred thousand men is set out from Carthage, under the conduct of Hannibal, nephew to that Hamilcar, who, (as you have heard before,) was overthrown with the Carthaginian army at Himera by Gelon. Hannibal was exceeding greedy of this employment, that he might take revenge as well of his uncle's as of his father's death, the one of them having been slain by the Himerans, the other by those of Selinus. Both these cities Hannibal, in this war, won by force of arms, sacked them and burnt them; and having taken three thousand of the Himerans prisoners, he caused them to be led unto the place where Hamilcar was slain, and buried them there.

After this followed some trouble at Syracuse, occasioned by the banishment of Hermocrates, who had lately been general of the Syracusan forces against the Athenians. The malice of his enemies had so far prevailed with the ungrateful multitude, that he was condemned to exile for his mere virtue, at such time as he was aiding the Lacedæmonians in their war against Athens, wherein he did great service. All the honester sort within Syracuse were sorry for the injury done unto him, and sought to have him repealed. Hermocrates himself returning into Sicily, gathered an army of six thousand, with which he began to repair Selinus, and by many noble actions laboured to win the love of his citizens; but the faction that opposed him was the stronger. Wherefore he was advised to seize upon a gate of Syracuse, with some strength of men, whereby his friends within the town might have the better means to rise against the adverse party. This he did; but presently the multitude fell to arms, and set upon him, in which conflict he was slain. But his son-in-law, Dionysius, shall make them wish Hermocrates alive again.

END OF VOLUME FOURTH.





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